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Abstract 
This thesis seeks to contribute to knowledge on Peru’s internal armed conflict (1980-
2000), in which the insurgent group Shining Path attempted to destroy and replace the 
existing Peruvian state, by analysing the key themes of violence, culture and memory 
through the lens of space. By deploying this spatial analysis, the thesis demonstrates 
that insurgent and state violence were shaped by the politics and production of space, 
that cultural responses to the conflict have articulated spatialised understandings of 
violence and the Peruvian nation, and that commemorative sites exist within a broader 
geography of memory (or commemorative “city-text”) which can support or challenge 
memory narratives in unintended ways. 
Whereas previous literature on the Peruvian conflict, by Carlos Iván Degregori, 
Nelson Manrique and Peru’s Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, has emphasised 
the fundamentalist nature of Shining Path’s Maoist ideology, this thesis highlights the 
ways in which party militants interpreted this ideology in their own way and adapted it 
to local realities. I also argue that counterinsurgent violence was premised upon a 
spatialised understanding of Peruvian society which conflated indigeneity with Leftist 
radicalism. Using a broadly Foucauldian framework, I argue that the state created 
spaces of exception in order to eliminate political and biopolitical enemies. 
In approaching cultural responses to the conflict, I use the work of Butler on 
grievability to argue that the perceived non-grievability of insurgents and indigenous 
communities has been produced by the vast (and to some extent imagined) cultural 
distances which exist between Peru’s disparate communities. I also tie these issues of 
grievability to post-conflict memory practice, arguing that commemorative sites have 
not only been shaped by spatialised understanding of the conflict and by two distinct 
memory narratives in Peru, but also by the politics and production of urban space in 
which each of these sites has been created. 
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The Testimony of Space: Sites of Memory and Violence in Peru’s Internal 
Armed Conflict 
The Lugar de la Memoria, la Tolerancia y la Inclusión Social (LUM), inaugurated in 
Lima in December 2015, can be viewed as the archetypal space of memory. As a 
memory museum whose creation was recommended by the Comisión de la Verdad y 
Reconciliación (CVR), the site acts as a space in which the history of Peru’s internal 
armed conflict (1980-2000) is exhibited, in which memory practice and truth-telling are 
made possible, and which aims to act as a contact zone for Peru’s diverse communities 
for the purposes of ongoing reconciliation. Yet a reading of the museum’s spatiality also 
reveals (perhaps unintended) characteristics and consequences of the project. 
For example, the museum exhibits representations of the geographies of violence 
perpetrated during the conflict, with references to violence conducted in Lima, in the 
Andean highlands, and in the Amazonian jungle. In this way, LUM replicates 
nineteenth century depictions of Peruvian geography which constructed knowledge 
about national space from the perspective of the capital, dividing the country into la 
costa (the coast), la sierra (the highlands), and la selva (the jungle).1 Moreover, LUM 
exists within its own spatial context; simultaneously located in a middle-class region of 
Lima largely protected from the violence, and within view of the island El Frontón (one 
of the sites of the infamous 1986 prison massacres). In these ways, whilst a spatial 
analysis of the museum demonstrates how space has been used as a mechanism for 
memory and reconciliation, this reading also points to contradictions and 
inconsistencies between LUM’s stated goals and its spatiality.  
                                                          
1 Benjamin Orlove, ‘Putting Race in Its Place: Order in Colonial and Postcolonial Peruvian Geography’, Social Research, 60:2 
(1993), pp.301-336 (p.325). 
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An appreciation of the importance of emplacement, locale, national geography, and 
the production and representation of space has, I believe, the potential to significantly 
contribute to understandings of the internal conflict. This includes an understanding of 
the many ways in which space can produce political violence, how space shapes the 
aftermath of violence in culture, and how individual commemorative sites exist also in a 
broader landscape of memory.  
Almost twenty-five years on from the capture and imprisonment of Abimael 
Guzmán, and nearly fifteen years since the publication of the CVR’s Informe Final, the 
legacies of the Shining Path insurgency which engulfed Peru in the last two decades of 
the twentieth century remains an unresolved issue for many communities, while for 
others it is an episode of history best consigned to the past. However, whilst literature 
on the conflict over the past thirty years has utilised a wide range of theoretical and 
methodological approaches from many different academic fields, little attention has 
been paid to the spatiality of the conflict. This oversight ought to be rectified, not only 
because the internal armed conflict can be better understood through a spatial approach, 
but because representations of geography have contributed significantly to ideas about 
what constitutes Peru as a modern nation. For this reason, this dissertation attempts to 
fill the gap in the current literature from which a rigorously spatial approach to Peru’s 
internal conflict, and its afterlife, is missing. 
Early studies by North American scholars (commonly referred to as 
“Senderologists”) such as Cynthia McClintock and David Palmer interpreted the 
conflict as a peasant-led rebellion in the context of subsistence crises and the failure of 
governmental reforms in Ayacucho.2 Partly in reaction to this early literature, a second 
historiographical phase, heavily influenced by the work of Carlos Iván Degregori, 
                                                          
2 Cynthia McClintock, ‘Why Peasants Rebel: The Case of Peru’s Sendero Luminoso’, World Politics, 37 (1984); David Scott 
Palmer, ‘Rebellion in Rural Peru: The Origins and Evolution of Sendero Luminoso’, Comparative Politics, 18:2 (1986), pp.127-46. 
12 
 
emphasised the role of “provincial mestizos with a higher-than-average education” in 
Shining Path’s ranks, and used Shining Path’s “all-powerful” Maoist ideology as a 
primary explanatory factor for its “astonishing violence”.3 The response of the Peruvian 
state to Shining Path violence, including the role played by peasants in the defeat of the 
insurgents, also came under greater focus before the publication of the Informe Final.4  
The publication of the CVR’s report in 2003 is in this sense a pivotal moment in 
which a particular interpretation of the conflict, criticising both insurgent and state 
violence, has become to some degree institutionalised (while still being heavily 
contested by some).5 To a large extent, the CVR’s arguments agree broadly with the 
emphasis of Degregori (also a member of the Comisión) and others on Shining Path 
ideology and the key role of the peasantry in resisting the insurgents. Important studies 
since 2003 have focused on issues of cultural responses to violence, memory narratives 
of the conflict, and a range of localised case studies which add further complexity to the 
existing literature.6 Yet despite these significant contributions, this literature continues 
to lack a cohesive explanation of how the conflict was indelibly shaped by spatial 
processes, an explanation which would highlight underlying similarities between 
diverse case studies and demonstrate how geographically differentiated experiences of 
violence have produced distinct artistic responses and memory narratives in the 
aftermath of the conflict. In particular, it remains to be understood how both the Shining 
Path insurgency and the Peruvian state’s counterinsurgency operation were processes 
                                                          
3 Carlos Iván Degregori, How Difficult it is to be God: Shining Path’s Politics of War in Peru, 1980-1999 (London, 2012), pp.159-
71. 
4 Carlos Iván Degregori, ‘Harvesting Storms: Peasant Rondas and the Defeat of Sendero Luminoso’ in (Steve J. Stern ed.), Shining 
and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995 (London, 1998), pp.128-157. 
5 Established in 2001 by Peru’s transitional government, after the downfall of Alberto Fujimori’s authoritarian regime, the CVR was 
charged with producing a report into the human rights abuses perpetrated by insurgents and state agents during the internal armed 
conflict. Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Informe Final (Lima, 2003). 
6 Jo-Marie Burt, Political Violence and the Authoritarian State in Peru: Silencing Civil Society (Basingstoke, 2007); Víctor Vich, 
Poéticas del duelo: Ensayos sobre arte, memoria y violencia política en el Perú (Lima, 2015); Cynthia Milton (ed.), Art from a 
Fractured Past: Memory and Truth Telling in Post–Shining Path Peru (Durham, 2014); Jaymie Heilman, Before the Shining Path: 
Politics in Rural Ayacucho, 1895-1980 (Stanford, 2010); Ponciano del Pino, En nombre del gobierno: El Perú y Uchuraccay: un 
siglo de política campesina (Lima, 2017); Miguel La Serna, The Corner of the Living: Ayacucho on the Eve of the Shining Path 
Insurgency (Chapel Hill, 2012); Theidon, Kimberley. Intimate Enemies: Violence and Reconciliation in Peru (Philadelphia, 2012). 
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constructed through the local politics of space, the actions of diverse social agents, and 
discourses about geography and the Peruvian nation.  
Geography and space have rarely been absent in these interpretations of Peru’s 
conflict, yet they are rarely explicit in this literature either. For example, the Informe 
Final highlights a geographical dimension to the violence, stating that 40% of the 
victims of violence came from Ayacucho with another 45% coming from five other 
departments (Huancavelica, San Martín, Huánuco, Junín and Apurímac), but the report 
explains this as a result of the socioeconomic status rather than as a product of 
geography.7 Similarly, studies of Andean communities by McClintock and Isbell have 
been criticised, by Orin Starn and Poole and Renique, for having omitted concepts of 
space from their analysis and of treating the region as temporally and historically 
separate from the rest of Peru.8 In both of these cases, space has been presented by 
McClintock and Isbell only as the location in which events occurred, rather than a 
defining element of the narrative. Conversely, when geographical approaches have been 
deployed, such as Puente’s argument that Shining Path violence was shaped by the 
“intersection of drought and increasingly militarized sociopolitical conflict”, they have 
often focused on peasant participation in the conflict, and not the spatiality of the 
counterinsurgency operation or post-conflict memory practice.9  
In part, then, my aim is to reassess the existing history of the Peruvian conflict 
through the lens of space, to make explicit that which is currently implicit (or 
deliberately hidden), and to give answers as to why space has remained silent in 
historical narratives of the conflict for so long.  Beyond this, however, my aim is also to 
                                                          
7 CVR, Informe Final, Tm. VIII, p.316. 
8 Orin Starn, ‘Missing the Revolution: Anthropologists and the War in Peru’, Cultural Anthropology, 6:1 (1991), pp.63-91; Deborah 
Poole and Gerardo Renique, ‘The New Chroniclers of Peru: US Scholars and Their 'Shining Path' of Peasant Rebellion’, Bulletin of 
Latin American Research, 10:2 (1991), pp.133-191. 
9 Javier Puente, ‘Making Peru’s Sendero Luminoso: The Mega Niño of 1982-1983’, Age of Revolutions 
[https://ageofrevolutions.com/2017/03/29/making-perus-sendero-luminoso-the-geography-ecology-of-civil-war/, accessed 19 July 
2017]. 
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argue the positive case for how a spatial analysis of the conflict can contribute 
knowledge, and create new lines of enquiry, for understanding violence, culture and 
memory in Peru over the last forty years and beyond.  
My research will focus on a spatial analysis of the internal armed conflict in three 
ways. Firstly, I will examine the ways in which violence was produced by spatial 
contexts, locally regionally and nationally, and assess how particular forms of violence 
reconstituted spatial structures of state power and governance. Secondly, I will approach 
how the spatiality of this violence has been understood culturally, and what this means 
for intersecting categories of class and race which are themselves constituted by space. 
Finally, I will address memories of the internal conflict, highlight where these have 
been produced, and assess the significance of geography’s role in memory practices. I 
will also pay particular attention to how the perspectives and memories of key 
participants in the conflict, including peasant communities and Senderistas, have to 
some extent been rendered invisible by homogenising narratives about violence 
constructed from a singular geographical perspective. 
 
Contribution(s) to knowledge 
The two dominant and competing interpretations of Peru’s internal armed conflict can 
be loosely understood as the heroic military narrative and the human rights narrative 
which has been promoted by organisations such as the Asociación pro Derechos 
Humanos (APRODEH) and, arguably, the CVR.10 The military narrative positions the 
armed forces as defenders of the Peruvian nation against the threat of terrorism. 
Emphasising the need to protect national security, representatives of the military and 
                                                          
10 There are, however, tensions within each of these broad narratives, particularly between supporters of the former President 
Alberto Fujimori and members of the armed forces and police. Although each broadly subscribes to this state-military narrative, 
they assign different levels of importance to the role of Fujimori, the armed forces and the police in defeating insurgent groups. 
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state have represented human rights abuses committed by state agents as excesses and 
errors, but not as a systematic practice. By contrast, the human rights narrative argues 
that state practices of violence were indeed systematic and excessive, but were 
nonetheless a response to the armed struggle launched by Shining Path in 1980. It is 
worth pointing out that Shining Path also have their own heroic narratives of the guerra 
popular but, as will be discussed, these memories of the conflict have not received 
sufficient attention or been fully understood, neither by scholars nor in Peruvian society.  
The positioning of these two dominant narratives, which sees “the immediate and 
fundamental cause of the unleashing of the internal armed conflict [to be] PCP-SL’s 
decision to start the armed struggle against the Peruvian State”, is, however, 
problematic.11 For instance, both narratives accept the manner in which Shining Path 
leaders positioned themselves as instigators of the conflict, and as a political entity 
which was separate from previous radical movements in Ayacucho and across the 
Andes. As discussed in Chapter 1, however, many of Shining Path’s rank-and-file 
interpreted the group within the context of local politics and previous radical 
movements. Furthermore, Rénique has argued that these previous movements 
constituted a tradition of radicalism in Ayacucho during the decades preceding the 
internal conflict.12 For this reason, it is essential that the conflict is interpreted alongside 
ongoing power struggles and radical movements from the 1950s onwards, in which 
different radical groups came to prominence at different times. My interpretation of 
Peru’s conflict, therefore, sees the roots of the violence of the 1980s in the unresolved 
conflicts of earlier decades, which I interpret as being deeply tied to the local politics 
and production of space.  
                                                          
11 CVR, Informe Final, Tm. VIII, p.317. 
12 José Luis Rénique, Incendiar la pradera: un ensayo sobre la revolución en el Perú (Lima, 2015). 
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Furthermore, the Peruvian state’s response to this new iteration of an ayacuchano 
radical tradition was not simply defensive, but an assertion of state power after the 1969 
Agrarian Reform had loosened the grip on local politics held by gamonales.13 This use 
of state violence, I believe, was supported by a racialized cultural framework which 
positioned Andean communities as dangerously radical, anti-modern, and backwards.14 
In particular, this framework rests upon an imagined geography which understands 
power, wealth and modernity in Peru to be located on the coast (specifically in Lima) 
and poverty, violence and indigeneity in the Andean (and to some extent the 
Amazonian) regions of the country’s interior. Importantly, this imagined cultural 
geography had severe consequences for how the counterinsurgency operation was 
conducted, acting as the foundation for a very real geography of differentiated modes of 
governance in which forms of sovereign and governmental power were exercised in a 
spatially-contingent manner (the operation in the sierra and selva representing the 
violent exercise of sovereignty).15 
In the years during and since the conflict, memories of the mobilisations of peasant 
communities (both in co-operation with and against Shining Path) have challenged 
representations of the indigenous population as passive, vulnerable and helpless. 
However, in other ways this cultural geography has been strengthened in forms of 
cultural production and memory which have conflated Peru’s interior with violence and 
radicalism. Because of this, memories of the conflict have been used to both justify and 
challenge the further cultural and political exclusion of indigenous communities.  
                                                          
13 Gamonal is a term used to refer to local powerholders in Andean regions who, prior to the Agrarian Reform, acted as 
representatives of the Peruvian state and oligarchy in a semi-formal or informal capacity.  
14 Examples of this cultural framework will be discussed throught this thesis, but a particularly pertinent example of this type of 
representation of the Andes can be seen in the anthropological report produced by the Vargas Llosa Commission into the murder of 
eight journalists in Uchuraccay in 1983. Juan Ossio and Fernando Fuenzalida, ‘Informe antropológico: la comunidad de Uchuraccay 
y la región iquichana’ in (Mario Vargas Llosa, Mario Castro Arenas and Abraham Guzum Figueroa eds.), Informe de la Comisión 
Investigadora de los Sucesos de Uchuraccay (Lima, 1983), pp.53-77. 
15 See below section on “Spatial practice” for discussion of Foucault’s formulation of sovereign and governmental power. 
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I therefore see my contributions to knowledge as being focused around the three key 
themes of violence, culture and memory, each of which are viewed through the lens of 
space. Specifically, I will demonstrate that: 
i) The conflict reflected a battle between competing projects of statecraft, 
articulated by Shining Path and by the Peruvian state and armed forces, 
which were rooted in the local politics and production of space in Andean 
and Amazonian regions, the relationship between Peru’s capital and 
provinces, and the nation’s historical socio-spatial structure. 
ii) Cultural production in response to the conflict is implicitly spatial and 
premised upon racialised cultural ideas about geography. The imaginative 
construction of space is central to the interpretations of violence and forms 
of memory privileged in each cultural artefact, often revealing the inherent 
beliefs, assumptions and prejudices of cultural producers. 
iii) Public space and sites of memory in Peru today act as discursive 
battlegrounds in which competing visions of the Peruvian nation are 
articulated, and contribute to the construction of a geography of memory 
across national space. In particular, I believe that the conflict has produced 
sites of memory which challenge the cultural power and central role of the 
military in the Peruvian nation (which, as Milton argues, is highly visible in 
“urban beautification and [the] planning” of public space).16 However, this 
should be not as a linear progression from military impunity to 
accountability, as there are numerous examples of state intervention into 
sites which are critical of the state’s role in the internal armed conflict. 
                                                          
16 Cynthia Milton, Conflicted Memory: Military Cultural Interventions and the Human Rights Era in Peru (Madison, forthcoming 
2018), Conclusion, p.4. 
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Furthermore, many other sites have been established in order to reassert the 
military’s cultural power. 
I will also engage with the existing literature on Peru’s internal armed conflict along 
these lines. As highlighted above, this literature has evolved from early depictions of 
Shining Path as a peasant-led rebellion sparked by subsistence crises to interpretations, 
developed particularly by Degregori and the CVR, which emphasise the insurgents’ 
Maoist ideology, fundamentalist character and party leadership (drawn primarily from 
the provincial middle-class) as explanatory factors for Shining Path violence.17 Whilst 
the work of Degregori and the CVR are important for my research, I will also engage 
closely with a more recent body of historical research, by Heilman, Aroni, Del Pino, 
Rénique and La Serna (among others), which has re-asserted the importance of peasant 
agency, local conflicts, and histories of radicalism across the Andes, arguing that 
Shining Path were not a monolithic, homogenous entity as previously depicted.18 This 
range of scholarship has aimed to contextualise the conflict historically in terms of 
previous conflicts, forms of radical mobilisation, and state repression in the Andes, 
whilst also crucially highlighting the different local circumstances, tensions and 
histories across the region which shaped both Shining Path and state violence in 
different ways.  
This thesis is also in dialogue with important literature on cultural responses to the 
internal armed conflict. This literature has been produced from a range of disciplinary 
approaches (including art history, cultural history, and language studies) and includes 
key contributions by Cynthia Milton, Víctor Vich and Anne Lambright on the various 
                                                          
17 Cynthia McClintock, ‘Why Peasants Rebel’; Carlos Iván Degregori, Ayacucho 1969-1979: El surgimiento de Sendero Luminoso 
(Lima, 1991); Degregori, How Difficult it is to be God; CVR, Informe Final.  
18 Heilman, Before the Shining Path; Renzo Aroni, De Víctimas y Ciudadanos: Memorias de la Violencia Política en Comunidades 
de la Cuenca del Río Pampas (Lima, 2012); del Pino, En nombre del gobierno; Luis Rénique, Incendiar la pradera; La Serna, The 
Corner of the Living. 
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memory narratives constructed in Peruvian cinema, literature and visual art.19 However, 
whereas these previous studies have highlighted the representation of a number of 
complex themes in relation to the conflict (including social and racial exclusion, guilt 
and mental illness, peasant identity, and sexual violence among others), I will focus on 
the role which space and geography play in the construction of these narratives.  
Similarly, there is a growing body of studies relating to transitional justice and post-
conflict memory in Peru which has analysed individual sites of memory (such as the 
Museo de la Memoria in Huamanga), controversies about memory (including the 
controversy surrounding El ojo que llora) and the role of testimony in the construction 
of memory narratives.20 Significant contributions to this literature have also been made 
by Milton’s research into the post-conflict memories constructed by members of the 
armed forces and agents of the state, and by Saona who has examined how memories of 
a traumatic past can be transmitted to post-conflict generations.21 Whilst engaging 
closely with this literature I will seek to emphasise how memory narratives have been 
supported and contested by the production of space, and argue that these individual sites 
are inextricable from a deeper geography of memory which represents the 
interconnections between sites and previous commemorations of bygone eras. 
There are also, however, more practical and policy-based outcomes which can be 
read from this research. McDowell and Braniff, for example, have argued that the “the 
significance of memory, memorialisation and commemoration and their 
interconnections with space…often receives insufficient attention not just in the 
                                                          
19 Milton (ed.), Art from a Fractured Past; Vich, Poéticas del duelo; Anne Lambright, Andean Truths: Transitional Justice, 
Ethnicity, and Cultural Production in Post-Shining Path Peru (Liverpool, 2015).  
20 Joseph Feldman, ‘Exhibiting Conflict: History and Politics at the Museo de la Memoria de ANFASEP in Ayacucho, Peru’, 
Anthropological Quarterly, 85:2 (2012), pp.487-518; Paulo Drinot, ‘For whom the eye cries: memory, monumentality, and the 
ontologies of violence in Peru’, Journal of Latin American Cultural Studies, 18:1 (2009), pp.15-32; Cynthia Milton, ‘Defacing 
memory: (un)tying Peru’s memory knots’, Memory Studies, 4:2, (2011), pp.190-205; Francesca Denegri and Alexandra Hibbett 
(eds.), Dando Cuenta: Estudios sobre el testimonio de la violencia política en el Perú (1980-2000) (Lima, 2016). 
21 Milton, Conflicted Memory; Margarita Saona, Memory Matters in Transitional Peru (Basingstoke, 2014). 
20 
 
literature but in peace processes themselves”.22 While a large degree of this project 
works with theoretical understandings of violence, space and memory, my work will 
also focus heavily on the politics of space and commemorative practice, and how these 
factors have come to shape (perhaps even weaken) processes of reconciliation and 
transitional justice in Peru. In particular, I will argue that the spatial logics of some of 
the commemorative projects analysed later suggest a superficial understanding of the 
benefits of reconciliation, a failure to deal with ingrained cultural racism in Peru, and 
attitudes towards truth and reconciliation which appear largely instrumental rather than 
transformative. 
In Chapters 2 and 5 of this thesis, I briefly touch upon the widespread nature of 
sexual violence and violence against indigenous women in relation to my overall thesis. 
There are, however, several other avenues down which I could have explored the 
important relationship between space and gender in Peru. Understanding the 
construction of gendered identities, and their intersections with race and indigeneity, is 
crucial to the internal conflict, in part because sexual violence was perpetrated by both 
Shining Path and MRTA insurgent groups, and by the Peruvian armed forces and 
police, in a widespread manner.23 An analysis which viewed gender and sexual violence 
through the lends of space, perhaps by highlighting the gendered spaces in which such 
violence took place (e.g. the home, the military base, urban space as a site of violence) 
could well reveal the political and cultural values which underpinned it and why sexual 
violence was so widespread.24 
                                                          
22 Sara McDowell and Maire Braniff, Commemoration as Conflict: Space, Memory and Identity in Peace Processes (Basingstoke, 
2014), p.6. 
23 This intersection between gender and indigeneity has been analysed by, among others, Marisol de la Cadena and Jelke Boesten, 
who has also provided a detailed analysis of sexual violence in Peru during the conflict and in times of peace. Marisol de la Cadena, 
‘Las mujeres son más indias: etnicidad y género en una comunidad del Cuzco’, Revista Isis Internacional, 16 (1992), pp.25-45; 
Jelke Boesten, Intersecting Inequalities: Women and Social Policy in Peru, 1990–2000 (University Park, 2010). 
24 For example, Cathy McIlwaine’s research has analysed the impact of globalisation on gender-based violence in the global South. 
Cathy McIlwaine, ‘Urbanization and gender-based violence: exploring the paradoxes in the global South’, Environment and 
Urbanization, 25:1 (2013), pp.65-79. 
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It is also important to consider the political agency and gendered cultural of key 
female participants in the internal conflict, including María Elena Moyano, members of 
ANFASEP, Elena Iparraguirre and other female Shining Path and MRTA militants. 
Often, the agency of these figures has been downplayed, their stories have been told 
through a series of gendered tropes (represented simply as mothers, or helpless victims) 
of they have been represented in a distinctly negative way because of the way in which 
they have subverted traditional gender roles (particularly in the case of female 
insurgents). This thesis will touch on the stories of Moyano, Iparaguirre and ANFASEP 
in places. However, for the purposes of this project I have decided to focus a more 
detailed analysis on the relationship between space and race, and therefore have not 
included a more thorough discussion of the role of gender in Peru’s internal armed 
conflict. Nonetheless, gender is not entirely absent from the following chapters and I 
hope to return to the ideas discussed above in more detail in my future work.  
 
Formulating a Lefebvrian spatial analysis 
Space has undergone a significant exploration as a category of analysis by social 
scientists, geographers and historians since the 1974 publication of Henri Lefebvre’s La 
production de l’espace. Lefebvre’s key argument is to highlight that space is both 
dialectically produced by, and productive of, societies: 
“The spatial practice of a society secretes that society’s space; it 
propounds and presupposes it, in a dialectical interaction; it produces 
it slowly and surely as it masters and appropriates it. From the 
analytic standpoint, the spatial practice of a society is revealed 
through the deciphering of its space.”25 
                                                          
25 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford, 1991), p.38. 
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Rather than acting as “nothing more than the locus of social relations”, space, he 
continues, undergoes a productive process in which it is defined, designed and 
constructed in accordance with the ideologies of its creator. Space is therefore produced 
in order to construct a particular type of society.26   
Furthermore, Lefebvre argues in favour of a conceptual triad for understanding the 
production of space which is made up of three distinct elements, around which I will 
base my spatial analysis in this project: 
i) Spatial practice – This refers to the spatial organisation and 
dynamics of a society which, Lefebvre argues, can be read backwards to 
illuminate the ideologies, assumptions and practices of those in power, 
and forwards, to determine the type of society which they will produce. 
ii) Representations of space – Lefebvre continues by arguing that the 
production of space is closely linked to the production of knowledge and 
the coded aesthetics of spatial practice. Whilst Lefebvre’s representations 
of space refer primarily to functional artefacts such as maps, blueprints 
and urban plans, I have (for reasons outlined below) expanded this factor 
to incorporate cultural representations of space, particularly the imagined 
forms of geography present in works of literature, cinema and visual art.  
iii) Representational spaces (or spaces of representation) – Spaces of 
representation are described by Lefebvre as those in which “complex 
symbolisms” and narratives about society are laid bare. In this sense, 
spaces of representation can be understood to be spaces which act as 
intense battlegrounds in which competing projects of nationhood, 
statecraft and social reproduction take place. For the purposes of this 
                                                          
26 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, p.11. 
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study, I believe that this category can incorporate the sites of memory 
produced in response to Peru’s internal conflict, as well as to the broader 
urban landscape which offers a window onto the cultural aesthetics and 
spatial practice of a given society.27 
The conceptual triad outlined above therefore forms the basis of my project and 
provides the foundation upon which both my theoretical and methodological 
frameworks are premised. In each chapter, I will approach each of my case studies 
through the lens of spatial practice, representations of space and spaces of 
representation in order to decipher the physical, cultural and representational spaces of 
Peru’s internal conflict.  
In order to do so, however, I believe that it is necessary to adapt Lefebvre’s triad to 
Peruvian conditions by also incorporating ideas from a range of scholars of political 
violence, spatial practice and Peruvian society into my theoretical framework. 
 
i) Spatial practice 
My analysis of the spatial practice of the Peruvian state will take place within what 
could broadly be considered a Foucauldian framework. Foucault uses the plague as a 
real and metaphorical explanation for why states practice forms of spatial exclusion, and 
attempt to prevent the contagion of populations with diseases of the medical kind, as 
well as those more political and societal in nature.28 He also makes the distinction 
between apparently pre-modern societies in which sovereign power is exercised, and 
thus contagion is prevented through a form of vengeful violence, and modern societies 
                                                          
27 Ibid., p.33. 
28 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York, 1997), p.216. 
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in which disciplinary mechanisms produce obedient populations through pastoral, 
governmental means without having to resort to this violence.29 
Foucault’s narrative of a modern transition from sovereignty to governmentality has, 
however, been challenged as being over simplistic and for representing governmental 
mechanisms as monolithic and homogenous.30 Agamben, for example, has used the 
concept of exception to argue that forms of sovereign and governmental power are often 
deployed simultaneously by states against different populations. Whilst governmental 
power is preserved for populations considered to have “value”, sovereign power is used 
in order to exclude and punish other individuals and populations who are reduced to 
“bare life”.31 Furthermore, whilst the distinctions made by Foucault and Agamben 
represent sovereignty as an essentially violent form of power (whilst governmentality is 
presented as being pastoral, disciplinary and technical in nature), I also understand 
violence in the terms set out by Žižek in his argument about objective (systemic or 
structural) violence which refers to the “more subtle forms of coercion that sustain 
relations of domination and exploitation”.32 In this sense, mechanisms of power which 
could be interpreted to be technocratic governmental in nature, such as management of 
the economy, healthcare and education, can also be seen to have a violent nature and to 
also function as mechanisms for exclusion. This argument in particular will be 
expanded upon in Chapter 5 where I argue that forms of neoliberal restructuring, price 
stabilisation measures, and a government programme of forced sterilisations, 
represented the exercise of punitive, sovereign power against indigenous communities.  
                                                          
29 Ibid.. 
30 These criticisms, related to Foucault’s work in Discipline and Punish and genealogical approach to history, include (but are not 
limited to) a lack of geographical differentiation or context, overemphasis on clear breaks and a lack of attention to continuities 
between the periods he establishes, an overemphasis on the significance of how prisons operate in theory as opposed to in practice. 
For more on criticisms of Foucault, see José Guilherme Merquior, Foucault (2nd Edn.) (London, 1991), pp.85-107; Michael 
Ignatieff, ‘State, Civil Society and Total Institutions: A Critique of Recent Social Histories of Punishment’, Crime and Justice, 3 
(1981), pp. 153-192. 
31 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford, 1995), p.142. 
32 Slavoj Žižek, Violence: Six Sideway Reflections (London, 2009), p.10. 
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Whilst these Foucauldian and Agambenian ideas about power are implicitly spatial, 
Aihwa Ong has argued explicitly that such practices of governmental and sovereign are 
not exercised monolithically or homogenously, but are instead applied in an uneven and 
geographically contingent manner. Ong’s work draws on the work of Castel who argues 
that the “differential modes of treatment of populations” are exercised in order to make 
particular regions and populations profitable for global capital and exclude those which 
are not.33 Ong builds on this by outlining the concept of graduated sovereignty, a system 
in which states direct sovereign, disciplinary forms of power against populations in 
“production zones”, whilst forms of governmental, pastoral and “individualising” power 
are prioritised for populations in other zones, often the economic and ethnic elite of a 
given state.34 Thus, in the type of states described by Ong which combine an 
authoritarian political outlook with liberal economic doctrine, elite populations enjoy 
preferential treatment which, to draw on the work of Mbembe, not only provides them 
with a privileged economic position but also makes them less vulnerable to state 
violence and death.35 As will be seen throughout this study, this framework, based 
primarily on the work of a group of scholars working broadly in a Foucauldian tradition, 
is immensely useful for understanding Peru’s historical socio-spatial structure and for 
analysing the internal conflict.  
The language Ong uses to describe geographically graduated sovereignty and the 
differential distribution of state practices of power is also significant because it is 
reminiscent of the language used by Judith Butler to describe her ideas about 
grievability. Butler argues that:  
                                                          
33 Robert Castel, ‘From Dangerousness to Risk’ in (Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter M. Miller eds.), The Foucault effect: 
studies in governmentality: with two lectures by and an interview with Michel Foucault (London, 1991), pp.281-98 (p.294). 
34 Aihwa Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty (London, 2006), pp.75-79. 
35 Mbembe’s argument concerning “necropolitics” states that “the ultimate expression of sovereignty resides, to a large degree, in 
the power and the capacity to dictate who may live and who must die”, and is also based heavily on the work of Foucault and 
Agamben regarding sovereignty and biopower. See Achille Mbembe, ‘Necropolitics’, Public Culture, 15:1 (2003), pp.11-40 (p.11). 
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“Forms of racism instituted and active at the level of perception tend 
to produce iconic versions of populations who are eminently 
grievable, and others whose loss is no loss, and who remain 
ungrievable. The differential distribution of grievability across 
populations has implications for why and when we feel politically 
consequential affective dispositions such as horror, guilt, righteous 
sadism, loss, and indifference”.36 
From this argument it is possible to deduce two key elements. Firstly that, racist 
values in society shape differential emotive reactions to violence and can act as an 
underlying framework for how violence perpetrated against different communities is 
perceived. Secondly, that if we combine the ideas of Ong and Butler, then the 
differential distribution in the exercise of governmental and sovereign power by the 
state can be seen to be supported by an underlying geography of grievability.  
Sovereign power, then, is enacted against target populations who are deemed to be 
non-grievable. Grievable populations are, by contrast, protected from the large degree of 
state violence enacted through the logic of sovereignty. This argument has direct 
relevance to the Peruvian case where victims of violence (perpetrated by Shining Path 
and by state agents) were predominantly from indigenous communities, and where “the 
tragedy suffered by the populations of rural Peru, the Andean and jungle regions…was 
neither felt nor taken on as its own by the rest of the country”.37 For these reasons, my 
arguments about governmental and sovereign power throughout this thesis will be 
framed with reference to grievability.38 
                                                          
36 Judith Butler, Frames of War: When is Life Grievable? (London, 2009), p.24. 
37 CVR, Informe Final, Tm. VIII, p.316. 
38 Similar theoretical frameworks which utilise the work of Foucault and Butler have been deployed previously to analyse Peruvian 
social formations in the work of Drinot and Boesten. See Paulo Drinot, ‘The Meaning of Alan García: Sovereignty and 
Governmentality in Neoliberal Peru’, Journal of Latin American Cultural Studies, 20:2 (2011), pp.179-95; Paulo Drinot, ‘Foucault 
in the Land of the Incas: Sovereignty and Governmentality in Neoliberal Peru’ in (Paulo Drinot ed.), Peru in Theory (Basingstoke, 
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ii) Representations of space 
Cultural responses to Peru’s internal conflict are, necessarily, grounded in 
representations of the geography in which violence was perpetrated. However, I will 
argue that how these spaces are culturally represented is never a simple recreation of 
geographical reality, but a re-imagining of space which draws attention to (and renders 
invisible) particular regions, constructs and demolishes imagined boundaries, and 
enlarges or compresses distance. In short, cultural representations of space become a 
highly ideological activity which reveals the inherent beliefs, assumptions and 
prejudices of cultural producers. 
Firstly, it is important to highlight that Butler’s argument concerning the differential 
distribution of grievability can apply to cultural responses to violence. The case studies, 
illustrative incidents and emblematic episodes of violence selected by cultural producers 
(as well as by museographers, scholars and the CVR) reveal the forms of violence 
which individuals or groups wish to prioritise in their narrative. Throughout my analysis 
of cultural artefacts, I will highlight the issue of grievability and draw attention to the 
particular forms, perpetrators and victims of violence which cultural producers have 
prioritised in their work. 
My readings of cultural responses to violence will also deal critically with how 
geography is represented in relation to narratives of civilisation and modernity, in part 
influenced by Doreen Massey and Edward Soja who have advocated for greater 
understanding of the heterogeneity of space.39 To achieve this I will deploy the concept 
of imagined geographies, first elucidated by Edward Said in his work on Orientalism. 
                                                          
2014), pp.167-89; Jelke Boesten, ‘Inequality, Normative Violence, and Livable Life: Judith Butler and Peruvian Reality’ in (Paulo 
Drinot ed.), Peru in Theory (Basingstoke, 2014), pp.217-43. 
39 Doreen Massey, For Space (London, 2005), p.5; Edward Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical 
Social Theory (London, 1989), p.89. 
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Imaginative geographies produce ideas and narratives about different spaces, in a 
process which layers meaning onto whole nations and regions, constructing boundaries 
between civilization on one side and savagery on the other.  In effect, imaginative 
geographies establish a homogenised idea, or construction, of space to mask its true 
nuances and heterogeneous reality.  
Said’s work has previously been transplanted into a Peruvian context by Orin Starn 
who argues that North American anthropologists based in Peru in the 1970s represented 
a discourse of “Andeanism”. Andeanism, Starn argues, is an academic discourse which 
“dichotomizes between the Occidental, coastal, urban, and mestizo and the non-
Western, highland, rural, and indigenous; it then essentializes the highland side of the 
equation”.40 Poole and Renique have supported this argument, stressing that the pre-
                                                          
40 Starn, ‘Missing the Revolution’, p.66. 
Fig. 1: Peru's "natural" regions. Orlove, 'Putting Race in its Place', p.319. 
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eminence of US scholars in producing knowledge on Peru’s internal conflict in the early 
1990s is reminiscent of colonial practices in which “truth [about Peru] was produced by 
outsiders, who bolstered their claims to scientific authority by citing each other's texts 
and theories”.41 What we can deduce from these arguments is that not only has 
knowledge about Peru been produced from outside of the country, but also that 
knowledge about the internal conflict, which took place predominantly in Peru’s 
Andean and Amazonian departments, has been produced in the capital. I believe that it 
is also possible to see these Andeanising, tendencies in cultural representations of 
Peru’s conflict, and that forms of imaginative geography are ever-present in these 
representations because they are produced predominantly from outside the spaces which 
they seek to explain to their audience.  
Understanding imagined geographies in relation to Peru is even more important 
because of pre-existing cultural traditions which have constructed Peruvian geography 
and racial categories as mutually constitutive. Cecilia Méndez argues that, in the late-
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, “the term Indian came to be intrinsically associated 
with the sierra, and the word serrano acquired a marked derogative connotation”.42 
This argument is corroborated by Orlove who suggests that the emergence of scientific 
geographical discourse in Republican Peru crystallised the idea that not only did the 
Indians live in the Andes, but that the Andes was the place of the Indians.43 Orlove is 
here referring to the creation of a spatial discourse which could be used to talk about 
race. In his own words: “The spatialisation of the Indian became a way to speak safely 
of race in an era of citizenship: the overt topic could be the integration of the highlands 
into the nation, while the subtext continued to be Peru's Indian problem”.44  
                                                          
41 Poole and Renique, ‘The New Chroniclers of Peru’, p.174. 
42 Cecilia Méndez ‘De indio a serrano: nociones de raza y geografía en el Perú (siglos XVIII-XXI)’, Histórica (2011), pp.53-102 
(p.53). 
43 Orlove, ‘Putting Race in Its Place’, p.325. 
44 Ibid. p.328. 
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Similarly, de la Cadena argues that “encrusted in geography, the cultural 
construction of race in Peru assumed, and continues to assume, that serranos are 
inferior to costeños”. She also identifies a change around 1940 when class replaced race 
as the primary category for analysis but highlights that, in talking about class, 
intellectuals continued to talk about race implicitly.45 Thus, terms like serranito were 
part of a euphemistic language which openly talked about space in place of race. It 
should not, however, be assumed that the use of class to talk about race was limited to 
conservative elements of society. As Drinot highlights, even progressives ultimately 
saw industrialisation as a way of assimilating the indigenous labour force into the 
Peruvian state, and in doing so remove the Indian as an obstacle to modernity.46 
In my analyses of cultural responses to political violence, therefore, I will pay 
particular attention to how space, race and geography are represented, how they are 
constructed to facilitate the narrative, and how they are associated with particular 
characters and violent acts. Through this approach, I will highlight the existence of 
imaginative geographies, Andeanising tendencies and spatial discourses in responses to 
Peru’s internal conflict. 
 
iii) Spaces of representation 
In formulating an approach to memory and the relation that, as a cultural practice, it 
holds with space and its production, I have taken into account the work of Nora on lieux 
de mémoire as places where “memory crystallises and secretes itself”.47 Nora’s work 
highlighted a wide range of spaces, symbols and cultural artefacts which act as 
repositories for historical discourses and symbolisms. Legg, however, has argued that 
                                                          
45 Marisol de la Cadena, ‘From Race to Class: Insurgent Intellectuals de provincial in Peru, 1910-1970’ in (Steve J. Stern ed.), 
Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995 (London, 1998), pp.22-59 (p.23-4). 
46 Paulo Drinot, The Allure of Labour: Workers, Race, and the Making of the Peruvian State (London, 2011), p.49. 
47 Pierre Nora, ‘Between memory and history: les lieux de mémoire’, Representations, 26:7 (1989), pp.7-24 (p.7). 
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Nora’s approach to memory is too limited, and argues that memory is also embodied in 
forms of cultural practice and performance.48 As a result, my understanding of what 
constitutes sites of memory and memory practice is not limited to traditional sites of 
memory (such as monuments, memorials and museums), but attempts to incorporate 
performative commemorative ceremonies, acts of civil disobedience, acts of individual 
remembrance and elements of urban planning which contribute to the commemorative 
city-text. 
Public monuments and memorials are, however, perhaps the most discussed spaces 
of memory and ought not to be ignored. Although many choose to represent the names 
of victims along with an abstract design, memorials vary greatly in design and examples 
such as Germany’s vanishing Holocaust monuments, the Vietnam War Memorial in 
Washington and Lima’s El ojo que llora show that they often use innovative, and 
controversial, forms of space to construct narrative meaning. Jay Winter argues that war 
memorials should also be seen as spaces onto which individual memories can be 
projected and consolidated into a wider sense of collective mourning. For instance, he 
highlights Edwin Lutyens’ abstract design of the London Cenotaph and its “simple and 
ecumenical character”, arguing that the monument does not impose a narrative of 
memory onto the public, but creates an empty space which they can fill with their own 
interpretations or experiences of violence.49 Sites of memory, he states, are “places 
where groups of people engage in public activity through which they express a 
collective shared knowledge…of the past, on which a group’s sense of unity and 
individuality is based”.50  
                                                          
48 Stephen Legg, ‘Contesting and surviving memory: space, nation, and nostalgia in Les Lieux de Mémoire’, Environment and 
Planning D, 23 (2005), pp.481-504 (p.500). 
49 Jay Winter, Remembering War: The Great War between Memory and History in the Twentieth Century (London, 2006), p.142. 
50 Jay Winter, ‘Sites of Memory’ in (Susannah Radstone and Bill Schwarz eds.), Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates (New York, 
2010), pp.312-24 (p.312). 
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In doing so, he builds upon the work of Maurice Halbwachs and Jan and Aleida 
Assmann on collective memory.51 However, Winter’s emphasis is placed upon the 
opportunities allowed by sites of memory for collective remembrance to take place. 
Similarly, Legg has argued in favour of the need for memorials and monuments to be 
understood alongside performative rememberance ceremonies and grassroots initiatives 
which create their own meanings and use sites of memory to develop more pluralistic 
forms of memory narratives practice.52 
Whilst the work of these scholars is certainly useful for understanding the manner in 
which memory narratives are represented, crystallised and performed at sites of 
memory, I believe it is also necessary to explicitly analyse the spatiality of each given 
site. By spatiality, I refer to (among other things) the site’s construction or architecture, 
its emplacement in a particular neighbourhood or city, and how the site interacts with its 
surroundings. In this sense, the work of Dwyer and Alderman has been particularly 
useful, as they have proposed a framework for analysing memorial landscapes and 
assessing the spatiality of sites of memory to understand how they may function as a 
form of text, arena, and performance. The framework they outline is premised upon 
three sets of questions which attempt to take into account signposting, site layout, on-
site commercial activities, transport and access, performative ceremonies and 
emplacement when analysing the significance of a given site.53 I have selected this 
framework not simply because it is convincing and useful in a theoretical sense, but 
because it also allows me to use space as a lens through which it is possible to see 
consistencies between practices of violence, culture, and memory. For example, 
Delacroix’s study of two versions of the El ojo que llora memorial (in Lima and 
                                                          
51 Jan Assmann and John Czaplicka, ‘Collective Memory and Cultural Identity’, New German Critique (1995), pp.125-133. 
52 Legg, ‘Contesting and surviving memory’, p.483.  
53 Owen J. Dwyer and Derek H. Alderman, ‘Memorial landscapes: analytic questions and metaphors’, GeoJournal, 73:3 (2008), 
pp.165-178 (pp.170-5). 
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Llinque, Apurímac) reveals memory discourses which are both centralising and 
Andeanist, dichotomising peasant communities into simplified and racialised categories 
of passive victim and savage perpetrator.54  
There are also important ways in which literature on sites of memory in Peru has 
contributed to a transnational historiography on conflict, space and memory. In 
particular, I believe that the Peruvian case offers a range of interesting perspectives on 
how memory narratives can be shaped by geographical context, and how they can 
become inscribed into the landscape. Palonen has outlined the need to understand 
traditional sites of memory within a broader commemorative city-text, a collection of 
sites in urban space which contribute to understandings of a shared cultural heritage. 
The city-text, Palonen argues, is a contested “site of politicking” in which, “through the 
act of naming and replacing political symbols, people are engaged in political acts that 
invest objects and sites with positive and negative connotations”.55 In Palonen’s work, 
sites of memory are not considered only to be commemorative statues, memorials and 
museums, but also streets, parks, and public spaces named after political, historical, and 
often military figures from a nation’s past. Although Palonen is also careful to make a 
distinction between this commemorative city-text and the urban landscape in general, I 
would argue that both form part of an inescapable spatial context in which sites of 
memory are rarely, but ought to be, understood. As a result, when discussing sites of 
memory, I will aim to not only analyse the memory narratives which they represent, but 
also highlight the significance of the streets and neighbourhoods in which they are 
located, the businesses and infrastructure which operate nearby, and the communities 
which live around them. 
                                                          
54 Dorothée Delacroix, ‘«Somos peruanos y limpios»: Discursos y prácticas en torno al monumento El Ojo que Llora de Llinque, 
Apurímac’, Bulletin de l'Institut français d'études andines, 43:2 (2014), pp.227-44 (p.230). 
55 Emilia Palonen, ‘The city-text in post-communist Budapest: Street names, memorials and the politics of commemoration’, 
GeoJournal, 73 (2008), pp.219-30 (p.220). 
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Whilst my work aims to add to this transnational literature on sites of memory and 
collective remembrance, I also aim to insert my work within a body of recent research 
on memory practice in Latin America. The work of Jelin and Stern on the politics of 
memory in Latin America has been highly influential in shaping debates on the link 
between memory and political resistance to state violence.56 More recently, however, 
Estela Schindel and Pamela Colombo’s volume Space and the Memories of Violence 
has drawn together a broad range of scholarship linking the politics of space, culture 
and memory in Turkey, Germany and Cambodia as well as from the Southern Cone of 
Latin America.57 This scholarship has broadly sought to reassert the territoriality of 
memory practice and has highlighted the role which memory has to play in ongoing 
political projects and struggles. Using this literature, I will argue that forms of memory 
practice produced in Peru have been influenced heavily by transnational trends for the 
development of post-conflict memory initiatives, studies of memory, and experiences of 
truth and reconciliation processes elsewhere in Latin American and around the globe. 
Whilst these influences have enabled the proliferation of memory projects and museums 
across Peru, they also place limitations on the ability of each project to engage with an 
audience outside of the memory activist community, and to represent a period of 
conflict which should be understood primarily within its own national context (as 
opposed to being subsumed into narratives about dictatorships in the Southern Cone).  
When considering the different actors who have worked, often in collaboration with 
other, to produce scholarly publications, cultural artefacts and commemorative sites in 
post-conflict Peru, Jelin’s concept of “memory entrepreneurs” is useful.58  Memory 
entrepreneurs produce a diverse range of memory works which vary in form, audience 
                                                          
56 Elizabeth Jelin, Los trabajos de la memoria (Madrid, 2002); Steve J. Stern, Battling for Hearts and Minds: Memory Struggles in 
Pinochet’s Chile, 1973–1988 (Durham, 2006). 
57 Estela Schindel and Pamela Colombo (eds.), Space and the Memories of Violence: Landscapes of Erasure, Disappearance and 
Exception (Basingstoke, 2014). 
58 Jelin, Los trabajos de la memoria, pp.48-9. 
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and subject matter, yet the majority appear to share a broad understanding of the 
Peruvian conflict which is critical of both insurgent and state violence.59 As Bilbija and 
Payne argue, memory entrepreneurs act within a memory market and, although “profit 
is assumed”, that profit is likely to provide a “side beneﬁt to the ultimate goal of 
building a human rights culture”.60  
At times in the current literature on post-conflict Peru, reference is made to a 
nebulous human rights community which clearly incorporates human rights 
organisations such as APRODEH, COMISEDH and the Coordinadora Nacional de 
Derechos Humanos (CNDDHH), but which also negates or leaves unclear the role of 
scholars, artists, and other civil society activists. This artistic-academic-activist group 
has significant connections to the human rights community, with many individuals 
holding positions which cross these institutional and disciplinary boundaries. In a 
similar way to Stern’s representation of the human rights community in Chile, this 
community in Peru has very often acted in a cohesive and collaborative manner in order 
to promote human rights, and the work of the CVR, in Peru.61 In order to describe them 
accurately, therefore, I have chosen to use my own term - “memory activists”. Memory 
activist is a term which combines the memory work inherent in Jelin’s memory 
entrepreneurs whilst also alluding to this community’s mobilisation in favour of human 
rights in key legal cases and landmark trials. However, I believe the term also offers a 
broader perspective on the ways in which this group deploys memory which 
encompasses a range of scholarly works, artistic products and commemorative projects 
which articulated a shared vision of the internal conflict. In this way, this community 
uses post-conflict memory as a subject around which multiple forms of activism against 
                                                          
59 For a detailed analysis of memory producers who eschew this narrative and instead produce “counter memories” which reflect the 
narrative of the Peruvian state and armed forces, see Milton, Conflicted Memory. 
60 Ksenija Bilbija and Leigh A. Payne, ‘Time is Money: The Memory Market in Latin America’ in (Leigh A Payne and Ksenija 
Bilbija eds.), Accounting for Violence: Marketing Memory in Latin America (Durham, 2011), pp.1-40 (p.12).  
61 Stern, Battling for Hearts and Minds. 
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state violence and corruption, and in favour of contemporary political projects, can be 
articulated. 
Furthermore, these memory activists also use their work to make significant 
contributions to the urban landscape. Again, Palonen’s concept of the “commemorative 
city-text” articulates a vision of the urban landscape in which micro-commemorations 
(such as the changing of street names, erecting of statues, naming of parks) are enacted 
to articulate political positions. Although memory activists have not generally been 
involved in these kind of planning decisions, they have carved out their own element of 
the urban landscape by, as Bilbija and Payne describe in other contexts, producing 
several sites in their own human tights-based memoryscape.62 The circuit of sites in 
Lima included LUM, the Yuyanapaq photography exhibition, and El ojo que llora 
monument, and in the national context also includes the Museo de la Memoria in 
Huamanga, Yalpana Wasi – Lugar de la Memoria in Huancayo, and El ojo que llora in 
Llinque. As I discuss throughout the thesis, these new sites are significant new and 
original contributions to the existing city-text of Lima which has been built upon a 
romanticised vision of a patriarchal and militarised Peruvian Republic. However, as the 
memoryscape which has been constructed by memory activists exists within the wider 
context of the commemorative city-text, post-conflict memoryscapes are limited by the 
existing range of commemorations in Lima’s urban landscape and must compete with 
the existing city-text; in terms of the vision of the Peruvian nation they articulate, but 
also to some extent for land, funding and visitors. While I will use Palonen’s 
terminology of the commemorative city-text throughout this thesis, therefore, it is 
important to also recognise that memory activists have their own circuit of significant 
                                                          
62 Bilbija and Payne, ‘Time is Money’, p.11. 
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spaces and sites around which their own commemorations and mobilisations are 
focused.  
 
It is also important to clarify here the reasons why I have predominantly chosen to 
deploy the terminology of “space” throughout this thesis whilst, for the most part, 
eschewing any mention of “place”. In part, this is to avoid the apparent 
interchangeability with which “place” and “space” appear to have been used since the 
so-called spatial turn.63 Where geographers such as John Agnew and Tim Cresswell 
have argued that place is fundamentally made up of location, locale, and sense of place, 
I have privileged the terms emplacement and neighbourhood / district (over location / 
locale) and have made efforts to describe how architecture, design and history 
contribute to particular narratives in certain spaces.64 I have preferred these terms not 
only because I believe they describe these fundamentals of spatiality more efficiently 
and distinctly, but also because the language of space has a greater potential to refer to 
the fluid, ever-changing, constantly reproduced nature of space, as opposed to place. 
For example, Cresswell makes the case that place often refers to the “fixed, 
objective co-ordinates on the Earth's surface”.65 Levey, in her research on 
commemorative sites in Argentina and Uruguay which builds on Cresswell’s 
arguments, contends that commemoration is “essentially concerned with place-making”, 
and references Jelin’s assertion that commemoration is the process by which “space 
becomes a place”.66 In these formulations, place appears fixed and imbued with 
                                                          
63 This interchangeability is also raised by Leif Jerram, ‘Space: A Useless Category for Historical Analysis?’, History and Theory, 
52 (October 2013), pp.400-419 (p.403). 
64 J.A. Agnew, Place and politics: the geographical mediation of state and society (London, 1987); Tim Cresswell, Place: A Short 
Introduction (Oxford, 2004), p.7. 
65 Cresswell, Place, p.7. 
66 Cara Levey, Fragile Memory, Shifting Impunity: Commemoration and Contestation in Post-Dictatorship Argentina and Uruguay 
(Oxford, 2016), p.25. 
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meaning, while space is fluid and meaningless. In other words, place is somewhere, 
whilst space is nowhere. 
The apparent emptiness of spaces which are not places, however, seems 
problematic. Whilst the aforementioned analyses which have mobilised the language of 
place have contributed invaluable knowledge to literature in a vast range of areas, not 
least the literature on memory in Latin America, questions ought to be asked about this 
relationship between space and place. Does place-making significantly alter the 
relationship of “places” with the “space” around them? Are spaces not assigned 
meaning continuously by their own production, thus always acting as places? Is place-
making opposed to the production of space, and can the two come into conflict, 
producing unforeseen consequences and challenging the meanings assigned to place 
during place-making? When asking these questions, it becomes quickly clear that places 
are not defined by their spatiality at all, but are often assigned particular meanings by 
their producers or by the public. These meanings, however, have the potential to be 
contradicted or challenged by the spatiality of the site (as will be discussed later with 
reference to numerous examples).  
For this reason, and because my attention in this thesis is fundamentally geared 
towards the production and characteristics of space, I see all places as spaces under 
continuous renewal, and have privileged language about space (with particular 
distinctions) as a result.67 I have not dismissed “place” completely from my research, 
and at certain points do describe a “sense of place” in particular scenarios. It should be 
noted, however, that this sense of place is not fixed in location, but is a particular spatio-
temporal moment under constant reconstruction. 
                                                          
67 In a similar way, Jerram argues in favour of “space” being used to refer to “the particular proximate disposition of things in 
relation to one another” and for “place” to refer to “the values, beliefs, codes, and practices that surround a particular location, 
whether that location is real or imagined—for example…the ways the Cenotaph in London comes to carry meanings of mourning, 
nation, monarchy”. Jerram, ‘Space’, p.404. 
39 
 
 
Violence, culture and memory: a methodological approach 
As should be clear from the theoretical framework outlined above, while my spatial 
analysis has been developed primarily to investigate the Peruvian conflict and its 
afterlife through the lens of space, it will also allow me to approach the three key 
themes of violence, culture and memory, as well as the consistencies and links between 
them. Because of this, the methodology I have deployed in support of my theoretical 
framework and the sources I have mobilised within this thesis have broadly been shaped 
by these three key themes. 
In dealing with violence, my work largely seeks to reinterpret episodes of violence, 
many of them already well-known in the context of the Peruvian conflict, through the 
lens of space and spatial practice. As such, the source that I predominantly use for 
dealing with violence is the CVR’s Informe Final. This document (available in-full 
online) contains a number of “representative histories” of violence during the conflict, 
as well as a large number of investigated cases and analyses of the roles of different 
institutions, populations and insurgent groups.68 I have supplemented my research with 
the Informe Final with time in the CVR archives in the building of the Defensoría del 
Pueblo in Lima, examining working documents, collected testimonies and press cuttings 
which formulated the basis of what is said in the Informe Final, but which in many 
cases provide extra details on particular cases.  
When analysing cultural responses to the Peruvian conflict, I have selected a range 
of artefacts from cinema (La boca del lobo, Tarata), literature (Los rendidos, La hora 
azul) and visual art (Shining Path murals). In each case, I have selected artefacts which 
                                                          
68 The online index of the Informe Final refers to these cases as “historias representativas de la violencia”. Elsewhere in the report 
and CVR archive they are also referred to as “caso emblemáticos” (when discussing human rights abuses by the state) or “estudios 
en profundidad” (referring to the cases inestigated in depth by the CVR. CVR, Informe Final, ‘Indice de Contenido General’ 
[http://cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/index.php, accessed 23 March 2017]; CVR, Informe Final, Tm. I, p.67. 
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most clearly represent spatialised understandings of the conflict, representing either 
“Andeanist” representations of violence (as discussed in Chapter 2) or perspectives 
which seek to challenge associations between the Peruvian interior, indigeneity and 
violence (analysed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5). These are the sources which I will read 
through the second element in my theoretical framework, which focuses on key issues 
of grievability, imagined geographies and the cultural construction of race and ethnicity. 
In some cases I have analysed cultural artefacts which have not previously been studied 
in the literature on the internal armed conflict, whilst in other cases I have analysed 
sources which have formed a key part of previous analyses. The reason I have done this 
is because I believe my spatial analytical framework offers fresh insight on these 
sources and highlights elements of the narrative, characterisation and structure which 
have not previously been commented on. In approaching these sources, I have adopted a 
simple textual (or cinematic) analysis to highlight the elements of the source which 
resonate with my framework, which are related to the study of space and, therefore, may 
have previously been overlooked.  
When analysing memory, I have chosen to broaden my scope beyond memory 
museums and commemorative monuments (although these are certainly analysed in 
detail in this thesis) to also study forms of commemorative performance, symbolic 
disobedience and elements from the urban landscape. This element of my methodology 
is, arguably, the most explicitly spatial of the three as it focuses intently on reading 
space in Peru as it is today as a means for understanding the violence of the conflict 
years. 
Finally, I have supplemented each of these elements with information and arguments 
from a number of face-to-face interviews conducted with academics, artists and activists 
in Peru in 2015-2016. Whilst in Peru on a six-month fieldwork trip to conduct research 
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for this project, I conducted twenty-two interviews (of 20-75 minutes in length) with a 
range of scholars, artists and activists across Peru, many of whom could be considered 
to be “memory activists”.69 Whilst the conversations I had were immensely useful for 
locating useful sources, finding out small details about the internal armed conflict and 
building my academic networks, the primary reason I conducted these interviews was to 
present my interpretation of Peru’s recent history (and arguments about space and race) 
to an audience whose own work was strongly tied to the conflict. By doing so, I aimed 
to challenge these memory activists to think critically about the way in which space 
may, implicitly or explicitly, have influenced their own work. However, I also wanted 
to be challenged by my interviewees to think critically about the theoretical framework I 
was presenting, about how to construct an original, engaging and accurate analysis of 
the conflict, and how to incorporate some of the wide range of voices who had been, so 
far, occluded from the existing interdisciplinary literature on the conflict.  
 Throughout this process, it was important to take into account a range of 
considerations related to ethics and positionality (my own and of the interviewees). In 
particular, I was very conscious of my own positionality as a white, English male 
conducting research in Latin America and participating in interviews with female 
participants and people of indigenous descent. In order to overcome any potential 
barriers between myself and interviewees as a result of these considerations, my aim 
was to be as accommodating as possible to the people I met with, travelling across 
Lima, to Huancayo and Huamanga to a place of their choosing (often a university 
building, busy café or office). I informed my interviewees of the nature of the project 
prior to meeting by sending a formal invitation and information sheet (both approved as 
part of my application for ethical approval for the research project), written in Spanish, 
                                                          
69 For a full list of the interviews conducted see Appendix 1. 
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via email. Throughout the process of arranging and conducting these interviews, I 
aimed to make the process as transparent as possible, and kept in mind my own position 
as researcher and the interviewee’s position as expert. As such, the interviews were 
focused around hearing the knowledge, opinions and criticisms of each interviewee on a 
subject which was clearly important to them. I felt throughout this process that such an 
approach was successful in establishing commonalities and a good relationship between 
myself and each participant.  
In most cases, I had been introduced to interviewees by other interviewees and 
memory activists in Peru, and as such met the criteria set out by Sands, Bourjolly and 
Roer-Strier for “involving key informants” in cross-cultural research interviews.70  I 
also aimed to develop a rapport with interviewees so that our conversation could 
develop in a natural, relaxed manner which was, for the most part, led by the 
interviewee. I prepared between eight and twelve open-ended questions related to my 
work, the interviewee’s work and the internal conflict prior to each interview, but often 
amended this structure throughout the interview to follow up on specific points and 
allow a more natural conversation. The large majority of the interviews were conducted 
in Spanish, and were only continued in English when it was made clear by the 
interviewee (unprompted) that this was preferable. I recorded each interview on two 
electronic devices and transcribed them over a period of several months.71 The analysis 
which I conducted was primarily text-based, reading through the transcripts primarily to 
highlight where interviewees had spoken about the relationships between space, race 
and violence, whilst also making note of any important details about the conflict or 
useful quotes from interviewees to integrate into my work. As will become clear 
                                                          
70 R.G. Sands, J.N. Bourjolly and D. Roer-Strier, ‘Crossing Cultural Barriers in Research Interviewing’, Qualitative Social Work, 
6:3 (2007), pp.353-372 (p.368). 
71 Most participants told me, again unprompted, that they did not need to see the interview transcript but would like to see the final 
version of my thesis. Prior to my examination, I sent all participants a final version of the thesis in English, highlighting page 
numbers relevant to our conversation and their own work. Where I had quoted any element of our interview, I also included this 
quote from the Spanish transcript for their verification.  
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throughout this thesis, I have incorporated several quotes and interesting points from 
these interviews throughout. 
 
Memory has often been articulated as a political imperative in the present to avoid 
repeating the mistakes, and crimes, of the past. Whilst the Holocaust in Germany 
remains in some ways the paradigmatic example for why it is necessary for societies to 
remember, numerous periods of authoritarian rule and violent state repression in Latin 
America’s Southern Cone have unleashed a wave of memory practices and studies in 
recent years. On the one hand, the forms of memory produced in response to these 
examples have been conducted under the logic of “Nunca Más” or “Para que no se 
repita”.72 Memory in this sense is deployed as a historical lesson, so that future 
generations will know not to make the same mistakes. There has also been a strong 
procedural element to memory, in which memory practice has emerged as a mechanism 
for opposing state impunity, building support for state accountability for violence, and 
for challenging official, top-down histories of the past in which the violence of the state 
(and / or other actors) is denied and hidden. 
Although these understandings of memory are certainly valuable and have 
contributed a great deal to the process of truth and reconciliation in Peru, especially in 
engendering accountability for state actors, the understanding of memory I deploy in 
this thesis rests more on the importance of competing cultural understandings of the 
past. Levey, drawing on the work of Holocaust scholar James Young, argues that 
memory encompasses a range of overlapping individual and “collected” versions of the 
past, but is a process which is continually reconstructed in the present within the context 
                                                          
72 Nunca Más is the report by Argentina's National Commission on Disappeared People, published in 1986. Para que no se repita is 
a phrase used in Peru, particularly by human rights organisations such as ANFASEP. 
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of numerous social, political and cultural frameworks.73 This formulation moves away 
from previous understandings based on the work of Halbwachs, which describes the 
idea of “collective memory”, to appreciate the myriad heterogeneous versions of history 
which compete for recognition and validation in the present. This collection of 
memories ought to also encompass institutional memories which seek to attest to (or 
obfuscate) the role played by state institutions, political organisations and civil society 
groups in episodes of violence.74 Furthermore, as argued by Stern and del Pino, these 
memories rarely exist harmoniously alongside each other, but are articulated as part of 
wider struggles and battles for recognition, identity and justice.75 
The associations I make in this thesis between how political violence was 
perpetrated and colonial, Andeanist modes of thought takes a lead from the work of 
Simon Springer. Springer argues that “at base, Orientalism is a form of paranoia that 
feeds on cartographies of fear by producing ‘our world’ negatively through the 
construction of a perverse ‘Other’”. He continues by arguing that violence is often 
bound up in virulent forms of imaginative geography, and that, whilst violence ought to 
be understood as fundamentally related to cultural practice, that “the grounds on which 
some insist on affixing and bounding violence so firmly to particular places in 
articulating a ‘culture of violence’ argument are inherently unstable”.76 When analysing 
acts of political violence in Peru’s internal conflict and cultural representations of 
violence, therefore, I will be particularly attentive to how particular episodes or artefacts 
                                                          
73 Levey, Fragile Memory, Shifting Impunity, pp.16-21. 
7474 Such an approach is represented by Milton’s book manuscript on military memories of the Peruvian conflict, and by Ayala and 
Zúñiga’s research on memories of the Peruvian Navy. Milton, Conflicted Memory; Henry Ayala Abril and Antonio José Zúñiga 
Romero. ‘Entre el recuerdo y el olvido: Memorias de infantes de la Marina de guerra del Perú sobre su participación en el conflicto 
armado interno’ in (Instituto de Democracia y Derechos Humanos de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú ed.), II Concurso 
de Investigación en Derechos Humanos y Derecho Internacional Humanitario: Compilación de textos ganadores (Lima, 2015), 
pp.9-41.  
75 Stern, Battling for Hearts and Minds; Ponciano del Pino, ‘Memorias para el reconocimiento’ in (Carlos Iván Degregori, Tamia 
Portugal Teillier, Gabriel Salazar Borja and Renzo Aroni Sulca eds.), No hay mañana sin ayer: Batallas por la memoria y 
consolidación democrática en el Perú (Lima, 2015), pp.11-23 (p.17). 
76 Simon Springer, ‘Violence Sits in Places? Cultural Practice, Neoliberal Rationalism, and Virulent Imaginative Geographies’, 
Political Geography, 30 (2011), pp.90-98 (p.90, 93). 
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can be understood to be based upon forms of imaginative geography and Andeanist 
discourse. 
My use of cultural artefacts for dissecting discourses about memory and violence in 
Peru also takes a lead from the work of Cynthia Milton. Milton’s key works in this 
context include Art from a Fractured Past (a collected volume of essay on violence, 
culture and memory in Peru’s internal conflict) and Conflicted Memory (a book 
manuscript which analyses military memories of the conflict and forms of cultural 
power held by the Peruvian military).77 As will be clear, Milton’s work has been highly 
influential for this thesis, not only in terms of methodology but also in the way that she 
has tied particular forms of military memory to projects of nation-building in Peru in the 
nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The ideas of Springer and Milton will 
therefore be deployed in a manner that is complementary to my theoretical framework, 
and have shaped my methodological approach by encouraging direct attention to factors 
of violence, culture and memory, around which I have structured each chapter with 
sections devoted to each of these three factors in relation to each case study. 
 
Outline of thesis structure 
This thesis will make distinct arguments about how the politics and production of space 
influenced both insurgent and state violence in different regions during the conflict. 
Because of this, the thesis will revolve around four case study chapters which deal with: 
Shining Path violence in the interior; counterinsurgent violence in the interior; insurgent 
violence in Lima; and counterinsurgent violence in Lima. Chapter 5 will deal 
specifically with the spatialisation of structural violence during Peru’s neoliberal 
revolution. Separating my analyses of insurgent and state violence, and of violence in 
                                                          
77 Milton (ed.), Art from a Fractured Past; Milton, Conflicted Memory. 
46 
 
the interior and violence in Lima, will allow me to highlight how Shining Path and the 
Peruvian state embarked upon geographically contingent strategies in which the violent 
practices they utilised (including assassinations, bombings and sabotage on the one 
hand, mass reprisals, torture and disappearances on the other) were deployed in different 
regions. Each chapter is structured in such a way that the themes of violence, culture 
and memory will be assessed (through analyses of a selection of cultural artefacts and 
forms of memory practice) alongside each case study. 
The first of these chapters will focus on a spatial analysis of Shining Path, 
incorporating their genesis, doctrine, and the forms of violence they perpetrated across 
Andean and Amazonian regions throughout the internal conflict. This analysis will 
demonstrate that Shining Path can, and ought to, be seen not solely as a product of 
external forces (such as revolutionary Marxism and the Cold War) but a syncretic 
phenomenon produced by transnational ideas about global revolution and the local 
politics of space in Peru. This local politics of space, which I will refer to as a tradition 
of Andean radicalism, includes the coalition of Leftist radicals and peasant movements 
which emerged (across many Andean departments but particularly in Ayacucho) during 
the middle of the twentieth century, and which has been identified by Heilman and 
Rénique (among others).78 Using the Lucanamarca massacre as a case study, the 1983 
reprisal conducted by Shining Path which resulted in the deaths of almost 70 
campesinos, I will argue that this moment represented the collapse of the coalition 
between radical Leftists and the peasant population in Ayacucho. However, by 
extending my analysis beyond the violence of the internal conflict to incorporate 
Shining Path’s cultural production and forms of memory practice, I will argue that it is 
                                                          
78 I use the term Andean radicalism deliberately as this broad tradition, encompassing a range of different movements and groups, in 
general tended to articulate variations on the “Andean utopia” as described by Flores Galindo. See Alberto Flores Galindo, 
Buscando un inca: identidad y utopía en los Andes (Lima, 1986); Heilman, Before the Shining Path; José Luis Rénique, ‘La utopía 
andina hoy: un comentario a Buscando un Inca’, Debate Agrario, 2 (1988), pp.131-45. 
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possible to see a continuation of the values of Andean radicalism. Whilst Shining Path 
cadres often subverted the doctrine of their party leaders and moulded revolutionary 
ideas to their own local histories and surroundings, memory activists have continued to 
articulate non-violent projects for change which are rooted in grassroots mobilisation 
and addressing geographical imbalances in Peru’s socio-spatial structure. As such, the 
work of memory activists (such as ANFASEP and Apoyo Para Paz) in Ayacucho today 
continues to draw on memories of past mobilisations and a tradition of Andean 
radicalism (albeit a tradition which rejects the violence perpetrated by Shining Path). 
The consistent factor in each of these discussions is an analysis of the local politics of 
space and place in Ayacucho, and I will highlight how the tradition of Andean 
radicalism came to shape violence, culture and memory (in relation to Shining Path) in 
important ways. 
Chapter 2 will address the issue of space in relation to the counterinsurgency 
operation conducted by the Peruvian state and armed forces in the interior. Whilst also 
articulating the counterinsurgency operation as a response to local politics and Andean 
radicalism, I will argue that the violence perpetrated by state agents represented the 
exercise of sovereign power, conducted against communities which were deemed to 
have become infected by radicalism. Using detention centres created by the armed 
forces, including Cuartel Los Cabitos and La Casa Rosada, I will use concepts of 
sovereign power, exception, and graduated sovereignty (from Foucault, Agamben and 
Ong) to argue that state violence was conducted under the logic of exception and 
exclusion, and that the creation of Emergency Zones, which in effect extended localised 
spaces of exception to cover whole regions, represents a form of spatialised graduated 
sovereignty and the differential management of populations by the Peruvian state.  
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Furthermore, I will argue that this practice is not only heavily contingent on 
geography, but intensely racialised, a product of the intellectual traditions of the 
Peruvian armed forces, and textured by Peru’s historical socio-spatial structure. The 
subsequent analysis of military cultural production and memory practice in the 
aftermath of the conflict will highlight forms of cultural production and memory 
practice where this racialised, intellectual cultural framework has been reinforced, and 
others where the military’s heroic narratives of the conflict have been challenged. 
My third chapter will deal specifically with violence perpetrated by Shining Path in 
Lima, an analysis which revolves around the case study of the Tarata bombing in 1992. 
Rather than seeing this as an exceptional or isolated incident, I aim to contextualise the 
bombing within Shining Path’s revolutionary strategy, a strategy which was understood 
by the party leadership in intensely spatial terms. However, I will also argue that the 
Tarata bombing has, in some forms of cultural production and memory practice, come 
to be seen as representative of experiences of violence in the capital which renders 
invisible many of the other forms of violence perpetrated against the communities of 
Lima’s barriadas. Furthermore, the bombing has been used as the impetus for a shift in 
geographical imaginings of the conflict, allowing residents of the capital’s middle-class 
suburbs to be repositioned as victims. In this sense, I use Tarata as a case which not 
only demonstrates important arguments about violent practice, but also about the nature 
of cultural representations of the conflict and forms of memory practice which are 
constructed from a distinct geographical position in order to support a particular 
narrative.  
Chapter 4 returns to an analysis of violence perpetrated by state agents in the 
conflict, this time the 1986 massacre of over 250 prisoners in the El Frontón, 
Lurigancho and Santa Bárbara prisons. In this chapter, I will argue that the forms of 
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sovereign power deployed by the Peruvian state and armed forces in the interior 
(discussed in Chapter 2) came to be increasingly deployed in the capital as the conflict 
progressed. Therefore, whilst a system of graduated sovereignty and spatialised 
exception was established by the Peruvian state in the 1983-5 period, from 1985 
onwards Lima also began to suffer the exercise of sovereign power from which it had 
previously been protected. This represented a shift in the geography of graduated 
sovereignty which had previously denoted only provincial departments as regions 
suitable for this form of state power. When turning to the forms of cultural production 
and memory practice produced in response to the massacres, I will highlight that 
Senderista memories of the conflict have largely been suppressed, or ignored, because 
Shining Path members are not considerable to be grievable in Peruvian society. In part, 
this condition of non-grievability can be read as a product of the violence waged by 
Shining Path against the civilian population during the internal conflict, but it can also 
be seen in the intellectual traditions of the Peruvian state and military. In particular, the 
use of violence to exclude, and eliminate, political opposition has precedents in the 
imprisonment of Apristas on El Frontón in the 1930s, and in the 1932 Chan Chan 
massacre in which over 50 Apristas were summarily executed. Because of these factors, 
I will argue that there are deep historical roots to the forms of state violence perpetrated 
during the conflict, and that they are premised upon a cultural framework which 
understood the exclusion of political opponents in spatial terms.  
The fifth and final chapter will continue with a similar approach, yet, rather than 
dealing with a singular instance of violence, will be based upon analysis of structural 
violence during Peru’s neoliberal revolution. I will use this case study to demonstrate 
continuities between the impacts of economic restructuring and the forms of physical 
state violence perpetrated in the 1980s and in Fujimori’s Peru in the 1990s. 
Furthermore, I will highlight how the the neoliberal regime which was created by 
50 
 
Alberto Fujimori in this period had its roots in the exclusionary state violence of the 
1980s and earlier. I will frame this argument with an analysis of how cultural responses 
to the 1997 hostage crisis have acted as an important moment around which forms of 
cultural production and memory practice have crystallised in order to support military 
narratives of the conflict, and Peru’s neoliberal order, as a whole. Whilst many of the 
discussed forms of memory practice have challenged this heroic narrative and presented 
alternative interpretations of state violence, I will argue that they have also 
fundamentally failed, in many ways, to challenge the underlying cultural framework 
which dictates Peru’s historical socio-spatial structure and provides the basis for a long 
history of exclusionary state violence. 
 
Selection of case studies and objects of study 
The cases which make up each of these five chapters have been carefully selected 
according to the following criteria. Because the focus of my thesis is, largely, to 
reinterpret existing data and knowledge through the lens of space, I have selected cases 
which could be broadly assumed to be emblematic cases from Peru’s conflict, all of 
which are featured as individual case studies in the CVR’s Informe Final, and around 
which particular memory narratives (which fall distinctly into either the military or 
human rights-based memory camp) have been formulated. To some extent, then, my 
aim is to continue to use these cases as paradigmatic episodes of violence which are 
able to explain instances of violence suffered by other communities throughout the 
conflict. Chapters 1 and 3 deal with the logics of insurgent violence during the conflict 
through two cases which demonstrate the use of different strategies (such as bombings, 
retiradas, infiltration of civil society), in different regions (in the interior and in Lima) 
at different stages of the conflict (Shining Path’s mobilisation in the Andes and Amazon 
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in the 1980s, and encroachment into Lima 1985-92).79 Similarly, Chapters 2 and 4 use 
their case studies to demonstrate how the state used torture, disappearances and mass 
reprisals to tackle insurgency, predominantly in the interior at first but increasingly in 
Lima after 1985. In Chapter 5, I argue that the logics of counterinsurgency came to 
shape Peru’s neoliberal revolution after 1990 and the forms of structural violence which 
it embodied. However, emblematic case studies can never be completely sufficient to 
describe the panoply of experiences of violence during the internal armed conflict, and 
so I have provided comparative examples (and drawn attention to the weaknesses of 
particular emblematic cases) where appropriate.  
My selection of cultural artefacts and memory projects in support of my case study 
chapters follows a similar logic. Firstly, I have attempted to use, where possible, sources 
which deal directly with the episodes of violence referenced in the chapter. Where this 
was not possible, I have selected sources which deal with similar ideas and themes, an 
approach which has allowed me to conduct a consistent level of analysis across 
violence, culture and memory within each chapter. I have paid particular attention to 
artefacts and memory projects which I believe push memory debates and 
representations of violence beyond the current historiographical framework which is 
dominated by military-based and human rights-based memory narratives. However, I 
have also made distinct efforts to incorporate these narratives into my analysis through 
important selected examples. In this scenario, the artefacts discussed are intended to be 
broadly illustrative of discourses in culture and memory, rather than dealing with all of 
the sources readily available.  
I have also been careful to ensure that a range of geographical perspectives are 
represented in my selection of case studies, cultural artefacts and forms of memory 
                                                          
79 The retiradas were a practice whereby Shining Path forced Andean communities to “withdraw” from their villages to more 
isolated areas where they could be watched more closely by the insurgents (and where the insurgents could avoid military reprisals).  
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practice. In part, as referenced above, this is in response to Soja and Massey’s 
arguments about the construction of narratives and the heterogeneity of space. The 
spaces in which these case studies occur are not vacuums but socially-produced, porous 
containers of historical-spatial trajectories which mould and influence future events in 
their own unique ways. This notion has the potential to drastically alter understandings 
of the internal conflict from one periodisation of political violence (or terrorism, or state 
violence, or civil war) to an appreciation of the myriad contemporaneous trajectories 
which constituted the process of the conflict.80 
It is also, however, a response to, and an attempt to avoid, the present 
historiographical situation in which narratives of the internal conflict have 
predominantly been constructed from the Peruvian capital, with the result that the 
discursive space in which Andean peasant communities and Senderistas can tell their 
stories about the internal conflict is limited. Although the publication of the CVR’s 
Informe Final has certainly opened up the range of spaces and forms of memory which 
are considered acceptable discourse on violence, the power to construct narratives and 
explanations of the conflict still resides in Lima. For this reason, whilst not providing an 
antidote to this situation, I have attempted to engage with forms of testimony from 
peasant communities, cultural artefacts produced in the Andes, interviews with scholars 
and activists in Huamanga and Huancayo, and forms of memory practice in Ayacucho 
and Junín where relevant.  
 
  
                                                          
80 Doreen Massey quoted in David Featherstone, Sophie Bond and Joe Painter, ‘“Stories so far”: A conversation with Doreen 
Massey’ in (David Featherstone and Joe Painter eds.), Spatial Politics (Chichester, 2013), pp.253-66 (p.264). 
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Chapter 1: Space and the Shining Path 
In this chapter, I will develop a spatial analysis of Shining Path and its position within 
the historiography of political violence in Peru. I will do this firstly by analysing 
descriptions of space in Shining Path ideology and propaganda, demonstrating that 
while Shining Path had a tactical appreciation of local geography, the party’s leadership 
preferred to derive their political programme from Maoist ideology rather than from the 
local cirumstances of Ayacucho department. Previous scholarship by Carlos Iván 
Degregori and Nelson Manrique has similarly emphasised Shining Path’s Maoist 
ideology and organisational structure, arguing that instead of deriving a nuanced 
programme for change from the social contours of the space around them, Shining Path 
ideologues instead attempted to transplant Chinese Maoism into Peru, using spatial 
metaphors to describe how they would erase the State and produce their own to rise in 
its place.81 In short, they argue that Shining Path believed that Peru could be wiped 
blank and made into a vacuum to be filled by a mobilised, class-conscious peasantry, an 
approach which was ignorant to the needs, or indeed existence, of those it was supposed 
to serve.  
However, this existing scholarship has tended to downplay, and at times overlook, 
the ability of party cadres to use, and at times subvert, the party’s ideology to engage in 
their own local battles, eliminating unpopular local officials and rival families. In order 
to demonstrate this, I will also explore the differences between space in “Gonzalo 
Thought” and in works by other ayacuchano radicals, arguing that whilst the party 
leadership’s appreciation of Andean history was fairly superficial, there were numerous 
radical movements, local conflicts and smaller rebellions which pre-dated Shining Path 
                                                          
81 Degregori, Ayacucho 1969-1979; Nelson Manrique, ‘Pensamiento, acción y base política del movimiento Sendero Luminoso: La 
guerra y las primeras respuestas de los comuneros (1964-1983)’ in (Anne Pérotin-Dumon ed.), Historizar el pasado vivo en América 
Latina [http://www.historizarelpasadovivo.cl/downloads/manrique.pdf, accessed 17 June 2017]. 
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and constituted a complex tradition of revolution in the South-Central region of the 
Peruvian Andes.  
Using the spatial theoretical framework outlined in the introduction, I will argue that 
the existence of antagonism between the ayacuchano population and the Peruvian state 
contributed to a distinct sense of place in the region. By this, I refer to a radical, local 
political culture produced by a history of systemic, or structural, state violence and local 
efforts to engage in resistance.82 However, it is crucial, as Springer argues, to 
differentiate between narratives which characterise the Andes as naturally or inherently 
violent, in which violence is “produced by the frenzied depravity of savage or 
pathological minds”, and those which see the emplacement of violence as the product of 
diverse agencies, socio-spatial structures and long-standing historical tensions.83  
Following this, I will examine the case of Lucanamarca, Shining Path’s most 
infamous and barbaric act of violence, with reference to archival documents and the 
Informe Final of the CVR. Through this analysis, I will argue that it is important to 
understand Lucanamarca as a result of Shining Path’s spatialised military strategy 
which aimed to establish a territorial core of support in Ayacucho, and demonstrate that 
peasant communities shaped this strategy through support and resistance. The massacre 
marked a new phase in Shining Path military strategy in which the insurgents not only 
targeted military patrols and local officials, but increasingly perpetrated reprisals against 
peasant communities. Lucanamarca therefore acted as a powerful demonstration of 
Shining Path’s spatial conceptualisation of proletarian revolution, in which old societies 
would be wiped clean for the creation of “New” power. Furthermore, this analysis 
demonstrates the far more ephemeral nature of Shining Path’s presence in the region 
                                                          
82 See also Rénique, Incendiar la pradera. 
83 Springer, ‘Violence sits in places’, p.93. 
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and raises questions of any narrative which represents the party as an all-powerful, 
monolithic, inherently barbaric organisation with peasants as their passive victims.  
I have chosen Lucanamarca as a suitable case study through which to analyse 
Shining Path violence because it is often held up as an emblematic episode of violence 
during the internal conflict. For example: Lucanamarca was one of the first four case 
studies put on display by LUM in Lima after its inauguration; it is one of twenty-three 
“representative histories of violence” in the index of the CVR’s Informe Final; and a 
documentary on the effects of the massacre in the community today was released in 
2008, based on material collected during the CVR investigations.84 In this sense, there is 
already plenty of excellent material on the case which I will re-evaluate through my 
theoretical framework. However, whilst I recognise that certain cases of violence do 
appear emblematic of wider patterns during rhe conflict, I will also assess why 
particular episodes have come to be redefined as representative cases (i.e. localised 
events used to stand in for wider experiences of violence), which forms of violence are 
privileged or rendered invisible by such cases, and what their existence says about 
memory practices of the conflict as a whole. In doing so, I will draw comparisons with 
other episodes of Shining Path violence in order to highlight differences and similarities 
with Lucanamarca, and determine the extent to which this case can be said to be 
representative of wider experiences. 
Finally, I will explore the way in which Shining Path’s relationship with peasant 
communities and Andean radicalism has been represented in forms of cultural 
production and memory practice produced in response to the conflict. On the one hand 
this includes forms of Shining Path cultural production such as pamphlets and murals. 
On the other, I will work with representations of Shining Path violence in the Museo de 
                                                          
84 Lucanamarca, dir. by Carlos Cárdenas Tovar and Héctor Gálvez (TV Cultura, 2008). 
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la Memoria in Huamanga. This site is of particular interest to me because the Museo 
represents a spatialised understanding of the internal conflict. I will argue that this 
memory museum has attempted to identify Shining Path more strongly with responses 
to structural violence from peasant communities, and in doing so articulate a narrative 
of Peruvian society which has its roots in traditions of Andean radicalism.  
Through this analysis, it is possible to see that Shining Path’s association with 
Andean communities is far clearer in Senderista cultural production and Andean sites of 
memory than in the documents produced by the party leadership. This suggests that 
location can be an important factor for determining the memory narrative which a given 
site produces. It is necessary to ask, in these cases, if memory narratives which highlight 
issues of structural violence and the radical political culture and traditions which 
produced Shining Path are only able to be created in the Andean communities which 
have experienced those same histories.  
 
Throughout this chapter, I will also aim to challenge a certain linguistic orthodoxy 
which exists around Shining Path violence in certain sectors of Peruvian society to this 
day. Numerous times whilst discussing my fieldwork informally with limeños, my 
euphemistic use of “the internal conflict”, “the violence in the ‘80s” or “the civil war” to 
describe my subject area was corrected: “Ah, the terrorism you mean!”. But terrorism as 
a term is highly problematic. It has been used frequently by the Peruvian press, 
politicians, and even the CVR (who, also euphemistically, denounce the “terrorist 
characteristics” and “terrorist character of [Shining Path] actions”) to denounce the 
insurgents as irrationally violent and, as Žižek highlights, characterise them as 
pathological anachronisms, resistant to modernity and progress.85 It was also (and still 
                                                          
85 CVR, Informe Final, Tm. VIII, pp.317-9; Slavoj Žižek, Living in the End Times (London, 2011), p.395. 
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is) a term widely deployed by the Peruvian armed forces to justify massive human 
rights abuses against the civilian population, and to vilify migrants displaced by the 
ongoing violence.86 The unease with which the CVR refers to terrorism, therefore, is 
derived partly from the term’s usage by the armed forces, and so its use in the Informe 
Final is mostly limited to references to bombings and blackouts as terrorist acts design 
to create widespread fear.  
Although in many ways the meanings of these terms overlap, I will use the terms 
insurgent or insurgency when describing Shining Path, instead of language about 
terrorism or guerrillas (a term which, it could be argued, accepts too readily the heroic 
language deployed by Shining Path about their own actions). The term insurgent is by 
no means neutral, but I believe that it best describes Shining Path’s position of aiming 
to create a popular, ideological uprising against an established state, whilst being 
flexible enough to argue that the group were an insurgent movement who, in particular 
times and spaces, used terrorism and guerrilla warfare tactics to achieve their goals.  
Furthermore, to refer to Shining Path as terrorists, or the more colloquial “terruco”, 
reflects a particular perspective on the violence of the conflict. For example, Burt has 
highlighted that, during the Fujimori era in the 1990s, all forms of political opposition 
to the regime were regularly denounced as terrorists, whilst Oliart has also highlighted 
that this association had echoes in the wider population who continued to repudiate 
Leftist candidates throughout the 1990s.87 As Aguirre argues, use of terruco as an insult 
“contributed decisively to the stigmatisation of sectors of the Peruvian population, 
including human rights activists, families of detainees and victims of violence, and 
people of indigenous descent in general”.88 Use of these terms therefore amounts to the 
                                                          
86 ANFASEP, ¿Hasta Cuándo tu Silencio?: Testimonios de Dolor y Coraje (Lima, 2015), p.23. 
87 Jo-Marie Burt, ‘"Quien habla es terrorista": The Political Use of Fear in Fujimori's Peru’, Latin American Research Review, 41:3 
(2006), pp.32-62 (p.34); Patricia Oliart, ‘Alberto Fujimori: “The Man Peru Needed?”’ in (Steve J. Stern ed.) Shining and Other 
Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995 (London, 1998), pp.411-24 (p.422). 
88 Carlos Aguirre, ‘Terruco de m…: Insulto y estigma en la guerra sucia peruana’, Histórica, 35:1 (2011), pp.103-39 (p.103). 
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conflation of political and biopolitical enemies, with the archetypal terrorist viewed as 
both Leftist and indigenous.89 In this chapter, therefore, I will therefore avoid the use of 
terminology which refers to Shining Path solely as terrorists, and make reference to the 
complex array of violent practices they engaged in outside of Lima.90 
 
Space in Shining Path ideology 
To understand the revolutionary and military tactics of Shining Path, it is vital to 
understand how the party’s leadership conceived of the space in which they existed, 
attempted to reshape that space through armed insurgency, and tried to use space to 
create a new form of state and society in Peru. Previous scholarship on Shining Path, 
represented in the conclusions of the CVR and in the work of Degregori, has 
emphasised the “fundamentalist” ideology of the group as a driving force behind the 
violence perpetrated by the group during the conflict.91 Firstly, I will aim to build on 
this work by arguing that Shining Path’s attempt to impose their Maoist doctrine upon 
Andean communities is representative of a particularly colonial mode of thought, in 
which ideas or policies which have worked in one country are mapped onto another 
without appreciation of its specific local circumstances. However, I also believe that 
previous scholarship has placed too much emphasis on Shining Path’s ideology, and has 
paid insufficient attention to how local circumstances, peasant communities and party 
cadres shaped Shining Path from outside and in. 
Officially speaking, orthodox Maoist doctrine formed the basis of “Gonzalo 
Thought”.92 The party leadership saw themselves as the vanguard of the Peruvian 
                                                          
89 Drinot has previously highlighted how political and biopolitical enemies were conflated in the discourse of anti-communism 
deployed by Alan García during his second Presidency in Peru (2006-2011). See Drinot, ‘The Meaning of Alan García’, p.187. 
90 Shining Path violence in the capital is dealt with in Chapter 3: ‘Tarata and the intensification of violence in Lima’. 
91 CVR, Informe Final, Tm. VIII, p.317; Degregori, Ayacucho 1969-1979, p.181. 
92 “Gonzalo Thought” is a term used to describe Abimael Guzmán’s own brand of Marxist-Leninist-Maoism, the official ideology of 
Shining Path as far as the party leadership was concerned. Comrade Gonzalo was Guzmán’s nom de guerre. 
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revolution within the context of global Marxist struggle, and believed that Guzmán’s 
ideology represented “the application of Marxist-Leninist-Maoism to the conditions of 
the Peruvian revolution”.93 The aim of this doctrine was to “represent the proletariat and 
unite with the poor peasantry, the destiny of the revolution depends on their 
mobilisation”.94 In party documents, there are almost no references to José Carlos 
Mariátegui (except to mention that he was the original Peruvian Communist Party 
founder), whilst Marx, Lenin, Mao and Guzmán are exclusively cited as influences 
(particularly the latter two), and a range of other Leftist leaders or groups (including 
Gorbachev, Castro, Izquierda Unida, PCP-Patria Roja) are denounced as revisionists.95  
Quite often in existing literature on the internal conflict, including in the Informe 
Final, “Gonzalo Thought” is represented as the only factor necessary for explaining 
Shining Path violence. Manrique, for example, argues that “violence became an 
absolute virtue” in Shining Path ideology whilst the CVR argues that the insurgents’ 
“fundamentalist ideology and totalitarian organization” manipulated peasant 
communities into a revolutionary mass for their own purposes.96 Yet such 
interpretations risk creating circular arguments in which ideology exists for its own 
sake, and occludes the extent to which Shining Path mobilised spatial metaphors 
regularly in their propaganda, and to which geography was central to the party 
leadership’s conceptualisation of how a Peruvian version of a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist 
revolution would unfold. The party strategy was to: 
“transform Peruvian society through a Democratic Revolution, 
developing the Popular War…that follows the path to encircle the 
                                                          
93 PCP-SL, ‘Sobre la ideología, el Marxismo-Leninismo-Maoismo, como punto de partida para hacer la Guerra Popular’, in (PCP-
SL ed.), ¡Viva el Maoismo! ¡Abajo el Revisionismo! (Lima, 1988), pp.81-84 (p.84). 
94 PCP-SL, Breves notas aclaratorias acerca de los tergiversados hechos de Lucanamarca en la Guerra Popular del Perú (Lima, 
2006), p.3. 
95 PCP-SL, ‘Sobre el Marxismo-Leninismo-Maoismo’, in (PCP-SL ed.), ¡Viva el Maoismo! ¡Abajo el Revisionismo! (Lima, 1986), 
pp.93-110 (p.109). 
96 Manrique, ‘Pensamiento, acción y base política del movimiento Sendero Luminoso’; CVR, Informe Final, Tm. VIII, p.317. 
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cities from the countryside, create revolutionary bases of support, 
destroying the old State”.97 
These beliefs were transmitted through the party’s hierarchical structure to the lower 
ranks and reinforced through adherence to rigid customs and rules. Young bands of 
Senderistas would patrol the puna (a grassland region of the central Andean highlands, 
located roughly 3000-3500m above sea level) singing: 
“In the final battle we will defeat fascism. 
Down with imperialism! Down!… 
Conquering the bases we will make that new State, 
constructing the future with our blood… 
We are the initiators of the peoples’ war, 
forming detachments, carrying out actions. 
Gonzalo brought the light, 
taking from Marx, Lenin, and Mao 
he forged the purest steel.”98 
In Shining Path doctrine, the peasantry were idealised as a proletariat awaiting class 
consciousness. As will be seen later in discussions of Shining Path cultural production, 
such as Elena Iparraguirre’s poem En mi pueblo, indigeneity is not something to be 
preserved but something to be erased in order for Peru’s lower classes to be able to 
become a mobilised proletarian class. That being said, Shining Path’s cultural 
production was diverse and many of the party’s murals, paintings and songs do depict 
indigenous faces and voices. This disparity suggests that Shining Path cadres 
                                                          
97 PCP-SL, Breves notas aclaratorias acerca de los tergiversados hechos de Lucanamarca en la Guerra Popular del Perú, pp.7-8. 
98 Gavilán, When Rains Became Floods, pp.10-26. 
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interpreted party ideology in their own ways, and that rather than simply accepting 
“Gonzalo Thought” as their guiding message, they looked for different ways in which 
Maoism could be applied to Peruvian, and their own local, conditions.  
The ideology of the Shining Path leadership, however, built upon the pre-existing 
and widely held belief that there were Two Perus; one modern (located in la costa) and 
one ancient (in the la sierra). This construction of Peruvian geography, which has 
existed since the early Republican period, relies upon an imaginative geography which, 
based on the work of Said, can be defined as the “invention and construction of 
geographical space beyond a physical territory, which constructs boundaries around our 
very consciousness and attitudes, often by inattention to or the obscuring of local 
realities”.99 This imaginative geography is regularly mobilised to justify a range of 
dubious political positions, including the more conservative, fatalistic assertion that the 
existence of Two Perus is somehow a natural phenomenon (and therefore it is not worth 
attempting to right the social wrongs that are a result of it), as well as more liberal, 
exoticising discourses which highlight the plight of Peru’s indigenous, mountain-
dwelling population whilst at the same time lumping them together into a homogenised 
mass.  
To some extent, Shining Path’s interpretation of the Two Perus reversed previous 
constructions by locating Old power in the coast and New power in the highlands. 
Nonetheless, “Gonzalo Thought” relied on a homogenising geographical imagination by 
locating these oppositional elements in the cities and in the countryside, and attempted 
to mobilise frustration at the social and cultural divides implied by the idea of Two 
Perus. Not only was Peru’s socio-spatial structure identified as a symptom of the 
                                                          
99 Méndez, ‘De indio a serrano’, p.58. This idea is particularly developed in Edward Said, Orientalism (London, 1978); Quote taken 
from Karen M. Morin, ‘Edward W. Said’ in (Phil Hubbard and Rob Kitchin eds.), Key Thinkers on Space and Place (London, 
2011), pp.337-344 (p.339). 
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“dictatorship of landowners and the big bourgeoisie”, but it was identified as something 
that must be overcome as part of the process of a Democratic Revolution.100 
Whilst rhetorically useful, the idea of Two Perus fails to reflect the reality of daily 
life and the local histories of the ayacuchano communities in which Shining Path 
garnered most support. That Abimael Guzmán coupled this simplistic spatial discourse 
with rigid Maoist doctrine, an ideology borrowed from elsewhere and transplanted onto 
Peru, demonstrates how inattentive to the politics of space Shining Path really were. 
 
However, there were more subtle analyses of Peruvian geography and social relations 
available. Ayacucho: Hambre y Esperanza by Antonio Díaz Martínez, for example, 
develops a critique of Peruvian society in similar terms to Shining Path by highlighting 
the role of latifundista landowners and the country’s “obsolete colonial structure” in 
enforcing poverty on the communities of Ayacucho.101 Through a series of chapters 
based on his travels to the different provinces of the department, Díaz traces the 
historical roots of armed rebellion through to 1980, highlighting the numerous 
contradictions and failures of Velasco’s Agrarian Reform.102 As Starn argues, Díaz’s 
identification of the shared experiences and frustrations of disparate communities across 
Ayacucho allowed him to envisage seeds of rebellion years before the emergence of 
Shining Path.103 Díaz Martínez’s argument does make reference to Mao Zedong and 
Karl Marx, but also to historians of Peru such as Klarén and Flores Galindo.104 
Furthermore, he discusses phenomena such as gamonalismo, the forced displacement of 
peasants, peasant mobilisation in the sierra (highlighting cases in Puno, Huanta and 
                                                          
100 PCP-SL, Breves notas aclaratorias acerca de los tergiversados hechos de Lucanamarca en la Guerra Popular del Perú, p.8. 
101 Antonio Díaz Martínez, Ayacucho: Hambre y Esperanza (Lima, 1985), p.33. 
102 Díaz Martínez, Ayacucho, p.196. 
103 Starn, ‘Missing the Revolution’, p.74. 
104 Díaz Martínez, Ayacucho, p.180. 
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Cusco) and ties the political situation he witnessed in Ayacucho in 1969 back to earlier 
peasant movements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.105 Therefore, 
whilst the terminology and conclusions of Díaz are similar to those used by the party 
(Díaz Martínez was later a key figure in Shining Path), his analysis is grounded in the 
local histories of communities across the Andes.  
In a similar fashion, Los ilegítimos by Hildebrando Pérez Huarancca uses a family 
metaphor to describe Andean communities as the illegitimate children of the Peruvian 
state, cast aside and forgotten.106 As with Díaz Martínez’s work, Los ilegítimos reflected 
the atmosphere of antagonism in Ayacucho in the decades preceding the conflict and, in 
doing so, contributed to a sense of place in which Ayacucho would be the centre of the 
revolution, albeit one which was was based upon local concerns and experiences. Both 
Díaz Martínez and Pérez Huarancca can therefore be seen to divert somewhat from the 
strict Maoist doctrine of “Gonzalo Thought” and instead represent a more syncretic 
approach to Shining Path mobilisation in which Maoist ideas are more thoroughly 
adapted to ayacuchano and Peruvian history. 
In Peruvian literature, there was also an established tradition of indigenista writers 
who demonstrated increasing optimism about the future of the Peruvian nation if greater 
cultural integration was achieved between the Creole coast and the indigenous sierra. 
This optimism was demonstrated by Mariátegui, but it arguably culminated in the work 
of José María Arguedas who, according to Archibald, demonstrated the existence of 
numerous projects of modernity in the twentieth century which came to shape the 
Andean world in different ways.107 Yet, despite the clear potential for discourses such as 
these to be integrated into a truly syncretic form of Peruvian Marxism, they were 
                                                          
105 Ibid., pp.180-6. 
106 Hildebrando Pérez Huarancca, Los ilegítimos (Huamanga, 2015). 
107 Priscilla Archibald, Imagining Modernity in the Andes (Plymouth, 2011), p.16. 
64 
 
anathema to Abimael Guzmán. This is particularly reminiscent of Tyner’s argument 
about Cambodia, insofar as both the Khmer Rouge and Shining Path saw the 
communities around them as obstacles to their Revolutions. For the Revolution to 
succeed, Andean space had to be wiped clean and the old society had to be destroyed.108 
Yet, as del Pino argues, this totalising ideology was not necessarily consistent 
throughout the party’s rank and file and "becomes more flexible as one descends from 
the pinnacle towards the social base”.109 While many in the party leadership preferred to 
take doctrinal and cultural cues from Mao’s Cultural Revolution, Shining Path cadres 
tended to interpret these teachings in relation to their own backgrounds. As Ritter has 
highlighted, these practices produced interesting cultural results. Although Shining Path 
militants often showed a great degree of antipathy towards Andean culture and banned 
folkloric customs in numerous villages, party cadres also blended their ideological 
outlook with folkloric musical forms, creating revolutionary songs in the style of 
Andean huaynos. Many Senderistas, Ritter argues, therefore saw themselves both as 
militants and as active members of their own communities.110 Because of this, party 
cadres took their cues on how to act from two distinct cultural spaces: Mao’s China 
(transmitted to them through the party leadership) and their own villages and towns.  
Shining Path’s official doctrine, on the other hand, was always outwards-looking. 
Although it was ostensibly an application of orthodox Maoism to Peruvian conditions, 
and as Rothwell argues there was a degree of “domestication” of Maoist ideology, the 
party ideologues demonstrated an obsessive tendency to refer to a pantheon of 
international Marxist figures rather than intellectuals from their own country. Party 
documents often wished eternal glory upon Mao and argued that, despite his death, “his 
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ideas and actions live on in the working class”.111 Of particular importance were 
translations of Mao’s speeches and poems when he talked of removing the mountains 
(referring to imperialism and feudalism) in order allow for the creation of a fairer 
society.112 This idea is particularly illustrative as Shining Path leaders tended to 
interpret the mountains, and the peasants who were historically associated with them as 
serranos, as obstacles to progress and a modern proletariat. Shining Path’s leaders did 
not seek to create a peasant-led revolution (arguably because most of the party’s leaders 
were from the provincial middle-class) and aimed to control the organisation of 
indigenous communities themselves. In following this strategy, they failed to truly adapt 
Maoist thought to Peruvian reality.   
Building on the work of Degregori, Portocarrero argues that the fundamentalist 
character of “Gonzalo Thought”, Shining Path’s obsession with Maoist doctrine and 
political texts from China and the Soviet Union, reflect a distinctly religious nature in 
the insurgents’ beliefs. In this interpretation, young militants wholeheartedly accepted 
Guzmán’s simplified version of Marxism because it offered them a form of redemption 
from their excluded position in Peruvian society.113 However, this argument appears to 
underestimate the degree to which militants interpreted “Gonzalo Thought” alongside 
their own personal and local communal histories, and perhaps overstates how readily 
they accepted party doctrine. Rothwell argues, for example, that the peruanificación of 
Maoism was more clearly visible in the application of Maoist strategy by party cadres 
who were required to adapt Mao’s military strategy to the Andean puna.114  
                                                          
111 PCP-SL, ‘¡Gloria eterna al presidente Mao Tsetung!: Gran Maestro del Proletariado Internacional de los Pueblos Oprimidos y de 
la Revolución Mundial (1976)’, in (ed. PCP-SL), ¡Viva el Maoismo! ¡Abajo el Revisionismo! (Lima, 1988), pp.41-46 (p.46). 
112 Mao Zedong, ‘Retorno a las Montañas Chingkang (1965)’ in (ed. PCP-SL), ¡Viva el Maoismo! ¡Abajo el Revisionismo! (Lima, 
1988), p.9; Mao Zedong, ‘El Viejo tonto que removió las montañas’ in (ed. PCP-SL), ¡Viva el Maoismo! ¡Abajo el Revisionismo! 
(Lima, 1988), pp.17-22. 
113 Gonzalo Portocarrero, Profetas del odio: Raíces culturales y líderes de Sendero Luminoso (Lima, 2012), pp.12-13. 
114 Matthew D. Rothwell, Transpacific Revolutionaries: The Chinese Revolution in Latin America (London, 2013), p.69. 
66 
 
The party leadership was almost blind to the ways in which their militants adapted 
ideas to make sense to their own lives, or connected Marxist ideas to previous 
revolutionary movements in Ayacucho and other Andean departments. Whilst writers 
such as Díaz Martínez and Pérez Huarancca demonstrate the existence of a radical 
political culture rooted in the realities of life in the Peruvian interior, Shining Path 
cadres would demonstrate the continuities between radicalism, folkloric traditions and 
communal conflicts and their militancy in the 1980s. Local memories of previous 
insurgencies and radical mobilisations are therefore vital for understanding the nature of 
Shining Path’s actions. That is, because they produced the rank-and-file Senderistas 
who formed detachments, and carried out actions, on the party leadership’s behalf. 
 
A tradition of Andean radicalism? 
In order to comprehend why cadres and peasant communities initially supported 
Shining Path in the 1980s, it is vital to understand the numerous forms of radical 
mobilisation which existed in Ayacucho, and across the Andes, in the preceding 
decades. These included the insurgencies led by the Ejército de Liberación Nacional 
(ELN) and Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario (MIR), student protests, and the 
mobilisation of the teachers’ union Sindicato Único de Trabajadores de la Educación 
del Perú (SUTEP).  
The ELN and MIR insurgencies of the early and mid-1960s aimed to recreate the Cuban 
Revolution in Peru. The operations of the ELN were focused around Junín and 
Ayacucho, and the MIR created three revolutionary fronts in the north, central and south 
of the Peruvian Andes. Ultimately, both movements were shortlived and were defeated 
by the Peruvian military in 1965. These experiences would have a significant impact on 
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the internal armed conflict, however, as Shining Path aimed to avoid the mistakes of 
these previous movements.115 
These groups, however, were not the only people who suspected that the Andes, and 
Ayacucho department in particular, might be ripe for revolution. Vich, for example, 
describes a “situation of profound antagonism between the peasant population and the 
Peruvian State”, in which ayacuchano communities became increasingly resistant to 
police harassment, endemic poverty and the unpopular educational reforms which led to 
the Huanta rebellion in 1969 (in which Abimael Guzmán was arrested).116 In 1971, as 
Heilman demonstrates, peasants mobilised from communities across Ayacucho in order 
to voice their frustrations against abusive district authorities.117 And throughout the 
1970s, SUTEP became increasingly radical whilst agitating for reform. That SUTEP’s 
local leaders would turn towards a Maoist doctrine and eventually become Shining Path 
militants highlights, for Heilman, an important element of continuity between 1970s 
activism and mobilisation in support of Shining Path at the beginning of the conflict.118 
Popular mobilisation persisted despite the reforms of the Leftist Velasco military 
government, including the Agrarian Reform which allowed limited sectors of the 
peasantry to own and work their own land whilst continuing to exclude the majority.119 
Yet these reforms were not the starting point of antagonism between Ayacucho and the 
state; they were simply another example of the state’s failure to create effective, 
progressive policy on behalf of the peasant population.120 Furthermore, the patterns of 
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political tensions visible across Ayacucho department in this period can also be seen 
elsewhere across the Andean interior. For example, Meza Salcedo has highlighted the 
numerous inter- and intra-communal conflicts which existed in the community of 
Ticlacayán, Cerro de Pasco in the 1970s. These disputes were partly produced by inter-
generational conflicts and the differing economic fortunes of families as a result of the 
Agrarian Reform, and would later re-emerge as peasants used Shining Path as a vehicle 
for promoting their own localised causes and eliminating their rivals.121 
Using a Lefebvrian understanding of power and spatial practice, I argue that the 
situation of antagonism as described by Vich and Meza Salcedo was created by local 
resistance to the exercise of hegemony by the Peruvian state over the Andean region. A 
similar argument is made by Flores Galindo in his description of the “Andean utopia” 
which he argues is both a form of historical memory which idealises Peru’s Incan past, 
as well as a call to action to for successive movements to create a more equal society.122 
However, whereas Flores Galindo emphasises the cultural aspects of the Andean utopia, 
I believe it is essential to highlight how the concept inspired a very local form of 
resistance to Peru’s historical socio-spatial structure. For young militants in Ayacucho, 
inspiration for supporting Shining Path came not so much from ideas about an idealistic 
Incan past, but from the recent memories and stories of conflicts in previous decades. 
Space was not a passive factor in these conflicts, but a mechanism used to maintain 
forms of governmental control. However, I also argue that this resistance against 
hegemony existed because Andean radicals created new ideas about how space and land 
could be used as a mechanism to create a new society. The conflict between these two 
projects contributed a distinct sense of place in many communities; a distinct feeling 
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that Ayacucho was ripe for rebellion which can be felt in the writings of Díaz Martínez 
and Pérez Huarancca. This sense of communal resistance persists in many ways to this 
day, but it was particularly strong in the 1970s and early years of the internal conflict. 
 
Case study: Lucanamarca 
The murder of 69 campesinos in the ranching community Lucanamarca, in the 
Huancasancos province of Ayacucho, is one of the earliest and most brutal reprisals 
carried out by Shining Path against the peasant communities of the Andes. The Informe 
Final states that “the study of the Lucanamarca massacre is important because it marks 
the beginning of the policy of massive repression by Sendero Luminoso on the national 
political level”.123 However, this was not an isolated incident and the massacre exists in 
a pattern of community resistance to Shining Path and subsequent reprisals which 
would have been familiar to villages across the Andes, but particularly in Ayacucho, 
during the early years of the conflict. Having initially demonstrated support for Shining 
Path, the communities of Huancasancos were encouraged by the military to repel their 
invaders, and as a result suffered brutal revenge at the hands of the insurgents. At the 
same time, it is important to highlight that the armed forces conducted reprisals of their 
own. Because of this interplay between the actions of the military, Lucanamarca 
community and Shining Path, I have selected the Lucanamarca massacre as a moment 
through which it is possible to understand wider experiences of community organisation 
and retribution in the internal armed conflict. 
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i) Lucanamarca 
The early years of the internal conflict saw Sendero Luminoso attempt to establish 
control over the northern reaches of Ayacucho department, and areas of Apurímac and 
Huancavelica. Kent argues that the insurgents were moving between a primary phase of 
guerrilla warfare, in which they focused on attacking government outposts and 
individual assassinations, and a secondary phase, in which they established a territorial 
core of support. Control over the Caracha river region of Ayacucho, incorporating 
Saccsamarca and Lucanamarca, was central to this strategy.124 In particular, the isolated 
geography and terrain of the region, as well as the perceived higher levels of wealth in 
the Huancasancos region, made the area an important strategic zone for Shining Path.125 
The local Colegio Los Andes had also been an important centre for Senderismo in the 
years preceding the conflict. Professors who had trained in Huamanga were central in 
setting up Comités Populares and becoming local guerrilla leaders.126 Shining Path 
aimed to manipulate local tensions, turning younger generations against local elites.127 
This strategy included the assassination of gamonalillos (wealthier peasants) and local 
powerholders in the main plaza of the community and the redistribution of property 
amongst the peasants.128 These acts conformed to Shining Path’s belief that the 
bloodletting of local powerholders (particularly when demonstrated in significant 
communal spaces) would act as a foundational moment of violence for their new society 
and mobilise the peasantry to their cause.   
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As a result, violence intensified across Huancasancos from 1982 but the insurgents 
initially met with little resistance. Flores Galindo argues that, in order to counter this, 
the military increased their presence in Huanta and Uchuraccay whilst also taking part 
in forms of “psychological warfare” to turn peasants against Shining Path.129 
Encouraged by the military, the first roots of peasant resistance to Shining Path began to 
appear in 1983 when seven Senderistas were assassinated in Huaychao and Macabamba 
in January, shortly before peasants in Uchuraccay killed eight limeño journalists who 
they suspected of being Shining Path members.130 The combination of military 
propaganda, the systematic abuses of Shining Path against the peasant population and 
the demonstration by the armed forces that little or no punishment would be given for 
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Fig. 2: Map of Ayacucho department [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ayacucho_Region]. 
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the execution of suspected terrorists (as highlighted in the Uchuraccay case) were 
effective in persuading other communities to resist the insurgents.  
On top of this, the comuneros of Lucanamarca were particularly enraged that 
Shining Path forbade them from negotiating prices for their own produce, and so they 
agreed (with the authorities of Saccsamarca and Huancasancos) to prepare the ronda 
campesina to capture the local Senderista leader Olegario Curitomay.131 In February 
and March, ten Senderistas were killed and another seven were captured in the towns of 
Saccsamarca and Lucanamarca. Finally, on March 22 1983, a group of comuneros 
captured Curitomay and took him to the town square. Curitomay was surrounded by 
villagers and attacked with stones and axes, set on fire and then shot dead. In the 
testimony given to the CVR, it was the death of Curitomay which, for most witnesses, 
created Shining Path’s desire for vengeance against the population of Lucanamarca.132 
In the early hours of Sunday April 3, a column of around sixty Senderistas armed 
with axes, machetes, knives and guns launched a series of attacks on hamlets and 
villages in the Huancasancos region, culminating in an attack on Lucanamarca. The 
column first came upon a group of twenty men, women and children in Yanaccollpa 
who were locked inside a building and slaughtered them. The column then marched to 
Lucanamarca, killing a further eight people on the way, and arrived in the village 
around 4pm. The insurgent leaders called upon the Lucanamarca villagers not to flee, 
claiming that they were only there to hold an assembly in the village square.133 Many 
villagers did attempt to leave, but a large group were conducted towards the square 
where all adult males were killed against the church wall. Testimonies given to the CVR 
then state that a young boy, named Epifanio Quispe Tacas, prevented a second group of 
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comuneros from being executed by shouting from the church tower that he could see the 
military approaching Lucanamarca. At this point, the column left the town, but not 
before looting and burning several key buildings and shops.134 In total, sixty-nine men, 
women and children were killed in the district of Santiago de Lucanamarca throughout 
the day. 
Full responsibility for the attack on Lucanamarca was accepted by Abimael 
Guzmán, who confirmed to the CVR that the massacre had been planned by the Central 
Committee of the Shining Path. Other important Sendero leaders, including Elena 
Iparraguirre, Osman Morote and Martha Huatay, admitted knowledge of and 
responsibility for the attack, but peasants who gave testimony pinned full responsibility 
for the attack on Hildebrando Pérez Huarancca, a local mestizo teacher wearing military 
uniform (and author of Los ilegítimos), for organising and planning the reprisal at the 
local level.135 
The massacre is described by the CVR as “a milestone in the so-called ‘popular 
war’, the first of the massive and indiscriminate massacres which began to characterise 
the actions of Shining Path and converted them into the bloodiest seditious group in 
Latin American history”.136 However, Lucanamarca must also be understood as an act 
of intimidation and retaliation by Shining Path amidst a battle for local supremacy. To 
the party, it appeared that the initial support they had received was on the wane and that 
Ayacucho communities needed reminding of who they should really be supporting. 
Speaking later about the incident, Abimael Guzmán stated that “[when] confronted with 
the use of armed bands and reactionary military action, we responded decisively with 
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one action: Lucanamarca…The principal thing was to make [the peasants] understand 
that we are a hard bone to chew and that we are ready to do anything”.137 However, the 
party has more recently described the massacre as an excess, whilst continuing to frame 
Lucanamarca within the context of a battle between themselves and the Armed Forces: 
“Here is the political significance [of Lucanamarca]: the suspension 
and breaking of the use and formation of rondas, plans that [the 
Armed Forces] had to postpone. The negative aspect: the excess, the 
military extremism that never has been a general policy of the 
Peruvian Communist Party.”138 
It was a moment in which all of the rage which Shining Path had articulated and 
directed against the state was suddenly and devastatingly turned back upon the 
communities on behalf of whom the popular war was ostensibly being fought. What 
Shining Path could not come to terms with was that in some cases communities were 
voluntarily forming rondas campesinas, and that in others the Armed Forces were more 
effective at bargaining or coercing the campesinos into forming patrols, and so they 
lashed out. To paraphrase Žižek, this was a dramatic and impotent passage à l’acte 
which “avoided the real enemy”.139 Shining Path’s attempt to erase the State was in 
ruins, the Popular War rendered impotent by its failure to grasp local reality and 
articulate opposition to local problems as previous movements had done in the past. 
And so the party turned on the communities who had rejected them, misconstruing them 
as the real enemies of the revolution, failing to understand that peasant populations had 
their own agency and distinct perspective on mobilisation which existed outside of 
Shining Path’s dichotomous understanding of Old and New power. In fact, in the case 
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of Lucanamarca, the real counterrevolutionaries were Senderistas because, having 
witnessed the failure of their Popular War to mobilise the peasantry, they internalised 
and acted upon the same violent racism which had been demonstrated to them by 
decades of bureaucratic abuse. Not eradicating gamonalismo, but reproducing it. 
 
ii) New frontiers of violence: Shining Path in the selva 
In order to demonstrate the ways in which local politics shaped Shining Path strategy 
under a very different set of circumstances, it is necessary to explore the party’s 
expansion into the selva central from 1987 onwards. The geography of this period is 
highly important as Shining Path, having begun to expand their operations into the 
jungle from 1983, came to dominate Alto Huallaga, the Río Ene and Satipo province, 
whilst the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA) retained a strong 
presence in Oxapampa, Valle de Perené and Chanchamayo. The Asháninka 
communities of Gran Pajonal, however, rejected the attempted incursions of Shining 
Path altogether.140 In the Alto Huallaga, Cáceres and Río Ene regions, Shining Path also 
embarked upon a co-operative arrangement with drug traffickers (particularly members 
of the Medellín cartel) whilst also acting as “protectors” of the local population from the 
abuses of state forces and the Medellín traffickers. The insurgents’ “conviviencia” with 
the traffickers was a marriage of convenience in this time as the two parties shared 
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resources to protect themselves from state forces, but the insurgents also assassinated 
many cartel members who resisted their right to rule.141 
The incursion of Shining Path into Satipo province caused massive displacement of 
indigenous Asháninka and Nomatsiguenga communities as they scrambled to escape 
insurgent violence. In the selva, Shining Path continued to assassinate local 
powerholders and opponents, but also took on a much more aggressive strategy of land-
grabbing by burning indigenous settlements, forcing participation in escuelas populares 
and enslaving parts of the population.142 Whilst the MRTA similarly participated in the 
assassination of local authorities (including the assassination of Asháninka leader 
Alejandro Calderón which ultimately led to the MRTA’s expulsion from Oxapampa by 
the Ejército Asháninka in 1990), they directed a lesser degree of violence against the 
civilian population which led to some areas passing from PCP-SL to MRTA control.143 
Nonetheless, the disruption to indigenous communities caused by both groups was 
enormous, replicating the same violations, enslavement, destruction and racial 
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hierarchies that had been demonstrated during the rubber boom in the region in the early 
twentieth century.  
The presence of Shining Path and the MRTA in the selva central must also be 
understood within the context of the colonisation of the jungle by peasants from 
mountain regions which had been occurring increasingly over the past century. To the 
community elders of the selva, the insurgents represented a continuation of this practice 
in which their lands had been encroached upon with regularity. Espinoza and Villapolo 
have argued that “the relationship of the subversive groups with the Asháninka 
reproduced the same type of discriminatory relationship that exists between the mestizo 
colonists of Andean origin and the indigenous communities of the region”.144 During 
the conflict, but also to this day, Asháninka communities in the Valle de los Ríos 
Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro (VRAEM) have been routinely harassed and displaced by an 
association of colonists, drug traffickers and Shining Path who “systematically invade 
indigenous lands in order to grow coca”. As Santos-Granero and Barclay highlight, 
however, these recent confrontations ought to be seen in a far broader context of 
violence against indigenous peoples in the selva central in which Andean colonisers, 
capitalist enterprises and state agencies have routinely encroached upon Asháninka 
lands for decades (if not longer).145 
This dynamic added another level of complexity into the political situation in the 
selva because, as rondas nativas and the Ejército Asháninka were formed, their struggle 
was marked by territoriality and the cultural identity of indigenous groups. Asháninka 
patrols distinguished heavily between nosháninka (“brother”), chori (“colonist”) and 
kichóncari (“guerrilla”) and whilst they struggled continuously against brutal Shining 
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Path violence, they also took violent revenge on colonist communities who they 
perceived as being equally responsible for indigenous deterritorialisation over the 
preceding decades.146 However, as Villapolo argues, indigenous memories of this period 
continue to contain huge silences over the activities, and widespread human rights 
abuses, of the rondas nativas against the insurgents and colonist population. In part, this 
serves to represent themselves as hapless victims rather than as active participants in 
violence, whilst also obscuring the initial support of some communities for Shining 
Path.147  
Shining Path’s presence in the selva central conforms to Kent’s arguments about the 
insurgents’ territorial expansion, insofar as they expanded along strategically important 
routes from Ayacucho into the jungle, developed a patron-clientele relationship with 
coca-growers and created escuelas populares to develop territorial bases of support.148 
To a large extent, it has been the development of these bases of support in jungle and 
rainforest areas which has frustrated the total eradication of Shining Path to this day. 
However, it is also clear that the local conditions of the selva, and complex of interplay 
of competing ethnic identities and indigenous organisations, highly influenced the 
temporary alliances made by Shining Path and the forms of violence they employed. It 
is therefore vital that Shining Path’s incursion into the selva is not represented as some 
kind of essentialised, Heart of Darkness-like episode of depravity, nor that it is ignored 
in historiography as Greene argues has been so often the case.149 Instead, the selva 
central must be understood as a collection of spaces produced both by highly modern 
conflicts (including the attacks on coca-growers by the Peruvian government with 
                                                          
146 Leslie Villapolo Herrera, ‘Senderos del desengaño: construcción de memorias, identitdades, colectivas, y proyectos de future en 
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support from the United States Drug Enforcement Agency), complex geography and 
dynamic local politics with numerous important powerholders. The political violence 
perpetrated by Shining Path in the selva central, therefore, was not simply a product of 
the insurgents’ ideology, but also of this complex set of local circumstances.  
 
iii) A “representative” history?150 
Given these examples, to what extent can Lucanamarca be called emblematic? Del Pino 
has highlighted the insufficiency of the national experience to stand in for the array of 
localised experiences of violence from the conflict, each shaped by the social contours 
of each community.151 Writing in 2004, he argued that the cases such as Uchuraccay, 
which for many represented a kind of ethnic Indian violence against white and mestizo 
journalists, had silenced and obscured other cases like Lucanamarca where it was the 
peasant population who were the victims. However, in the years since, Lucanamarca has 
become a highly discussed and represented case, having been selected as an emblematic 
case of violence by the CVR and LUM. Whilst this is no guarantee that the significance 
of Lucanamarca is understood by large sectors of the population, del Pino’s analysis 
that “considers individuals and local communities as places of analysis” must be re-
applied, raising the possibility that the overrepresentation of Lucanamarca may now be 
silencing other experiences of violence.152 Given this, it is essential that we attempt to 
problematize and de-emblematize Lucanamarca in order to understand its true 
significance. 
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For a start, despite being held up as an emblematic example of insurgent violence, it 
is one of few examples of mass, collective violence perpetrated by Shining Path against 
civilians, as the insurgents often targeted local authorities and powerholders, the police 
force and military patrols. When considered alongside the numerous atrocities 
perpetrated by state agents and rondas campesinas in Accomarca, Putis, state prisons, 
and Cuartel Los Cabitos in Ayacucho (as discussed in Chapter 2), among others, mass 
reprisal appears to be a tactic which was not particularly expressive of Shining Path 
ideology, but one which was deployed by all sides during the conflict (and 
predominantly be state agents). In this sense, mass reprisal as a form of Shining Path 
violence must be understood alongside other practices (for example, retiradas and the 
execution of local officials) which were focused on constructing a New state in spaces 
where the vestiges of Old power had been eliminated. This was, fundamentally, Shining 
Path’s spatial practice, which ought to be understood as being distinct from the spatial 
practice of counterinsurgency violence (analysed in Chapter 2).  
Furthermore, the events in Lucanamarca after the massacre are also very rarely 
discussed. For example, the 2002 Comisión de Derechos Humanos (COMISEDH) 
report to the CVR states that “after the massacre by Shining Path came the sinchis that 
robbed them, raped the women and assassinated many people”.153 In the years that 
followed, numerous assassinations and disappearances were carried out in 
Huancasancos district by both Shining Path and the armed forces. However, these 
events, as well as the murder of Olegario Curitomay, have become divorced from 
official accounts of the massacre. As Almeida argues, this process had led to the 
solidification of Lucanamarca as an emblematic case of Shining Path violence, an image 
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which has been reinforced through the way in which testimonies related to it have been 
collected and represented.154 
In no way is this argument designed to excuse the violent actions of Shining Path; 
nor does it intend to hide the equally heinous, pervasive and systemic forms of violence, 
such as the enslavement of Asháninka communities, that the group perpetrated in the 
selva central. Instead, the intention of this analysis is to highlight the insufficiency of 
certain emblematic cases to stand in for a panoply of experiences. In the case of 
Lucanamarca, the massacre has become an event around which narratives of Shining 
Path violence have crystallised to the point that other memories of violence have been 
obscured from the community’s history. The construction of Lucanamarca as an 
emblematic case also places a false emphasis on the rationale and aesthetics of mass 
reprisal as somehow representative of all Shining Path violence. As Žižek argues, this 
kind of construction of violent narratives is an “ideological action par excellence”, the 
reasons for which can be located in the particular aesthetics of violence in the narrative 
which have been preserved.155 By building narratives of the internal armed conflict from 
the perspective of Lucanamarca, Shining Path violence is emphasised, counterinsurgent 
violence is legitimated (and to some extent rendered invisible), and the position of 
Andean peasants as helpless victims is reinforced.  
In a similar way, Koc-Menard argues that the construction of the community of 
Chungui as an emblematic case of Shining Path violence by the CVR has allowed the 
communities of the district to represent themselves as passive victims of violence and to 
                                                          
154 To an extent, legal preceedings have also contributed to the construction of “emblematic” moments of violence. For example, 
survivors of Lucanamarca spoke at Guzmán’s 2004 trial, whilst Guzmán and Iparaguirre were tried again in 2014 for the bombing 
of Calle Tarata in 1992. With reference to transitional justice in Argentina and Uruguay, Levey has argued that landmark cases such 
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accountability in post-conflict socieites. Claudia Almeida Goshi, ‘Entre sombras y silencios: los testimonies acerca de las muertes 
de Marcian Huancahuari y Olegario Curitomay’ in in (Francesca Denegri and Alexandra Hibbett eds.), Dando Cuenta: Estudios 
sobre el testimonio de la violencia política en el Perú (1980-2000) (Lima, 2016), pp.239-64 (p.262); Levey, Fragile Memory, 
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hide their own participation with the insurgents.156 Perhaps most telling, however, is the 
below statement by COMISEDH to the CVR in 2003: 
“On the theme of clandestine graves in general, the immense majority 
were created by members of the armed forces and the balance of 
forensic anthropological interventions of the CVR would appear to be 
slanted…the graves of Lucanamarca would have an important impact 
on public opinion…it affirms [the CVR’s] position of equilibrium and 
objectivity in your investigation”.157 
Concern over balance is highly common in approaches to the truth and 
reconciliation process in Peru, yet this quote specifically highlights the potential for 
Lucanamarca to be given greater prominence as an emblematic case in order to deflect 
criticism of the methods of the CVR. Human rights organisations and memory 
initiatives, beset on all sides by a hostile right-wing press, state institutions and the 
problems of securing financing for their projects, constantly attempt to walk a tightrope 
between criticising violence perpetrated by agents of the state and violence perpetrated 
by Shining Path and the MRTA. As part of this balancing act, Lucanamarca is regularly 
held up as an unsurpassable example of Shining Path brutality, without which the case 
for the extreme violence of the Peruvian state would be even more difficult to justify. 
As Almeida argues, it is an emblematic case because it was committed by Senderistas, 
and not by members of the armed forces.158 
It would be wrong to suggest that it was the CVR’s intention to establish equilibrium 
between different violents actors in the conflict, particularly when the Informe Final 
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makes great efforts to highlight the diverse non-fatal, societal and psychological 
impacts of political violence, or to argue that Shining Path violence has been 
exaggerated to justify state violence. Nonetheless, from this we can conclude that the 
construction of Lucanamarca as an emblematic case of violence is highly problematic. 
The idea of Lucanamarca, in essence, is to highlight the victimisation of the peasant 
population at the hands of Shining Path in order to suggest that it is representative of 
systematic violence when, in fact, it is one of many forms of violence deployed by the 
insurgents, against an array of victims, on the basis of complex (and at times 
competing) logics of violence. In the words of Ramírez, “the macrostory of the CVR 
constructed from the point of departure of Lucanamarca…generated a new national 
narrative that not only maintains the bloody image of Shining Path, but allows Andean 
peasants…to pass as victims”.159 The mobilisation of this discourse also silences the 
voices of many other communities, in the sierra but particularly in the selva, who 
suffered intensely during this period. This focus, as Greene argues, has had the effect of 
conflating Andeanness with ideas about poverty, victimisation, suffering and 
indigeneity; categories which, rightly or wrongly, apply just as easily to indigenous 
communities in the Amazon but which are silenced in the context of the conflict.160 
Thus, rather than highlighting the importance of Lucanamarca in an emblematic or 
illustrative sense, it is important that the heterogeneity of experiences of the conflict 
across different locations is recognised and that the case is considered as only one 
element of the wider spatio-temporal trajectory of Shining Path. 
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iv) The geographies of Shining Path violence 
To appreciate these numerous trajectories of violence, it is worth returning to the CVR’s 
Informe Final which states that: 
“the most probable figure for victims who died in the violence is 
69,280 individuals… More than 40 percent of the deaths and 
disappearances reported to the CVR are concentrated in the Andean 
department of Ayacucho. These victims taken together with those 
documented by the CVR in the departments of Junín, Huánuco, 
Huancavelica, Apurímac and San Martín, add up to 85 percent of the 
victims.”161 
Taken together, the six departments mentioned here highlight the concentration of 
victims in mountainous areas as well as in the jungles regions of Junín and San Martín. 
In short, the CVR immediately creates a geography in which the conflict took place, and 
from which it derives later conclusions about Shining Path violence, the human rights 
abuses of the counterinsurgency operation and why the scale of the violence was so 
widely underestimated in Peru for so long. However, each of these departments was 
also affected by violence more heavily at differing stages of the conflict. For example, 
whilst high percentages of deaths and disappearances in Ayacucho and Huancavelica 
occurred between 1980 and 1986, San Martín, Junín and Ucayali suffered more violence 
between 1985 and 1990 after Shining Path had moved into jungle areas, whilst violence 
in Lima-Callao increased in the late 1980s and early 1990s.162 
What this suggests is, as opposed to ever coming close to encircling Lima, Shining 
Path’s activities during the conflict fall into three spatio-temporal stages. Whilst the 
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group’s presence in Lima will be dealt with in later chapters, above are outlined several 
examples of the insurgents’ incursions into communities in the northern half of 
Ayacucho department in the early 1980s, and of their expansion northwards into the 
selva central later in the decade (at the same time they expanded south-east into 
Apurímac, with operations in Cusco and Puno to a lesser extent). This strategy does not 
point towards the logic of sporadic terrorist violence, but an attempt to build a 
revolutionary core from which to develop further actions. This strategy failed, however, 
because of the rejection of the insurgents by many of the communities they had planned 
to rely on.  
The geography of Shining Path was therefore dictated by a series of pre-existing, 
interlocking geographies which, in many ways, the insurgents benefitted from and acted 
upon as party cadres were themselves a product of the same spatial practices. 
Intercommunal disputes, agrarian reform, and a series of ethnic identities which came to 
denote Senderistas as colonisers, not liberators, all came to shape the progression of the 
party along the Andean cordillera.  
Therefore, Shining Path’s initiation of the armed conflict provided impetus for the 
remilitarisation of pre-existing conflicts and grievances in each of these regions, a 
situation further exacerbated by the actions of state forces, rondas campesinas, the 
MRTA, and narcotraffickers. Whilst to denounce Shining Path violence in this context 
is correct, it is vital to also criticise and denounce the multiple levels of educational, 
ethnic and economic structural violence which shapes the communities where the 
insurgents gained initial levels of support. Although the CVR highlights numerous 
overlapping factors likely to be shared by victims (categories such as peasant, 
indigenous, Quechua-speaking, illiterate, poor, Andean) and identifies the spaces where 
violence was concentrated, it fails to identify space as both productive of those 
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categories and of the violence which took place. However, it is important to also 
recognise, as Pereyra argues, “the political, calculating, negotiating capacity of the 
peasant populations”, which was also highly productive of geographies of violence.163 
This highlights the pivotal and difficult position held by the CVR. The aim of the 
Commission was to make Peruvians aware of the scale of violence that had occurred in 
the sierra; in short, its job was to create discourse about violence. However, in the 
opening of up discussions about violence in the Andes, the CVR also appears to have 
reinforced many stereotypes about the poverty and exclusion of Andean communities, 
using an array of problematic and constructed categories to create an image of the 
archetypal “victim”. The effect of this is to create a further category of the Andean 
victim, reinforcing the constructed discursive distance between the capital and the 
sierra, and failing to identify that discursive distance as a factor which also contributed 
to the production of violence. In this sense, the CVR report shares characteristics with 
the indigenista literature of the early twentieth century, the purpose of which, in the 
words of Kristal, was to “inform an urban public of a little-understood reality”.164 
Discourses and imagined geographies about Shining Path violence are, however, by 
no means limited to the CVR, as constructions of Peruvian geography are central to how 
Shining Path conceived of themselves, how cultural producers have understood Shining 
Path, and how memory projects in Peru have tried to represent the insurgents in the 
context of the internal conflict. In particular, cultural artefacts produced by Senderistas 
themselves provide an illuminating view of the competing geographies and social 
spaces which informed the decisions of Shining Path’s leadership. However, as will be 
seen below, a diverse array of cultural artefacts also suggest that party cadres were far 
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more inclined to draw on traditions of Andean radicalism and peasant mobilisation than 
the provincial middle-class who were the party’s leaders. 
 
Shining Path’s cultural production 
An analysis of the body of Shining Path cultural production on the internal conflict is 
shaped by diversity in the type of sources currently available, and limited by an 
awareness that any such understanding is only indicative of the wider array of 
documents, artworks and songs produced by the group which are now lost or hidden. 
That being said, the below analysis takes into account a range of documents and 
artefacts produced by Shining Path which covers official party documents, tracts and 
pamphlets, forms of cultural production sympathetic to the Communist and Maoist 
ideals of the party leadership, and alternative interpretations of Shining Path which 
place greater emphasis on the party’s Peruvian and Andean roots.  
Gorriti’s analysis of New Democracy, a Shining Path publication which focused on 
outlining party ideology and its links to Chinese Maoism, suggests that Guzmán’s 
“creative, yet rigorous adaptation of Marxism” thoroughly adopted Marxist symbols and 
language, referencing the writings of Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao.165 Documents 
written by Guzmán and the party to intervene in matters relating to the Peruvian conflict 
were prefaced by histories of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, Paris Commune and the 
USSR, all considered to be part of the “global proletarian revolution”.166 In this, Shining 
Path were not alone, having emerged from a splintered Peruvian Left which was highly 
factional but which also shared many characteristics across its spectrum. One pamphlet 
published sometime between 1986 and 1988, for example, contains a number of poems 
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and articles by Mao followed by articles by Shining Path and PCP-Bandera Roja on 
how to apply the lessons of Marxist-Leninist-Maoism to the popular war in Peru and to 
the global revolution.167  
As suggested earlier, these ideological tracts reflect the political views of the party 
leadership. Although the Marxist ideas outlined in them are discussed with reference to 
Peruvian circumstances past and present, they give the impression that party leaders 
took greater inspiration for their guerra popular from their trips to China than they did 
from the poverty and social exclusion suffered by the peasant communities who would 
fill their rank-and-file. This is supported by Rothwell who states that “Mao’s criticisms 
of Peng Dehuai in the wake of the Great Leap Forward hard a more direct bearing on 
the nature of Shining Path peasant organising in Ayacucho than did the writings of 
Peruvian communist founding father José Carlos Mariátegui” and that “the top 
leadership of Shining Path and many other pro-Chinese communists from competing 
organisations travelled to China and studied Maoism there. Not unlike Catholic priests 
taking special classes in Rome”.168 
This tendency to take influence from China is reflected to some extent in Shining 
Path’s cultural production in which Mao’s ideas and image (particularly in murals, 
discussed below) and Communist symbolism are deployed regularly. Take, for example, 
the poem En mi pueblo by imprisoned Senderista Elena Iparraguirre. This nostalgic 
remembering of the initiation of Shining Path’s armed struggle distinctly places the 
insurgents within a Peruvian context, yet Iparraguirre deploys Marxist symbols and 
ideas, specifically that the peasantry had to disappear as a class in order to mobilise as 
the proletariat. The poem plays on the numerous meanings of pueblo in the context of 
the conflict, standing in simultaneously for an Andean community, the Peruvian nation, 
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and most importantly for Iparraguirre, the masses. She deploys romanticised language 
about peasant communities, describing women “with their big vicuña eyes” washing 
clothes in the river, “the elders that talk of yesterday”, the animals and livestock in the 
community and the mountains and fields of the pueblo. The peasants are presented as 
the stoic heroes, survivors of the conflict between “the malevolent and the guerrillas”. 
169  
Yet it is in her description of the antagonism between the community and the outside 
world where Iparraguirre makes important statements about the conflict. She describes 
when “there was war to free yourself of the mountains that weigh upon your shoulders”. 
And, at the culmination of the poem:  
“Many times they killed these people 
Many times more they created combatants and rebels… 
Happy, alert, vigilant 
The masses remain in the town 
With their sickles and hammers.”170 
This rather ambiguous ending hints at the possibility of future conflict as the now 
mobilised peasants wait patiently for the germination of a new generation of rebels to 
re-open this seemingly eternal struggle between the Andean pueblo and the State. 
However, there is also suggestion that, as a result of their defeat, the peasants must 
remain in their community, that they were unable to free themselves of the sierra. This 
point is vital because it demonstrates Shining Path’s belief that, to become a modern 
proletariat, the peasantry must leave their communities, cease being serranos, and 
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transform themselves into a revolutionary class (whilst in the process erasing 
themselves from society).   
Iparraguirre was a high-ranking member of Shining Path for many years and fully 
integrated into the party leadership, and so her work can arguably be said to be more 
reflective of party doctrine rather than of the ways in which that doctrine was 
interpreted by rank-and-file. Other forms of Shining Path cultural production, on the 
other hand, demonstrate a degree of cultural syncretism and show how party militants 
integrated both Maoist ideology and Andean cultural forms, and imagery from Andean 
society, into their cultural expression. Ritter, for instance, argues that performances of 
revolutionary music “themselves were rarely transparent statements of propaganda by 
the guerrillas… nor were they organic expressions of peasant rebelliousness and support 
for the revolution”.171 In a similar vein, Vich highlights that the 1970 song Flor de 
retama about the 1969 student protests in Huanta, composed by Ricardo Dolorier and 
later popularised by Martina Portocarrero, was formerly considered a Senderista song 
which “to listen to in private or sing in public was a risky and dangerous act”.172 Now, 
however, Vich proposes that the song has been converted into “a symbol of ayacuchana 
identity and an agent of memory that resignifies the present”.173 As with many of the 
songs analysed by Ritter, Flor de retama was not directly composed by Shining Path, 
but these songs did act as performances of both political and local cultural identity. 
Because of this, revolutionary songs can be seen as important cultural artefact which 
were not simply representative of Shining Path doctrine, but which allowed cadres and 
those with Shining Path sympathies to adapt the party’s Maoist outlook to their own 
surroundings.  
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Music and revolutionary songs were not the only way in which Shining Path 
attempted to use cultural production to promote their doctrine among peasant 
communities. Senderistas also used theatre, graffiti and public murals to mobilise 
support in Andean villages and in Lima’s barriadas. These practices themselves had 
historical precedents. For instance, Buntinx has demonstrated how Aprista political 
prisoners in the 1930s and the Senderistas imprisoned on El Frontón in the 1980s both 
used murals, painting and drawings to articulate their experiences and recreate their 
time in incarceration as a heroic period.174 In a similar vein, Heilman’s history of 
twentieth century politics in Ayacucho shows that Apristas, radical teachers’ and 
students’ movements, and later Senderistas, also used graffiti as a key means of 
disseminating their propaganda.175 Muralists may also have taken inspiration from the 
political posters produced following the 1959 Cuban Revolution and by the Velasco 
military government in Peru which, Cant argues, “broadened the possibilities of what 
posters could achieve” by using varied artistic styles to transmit simple political 
messages.176 
Even in the years since the conflict, revolutionary art remains an important form of 
propaganda for the members of the Movimiento por Amnistía y Derechos 
Fundamentales (MOVADEF) who publicise art by Shining Path prisoners on their 
website, as well as a video of the creation of a MOVADEF mural in Buenos Aires and 
adverts for an arts and crafts workshop.177 In 2014, Interior Minister Daniel Urresti 
intervened when an arts exhibition, entitled En tu nombre, was opened by the 
Asociación de Familiares de Presos Políticos, Desaparecidos y Víctimas de Genocidio 
(AFADEVIG – an organisation which appears to campaign on similar issues to 
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MOVADEF with similar website content) which displayed artwork by Senderista 
prisoners.178 
Unfortunately, given the transient nature of graffiti and the desires of many 
communities around Peru to hide the influence that Shining Pay may once had in their 
locale, it is difficult to assess Senderista graffiti and murals in anything close to entirety. 
There are, however, a number of images of Shining Path murals available which were 
produced by imprisoned Senderistas during the conflict. Of the three murals included 
below, the first relies most on Communist imagery.179 In this case, Abimael Guzmán 
presides over an escuela militar, addressing a group of recruits. Guzmán is surrounded 
by pictures of Marx, Lenin and Mao, asserting his position as the so-called Fourth 
Sword of Marxism, and the mural uses various shades of red and yellow (the colours 
used in the flags of the USSR and China) as well as the hammer and sickle to reaffirm 
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Shining Path’s ties to global Marxism.180 The recruits themselves appear to be 
ethnically-mixed as they are represented with various dark skin tones, perhaps a 
reference to Shining Path’s Peruvian and predominantly indigenous cadres. However, 
the inclusion of a white-faced figure in overalls at the back of the group could be a 
subtle reference to Soviet socialist realism, and green flatcaps (of the type often worn by 
Mao) are being worn by all of the recruits. In this sense, the mural highlights both 
elements of Shining Path’s cultural background, but places the influences of global 
Communist figures at the forefront. 
Other murals, however, make greater reference to Shining Path’s syncretic cultural 
heritage and diverse racial background. Here, the colours red and yellow are again 
dominant, the hammer and sickle flag is being waved, and the artist has included the 
quote from Mao that “power is born from the rifle”. However, the figures depicted this 
time do not appear as uniform soldiers, but as mobilised peasants wearing typical 
                                                          
180 Interestingly, Josef Staln was often represented as the fourth great Marxist thinker in the late 1930s, after Marx, Engels and 
Lenin. See Anita Pisch, The Personality Cult of Stalin in Soviet Posters, 1929–1953: Archetypes, Inventions and Fabrications, Vol. 
1 (PhD thesis: Australian National University, 2014), p.186. 
Fig. 5: Painting produced by Shining Path militants  #2 
[http://www.brasil.indymedia.org/es/blue/2008/10/431069.shtml]. 
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Andean dress. Noticeably, the woman have braided hair, and some of the peasants 
appear to be holdings huaracas, or slings. Most importantly the image is framed by 
snowy peaks in the background, most likely representative of the Andes (but also 
reminiscent of the snow-covered volcanoes Misti and Pichu Pichu near Guzmán’s 
hometown Arequipa).  
Finally, the image above. This time the hammer and sickle is not upon a red and 
yellow flag, but painted onto a wall. The three diminutive figures are again represented 
in fairly typical Andean dress, and rather than being the passive recipients of a lecture 
they are the active agents, two painting graffiti on the wall and one on the lookout. And 
of course, the phrase which appears first in the image is not a quote from Mao but 
Fig. 6: Painting produced by Shining Path militants  #3 
[http://www.brasil.indymedia.org/es/blue/2008/10/431069.shtml]. 
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“Pueblo peruano”. As with Iparraguirre’s poem, the use of pueblo refers here not only 
to the population, but to the masses who have the power to carry Shining Path to power. 
Taken together, these last two images suggest that Shining Path’s influence is far more 
diffuse than simply representing an application of Maoism to Peruvian life. The artwork 
analysed here, while by no means conclusive, suggests that party cadres were far more 
inclined to represent Shining Path’s peasant background, alongside Marxist language 
and imagery, to transmit their propaganda.  
 
Thus, by analysing revolutionary songs and murals, it is possible to see that the 
Senderista leadership’s preference for Maoist ideas was not able to outweigh the ideas 
of their militants, and that Shining Path was a phenomenon produced by different social 
spaces; revolutionary China and the radical peasant communities of the Andes. Shining 
Path’s cultural artefacts are an important space in which this syncretism is clearly, and 
perhaps most clearly, on view.  
Today, it is difficult to assess the extent to which there are any lasting connections 
or sympathies between peasant communities and Shining Path. Milton’s analysis of the 
Rescate por la memoria artistic contests, held in Ayacucho and Huancavelica (2003-4), 
for example, highlights the common trope of peasant communities as passive victims 
caught between two fires during the internal conflict. Peasant communities not only 
represent themselves as distant from Shining Path in order to avoid punishment, Milton 
argues, but also to interpret themselves as victims “worthy of sympathy (and perhaps 
recognition and reparations)”.181 The above analysis of Shining Path’s cultural 
production from the conflict, however, does suggest that party cadres saw deep ties 
                                                          
181 Cynthia Milton, ‘Images of Truth: Rescuing Memories of Peru’s Internal War through Testimonial Art’ in (Cynthia Mliton ed.), 
Art from a Fractured Past: Memory and Truth-Telling in Post-Shining Path Peru (London, 2014), pp.37-74 (p.61). 
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between their peasant communities and Shining Path mobilisation. Whilst the party 
leadership were heavily influenced by their experiences in China and the tracts they 
read written by Mao and Guzmán, Shining Path militants appeared less concerned with 
applying Maoism to Peruvian conditions and more with adapting it to their own 
histories of mobilisation, creating an Andeanised version of Maoism which continued to 
assert the ability of peasants to shape their own future.  
These representations of space therefore allow us to more deeply understand, and 
perhaps recuperate, the Andean nature of Shining Path mobilisation. Given that many of 
these artefacts have now disappeared, however, or have been suppressed to silence 
debate about previous connections to Shining Path, it is important to consider how this 
relationship between Andean communities and Shining Path has been remembered and 
how it shapes memories of the conflict today. In order to do this, it is important not only 
to consider cultural representations of space, but the commemorative spaces of 
representation (or sites of memory) designed to remember the conflict and the initiation 
of Shining Path’s armed struggle. 
For this reason, I will now analyse a site of memory which deals with the internal 
conflict to highlight how the Andean roots of Shining Path have been represented. As I 
have argued, Shining Path violence was always shaped by a range of specific, local 
circumstances which constituted the local politics of space and reflected a degree of 
syncretism between Maoist ideology and Andean political reality. The localised 
memory narratives created at the Museo de la Memoria, discussed below, also reflect 
this syncretism because it has been developed from a particular geographical 
perspective, with close attention to the history and politics of Ayacucho. In this sense, 
whereas other museums such as LUM (in Lima) have located violence in the 1980-2000 
period, sites of memory constructed in the Andes (of which the Museo de la Memoria is 
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a key example) have tended to represent past violence as part of a continuous battle 
between local communities and the state, involving issues of inequality and social 
exclusion which are unresolved to this day. By reclaiming this radical, local factor in 
the emergence of Shining Path, the Museo de la Memoria frames the political violence 
of the 1980s as a discursive battleground from which a non-violent resistance to the 
political violence of the state, and of Shining Path, can re-emerge. 
 
Spaces for Remembering the Shining Path 
During and since the years of the internal conflict, Shining Path militants have 
themselves attempted to develop memory practices from their own perspectives and to 
represent their position in their so-called popular war. As highlighted above, this has 
often involved the development of cultural production to commemorate particular 
events or provide (often romanticised) artistic and intellectual commentary on the 
reasons for the initiation of the conflict. As Feinstein highlights, there is also a visible 
crossover between the language and imagery deployed in Senderista pamphlets and in 
the public marches in memory of the 1986 prison massacres, which “highlighted 
Shining Path symbols and mythology”.182 In many ways, the same language and 
symbolism has been deployed more recently by Shining Path’s political wing 
MOVADEF. Anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist rhetoric are common throughout the 
group’s newspaper, Amnistía General, which provides commentary on contemporary 
Peruvian politics whilst also promoting commemorative events and marches (such as 
the International Day of the Political Prisoner), campaigning for the release of Abimael 
Guzmán and printing memories, testimonies and poems about the internal conflict.183 In 
                                                          
182 Tamara Feinstein, ‘Competing Visions of the 1986 Lima Prison Massacres: Memory and the Politics of War in Peru’, A 
Contracorriente, 11:3 (2014), pp.1-40 (p.11). 
183 MOVADEF, ‘Día Internacional del Preso Político’, Amnistía General, May 2011. 
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these ways, Senderistas have used political organisation and cultural production to 
develop a degree of memory practice about Shining Path within limited political and 
discursive space. 
The possibility of developing this memory practice further, however, has been 
restricted by the 2012 Ley de Negacionismo which made illegal any act considered to 
be “expressing approval for, justifying, denying or minimising” acts of terrorism and 
the impact of Shining Path and MRTA violence upon Peru.184 In this sense, the 
Peruvian law takes its lead from a number of European countries, including Belgium, 
France, Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, which have banned Holocaust denial. 
Aside from the quite problematic comparison of Shining Path violence with the 
Holocaust (a comparison which, in itself, negates the human rights abuses and political 
violence perpetrated by the Peruvian state), the Ley de Negacionismo has formalised a 
situation in which space for debate about Shining Path memories was already socially 
restricted. In September 2016, a controversy erupted when the Peruvian press 
discovered that a mausoleum had been built in northern Lima for Senderista militants 
who died during the 1986 prison massacres, and that commemorative marches had been 
held in their memory. President Kuczynski stated that the bodies should be removed and 
the mausoleum closed, and a complaint was filed that such an act constituted an apology 
for terrorism (although it was not upheld on the grounds that the dead ought to be 
allowed to be buried in accordance with their own wishes).185 
Such events demonstrate the limitations imposed upon Shining Path memory 
practice in Peru today. However, although Shining Path memories themselves have 
often been excluded from museums and memorials for the conflict, there are a number 
                                                          
184 Human Rights Watch, ‘Peru: Reject “Terrorism Denial” Law’, 9 April 2012 [https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/09/peru-reject-
terrorism-denial-law, accessed 14 February 2017]. 
185 ‘El controvertido mausoleo de Sendero Luminoso que crearon en Perú’, BBC Mundo, 29 September 2016 
[http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-37513361, accessed 13 February 2017]. 
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of sites which contextualise the emergence of the insurgent group. Because of this, 
Shining Path’s history is still commemorated in public space in Peru. Although these 
representations of the party are far from sympathetic, their efforts to provide a critique 
of state and societal violence alongside their critique of Shining Path make each site 
stand out as important places in which the localised historical context of the armed 
struggle is itself commemorated. 
 
The site of memory I have chosen to explore in this section is the Museo de la 
Memoria in Huamanga.186 Understanding the internal logics of this memory museum is 
vital to this chapter on Shining Path violence, because, I believe, the Museo de la 
Memoria represents a spatialised understanding of the internal conflict. As argued 
earlier, Shining Path initially gained a lot of support from communities by building 
upon traditions of Andean radicalism and militancy, a tradition which the party 
leadership in some ways tried to move away from, but which party cadres identified 
with more clearly. This tradition, however, has been erased from narratives of the 
conflict which depict Shining Path as a singularly violent and monolithic organisation. 
In my following analysis of the Museo, therefore, I aim not only aim to explore how 
this site contributes to contemporary memory practice, but also how it reflects the 
history and perspectives of Ayacucho. In doing so, I believe the Museo attempts to 
recuperate local traditions of radical self-organisation and represent a political project 
which is opposed to both state and Shining Path violence. 
The Museo de la Memoria in Huamanga is a museum created by the Asociación 
Nacional de Familiares de Secuestrados, Detenidos y Desaparecidos del Perú 
                                                          
186 Another good example of a memory museum in Peru which has produced a spatialised understanding of the internal conflict in 
Peru is the Yalpana Wasi museum in Huancayo, Junín, which explores the history of colonialism in the Peruvian Amazon and 
Andes, global and national intellectual traditions, and a depiction of systemic, societal violence as explanatory factors for the 
internal conflict.  
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(ANFASEP). Formed in 1983, ANFASEP has held an important place in the political 
and communal life of Huamanga throughout the period of violence. The group 
organised soup kitchens, held vigils, led peace marches and called attention to the 
impact of violence on Ayacucho, despite being regularly denounced as a terrorist 
organisation by Presidents García and Fujimori.187 The museum is on the second floor 
of the ANFASEP offices, a few blocks outside of the bustling and rapidly changing city 
centre of Huamanga. It is decorated on the outside by graphically violent murals, and 
the subject matter inside is in a similar vein. The displays include a map of violent 
events in the Ayacucho region, photographs of the disappeared, representations of 
violence through local forms of art such as retablos, and depictions of graves with 
photographs of the exhumations of victims. At S/.2 (roughly equivalent to £0.40 in 
2016), entry is highly affordable for most and includes a guided tour around the small 
museum space. One mural towards the end of the tour shows two Death-like figures in a 
red and a green shroud facing each other, to represent the atrocities committed by 
Shining Path and the armed forces, with six retablos on either side of the mural 
depicting more specific acts of violence. Although the displays are interpreted on the 
visitor’s behalf by the tour guide, time is allowed for guests to take pictures and walk 
around the museum by themselves and look at displays in more detail. There is also a 
shop located in the museum which sells books and DVDs related to the conflict (such as 
a collection of victims’ testimonies and the abbreviated version of the CVR’s Informe 
Final) among other items, with proceeds going towards the funding of the museum and 
other ANFASEP activities.  
To fully understand the significance of this site, I believe it is important to apply 
Dwyer and Alderman’s triple framework for analysing memory sites as forms of text, 
                                                          
187 Feldman, ‘Exhibiting Conflict’, p.492. 
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arena, and performance.188 Using the framework for approaching the site as a text, two 
clear factors are evident in the Museo’s space. Firstly, the museum heavily contrasts the 
barbaric acts of Shining Path and the military with the individuality of the victims and 
the disappeared, and a highly graphic use of violence suggests a total rejection of 
violence as a means for social change. There is little effort made to contextualise 
violence or its perpetrators; the emphasis is instead placed with its effects on its victims. 
In this sense, the curation of the museum supports Weissert’s argument that the 
exhibition not only provides evidence that violence was perpetrated, but also elucidates 
a victim-centred demand for recognition from the Peruvian state.189 
Secondly, the centrality of ANFASEP itself to the museum’s narrative about 
political violence is heavily demonstrated by the museum’s space. Most important in 
this context is a wall covered in photos of ANFASEP members and of their disappeared 
loved ones. This display highlights the victimisation of the local community during the 
conflict, but also the possibility of resilience through organisation and of positive 
change through non-violent means. In many ways the museum is undoubtedly for 
ANFASEP itself; it is a space where members can see photos of their loved ones, tell 
others of their experiences and benefit from the proceeds of the museum to fund their 
community projects. Reading the space of the site as an arena, or space for performance 
of memory, supports these conclusions, as well as adding a third.  
On my visit to the museum to meet with the current President of ANFASEP Adelina 
García, our discussion was interrupted by two moments highly emblematic of 
ANFASEP’s overall goals; the first was a brief delay whilst García spoke with a local 
woman about her experiences, and the second was the arrival of a class of 
                                                          
188 Dwyer and Alderman, ‘Memorial landscapes’. 
189 Markus Weissert, ‘Memories of Violence, Dreams of Development: Memorialisation Initiatives in the Peruvian Andes’ (PhD 
Thesis: Freien Universität Berlin, 2015), p.219. 
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schoolchildren for a lesson on why ANFASEP existed. The building is in this way a 
pivotal space, in which memories of the past can be described by their protagonists and 
heard by younger generations. In García’s own words: 
“The younger generation don’t know how this violence happened. 
Then they come, see, and reflect so that they don’t repeat this violence 
again. We have thought in these terms and implemented them. It’s a 
small thing but we are the same people, we have suffered, we have 
testimonies, photos of our families. Therefore [the museum] has lots 
of significance for us.”190 
Although overwhelmingly positive and nonviolent, ANFASEP’s approach is 
nonetheless considered controversial in many ways. For example, in 2015 Fujimorista 
congressman Carlos Tubino criticised one of the displays for “showing the Armed 
Forces as violators of the human rights of peasants. It is a strong and severe image 
which ought not to be exhibited”.191 Whilst the museum exists as a way of teaching the 
lessons of the past so they are not repeated, many see it as the reopening of old wounds, 
funded by an organisation committed to criticising the state. Although ANFASEP still 
sees a high degree of participation with its activities, remembering violence remains 
anathema to parts of the local population and in terms of importance the museum is 
relegated below sites from the pre-Incan, Colonial and Republican eras by tourist 
agencies and tourists alike.192  The museum’s criticism of all forms of violence and 
display of shared responsibility between Shining Path and the armed forces also goes 
                                                          
190 Adelina García, ‘Interview in-person’ (Ayacucho, 2016). 
191 Carlos Tubino quoted in ‘Congresistas critican esta escultura en museo de Ayacucho’, El Comercio, 6 April 2015, 
[http://elcomercio.pe/peru/ayacucho/congresistas-critican-esta-escultura-museo-memoria-ayacucho-noticia-1802250]. 
192 For example, the Museo de la Memoria is ranked “#10 of 25 things to do in Ayacucho” by TripAdvisor 
[https://www.tripadvisor.co.uk/Attractions-g316041-Activities-Ayacucho_Ayacucho_Region.html, 6th June 2016]. 
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against more widely accepted narratives that position the insurgents as primary 
aggressors in the conflict.  
However, as Legg argues, this criticism highlights the difficulty of conflating sites 
of memory with ideas about national collective memory. In part, this is because of the 
influence of a transnational trend for truth commissions, transitional justice and 
museums of memory in the wake of violence (in Argentina, Rwanda, South Africa and 
the Balkans, to name only a few examples) which can tend to locate responsibility for 
violence with the state.193 The Museo de la Memoria supports this argument, being 
influenced by transnational ideas about the use of museums as a means of creating 
social justice, whilst also being highly local in its outlook. It is important, therefore, to 
emphasise that the museum is not simply a site of memory (i.e. a site in which 
narratives of memory are displayed), but a site for memory (a site in which an array of 
memories are actively practiced for other ends). 
As Feldman argues, the Museo de la Memoria exudes a kind of discursive 
independence and rebelliousness from more widely accepted memory discourses in 
Peru.194 Even whilst it is impossible to outline something close to an official narrative of 
violence in Peru since the publication of the CVR’s Informe Final, ANFASEP’s 
approach stands separately because of the organisation’s use of memory practice to 
constantly remake ayacuchano society, and bring progressive change to Peru more 
generally. In this sense, it is possible to understand the Museo’s interpretation of the 
conflict and its consequences as a distinctly spatialised memory narrative. 
The importance of this local perspective can also be seen in the visit of Verónika 
Mendoza (the Presidential candidate for Leftist coalition Frente Amplio) to ANFASEP 
                                                          
193 Legg, ‘Contesting and surviving memory’, p.500. 
194 Feldman, ‘Exhibiting Conflict’, p.510. 
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during the 2016 election campaign, ANFASEP’s development of the Santuario de la 
Memoria at La Hoyada (discussed in the next chapter), and the creation of a temporary 
museum of memory in the streets of Huamanga in 2015.195 Each of these projects and 
meetings demonstrate, and are designed to reinforce, the importance of ANFASEP’s 
position, not just as victims of violence, but as local community organisers aiming to 
address the social inequalities present in Peru’s historical-spatial structure. The 
organisation’s memory practice is to highlight the suffering of the region in the past, 
and to utilise these memories as a tool for creating social justice in the future.  
The particular aesthetics of this space, therefore, suggest that the past is neither static 
nor dead. There is a particular politics of place involved in ANFASEP’s activities which 
in itself is deeply tied to the forms of memory displayed in the Museo de la Memoria. 
ANFASEP is therefore a contemporary example of trends of ayacuchano radicalism and 
mobilisation which can also be seen in the radical movements of the 1960s and in the 
development of Shining Path (to a lesser extent). However, as with these previous 
movements, it is vital to see ANFASEP not simply as an expression of a non-Western, 
un-modern, indigenous cosmic vision, but as the product of Peru’s uneven socio-spatial 
structure and the political violence which erupted as a result of it. From this perspective, 
space acts not only as a mechanism for reproducing society, but also as a technology 
which reproduces narratives about society too. 
The museum’s critique of political violence therefore uses space to articulate a 
distinctly spatialised understanding of the internal conflict, premised primarily upon the 
highlighting that the factors which produced Shining Path were rooted in the Andean 
and Amazonian pueblo. As will be seen through analyses of other spatialised 
understandings of the conflict in the next chapter and throughout this dissertation, this 
                                                          
195 Apoyo Para La Paz, ‘Museo Itinerante estrenado en el Centro Histórico de Ayacucho’ [http://ayacucho.memoria.website/museo-itinerante-
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perspective is in itself a form of knowledge produced from a particular geographical 
perspective, and it is possible to see how interpretations of the conflict differ depending 
on where the individual or group producing the narrative is culturally located.  
 
The spatial aesthetics of Shining Path violence 
Throughout this chapter, I have built upon pre-existing interpretations which position 
Shining Path not as the development of a new outcrop of revolutionary Marxism in the 
international context of the Cold War, but as the appropriation of Maoist ideas by a 
localised group of ayacuchano radicals frustrated by the failures of previous movements 
to produce social change. However, whereas previous interpretations have placed a 
large degree of emphasis on “Gonzalo Thought” as an explanatory factor for Shining 
Path violence, I have highlighted some of the ways in which this ideology was locally 
interpreted, modified and even subverted in the actions and cultural production of party 
cadres. In this interpretation, Shining Path was intrinsically produced by the radical 
atmosphere of Ayacucho which contained a fundamentally spatialised understanding of 
where revolution would come from and how it should be conducted. 
In this context, Shining Path ideology was a pessimist reaction to the defeat of 
previous groups such as the MIR and ELN in the 1960s, and to the slow, contradictory 
reforms of the Velasco government. This pessimism highly affected the provincial 
middle-class who had been part of a brief regional consensus with peasant movements 
which attempted to use ideas of Andean utopianism to allow the South-Central Andes to 
overcome its historical poverty, isolation and underdevelopment. The response of those 
elites was to appropriate a more violent, more destructive set of ideas to achieve their 
goals. 
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However, there was also a highly ideological form of epistemological violence 
which took place in this moment. In discussing Stalinism in 1930s Russia, Žižek argues 
that the purges represented an inversion of ideological violence which became 
necessary to deny the authentic revolutionary past of the project and allow Stalinism to 
maintain power, in essence revolutionising itself.196 This is the point of departure for 
“Gonzalo Thought”; an ideology which took Andean radicalism to the next stage of 
extreme, ultra-violence, whilst at the same denying the party’s roots in traditions of 
ayacuchano politics and Andean rebellion. In this sense, Shining Path was not just, in 
the words of Flores Galindo, a “nightmarish version of the Andean utopia”, but a 
nightmarish inversion of the Andean utopia.197 
From the point at which Guzmán and his followers began to employ violent 
repression and reprisals, the temporary alliance that had existed between Leftist 
intellectuals and peasant communities in the 1960s fell apart, and communities instead 
followed a more complex strategy of negotiation between the insurgents and the armed 
forces. This perspective on the conflict challenges the idea that peasant communities 
were passive victims to violence, caught between two fires. Instead, the rise of radical 
movements in the 1960s, Shining Path and the formation of rondas campesinas can all 
be seen as the results of a series of negotiations made by the peasant population with 
various local powerholders. According to Nelson Pereyra Chávez: 
“from the moment these communities opposed the hacendados and 
supported the insurgents, they developed a political strategy which 
was present in the ‘70s and ‘80s when they decide whether to support 
                                                          
196 Žižek, Violence, p.178. 
197 Flores Galindo, Buscando un Inca, p.81. In a similar vein, Mallon has argued that the alliance between Leftist activists and 
indigenous communities in Andahuaylas in the 1970s was “superficial and fragile at best, and…broke apart quickly when faced with 
repression and state cooptation”, a case that would be a “shining omen” for Shining Path’s turn against the peasant population in the 
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or reject Shining Path…and this strategy has not been revealed by the 
social sciences, nor by the CVR, much less by the press”.198 
In this context, Shining Path violence appears not as a crisis in the tradition of 
Peruvian Marxism, but as a crisis in the relationship between ayacuchano radicals and 
local communities in which both sides turned their pessimism and frustrations at 
previous failures into a violent rage at the other party.  
Whitehead’s argument that violence can be construed as a form of cultural 
performance, the rationale and aesthetics of which are derived from the local histories 
and cultures of the space in whey take place, is useful in two ways here.199 Firstly, 
peasant responses to Shining Path, and the actions of the peasants who supported the 
insurgents as cadres, can be interpreted as a performance of the long-standing tradition 
of independence and self-defence in these communities; a tradition which existed fresh 
in the memory after the land seizures and armed rebellions of the 1960s. Secondly, in 
responding to peasant resistance and in their incursions into the jungle, Shining Path 
reproduced the racial hierarchies which exist in Peruvian society though violent 
domination, and in effect reinforced the racist values which contribute to Peru’s socio-
spatial structure. It is also essential to understand the Andean nature that many instances 
of violence took on; not in the sense that peasants acted as prototypes of the Indian 
savage, but that their support for, or rejection of, Shining Path was rooted in the 
localised politics of everyday life. The complexities and localised nature of this violence 
are, however, hidden when represented in the media on the national and global scale 
and, as Whitehead argues, become compressed into simplified narratives of primordial 
savagery and terrorism.200  
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200 Ibid., p.74. 
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In this context, Lucanamarca is almost a pre-emptive declaration of victory by 
Shining Path’s central command, trying to do away with communities who had been 
their engine of revolution before the revolution has even taken place. Indigenous 
participation with Shining Path has, in this way, been denied by all sides. A spatial 
analysis therefore not only allows us to understand how violence was produced by 
geography and local circumstances, but, as Soja argues, is necessary to recover and 
appreciate the simultaneity of numerous contributing factors, whilst avoiding the 
construction of deterministic linear narratives.201 
Shining Path represented a degree of syncretism between Western and Maoist ideas 
about political violence and the ability and desire of Andean communities to control the 
land and remake the world around them. This agency persists today in the activities of 
ANFASEP and Apoyo Para La Paz (an organisation based in Huamanga which works 
closely with ANFASEP), and in continued support for Leftist movements which appear 
to share similar political priorities and concerns. The results from the first round of the 
2016 Presidential Elections demonstrate this. Despite a concerted media campaign to 
depict her as a threat to national security and “terrorist” sympathiser, Verónika 
Mendoza and Frente Amplio won the majority of departments affected most heavily by 
the conflict, including Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Apurímac, Cusco and Puno.202 When I 
discussed this with Yuber Alarcón of Apoyo Para La Paz, he argued that there was still 
a strong desire to build a new society, saying that:  
“They tell us that those who think differently: they are Leftists, they 
are terrorists…It has stigmatized both this sector of the population… 
[but] it’s not necessarily only Leftists who have voted for Verónika, 
                                                          
201 Soja, Postmodern Geographies, p.22. 
202 It is worth nothing that, in both 2006 and 2011, these departments overwhelmingly voted for the ostensibly left-wing nationalist 
(and also retired Lieutenant Colonel) Ollanta Humala, who won the Presidency in 2011. 
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no. In our country there is a change. There is a change in the 
mentality of Peruvians, there is a change in the social structures of 
our country.”203 
What Alarcón’s words tell us is that Peruvian geography is not only continuing to 
produce spatialised understandings of Peruvian society, including new articulations of 
the Andean utopia, but has also produced spatialised memory narratives which continue 
to shape regional and local politics today. From a limeño perspective, the conflict can be 
neatly bracketed into the 1980-2000 period (and in many cases is limited to 1980-1992). 
In Ayacucho, Junín and other departments greatly affected by the violence, however, 
the conflict is interpreted in a far broader and more continuous manner, involving issues 
which are unresolved to this day. Whilst this analysis has shown that Shining Path was a 
phenomenon produced by the local politics of Ayacucho, therefore, it is also possible to 
see Andean sites of memory as representative of spatialised understandings of the 
conflict which are equally produced from a local perspective.  
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110 
 
Chapter 2: Space and the counterinsurgency operation 
In this chapter, I will explore how the logic of counterinsurgency violence was derived 
from a particular spatial logic, based upon a colonial mode of thought which positioned 
Peru’s interior as an unruly colony in need of subjugation, or (re)conquest, by the 
Peruvian state. I will demonstrate this firstly by analysing the detention centres 
established by the armed forces as part of their counterrevolutionary strategy. The 
exclusionary spatial logic of detention centres, which acted as small, localised spaces of 
exception, was tied to a far wider practice of suspending human rights and the rule of 
law in the so-called Emergency Zones in order to exterminate Shining Path. In effect, 
the exception was extended to whole departments of the Peruvian Andes and Amazon.  
The military’s actions collectively punished communities and reinforced pre-
existing racial hierarchies; this much is already known from the CVR.204 However, I 
will argue that these reprisals were not simply excesses and abuses, but that this 
collective punishment was central to the logic of the counterinsurgency operation. This 
is because the Peruvian armed forces had come to see the Andes, but particularly 
Ayacucho, as a radical space which continuously fomented rebellion. As Rénique 
highlights, the radical social movements in the sierra in the 1960s and 70s has led many 
to see the historical roots of the internal conflict (and of Shining Path’s mobilisation) in 
the radical political traditions of earlier decades.205 In this sense, ayacuchano political 
culture represented an alliance between the Peruvian Left and indigenous communities; 
the two groups who had traditionally been constructed as internal enemies and obstacles 
to order and progress by the armed forces. Whilst Leftists, particularly Flores Galindo in 
his book Buscando un Inca, have interpreted these traditions of Andean radicalism in a 
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205 Rénique, ‘La utopía andina hoy’, p.143.  
111 
 
positive light, for the Peruvian state and armed forces these social movements appeared 
as a dangerous rejection of state authority. 
Because of this, the way in which the armed forces conducted their 
counterinsurgency operation was more reminiscent of the suppression of a colonial 
rebellion than of a state protecting its subjects. I will therefore argue that 
counterrevolutionary violence represented a form of bloodletting, a purge deemed 
necessary to clear the sierra of radical movements for decades and punish the 
communities who supported them. These practices relied heavily upon the extension 
and formalisation state power in the sierra, particularly through the establishment of 
numerous military bases and a network of rondas campesinas. However, the vengeful 
nature of the counterinsurgency operation also represents the exercise of sovereign 
power by the Peruvian state in the nation’s interior, suggesting that forms of state power 
were differentially exercised in a geographically-contingent manner across Peru during 
this period. 
Often it is noted that the human rights abuses perpetrated by agents of the Peruvian 
state occurred under different circumstances to those perpetrated in the Southern Cone 
because the Peruvian government was democratically elected. Throughout this chapter, 
I will draw on Foucauldian and Agambenian understandings of sovereign power to 
argue that state forces created numerous spaces of exception, inside which the 
democratic rule of law ceased to operate.206 In this scenario, spaces of exception are 
those in which human rights are no-longer guaranteed by the state, and in which the rule 
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of law is effectively suspended.207 These spaces existed at varying levels of scale, from 
detention centres such as Cuartel Los Cabitos to the zonas rojas (departments including 
Ayacucho, Apurímac, Huancavelica and many others which were placed under a state 
of emergency). In creating these spaces of exception, state forces made human rights 
geographically contingent, privileged in some regions but not in others. In effect, the 
rule of law was suspended across large swathes of the country, but this situation was 
created through legal frameworks. Some of the worst abuses, as will be outlined in 
Chapter 4, occurred after the election of Alan García who had promised to bring an end 
to the heavy-handed nature of the counterinsurgency operation. The reason that such 
atrocities were able to be conducted by a democratic regime, I will therefore argue, is 
that democratic governance had itself become spatially contingent. Furthermore, using 
Butler, I will argue that spaces of exception denoted the lives of those confined within 
them as valueless and non-grievable. Detainees in Peru’s conflict were not just beyond 
the protection of the law; in many ways they were considered to be non-grievable, a 
construction which has implications for how Senderista perspectives are excluded from 
memory practice in Peru to this day. 
As with Shining Path violence, I will also highlight how counterinsurgency 
operations were shaped by peasant communities. This is clearest in the case of Putis 
where there is evidence to suggest that peasants from Marccaraccay (a nearby village) 
encouraged the armed forces to eliminate their local rivals. The rondas campesinas also 
played an important role in repelling Shining Path, and were arguably pivotal in turning 
the tide against the insurgents. However, the role of the rondas campesinas is still 
central to historiography on the conflict whilst, as Portugal argues, the “positive 
contact” between peasant communities and Shining Path at the early stages of the 
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conflict has largely been hidden by peasants, in part to “conserve the strategic image of 
the victim”.208 
I will also analyse how the counterinsurgency operation has been represented in 
forms of cultural production produced by the Peruvian armed forces and representations 
of the counterinsurgency operation from Peruvian cinema. I will argue that many 
cultural representations of the conflict support the military’s attempts to exterminate 
Shining Path and dismiss human rights abuses as a necessary evil, a perspective shared 
by cultural artefacts produced by the armed forces themselves. Following this, I will 
discuss the sites of memory which have been created to reflect upon the armed forces’ 
counterinsurgency operation, including the Museo Chavín de Huántar in Lima and the 
Santuario de la Memoria in Huamanga. Although these analyses may appear tangential 
to the argument developed about state violence in the earlier parts of this chapter, these 
sites of memory are important artefacts for understanding how the historical spatialised 
understandings of the conflict which supported the state violence of the 
counterinsurgency operation have been replicated, and challenged, in memory 
narratives of the conflict. These sites help us to understand how Peruvian space was 
socially produced under particular ideological assumptions, and that this space, in turn, 
produced forms of violence and reinforced the same ideological beliefs which underpin 
its construction.  
 
A brief history of Peru’s armed forces 
When considering the internal conflict in Peru, it is important to remember, as has been 
highlighted previously, how and why the military’s intervention represented a distinctly 
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Peruvian form of state violence (in contrast to other twentieth century experiences of 
state violence in the Southern Cone and globally). In order to understand this fully, it is 
necessary to first briefly outline the history of Peru’s armed forces, their role in projects 
of nation-building in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and how the character of 
the Peruvian army is distinct from other military forces in Latin America which have 
perpetrated seemingly similar episodes of counterinsurgent repression.  
Throughout the twentieth century, the armed forces have held a distinct position in 
terms of Peruvian national identity, a position which is reinforced regularly through 
cultural practices and activities. For instance, Milton has argued that the names and 
images of patriarchal military heroes, such as Bolívar, San Martín, Sucre and Bolognesi, 
recur throughout Peru’s urban landscapes, reflecting the armed forces’ cultural 
power.209 In a similar way, the Guard Mounting ceremony at the Presidential Palace in 
Lima’s Plaza des Armas (every noon, with mounted displays on selected Sundays) is a 
proud display of military tradition and prowess, popular with Peruvians and foreign 
tourists alike. Whilst such instances by no means suggest that support for the military is 
universal among Peruvians, it does reflect a form of cultural power wielded by the 
military and state agents to reinforce their own central position as elite, masculine 
leaders of the nation. 
The Peruvian army even has its own military journal (the Revista Militar del Perú, 
founded in 1897) and Comisión Permanente de Historia del Ejército del Perú (CPHEP) 
which produces reports on historical events.210 In particular, the CPHEP demonstrates a 
preference for events form the nineteenth century, or more recent events (such as the 
1997 Operación de Huántar) which might be broadly assumed to be less controversial 
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than the numerous militarily-backed coups d’état or counterinsurgency operations in the 
Peruvian interior in the twentieth century. In fact, the period covered by the CPHEP’s 
current five volumes of The General History of the Peruvian Army ends in 1899.211 This 
bias for the events and heroes of the nineteenth century is not, perhaps, surprising, given 
that it allows the military to present themselves as heroes of Peruvian Independence and 
Republicanism. Many of the military’s interventions in the past one hundred years or so 
have been more difficult to present as heroic, however, and perhaps are sufficiently 
distant within the scope of collective memory to be re-interpreted as such.  
That being said, the military’s interventions in Peruvian politics in the nineteenth 
century were, of course, not confined to the heroic defences of Peruvian democracy and 
Independence often represented in military parades. Despite Peru’s humiliating defeat 
and invasion by Chile, however, the War of the Pacific nonetheless remains an 
important moment in Peruvian military history, from which a number of heroes are still 
remembered (such as Admiral Miguel Grau who died during the Battle of Angamos in 
1879).212 In part, this is because the military interpreted the War as a failure of civilian 
leadership, and Loveman argues that the War’s legacy was to bequeath Peru “another 
generation of militarism”.213 This is supported by Masterson, who states that “if the War 
with Chile gave Peru its greatest martyr heroes, it also fostered decades of frustration 
and demonstrated that caudillismo was a poor substitute for military 
professionalism”.214 The War of the Pacific therefore persuaded the Peruvian military 
not only that they ought to be continuously politically active to safeguard the nation and 
their interests, but that they would also have to modernise, professionalise, and take 
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influence from Europe on how to organise the armed forces for the purposes of the 
Peruvian nation-state. 
The first two decades of the twentieth century are described by Jorge Basadre as the 
“Aristocratic Republic”, a period in which military control over the state receded, to an 
extent, and the Partido Civil predominanted in government.215 However, as the century 
progressed, the military demonstrated a regular willingness to take action against 
perceived threats to social order. In particular, Milton highlights the regimes of Augusto 
B. Leguía (1919-1930), Luis Miguel Sánchez Cerro (1930-1931), and Manuel Odría 
(1948-1950) as key times when the Peruvian army intervened to safeguard its political 
and economic interests through coups d’état, but these are only three examples of the 52 
of Peru’s Presidents (out of 74) from a military background, suggesting a far more 
pervasive level of influence over Peruvian politics.216 As Milton notes, this led Toche to 
argue that, throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth century, the Peruvian armed 
forces developed a sense of “military anti-politics” in which the military saw 
themselves, and not civilian politicians, as the only state agents capable of governing, 
protecting law and order, and achieving modernity and progress for the Peruvian 
nation.217 Similarly, Villanueva argues that, from Leguía’s Presidency onwards, 
Peruvian militarism came to not only refer to specific military (or military-backed) 
governments, but to “military influence in a nation’s politics and to the use of the 
military as a tool for capturing and maintaining power”.218 
As Milton argues, this project would lead the military to identify two distinct 
internal enemies who represented barriers to Peruvian order and progress. Whilst the 
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indigenous populations of the Andes and Amazon could, from the military’s 
perspective, be civilised, Leftist subversives were identified as a threat which must be 
eliminated (a position which would later map comfortably onto Cold War ideas which 
saw the Peruvian Left as Soviet or Chinese provocateurs).219 As both Milton and Toche 
highlight, this belief was violently demonstrated through the military’s suppression of 
the 1932 Trujillo uprising, in which over 50 Apristas were summarily executed in the 
pre-Columbian ruins of Chan Chan, a moment from whence on the image of the 
subversive was routinely deployed by the military to justify violence.220 However, the 
military’s conflation of indigeneity and Leftism had a spatial corollary. Whilst 
indigeneity as a category was historically associated with the Peruvian interior, the 
military’s experiences in combatting the MIR and ELN (among others) in the sierra in 
the 1960 reinforced the belief that the Andes was also insurgent territory.   
It is important to also recognise the radical turn which Peruvian military thought 
took in the 1950s and 1960s. As Cant highlights, the Gobierno Revolucionario de las 
Fuerza Armadas (GRFA, 1968-80) tried to incorporate forms of popular mobilisation 
and use agrarian reform and economic development as tools for guaranteeing security, 
influenced by teaching at the Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (CAEM, a military 
academy established in 1950) and experiences of fighting the Guevarista MIR in 
1965.221 The Leftist nature of the Velasco regime has been called into question and it is 
often represented as a cynical move to co-opt the wave of revolutionary insurgent and 
peasant movements which emerged from the Andes in the 1960s. Cant, however, has 
argued that the GRFA’s agrarian reform was “driven by a long-term change in military 
priorities”, and that attempts to foster popular mobilisation demonstrate the regime’s 
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willingness to limit state power in favour of civic society to some extent.222 This is 
supported who by Kruijt who argues that Velasco’s programme was widely supported 
in the military, particularly by a generation of military radicals (or “Young Turks”) who 
believed in the need for structural change, achieved through a combination “anti-
subversive and developmental activities”.223  
However, the power of the military radicals came to an abrupt end after the 1975 
coup within the GRFA which installed Francisco Morales Bermúdez as President. 
Despite Morales’ apparent position as a compromising successor to Velasco between 
the radical and conservative factions of the military, he “made a complete about face 
from Left to Right…a mere year later Morales was the leader of a classical 
dictatorship…a repressive military regime which recalled the days of Odría and 
Sánchez Cerro”.224  
At the start of the internal conflict, therefore, Masterson argues that conservatives 
within the Peruvian military had regained the upper hand and that there was “a backlash 
against armed forces’ officers who voice similar progressive views”.225 This is 
corroborated by Hurtado who argues that, by 1980 “the word ‘revolution’ had acquired 
threatening meanings and had become associated with a group of people, the Shining 
Path, and with a specific region in Peru, the highlands”.226 However, Hurtado has also 
argued that this image of the military, and particularly of the Peruvian army, is 
complicated by the “army’s spatial distribution” which meant that it not only had a 
rank-and-file composed primarily of young indigenous men, but also offered legitimate 
avenues for social mobility through its officer ranks.227  
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In this sense, Peruvian military thought was influenced by two competing elements: 
one which saw indigenous communities as obstacles to progress, and another which 
took a more benevolent, paternalistic view and saw the armed forces as potential agents 
for progress on behalf of the indigenous population. It is therefore important to see this 
conflation of the indigenous population and Leftist insurgents as a partial return, in 
military ideology, to the counterrevolutionary and oligarchic traditions of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, this position was also complicated 
by a more paternalistic military approach to indigenous communities, and the 
predominantly indigenous composition of the Peruvian army.  
 
The spatial logics of counterrevolutionary violence 
In order to understand the true nature of the counterinsurgency operation conducted by 
agents of the Peruvian state, it is necessary to consider several instances of violence 
with differing logics or aesthetics of violence simultaneously. In this chapter, I will 
therefore examine the military detention centres Cuartel Los Cabitos and La Casa 
Rosada in Ayacucho, alongside instances of mass reprisal such as those perpetrated at 
Putis. 
The detention centre Cuartel No 51, known as Los Cabitos, was located in the heart 
of Huamanga. The base was established as the headquarters of the Political-Military 
Command of Ayacucho under General Roberto Clemente Noel Moral at the beginning 
of 1983. Between 1983 and 1985, the CVR states it has evidence that the human rights 
of 136 persons were violated at the centre, through kidnapping, torture, detention, 
disappearance and assassination. However, as Yuber Alarcón highlights, Los Cabitos 
was used by the military until almost 1997, during which time: 
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“the training field was used as a clandestine cemetery where people 
who were detained, tortured in the barracks, then executed, were 
buried in mass graves. They built a furnace in the 1985 to remove the 
bodies from the pits and burn them to destroy all evidence. And this 
oven and this space continued burying bodies even until ‘93, ‘94, 
when there were still disappearances the Ayacucho region”.228 
La Casa Rosada was another military location in the city of Huamanga used by the 
armed forces to detain and torture numerous people according to victims’ testimonies, 
although its existence was routinely denied by military officials during interviews with 
the CVR.229 This makes analysis of the difference between the two spaces difficult, but 
the evidence from victims’ testimonies suggests that they were both used for detentions, 
beatings and interrogations, located half a kilometre away from each other in the city 
centre.230 
Many testimonies in the archives of the CVR relating to Los Cabitos follow a 
similar pattern, in which soldiers would arrive in the night and bundle people into 
military vehicles before taking them to the base. Don Tedosio Borda Quispe, for 
example, states how his son Jesús was taken during the night (he believed because of a 
false accusation by a neighbour) and disappeared inside the base.231 Olga Gutiérrez 
Quispe’s testimony in the Informe Final tells how she and her husband were taken 
separately to be interrogated at Los Cabitos where she was brutally beaten and 
tortured.232 Adelina García (president of ANFASEP) told the CVR how the military 
came to her house at night and violently detained her husband Zósimo Tenorio Prado, 
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beating her unconscious with the butts of their rifles as they left. As the Informe Final 
notes, these detentions were made without judicial order, or participation from any 
organisation involved in the legal procedure of detentions such as the public prosecutor. 
Further testimony from a former intelligence officer describes the use of torture and 
interrogation rooms in Los Cabitos where specialists taught the police how to torture 
detainees, whilst detainee Edgar Timoteo Noriega Ascue has described being tortured 
with electricity and hung from a helicopter during flight.233 Another classified witness 
refers to being tortured in La Casa Rosada where he was hung from a pulley for a 
minute, beaten regularly, submerged in a cylinder of water and urinated on by 
soldiers.234 Lurgio Gavilán, a former Senderista who later joined the army and was 
stationed at Los Cabitos, also makes reference in his memoir to a similar building 
known as Los Gatos which was operated by the Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional del 
Perú (SIN). Gavilán noticed a number of detainees on his arrival at the base but in the 
morning they were gone, leading him to conclude that “they took them to the ovens”.235 
It was not until August 2017 when military personnel were charged with crimes relating 
to Los Cabitos. Humberto Bari Orbegoso Talavera (head of Los Cabitos) and Pedro Paz 
Avendaño (head of intelligence at La Casa Rosada) were sentenced to thirty and twenty-
three years in prison (respectively) for the deaths of fifty-three people during the 
conflict.236 
One particular interview with Lieutenant Paz Avendaño describes the numerous 
forms of torture used by the armed forces: 
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“For example, you would give them breakfast at five in the morning, 
lunch at seven and dinner at nine, and then change the temperature, 
keep them in the dark a day or two days, or put on music four or five 
hours continuously and they come out mad and tell you 
everything.”237 
Avendaño’s interview also illustrates an attitude common among the military when 
confronted about their actions during the war as the two exchanges below demonstrate: 
“CVR: Where happened to the people after you had interrogated 
them? 
PPA: We handed them directly over to the police. 
CVR: Did they sign for them? Shouldn’t they have copies of these 
documents? 
PPA: There should be, but I retired in 1987…. 
CVR: Do you not think this is a type of excess? In 1983, speaking of 
nothing more.  
PPA: In war, there are no excesses…Do you believe that the army 
went to Ayacucho because they were assassins? All of them were 
good men who were prepared with one mentality: to defend the 
country. When they killed one, two or ten, they believed they were 
doing something good for their country. They were not bad, they were 
not assassins, they were doing the job given by your government to 
the army and to the navy”.238 
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The first exchange is one of countless examples of obfuscation by military personnel 
in relation to Los Cabitos. Although Avendaño readily admits to interrogating and 
torturing detainees, he tries to claim that they would then have been passed on to the 
police, and even then provides excuses as to why there would be no record of this. This 
is typical of military responses to the CVR in which respondents absolve themselves of 
all knowledge of, and responsibility for, the actions of superiors, inferiors, other 
organisations of the counterinsurgency operation. Memories of record-keeping practices 
are particularly vague.  
The exchange about Los Cabitos which follows it, however, elucidates a more 
consistent narrative about how state agents viewed their own actions during the conflict. 
Avendaño argues that the armed forces were good men given a bad job to do by 
politicians, governors and judges. As far as he sees it, there are no excesses in war, 
suggesting that he sees war as a state of exception. This is highly relevant to the case of 
Los Cabitos because it shows that agents of the counterinsurgency operation saw 
themselves as being above the law and believed in their own narrative of being saviours 
of the nation. Whilst the real enemies were always the insurgents, the military 
maintained real grievances with the political classes in Lima whom they perceived to be 
afraid to get their hands dirty. Thus, Los Cabitos was an open secret hidden in plain 
sight. Although the killings and disappearances couldn’t be justified legally and would 
be officially denied, the military relied on fear and impunity to protect them from 
punishment for their brazen kidnappings.   
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i) Space(s) of exception 
Agamben argues that spaces of exception are created through the declaration of a state 
of emergency which allows the suspension of law, erasing the legal status of individuals 
and leaving them:  
“neither as prisoners nor persons accused, but simply ‘detainees’, 
they are the object of a pure de facto rule, of a detention that is 
indefinite not only in the temporal sense but in its very nature as well, 
since it is entirely removed from the law and from judicial 
oversight”.239 
A space of exception can refer to either the region / nation in which law has been 
suspended (in this case Ayacucho) or the space of detention where the suspension of 
human rights is complete. The detainees, or target populations, in this scenario are 
reduced to a state of bare, or precarious, life. Butler’s work on precarious and grievable 
life argues: 
“The precarity of life imposes an obligation upon us. We have to ask 
about the conditions under which it becomes possible to apprehend a 
life or set of lives as precarious… Only under conditions in which the 
loss would matter does the value of the life appear”.240 
In this sense, the lives of detainees in spaces of exception are deemed to be 
valueless, non-grievable, and are considered not to matter. In this way, spaces of 
exception are produced by, and are also productive of, differential notions of which 
lives are valuable and ought to be grieved. Furthermore, as Gregory has highlighted, 
with reference to Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib prisons, these spaces are produced 
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by a series of overlapping spatialities, insofar as Camp X-Ray is both under the control 
of the United States but outside of its legal frameworks, its existence relying on the 
suspension of national and transnational laws such as the Geneva Convention.241 
It was the use of such legal frameworks to create a state of emergency in numerous 
departments which allowed for widespread human rights abuses on a regional scale. The 
declaration of a state of emergency in Ayacucho in 1981 allowed the sinchis to 
perpetrate numerous atrocities which “caused great resentment and distanced the 
population”. After the establishment of the Political-Military Command in the 
department, all police forces and intelligence operatives came under the command of 
General Noel and human rights violations increased as the military operation 
advanced.242 In particular, the CVR highlights how: 
“the first institutional turning point in the abdication of democratic 
responsibility by the government was the creation, by legal device, of 
the Political-Military commands…In zones declared to be in a state of 
emergency they assumed power for both the military and political 
conduction of the counterinsurgency struggle”.243 
In this sense, it is possible to understand that the declaration of a state of emergency 
placed Ayacucho department under a state of exception, whilst at the same time creating 
Los Cabitos as a space of exception. The human rights abuses perpetrated at Los 
Cabitos should therefore be seen as part of the same mechanism of the state’s exercise 
of power, not as errors or excesses. The very function of Los Cabitos is the exercise of 
sovereign power. The declaration of a state of emergency therefore was, in this way, a 
mechanism for making Peruvian democracy geographically contingent. In the words of 
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Stavrides, “exception is established in the name of the law, order is broken in order to 
be saved”.244 
Calveiro argues that the existence of “black holes” such as Los Cabitos or 
Guantánamo Bay are created within, and supported by, legal frameworks in order to 
control the dangerous Other, putting them under extreme stress and isolation before 
making them cease to exist.245 The evidence from the CVR therefore suggests that the 
declaration of states of emergency amounted to the abdication of Peruvian democracy. 
Successive governments under the leadership of Belaúnde, García and Fujimori allowed 
the military to rule with impunity over large swathes of the country and human rights 
abuses committed by the counterinsurgency operation were, in effect, legalised. Yet, as 
Tamayo argues, such frameworks also relied on a “doctrine of national security that was 
linked to an engrained creole racism that was the axis of this strategy [of indiscriminate 
repression]”.246 In this sense, the forms of state power deployed by the armed forces not 
only represented a vengeful form of sovereignty, but a distinctly colonial mode of 
thought predicated upon racist ideas about the threat of indigenous communities to 
national order and progress. To fully understand the implications of this spatialised 
practice of governance, it is important to identify which communities it targeted and 
why. 
In this context, Los Cabitos can remind us of Foucault’s writings on internment and 
hospitalisation as forms of treating, whilst simultaneously excluding, the mad and 
diseased. As Elden highlights, in Foucault’s writings: “The opening of the Hôpital 
Général…was a social mechanism for the control of the city, for the establishment of a 
homogenous world. The venereally diseased and the insane were held in the same place 
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of enclosure, stigmatised and punished”.247 In the context of Peru’s internal conflict, the 
detention centre was a space for the exclusion of parts of society deemed to be diseased 
or dangerous, in this case Senderistas. If innocent people got killed as part of the cure, 
then that was no matter as long as it stopped the contagion from spreading. This medical 
logic to state violence can be seen in Franco’s Spain and Pinochet’s Chile among many 
other examples, where Leftists were not only exterminated en masse but their culture, 
music, poetry and art were also destroyed or banned. These acts are not solely 
concerned with winning the war against an enemy; they are about remaking society 
through violent social engineering and excluding sectors who stand to oppose it.  
As highlighted by the CVR, the proliferation of these programmes across Latin 
America during the latter decades of the twentieth century was no coincidence, but was 
highly influenced by the foreign policy and counterinsurgency strategies of the United 
States in the context of the Cold War. The United States’ strategy of assisting “low-
intensity conflict” in support of friendly foreign governments, the CVR argues, had a 
significant impact on the strategies of the intelligence services in Peru, encouraged the 
militarisation of the conflict and led to blanket reprisals against communities aimed at 
wiping out Shining Path’s bases of support.248 However, in the Peruvian case it is 
important to remember that Leftist radicalism in the Andes was indivisible from the 
perceived problem of indigenous integration, meaning that both political and ethnic 
identities came to be diagnosed as undesirable.249 Furthermore, the Peruvian armed 
forces’ willingness to deploy violence against Leftist insurgents had a much longer 
tradition which predated the Cold War, as highlighted above. 
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ii) Extending the space of exception 
Whilst Los Cabitos and La Casa Rosada are perhaps the most infamous examples of this 
violence, they are representative of a much wider practice of extrajudicial executions 
which occurred predominantly in military bases, but which also extended into other 
spaces. These include: the Navy base created at the Estadio de Huanta where journalist 
Jaime Ayala was disappeared in 1984; the military base at Totos (Cangallo province) 
where 14 peasants were executed as part of a larger campaign of forced disappearances; 
and the Huamanga General Hospital where three people accused of terrorism were 
assassinated by the police in 1982.250 Although it would be incorrect to suggest that the 
Huamanga hospital became a space of exception in the way that military bases were, 
this case is indicative of the way in which public spaces came to be militarised during 
the conflict and the counterinsurgency operation increasingly acted with impunity 
across the department. Public spaces such as the Estadio de Huanta, local hospital and 
streets of Huamanga suddenly became dangerous. In this sense, whilst we can talk about 
specific, localised spaces of exception, the wider effects of their existence were for 
military repression to pervade the spatial fabric of the entire department of Ayacucho.  
The declaration of states of emergency across numerous Andean departments 
therefore allowed for both the creation of spaces of exception on the local level and the 
much wider militarisation of almost the entire region. As is explored in more detail 
below, the effect of this was to create a new imaginative geography in which the entire 
Andean region became criminalised as a singular zona roja.  
Los Cabitos and La Casa Rosada demonstrated the extreme levels of authoritarian 
repression the Peruvian armed forces were willing to embark upon in order to 
exterminate the Leftist insurgency in Huamanga. In rural areas of the department, 
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however, their strategy was dependent on the installation of military bases and 
formation of rondas campesinas in order to expand their intelligence gathering into the 
puna and tackle Shining Path on their own terrain.251 Therefore, whilst the use of 
detention centres by agents of the Peruvian state was reminiscent of Southern Cone 
violence, different models must be found to explain how they behaved outside of 
Huamanga.  
With the democratic rule of law suspended and communities at the mercy of the 
military, state agents acted in a manner more reminiscent of an invading army. With 
violent practices rooted in racial hierarchies and colonial ideas about civilisation and 
barbarism, the ayacuchano population was perceived as an external, existential threat to 
modern Peru and became the target of the counterinsurgency operation (as opposed to 
collateral damage). The military’s lack of initial awareness or preparation for conflict 
had put them on the back foot but, faced with an enemy which they were unable to 
understand, they reverted to increasingly brutal reprisals. 
This was the tragic lesson learned by the residents of Putis in Huanta province where 
over 100 peasants were extrajudicially executed by state agents as a form of collective 
punishment for alleged support for Shining Path. Before the massacre, four peasants 
from the nearby village of Marccaraccay visited the newly-installed military base in 
Putis district, and told the soldiers that the peasants in Putis were supporting Shining 
Path.252 The reasons for this remain unclear but documents from the CVR files show a 
list of 45 peasants from Cayramayo who were beneficiaries of the Agrarian Reform, the 
large majority of whom also appear in the list of victims.253 There is also extensive 
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testimonial evidence that livestock from the district of Putis was sold back to the 
peasants of Marccaraccay after the massacre. The testimony of Aurelio Condoray Curo, 
for example, states that: 
“This massacre was perpetrated on the insinuation of members of the 
ronda campesina of Marccaraccay who had gone to the [military] 
base, carrying crates of beer on six mules, to convince the 
commander to kill the people and sell their livestock”.254 
Rogelio Cusichi Ricra, who was serving at the Putis base at the time of the 
massacre, also said that the massacre was perpetrated for “their livestock, their animals; 
they had cows, sheep, horses, mules, pigs, llamas and alpacas”.255 It is therefore highly 
likely that the marccaraccaínos targeted the residents of Putis because of longstanding 
grievances from the Agrarian Reform and a desire to take their livestock for themselves. 
Portugal has corroborated this hypothesis through the testimony of Gerardo Fernández 
who, she argues, places the greatest culpability for the massacre on the shoulders on 
those four peasants, known to him and the other residents of Putis, who went to the 
military base. This detail is central to the story of Putis and to the wider history of the 
conflict because, as Portugal highlights, it clearly challenges peasant-victim and soldier-
perpetrator binaries, instead highlighting the role of peasants as key agents in violence 
with “distinct positions” and “possibilities of decision and action”.256 
There are two key lessons which the case of Putis demonstrated about how the 
counterinsurgency operation was produced by space. Firstly, that peasant agency and 
the local politics of space had an important role in shaping how the counterinsurgency 
operation was enacted, just as they had in influencing Shining Path violence. Secondly, 
                                                          
254 CVR. Unidad de Investigaciones Especiales. Lima, 10 June 2002. ‘Declaración testimonial del Aurelio Condoray Curo’, 
Testimonio 200919. 
255 CVR. Unidad de Investigaciones Especiales. ‘Declaración testimonial del Rogelio Cusichi Ricra’. 
256 Portugal, ‘Memoria de la violencia en Putis a partir del testimonio de Gerardo Fernández’, p.267. 
131 
 
the case demonstrates the impunity with which state agents were able to perpetrate 
violence against the peasant population, in effect extending the localised state of 
exception (represented by spaces such as Los Cabitos) to cover whole regions. Putis is 
not an isolated case of mass violence perpetrated by the armed forces against sectors of 
society deemed to be dangerous. In Huancapi, the armed forces murdered a group of 
local teachers, but the involvement of state agents was hidden by blaming Shining Path 
for their deaths. In Accomarca, 62 members of the community (26 of them children) 
were assassinated by members of the armed forces under the “Plan Operativo 
Huancayoc”. As the CVR details, the focus of this plan was to destroy all subversive 
elements in Huancayoc in the district of Accomarca.257 
During the conflict, reporting on such crimes was incredibly difficult because the 
military limited access to information by banning journalists from travelling to the 
emergency zones. Instead, many newspapers were fed information by the 
counterinsurgency operation which placed emphasis on Shining Path violence and 
ignored human rights violations by the military (or passed them off as terrorist 
atrocities). Despite this, there were numerous reports of military violence, particularly in 
the Left-wing newspaper Diario de Marka which denounced the death of eight 
journalists at Uchuraccay as a military conspiracy and denounced the “disguised 
sinchis” and “who commit all type of outrages and abuses including murder, looting and 
the rape of peasants”.258 Other publications such as La República and Kausachum also 
tried to hold the military to account through reports on the massacre at Socos 
(perpetrated by the Guardia Civil but passed off for a year as a Shining Path atrocity) 
and interviews with soldiers who confessed to participating in massacres and executing 
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prisoners.259 The CVR has also confirmed that it received numerous testimonies 
suggesting links between the police and paramilitary death squads in many areas.260 
Combined, these reports alluded to far wider practices of state violence and attempted to 
redefine the counterinsurgency operation as the guerra sucia (dirty war).261 As with 
Shining Path violence, instances of massive collective violence were supported by a 
consistent practice of individual assassinations and smaller reprisals, reminiscent of the 
strategy of low-intensity conflict referred to earlier. The existence of such practices 
lends further credence to the argument that the Peruvian armed forces had come to see 
Andean communities as an insurgent population which had to be subdued.  
The scale of the Putis and Accomarca massacres, and the frequency with which such 
events occurred, therefore illustrate the logic between epsiodes of mass violence and the 
disappearances at Los Cabitos. These massacres were not accidents, nor can they be 
dismissed as excesses. Put simply, they were an attempt to eliminate not just members 
of Shining Path, but any community who might consider providing resources or support 
to the insurgents. The massacres were conducted with the complicity of the entire state 
machinery from the police and military to the judiciary (criticised by the Interamerican 
Court of Human Rights for failing to investigate the Huancapi case).  
 
iii) Geography, governmentality and sovereignty 
In order to fully understand the spatial practice of the counterinsurgency operation, it is 
important to reconsider some of the, perhaps unintended, effects of the state’s response 
to Shining Path. For instance, the conflict created a situation in which vast numbers of 
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Peruvians living in rural areas of the Andes and Amazon were displaced from their 
homes, either by Shining Path’s practice of retiradas or by military reprisals. Between 
1981 and 1993, the population of Huamanga grew by 65.2% whilst the rural population 
of Ayacucho department fell by 23%. In the same period, the population of Lima grew 
by 34.7%. The full impact of this displacement has yet to be fully understood, although 
in many ways it has exacerbated and accelerated the pre-existing trends of mass 
migration to the cities in the latter half of the twentieth century. However, the short-term 
effects for the displaced have been rising poverty, increased racial discrimination and 
the loss of social networks, whilst most cities have struggled to cope with the increased 
pressure on public services.262 Alongside these factors it is also important to consider 
the drastic effects on peasant identity, deeply associated with community and the 
working of the land, or the thousands of others (particularly the Asháninka) who have 
been displaced from their land without moving into the city.  
Peasant communities who had been perceived to be supportive of Shining Path were 
therefore disrupted and displaced as a result of counterinsurgent violence. Following 
Agamben and Ong, we can interpret this as the use of sovereign power in order to 
produce a productive, docile population. The effects of forced displacement are, in this 
sense, congruent and consistent with the aims of the counterinsurgency operation to not 
only eliminate Shining Path, but also to eliminate the local cultures of radicalism which 
had developed and reassert more centralised forms of state power in Ayacucho.  
This scenario (and this dissertation in general) relies on a Foucauldian understanding 
of the state and culture in which, in the words of Gupta and Ferguson, “power relations 
permeate all levels of society…[with] a stress on the active practices of social agents, 
who never simply enact culture but reinterpret and reappropriate it in their own ways”. 
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Drawing on a diverse range of scholars, including Bourdieu, Gramsci, de Certeau and 
Massey, Gupta and Ferguson have also argued that this Foucauldian construction of the 
state must be understood alongside “spatially territorialised notions of culture” which 
incorporates “perceptions of [how] locality and community are discursively and 
historically constructed”.263 
Through this Foucauldian lens, the displacement of communities from rural spaces 
to the city slums can be seen as a result of the acts of social agents performing particular 
cultural values. Indigenous populations who had been sprawled out across the Andes 
now found themselves concentrated on the peripheries of major towns and cities, their 
ties to the lands they had once called home broken. It is important to recognise that, in 
this scenario, displacement has not removed these communities from the margins of 
state power, but has instead forced them to exchange one form of marginality (in the 
puna) for another (in barriadas at the periphery of urban areas). To read this process 
through Ong’s work on spatialised sovereignty suggests that communities were 
displaced from regions in which sovereign, or informal power, has been deployed, into 
spaces where more formal state institutions and governmental mechanisms of power 
operate.264 In this sense, discourse which conflated indigenous communities with 
Shining Path can be seen to have contributed to the production of localities in which 
sovereign power was exercised and constructed a process of counterinsurgency in which 
the displacement of indigenous communities became prevalent. 
Whilst Shining Path deliberately displaced communities (through their practice of 
retiradas) as a means of creating their model society, it is important to also understand 
displacement as a major symptom of the counterinsurgency strategy. The influence of 
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the hemispheric counterinsurgency strategy developed by the CIA (and taught as part of 
the Foreign Intelligence Assistance Program at the US Army Intelligence School which 
was attended by 898 Peruvian officers between 1980 and 1996) was to identify the rural 
communities (and to a lesser extent student communities) as the insurgents’ base of 
support, and therefore as the enemy.265 Collective punishment and community reprisals 
therefore became a central part of the operation, but the most complete way to eliminate 
communities was for the survivors of such assaults to flee to the cities. The failure of 
state agents to protect communities, leaving them open to constant harassment by 
Shining Path and the military, heavily contributed to the decisions of many to leave 
their homes. That is not to say that the counterinsurgency operation created 
displacement through direct bureaucratic commission, but that it did so because it was 
inherently racist and represented a performance of pre-existing prejudices. 
 
iv) Andeanist geograhies and race 
This racism was predicated upon a virulent imaginative geography in which the Andes, 
peasant communities and radicalism had become synonymous. Beliefs about race, 
geography and politics overlapped to construct campesinos as a dangerous internal 
enemy. Furthermore, in these formulations, indigeneity has often been represented as a 
source of violence in itself. The idea that ancient, barbaric cultural practices have 
persisted despite modernisation has been used as a means to explain why radical 
opposition to the state has so regularly found its inspiration in the Andean region. 
This spatialised formulation of race and rebellion in Peru was not, however, limited to 
the Peruvian armed forces, and can also be identified in the infamous 1983 Vargas 
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Llosa commission report into the incident at Uchuraccay, which talks of the “world of 
traditional beliefs” in which the iquichanos live with “the magical powers of their apus 
and mountain gods”.266 However, not only has the seriousness of Ossio and 
Fuenzalida’s report since been called into question, but also the conclusions derived 
from it by Vargas Llosa.267 Cecilia Méndez concludes, in her book on the “myth and 
history” of the iquichanos, that “it is as if the authors [of the report] believed that the 
peasants of Uchuraccay not only preserved the past, but embodied it”.268 In making 
these claims, the report draws a dubious link between exoticised interpretations of local 
beliefs and customs, the pre-Hispanic past and violence in the presence day, claims 
which were echoed in media reporting on Shining Path.   
In a similar vein, a 1983 report in US magazine Newsweek (which was reproduced 
in Diario de Marka) referred to Shining Path as a “peculiar communist group whose 
favoured weapon is the huaraca, an ancestral Indian sling used for throwing 
dynamite...who take the Gang of Four, Khmer Rouge and Albania as their model”.269 
Peruvian magazine Cambio explained that in “the heart of the Peruvian Andes – a 
fascinating mixture of imposing landscapes, ancestral indigenous cultures and the clear 
presence of old Spanish civilization – there exists a revolutionary movement which 
positions itself at the heart of global revolution”.270 The combination of these references 
to ancient practices, landscape, indigeneity and political violence are designed to create 
                                                          
266 Ossio and Fuenzalida, ‘Informe antropológico’, p.74. 
267 For a discussion of the various criticisms of the Vargas Llosa commission report see Enrique Mayer, ‘Peru in Deep Trouble: 
Mario Vargas Llosa's "Inquest in the Andes" Reexamined’, Cultural Anthropology, 6:4 (1991), pp. 466-504. Misha Kokotovic, 
‘Mario Vargas Llosa Writes Of(f) the Native: Modernity and Cultural Heterogeneity in Peru’, Revista Canadiense de Estudios 
Hispánicos, 25:3 (2001), pp.445-467 (p.449). Vargas Llosa has also been heavily critical of what he appears to perceive to be the 
excessively ideological indigenista works of Jose María Arguedas. See Mario Vargas Llosa, La utopía arcaica: José María 
Arguedas y las ficciones del indigenismo (Madrid, 2011). 
268 Cecilia Méndez, El poder del nombre, o la construcción de identidades étnicas y nacionales en el Perú: Mito e historia de los 
iquichanos (Lima, 2002), p.10.  
269 Barry Cane, quoted in Diario de Marka, ‘Fríamente, los sinchis mataron a 3 campesinos’, 6 February 1983, p.3. 
270 Cambio, ‘Guerra en los Andes: Sendero Luminoso, el peor desafío a la democracia Peruana’, 16 June 1983. 
137 
 
a highly effective imaginative geography, with an approach very similar to that which 
Starn has criticised North American Senderologists of adopting.271  
In short, it is to conflate simplistic ideas about the ancient, poor, backward Andes 
with language about Leftist revolutionaries in order to characterise highly modern, 
Western forms of political violence as representative of a hidden ethnic barbarism. The 
affixing of violence to a particular region and culture is, as Springer argues, inherently 
unstable because, whilst violence is certainly tied up in the social production of space, 
the heterogeneity and porosity of space make such an imaginative geography a highly 
contestable construct.272 However, by characterising regions and cultures as violent, 
Othered spaces, these racialised discourses provide justification for violent intervention. 
In short, they create a colonial fantasy in which civilisation and savagery become 
monolithic, geographically constructed opposites on a collision course. Civilisation’s 
only hope, in this scenario, is to become barbaric in order to eliminate the Other. This 
vision is, at best, a clumsy reading of cultural history, whilst at worst provides 
justification for the wholesale eradication of indigenous communities on the basis that 
they are supposedly doomed to history in any case.273  
Thus, imagined geographies become a self-serving justification for state violence 
directed against communities already suffering from the geographically uneven effects 
of economic development and state projects. For this reason, it is possible to assert that 
a form of ingrained cultural racism formed the basis of counterinsurgency strategy in 
the Peruvian conflict. This argument is supported by Roberto Ayala, a historian from 
Ayacucho.274 When I interviewed Roberto in 2016, he articulated a position very similar 
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to that of the CVR with regards to the relationship between violence and racism in Peru, 
arguing that: 
“Racism played a very important role in the internal armed conflict. 
The armed forces behaved in that way, dehumanised the people [in 
the Andes], disappeared them and tortured them, or disappeared 
whole communities like in Accomarca and Putis.”275 
The way in which the counterinsurgency operation was conducted was perhaps the 
most physical representation possible of this idea; it was, as with Shining Path violence, 
a performance of cultural values. Colombo’s research regarding the Argentinian 
counterinsurgency operation against the Monteneros during the Dirty War is useful in 
this sense, as she argues that the Argentine military focused on depopulating the 
Tucumán monte which was perceived to be the where the insurgency was 
“territorialised”.276 In a similar way, the Peruvian military’s denotation of zonas rojas 
attempted to imaginatively “locate” Shining Path in particular spaces. Yet, rather than 
targeting actual Shining Path patrols (which the military struggled to locate in a real 
sense) in the difficult to traverse puna and cloudforest regions, they instead “located” 
Shining Path presence in indigenous communities, perceived to be supportive of the 
group and representative of their cultural difference. Thus, this locating, or 
territorialising, of Shining Path in indigenous communities, and also across the Peruvian 
interior more generally, acted as the foundation for the geography of sovereign power 
exercised during the counterinsurgency campaign. 
This is the context in which Los Cabitos and the communal reprisals ought to be 
seen. Firstly, Los Cabitos and the establishment of Emergency Zones can be understood 
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as mechanisms for the governance of space, intended in the first instance to combat the 
very real insurgent threat posed by Shining Path (and elsewhere by the MRTA). Once 
these spaces of exception were established and all recourse to accountability and human 
rights was cut off, however, the counterinsurgency became increasingly shaped by 
cultural values and the performance of racial hierarchies. As a result, the state’s 
counterinsurgency operation came to represent the exercise of a vengeful sovereign 
power predicated upon discriminatory ideas about space and race, and in doing so 
produced a less-radical, more-docile population over wider areas of the Andes. 
Given the above argument that the counterinsurgency operation was a performance 
of cultural values about race, politics and geography, it is important to understand 
further how this performance has been represented culturally since the conflict. Such an 
analysis not only reveals some of the beliefs that predicated violence, but also the ways 
in which narratives about the same violence have been subsequently used to justify the 
same beliefs.  
 
The counterinsurgency operation in cultural production 
As with the analysis of Shining Path violence in the previous chapter, I will now 
explore the counterinsurgency operation through an analysis of the cultural responses 
produced by the armed forces, as well as by cultural producers working on the subject 
of state violence. That is because, following the work of Lefebvre, Springer and 
Whitehead, it is possible to understand political violence as both productive of, and 
produced by social space, a phenomenon “whose poetics derive from the sociocultural 
histories and relational geographies of the locale”.277 In this sense, violence can be 
understood to be produced by the same cultural frameworks which produce social 
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space, and to understand why violence is perpetrated in distinct ways it is necessary to 
also interrogate that same cultural framework.  
Cultural artefacts produced by the Peruvian armed forces are, I believe, a window 
into this framework and the way in which the military interpret the aesthetics of their 
own violence. Importantly, however, cultural artefacts produced about the 
counterinsurgency operation (by those not in the military) represent a range of different 
cultural values which either support the military’s heroic narrative or challenge it. In the 
following analysis, however, I will particularly draw attention to the forms of memories 
produced by state agents in order to interpret how they understood the violence they 
themselves perpetrated.  
 
i) Space and the cultural frameworks of counterinsurgency 
One form of cultural production that is particularly relevant to military memories of the 
conflict is the testimonial book, many of which have been produced by army officers to 
present their experiences of the conflict. Milton has analysed a range of these books in 
her work on counter memories, arguing that figures from the armed forces have 
attempted to “counter through cultural means human rights memories of the past with 
their own… [and] challenge the CVR’s supposed monopoly on truth… by arguing that 
the authors have a fuller, less biased, and more direct experience…[of the] verdadera 
verdad (the real truth)”.278 Items representative of this trend include Ayacucho: 
testimonio de un soldado by General Clemente Noel Moral (who was in charge of the 
counterinsurgency operation in Ayacucho from 1982 to 1984), and En honor a la 
verdad, an alternative truth report to that of the CVR produced by the CPHEP. 
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The CPHEP’s account is shaped by a spatialised understanding of the internal armed 
conflict, and the actors who participated in it, in two important ways. Firstly, En honor 
a la verdad uses spatial terms to outline the armed forces’ counterinsurgent strategy. 
The report begins by depicting the sierra as a space where “there is no state” and where 
“Shining Path and the MRTA tried to fill the vacuum” caused by the absence of the 
state.279 These supposedly empty spaces were then, during the course of the conflict, 
filled by the creation of military bases in Huancayo, Huamanga, Cusco, Totos, La 
Merced, Jauja and Puchari.280 This formulation of the counterinsurgency operation 
renders invisible the informal manifestations of state power and forms of structural 
violence which shape the Peruvian interior, creating a scenario in which the Peruvian 
state and military share no responsibility in the origins of the conflict because they were 
simply “absent”.281 The installation of military bases, establishment of Political-Military 
Commands and creation of states of exception are, under this logic, justified by the need 
to direct operations and control territory in the interior.282  
In this sense, counterinsurgency strategy appears to be as concerned with the filling 
of supposed political vacuums with formal state power and the assertion of military 
authority. In August 1984, for example, General Huamán Centeno held a ceremony in 
which 8,000 campesinos from communities across Ayacucho swore allegiance to the 
Peruvian flag.283 Similarly, the report details the military’s intervention in universities, 
including the installation of bases in the Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, 
Universidad Nacional de Ingeniería and Universidad Nacional del Central Huancayo, as 
part of a strategy to “re-establish the principle of authority”.284 Military strategy in these 
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cases was not to tackle Shining Path head on, but to punitively reassert authority over 
the communities perceived to be supporting them.  
Secondly, En honor a la verdad makes space central to its narrative about the 
genesis of Shining Path (and to a lesser extent about the MRTA). The report gives a 
detailed history of the party (which it refers to as Organización Terrorista – Sendero 
Luminoso) from early roots in the 1920s, through numerous splits in the 1960s until the 
Shining Path faction emerged in 1971. Particular effort is made by the CPHEP to 
highlight the foreign ideological influences on Shining Path’s leaders, with the report 
going into detail on the Sino-Soviet split which, it argues, led Peruvian Maoists to adopt 
the strategy of armed struggle for “the conquest of power and establishment of 
communism”.285 Later, the report devotes a whole page (in a separately boxed, 
unreferenced section) to theories of “foreign conspiracy” in relation to insurgent 
activity. While acknowledging a lack of detailed evidence, the report nonetheless cites 
numerous claims (from figures such as President Belaúnde) that Shining Path and the 
MRTA were receiving support from Marxist groups based in Chile and Argentina.286 In 
these cases, the CPHEP develops its spatialised narrative of the internal conflict further 
by depicting Shining Path and the MRTA as foreign terrorists who occupied spaces 
from which the state was absent in the interior. Rather than understanding the conflict as 
a bloody civil war precipitated by systemic inequality and cultural divides across Peru, 
this formulation represents the conflict as an invasion by foreign Marxists, legitimating 
the state’s response through the context of national security and sovereignty.   
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The narrative of the internal armed conflict deployed in En honor a la verdad is also 
reflected in Ayacucho: testimonio de un soldado. In particular, Noel deploys Cold War 
rhetoric to evoke the spectre of communism, arguing that the armed forces were 
required to tackle the “enemies and traitors to our nation” and “eliminate the negative 
effects of subversive propaganda”.287 As Toche highlights, Noel makes great efforts to 
evoke the figure of the “communist savage”; a figure who is ideologically constructed 
to exist outside of the (imagined) “national community” and aims to spread the “virus of 
class struggle”.288 In this sense, Toche is correct to assert that the armed forces’ practice 
of mass reprisals was underpinned by an anti-Leftist doctrine of counterinsurgency 
which was a major feature of Peruvian military thought in the twentieth century, 
shaping the military’s violent response to APRA, the insurgencies of the 1960s, and 
later to Shining Path.289 However, this doctrine was also premised upon a distinctly 
geographical imagining of insurgency which saw communism as coming from 
elsewhere, and therefore as an Othered, external force, rather than as a product of 
Peruvian society.  
That such a logic can be deployed in attempts to justify waves of exterminatory 
violence against Leftist organisation almost goes without saying. Latin American and 
global history in the twentieth century is littered with examples of this reactionary 
tradition which, arguably, extends at least as far back as the suppression of the Paris 
Commune during the Semaine sanglante. For instance, Winn has argued with reference 
to Chile that “this demonizing of the ‘foreign’ underscores the importance of 
international factors…the junta would use the fabricated threat of Cuban intervention to 
justify its own counterrevolutionary violence”.290 In many of these examples as well, 
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the medical logic of preventing contagion and limiting the disease of “red politics” is 
evoked in support of the nation.291 What makes the context of the Peruvian internal 
conflict particularly distinct, however, is that this countersubversive doctrine was 
mapped onto an imagined geography of the nation which was already intensely 
racialised. Thus, this perspective leads to a conflation in military doctrine between 
communist traitors and indigenous communities who might become infected by foreign 
ideologies. In this way, the anti-subversive traditions of Peruvian military thought 
highlighted above can be seen to be consistent in the forms of memory practice 
produced by the armed forces in the aftermath of the conflict.  
 
In contrast to the account produced by Noel, Pizarro Romero has highlighted the 
testimonies of around 30 lower-ranking state actors in the CVR which challenge the 
heroic narrative established by the armed forces.292 These memories, in which 
policemen and soldiers express regret for their actions, or question the necessity of the 
human rights abuses and reprisals conducted by the armed forces, are represented to 
some extent in Memorias de un soldado desconocido (“Memories of an unknown 
soldier”). This memoir (translated into English as When Rains Became Floods: A Child 
Soldier’s Story), by former soldier, Senderista and priest (and now anthropologist) 
Lurgio Gavilán, demonstrates that the Peruvian military did not necessarily act as a 
homogenous group, but that there are examples of dissent within the rank-and-file 
which have also come to shape the way in which soldiers and state agents remember the 
conflict on a personal level. 
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Gavilán’s experiences with the military began when he was captured by a military 
patrol on Apu Razuhuillca and his life was spared by the patrol’s lieutenant (against the 
protests of the local ronda campesina who had been engaged in constant battle with 
Gavilán’s Senderista column).293 For a number of years, Gavilán remained at the 
military base at Huanta, and his memoir suggests that he came to think of the military 
like a family with brotherly comrades and a paternal lieutenant as a “father”294. Given 
that the beginning of the memoir highlights Gavilán’s time as a Senderista and the 
violence which he himself took part in, it is possible to see the testimony as not overtly 
anti-military in character, but one that calls into question the complex nature of defining 
victims and perpetrators of violence. 
Nonetheless, several of Gavilán’s memories stand in direct contrast with the armed 
forces’ heroic salvation narrative of the counterinsurgency operation. He details the 
large numbers of charlis (prostitutes) who would visit the base once a week, and who 
were raped by the soldiers, as well as female prisoners at the base who were raped and 
then executed outside.295 Gavilán also tells the story of Claudio, a nineteen year-old boy 
who, like him, was a captured Senderista whose life was spared, in Claudio’s case in 
order to perform intelligence work for the military. According to Gavilán, Claudio died 
under suspicious circumstances and, although it was said that Shining Path killed 
Claudio, Gavilán suspected he had been killed by the intelligence services.296 Gavilán 
also recounts one instance when: 
“The members of the patrol called the central base to say they were 
being ambushed by Shining Path…The Shining Path prisoners were 
dead, I had already seen them at the barracks. They would place 
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homemade bombs in their hands and strew their bodies around here 
and there. There were about twenty dead Shining Path members lying 
around. They put rifles in their hands too. The public prosecutor took 
some notes…The truth is the whole scene was fabricated in order to 
eliminate the Shining Path guerrillas. It had happened before.”297 
In these descriptions, Gavilán questions the military’s official narrative of the 
conflict by highlighting the excessive forms of violence conducted by the armed forces 
against vulnerable individuals (charlis, prisoners, young recruits), as well as their 
attempts to deliberately misrepresent the extrajudicial executions they conducted.  
In 1993 Gavilán left the army despite having risen to the rank of sergeant. He left in 
order to become a Franciscan priest having been, to some extent, mentally defeated by 
the military’s brutal violence and aiming to “do something for those who had nothing, 
for my countrymen we had so brutally mistreated, stealing from them and raping their 
women”.298 In this sense, Gavilán deconstructs the mythical representation of the armed 
forces as defenders of the people and Peruvian nation, instead representing them as a 
force which perpetrates violence which is comparable to that of Shining Path in scale 
and brutality. When I spoke with him in 2016, Gavilán described Ayacucho, and the 
Andean cordillera, as regions which had suffered a particular “type of violence which 
maintains [the power] of the state”. In this sense, Gavilán inserts his criticism of the 
armed forces into a wider criticism of political and structural violence which 
incorporates criticism of Senderista violence and the political and economic exclusion 
of campesino communities. Because of this, his memoir is not representative of the 
majority of military memories of the counterinsurgency operation, but instead seeks to 
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challenge the Peruvian armed forces’ official narrative of the internal conflict from the 
perspective a former soldier (and perpetrator of state violence).299 
An analysis of the relationship between the counterinsurgency operation and cultural 
production, however, ought not to be confined to cultural artefacts produced by state 
agents, but must also incorporate artefacts produced about the counterinsurgency 
operation by civilians. Extending my analysis in this way allows me to assess the extent 
to which the military’s salvation narrative has been taken on and reflected by cultural 
producers in Peru. In the following section, therefore, I focus on an analysis of the 
complex ways in which Peruvian cinema reflects the counterinsurgency operation. 
 
ii) Cinema and the counterinsurgency operation 
Cinema is a particularly useful medium through which to analyse discourses about 
political violence in Peru for several reasons. There are a wealth of sources from which 
to choose, both from established directors such as Francisco Lombardi and from 
younger documentary filmmakers, some of whom have worked closely with memory 
projects such as the CVR and LUM.300 Through translations and subtitles, film as a 
medium is able to cut across language barriers whilst retaining some of the orality of 
indigenous languages in a way that literature cannot. Many of the elements which are 
considered when producing and editing cinematic narratives, such as location, shot, and 
framing, are also inherently spatial but can be played with by directors. In essence, 
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filmmakers have freedom to create a sense of space, geography and the locale within 
their own work. 
La boca del lobo (“The Lion’s Den”) is the Lombardi film which deals with Shining 
Path most directly. Vitín Luna is a soldier in a battalion which has taken control of 
Chuspi, a small town in and Andean emergency zone which has been “laid waste” by 
Shining Path.301 The army in Chuspi are faced with an overwhelming tide of insurgent 
violence until the arrival of Lieutenant Iván Roca who begins to combat the insurgents 
with increasingly violent methods. Luna is ultimately forced into a choice between two, 
equally violent prospects: strict obedience to Roca’s project of collective punishment to 
annihilate Shining Path, or stepping out of line at the risk of punishment. The complex 
moral choices faced by Luna are in this way shown to be somehow representative of the 
counterinsurgency operation, whilst Shining Path violence (such as the appearance of 
several corpses with a sign reading “So die the informers and traitors of the 
population”) appears simplistically barbaric, savage and without rationale. By falling 
back on this false dichotomy, Lombardi’s film appears to fall within the classic 
narrative that the armed forces were highly conscious of their role in the deepening 
cycle of violence, but that they were forced into increasingly abusive habits by the 
encroaching threat of Shining Path violence and the existence of numerous ‘bad apples’ 
who committed a limited number of excesses and mistakes. Such an interpretation is 
centred on the assertion that Shining Path were ultimately the primary aggressors in the 
conflict and that, whilst military abuses certainly existed, they were the exception rather 
than the rule. However, whilst the main narrative of the film does appear to humanise 
the majority of the soldiers, there is another reading of La boca del lobo possible which 
is deeply tied to ideas about race and space. 
                                                          
301 La boca del lobo, dir. by Francisco Lombardi (Inca Films S.A., 1988). 
149 
 
Durand argues that La boca del lobo ultimately represents the military as defenders 
of the nation driven to abuses by the violence of Shining Path and the inaction of the 
political powers situated in Lima. In this sense, they see themselves as doing the dirty 
work required of them by the state. However, Durand also argues that Lombardi suggests 
the military detest the Andean world, as the soldiers show a complete distaste for Andean 
food and music, and a total “disidentification” with the communities they are supposed 
to protect.302 This theme is apparent throughout the film, particularly in an early scene 
when soldiers raid a local workshop, smashing the delicate retablos (an Andean 
handicraft) made by the owner. For Lombardi, this disparagement of local culture 
demonstrates that the soldiers sent to the sierra are not simply corrupted by excessive 
Generals, but also by racist beliefs they hold themselves.  
However, the narrative structure of the film also establishes a form of ethnic hierarchy 
which could be seen as problematic. Towards the film’s culmination, in the most 
distressing sequence, Luna and the other soldiers are ordered to execute a group of 
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Fig. 7: La boca del lobo (Francisco Lombardi, 1989). 
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detained peasants. Although Luna appears not to fire, the other soldiers do whilst yelling 
with fury in the same way as their General. What this suggests is that whilst many of the 
soldiers are complex, humanised characters, on some level there is a profound racial 
hierarchy central to the counterinsurgency operation which supersedes the soldiers’ 
humanity. Whilst they may sympathise or pity the peasant communities that they 
terrorise, they continue to do so under orders from their Creole superior. Even when Luna 
refuses to kill a survivor, he does not protect the man or attack Roca but simply refuse the 
order. This is central to the hierarchy set up in La boca del lobo. In this hierarchy, the 
Andean community are cast as victims, worthy of our pity but not represented as 
particularly complex characters, whilst their possible links to Shining Path are not 
explored in great detail. The sound of the wind in footage of the Andes is a common 
feature and can be seen as a way of signalling the harshness of the landscape and tragic 
events which have happened there, linking the suffering of the community to the 
landscape in another form of imaginative geography. 
Fig. 8: La boca del lobo (Francisco Lombardi, 1989). 
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At the climax of the film, Luna challenges Roca to play Russian roulette with him of 
the film (the first five chambers are empty before Roca orders Luna to kill him with the 
last bullet, but he refuses), yet here is no right of reply for the indigenous community 
around them; they remain silent and excluded from the centrepiece of the film.303 In this 
sense, both Luna and Roca retain agency in the narrative whilst the victims, the peasants, 
do not.  
La boca del lobo is therefore, in many ways, sensitive to race relations in Peru. 
However, whilst illustrating the effects of racial hierarchy on the counterinsurgency 
operation, the same hierarchy shapes the internal structure of the film’s narrative. It is 
Luna, the mestizo, humanised soldier, who is the protagonist and hero of the story, whilst 
peasant communities continue to appear as archetypal victims. However, it is also 
important to consider the timing of the film. Whilst films about the conflict in Peru since 
2003 have had to address the question as to whether they are for or against the conclusions 
of the Informe Final, films in pre-CVR Peru were created at a time when understandings 
of the conflict were very different. Because of this, La boca del lobo was arguably ahead 
of its time in its unheroic characterisation of military leaders, and criticism of its narrative 
should be understood within this context.   
 
There are also a number of films on the conflict which continue to rely on highly 
simplified narratives and stereotypical characters which continue to retain currency in 
Peruvian society. Of these, Rocío Lladó’s Vidas paralelas is one of the worst culprits, a 
semi-blockbuster action movie which, Milton argues, represents Senderistas as barbaric 
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hedonists and hides the abuses of the Armed Forces.304 Shining Path violence is depicted 
by Lladó as the physical demonstration of an exoticised, ever-present Otherness in Peru, 
a representation which compresses complexity and roots its aesthetics in vague, 
homogenised depictions of the Andes (also exoticised, also savage, also Othered). In this 
sense, in the words of Springer, the film represents a “caricatured” vision of the Andes 
which attempts to “affix” notions of violence and characteristics of the Other to the 
Peruvian interior.305 Decoding such representations of the conflict is therefore essential 
for understanding how cultural producers conceive of political violence as either an issue 
of highly subjective, visible, terrorist violence, or something that is more structural in 
nature, permeating the social and spatial fabric of the entire nation.  
As highlighted, these representations of the counterinsurgency operation reiterate the 
military’s heroic narrative about their own role in the conflict. Furthermore, the way in 
which violence is depicted, in which language is used, or in which individuals and 
communities are represented in each cultural artefact, gives clues as to how the producer 
envisions violence, society, and the purposes of cultural memory. In particular, I have 
aimed to highlight that the forms of social and racial exclusion inherent to military 
violence during the internal conflict have been replicated in forms of cultural production 
which depict Peru as a nation struggling to cope with a racialized, colonial battle between 
the civilised centre and the savage periphery. Of course, some filmmakers, such as Palito 
Ortega from Ayacucho, have also eschewed these representations, attempting to articulate 
visions of the conflict which challenge the official military narrative, and in doing so the 
military’s cultural power which positions itself at the centre of the Peruvian nation.306 
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However, in order to fully understand what Milton refers to as the soft cultural 
power of the Peruvian military, and to engage with a broader scope of their intervention 
into post-conflict memory practice, it is also necessary to examine how the armed forces 
have used public space as an arena for “what we might consider careful curations to 
evoke a shared glorious past”.307 In a similar way to how the armed forces have 
developed forms of cultural production and testimony, military figures have also 
replicated memory practices traditionally used by human rights activists, such as 
memory museums, as a means to challenge the conclusions of the CVR, establish 
military memories within memory discourse and support the heroic narrative of the 
counterinsurgency operation. These forms of military memory practice have also 
attempted to establish their own spatialised understandings of the conflict. By locating 
didactic memory projects in military institutions in Lima, the spatiality of these projects 
reflects a narrative of the conflict in which Shining Path, an external Other, initiated 
political violence by attacking a unitary and solidary Peruvian nation.   
 
Commemorating the counterinsurgency operation 
Assessing the degree to which the military’s counterinsurgency operation is 
commemorated, or remembered in public space in Peru is not a straightforward task. On 
the one hand, as Milton has highlighted, there are the forms of commemoration 
designed by the armed forces themselves, including the monument to fallen soldiers at 
El Pentagonito barracks in Lima and the Museo del Ejército Contemporáneo Chavín de 
Huántar in Chorrillos, Lima, which commemorates the 1996-7 hostage crisis and re-
taking of the Japanese ambassador’s residence by the military.308 Although the Museo 
Chavín de Huántar is designed to represent a relatively isolated incident in the final 
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stages of the internal conflict, it nonetheless represents a distinct effort by the Peruvian 
armed forces to enshrine their heroic narratives of the counterinsurgency operation in 
space. 
In contrast to these sites, there are those which directly oppose the military’s heroic 
narrative. Of these, the Santuario de la Memoria developed by ANFASEP on the site of 
a clandestine graveyard next to the former site of Cuartel Los Cabitos is notable because 
of the way in which the site highlights, through its very existence, the systematic nature 
of human rights abuses perpetrated by state agents. Understanding the narratives evoked 
by these sitesm is crucial for determining the significance of the Peruvian military’s 
memory work and how it contributes to the production of space (and spatial narratives) 
in Peru today. 
 
i) Military memories in public space 
Milton has pointed to the annual recreation of the Chavín de Huántar operation at the 
Museo Chavín de Huántar in Chorrillos as an example of the prevalence of “counter 
memory” in Peru. Recreations of the operation serve to celebrate the heroism and daring 
of the armed forces, thus prioritising their memories over those of the emerretistas who 
died in the crisis. In the same military base as the museum also stands the Monumento 
al Valor Militar where commemorative ceremonies are still held every 22 April to 
commemorate the day of the operation. A re-enactment of the operation can be seen in 
Martha-Cecilia Dietrich’s documentary Entre memorias: the laying of an explosive 
charge on the replica of the Ambassador’s residence, the entry of the counterinsurgent 
commando unit into the building, punctuated by gunfire and loud explosions, and 
eventually the hostages being removed from the building to applause from the audience. 
After the demonstration, families take photographs next to the large, smouldering hole 
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blown in the wall by the commandos’ explosive charge. The documentary also shows a 
speech made at the site by a man who declares: 
“Today we can feel proud, despite what we read in the papers, [in] 
this example, this glorious page in our history, and in our commandos 
who proved the quality of our Peruvian army, of our officials and 
soldiers, we are proud!”.309 
This speech articulates very well the memory narrative represented by the re-
enactment and the museum, in which the armed forces are depicted as heroic figures 
who defeated the MRTA and Shining Path through ingenuity and bravery. Apparently 
absent from the re-enactments are the executions of insurgents, who remain silenced. 
As Milton argues, “the re-enacted Operation points to a desire to simulate what the 
Armed Forces remember as having taken place and to relive this triumphant 
moment”.310 In fact, the recreations serve a dual purpose insofar as they also recreate, 
perform, and elicit the possibility and fear of violence before reiterating the role of the 
military and Fujimori as saviours. These memories of violence are highly ideological, 
primarily evoked in order to silence other memories of the conflict which would 
highlight the human rights abuses carried out by state actors.  
Counter-memory narratives also hinder the ongoing process of reconciliation, and 
their evocation by key political figures and Presidential candidates (including Alan 
García and Keiko Fujimori) continues to make the completion of projects linked to 
reconciliation less likely. These projects, including the payment of reparations to 
victims of violence, developmental projects designed to alleviate poverty and low levels 
of education in rural areas, and the creation of LUM, were established by the CVR to be 
                                                          
309 Entre memorias, dir. by Martha-Cecilia Dietrich (Granada Centre for Visual Anthropology, 2015). 
310 Cynthia Milton, ‘Curating memories of armed state actors in Peru’s era of transitional justice’, Memory Studies, 8:3 (2015), 
pp.361-78 (p.372). 
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fundamental elements of the wider process of reconciliation by reducing socioeconomic 
exclusion in Peru and preventing further violence.  
Fujimorismo still hold a central place in narratives of the conflict as Peru’s 
salvation. The re-enactments of the Operación serve to promote this narrative and 
prevent the armed forces from being criticised, and prosecuted, for being perpetrators of 
violence in the same way that Shining Path and MRTA members have been. However, 
it is also important to recognise that Milton has highlighted a tension between the 
Fujimorista “salvation” memory narrative and the military and police force’s “heroic” 
narrative of their own role in the conflict.311 Although both positions take a similar 
perspective on the conflict and are highly opposed to the conclusions of the CVR, 
tensions have arisen in the post-Fujimori years about the emphasis which Fujimoristas 
have placed on the former President’s personal role in the pacification of Shining Path 
which has sidelined, to a degree, the role of the police and armed forces. Whilst the 
annual anniversary of the Operación remains an important moment for Fujimorismo and 
its key representatives, Keiko and Kenji Fujimori, who use it to legitimise their own 
political future’s as well as their father’s past, it is also a moment which highlights 
ongoing tensions about the Fujimorista memory narrative.312 Similarly, Ayala and 
Zúñiga have highlighted the tensions which exist between the official “institutional 
memory” of the Peruvian Navy and the daily experiences and recollections of the 
marine infantry which, they argue, illustrates the human character of the infantry 
without excusing all of their actions. Because of this, it is important to remember, as 
with Shining Path militants, that many state actors were not simply perpetrators, but 
also human agents making complex decisions, and sometimes victims.313 
                                                          
311 See Milton, Conflicted Memory, pp.19-20. 
312 For example, see ‘Mineros de Chavín de Huántar Llegan a Congreso por sus Derechos’, Manifiesto, 12 May 2017 
[http://manifiesto.net.pe/2017/05/12/mineros-de-chavin-de-huantar-llegan-a-congreso-por-sus-derechos/, accessed 16 June 2017]. 
313 Henry Ayala Abril and Antonio José Zúñiga Romero, ‘Entre el recuerdo y el olvido: Memorias de infantes de la Marina de 
guerra del Perú sobre su participación en el conflicto armado interno’ in (Instituto de Democracia y Derechos Humanos de la 
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Broadly speaking, however, counter memory narratives have been deployed to 
support the actions of the military. As the same speaker states later in Entre memorias: 
“Being here with our families, and especially our children who need to know what 
terrorism means, so they fight for democracy and the freedom we deserve”. He then 
leads the crowd in an increasingly loud chant of “Long live Peru!”. This demonstrates 
the way in which this counter-memory narrative is being intertwined with a form of 
militarised nationalism. The foundational idea of this outlook is that Peru, as a unitary 
and solidary nation, was attacked by terrorists and plunged into chaos until the arrival of 
Alberto Fujimori who allowed the military to get on with their job. Needless to say, 
such an outlook obscures the plethora of social, racial and cultural conflicts and 
contradictions which also contributed to the conflict, and completely disregards any 
suggestion that the military engaged in human rights abuses. That is because, to 
reference Butler again, the lives of insurgents are not deemed to be grievable. They are 
a population whose annihilation, for many Peruvians, prompts little affective disposition 
other than indifference, and so the violence exercised by state agents is seen as 
unproblematic in this memory narrative. This point is central to understanding the 
importance of cultural representation and memory narratives to the production of 
exclusionary state violence. As highlighted above in the analysis of Los Cabitos (and 
discussed later with reference to the 1986 prison massacres in Chapter 4), 
counterinsurgent forces perpetrated moments of physical, subjective, exclusionary 
violence. The counter-memory narratives which continue to assert that insurgents were 
not deserving of life, on the other hand, act as forms of discursive, objective, 
exclusionary violence, providing the justification for (and making possible) further acts 
of subjective exclusionary violence in the future.  
                                                          
Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú ed.), II Concurso de Investigación en Derechos Humanos y Derecho Internacional 
Humanitario: Compilación de textos ganadores (Lima, 2015), pp.9-41 (p.36). 
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The non-grievability of insurgents also demonstrates a broader point about the 
extent to which grievability was determined by race on both sides of the conflict, and 
the extent to which the contributions of indigenous populations to both Shining Path’s 
guerra popular and its ultimate demise have been included (or occluded) in memory 
narratives and historical interpretations. The rank-and-file of the Peruvian military, for 
example, are predominantly young men from indigenous backgrounds and suffer racial 
exclusion, yet despite the heroic narratives of the role of the military, indigenous 
soldiers have never been at the forefront of this narrative (nor have they considered to 
be eminently grievable).314 Similarly, whilst initial peasant support for Shining Path, 
and the contributions of the rondas campesinas to Shining Path’s defeat, have been 
increasingly recognised in scholarly literature on the conflict, the role of other groups 
such as the Ejército Asháninka is yet to be fully recognised.315 In this sense, despite 
Fujimorista and military narratives which emphasise the role of state agents, and to a 
lesser extent peasant communities, in the defeat of Shining Path, indigenous participants 
in the counterinsurgency operation remain almost as non-grievable as insurgents. 
It is also important to highlight how forms of commemoration related to counter-
memory narratives, including the DINCOTE (Dirección Nacional Contra el Terrorismo) 
museum for police and military actors and the Chavín de Huántar re-enactments, are 
based upon different uses of space to memorials (including El ojo que llora) and 
museums dedicated to victims of violence perpetrated by, amongst others, the police 
and armed forces (such as the Museo de la Memoria in Ayacucho). For one thing, 
Milton’s analysis of the DINCOTE museum highlights that it is not possible to visit the 
site without advance notice, extensive documentation and a guided tour with a member 
                                                          
314 Hurtado, ‘Velasco, Nationalist Rhetoric, and Military Culture in Cold War Peru’, p.179. 
315 See del Pino, En nombre del gobierno; Mario Fumerton, From victims to heroes: Peasant counter-rebellion and civil war in 
Ayacucho, Peru (1980-2000) (Amsterdam, 2003). 
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of the national police.316 This tells us that the National Police are acting as gatekeepers 
to the narratives of memory constructed within the museum. Because they are very 
careful about who is allowed into the museum and for what purposes, and provide a 
guide to explain the exhibits, Milton argues that these gatekeepers are able to limit 
interpretations of the displays to those which fit into their own narratives of the conflict.  
Likewise, the army museum is difficult to access, involves a structured and non-
participatory performance of memory, and presents its memory narrative fully-formed 
rather as something which becomes defined through an ongoing process of education 
and sharing of testimonies. In this sense, as Milton argues, while the armed forces have 
appeared to adopt the mechanism of human rights-based memory activists, including 
memory museum and monuments, to reflect their own narratives, the manner in which 
these mechanisms have been deployed reveals a different set of assumptions and 
prejudices as to why memory practice is necessary.317 
 
ii) Countering military memories in spaces of violence 
In contrast to this, I believe it is also important to consider the sites of testimony which 
stand in direct opposition to the military’s heroic narrative, and which are testimony to 
the forms of exclusionary violence practiced by the armed forces. For the reasons 
discussed earlier in this chapter, Cuartel Los Cabitos and La Casa Rosada are highly 
important objects for study in relation to military violence, but I have also chosen to 
analyse them in order to understand how those violent practices have been remembered, 
or forgotten, in the present. 
                                                          
316 Milton, ‘Curating memories of armed state actors in Peru’s era of transitional justice’, p.365. 
317 Ibid., p.375. 
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The two detention centres were created during a state of emergency and, since the 
end of the state of emergency, the two have in many ways been forgotten in the 
historiography of the conflict. Whilst museums such as the Museo de la Memoria and 
LUM can be seen as attempts to enshrine particular narratives of the conflict in public 
space, insufficient attention has been paid to how sites of trauma can also act as sites of 
memory. As discussed below, Los Cabitos has now been partially converted into a site 
of memory by ANFASEP, but La Casa Rosada remains privately-owned, forgotten in 
Huamanga and in the history of state violence. Therefore, whilst the interplay of space 
and memory in Peru has been partially explored through museums of memory, a deeper 
understanding of the geography of memory (encompassing the interplay between space, 
violence and memory in sites of violence) has yet to be fully explored. I will therefore 
argue below that Los Cabitos and La Casa Rosada have come to represent exceptional 
forms of state violence and that only through their development as sites of memory can 
they be fully recuperated as central cases of violence perpetrated by the 
counterinsurgency operation. Initiatives such as the Santuario de la Memoria therefore 
not only represent a localised, grassroots approach to memory practice, but also 
constitute an attempt to integrate a wider array of experiences of violence perpetrated by 
state agents into more widely-accepted, mainstream narratives of the conflict.  
 
The idea of the Santuario de la Memoria is to create a centre for memories of the 
human rights abuses committed in Ayacucho department during the internal conflict, 
whilst preserving elements of Los Cabitos including the mass graves and incinerator. 
Situated on La Hoyada, the training field at the side of the former military base, 
ANFASEP aim to create a public space for reconciliation between Peruvians, whilst 
also promoting “the Quechua language, Andean cosmovision, and traditional and 
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contemporary ayacuchano culture”. Original plans for the site included a site museum, 
photography exhibit, “Forest of Memory”, sculptures and art related to memory, a 
multifunctional events space known as the “Casa de la Reconciliación”, and an exhibit 
to the disappeared.318 Through these plans, they have attempted to maintain a sense of 
place by incorporating elements of the former military base, whilst re-characterising La 
Hoyada as a site of memory, reconciliation and education. Ultimately, the project is 
about reclaiming space from the shadow of violence, to bring life back to Ayacucho 
without denying what has happened.  
The site resembles a large cemetery with plots dug into the ground where 
ANFASEP members place flowers and remove rubbish. This is crucial because it means 
that, whilst there are plans to make the Santuario a site of memory in a historical sense, 
it is still also very much a place for the remembrance of the dead and the disappeared. In 
this sense the Santuario perhaps has more in common with the Cementerio Nueva 
Esperanza in Southern Lima than with the Museo de la Memoria. It is a space which 
families can visit to mourn for their loved ones without fear of reprisal or shame. For 
this reason, the site is not simply a museum but also a sanctuary, a safe space for the 
living as much as it is for the dead. 
The project is also indivisible from ANFASEP’s continuing work to find and 
identify the disappeared in Ayacucho. The disappeared continue to hold a huge place in 
ayacuchano memories of the conflict, representative of the many hidden secrets and 
deficit of state responsibility for the widespread militarisation of the conflict. 
ANFASEP have campaigned tirelessly for the Law for the Search of Disappeared 
Persons which gives greater impetus to the ongoing search for the remains of over 
15,000 disappeared persons (whilst the CVR stated that roughly 38% of the disappeared 
                                                          
318 ANFASEP, ¿Hasta Cuándo Tu Silencio?, p.60-1. 
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were in Ayacucho, there are also large proportions in Huanuco and Junín).319 As 
Adelina García describes, this search is central to the work of ANFASEP’s identity: 
“Our struggle is to seek the truth and the many people still 
missing…We have a value, we are not like objects they can sell…We 
are, and until now always have been, fighting. Many people tell us 
"they victimised you so much" but no, we are not only victims. Our 
families, until this moment, we don’t know where they are…This is 
our struggle.”320 
This demonstrates the way in which the disappeared maintain a very real presence in 
ayacuchano politics and culture, calling into question the ways in which the conflict has 
been periodised. As viewed from the capital, the violence and its effects appear to be 
consigned to the twentieth century. In Ayacucho, and across other Andean departments, 
however, there is a sense that the conflict was part of an ongoing and unending struggle 
between the local community and state forces.321 The disappeared are a legacy, a 
constant reminder that systemic violence was deployed on a massive scale across this 
region (and to a certain extent, continues to be). 
The Santuario is therefore deemed to be a sacred space in which the disappeared can 
be mourned for, talked about and remembered; in many ways, it is a space in which 
they are brought back to life. In being a site for both reflection and organisation, the 
Santuario allows ANFASEP to continue to develop their own narratives of the conflict 
by literally building a positive space of remembrance on top of the former military site. 
The intention is not to hide the history of what took place there, but to reclaim the space 
                                                          
319 CVR, Informe Final, An. V, p.15; Washington Office on Latin America, ‘Organizaciones Internacionales Urgen Promulgación de 
la Ley de Búsqueda de Personas Desaparecidas en Perú’ 
[http://www.wola.org/es/noticias/organizaciones_internacionales_urgen_promulgacion_de_la_ley_de_busqueda_de_personas_desa
par, accessed 11 July 2016]. 
320 Adelina Garcia, ‘Interview in-person’ (Huamanga, 2016). 
321 As referenced elsewhere, this tension between representatives of the state and ayacuchano communities is also apparent in 
Heilman, Before the Shining Path, La Serna, The Corner of the Living, and del Pino, En nombre del gobierno.  
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for themselves, for the community of Ayacucho, and for the families of the disappeared. 
So, whilst the content itself may in many ways not be explicitly spatial, I argue that the 
methodology of such sites of memory is highly influenced by desires to understand 
political violence from a wider range of political and geographical perspectives. They 
elucidate spatialised understandings of the internal conflict in order to construct 
memory narratives about the Andes, but also to produce memory work from the Andes 
too.  
For this reason, ANFASEP act as important memory activists who have heavily 
influenced memory discourse locally, regionally and to an extent nationally. However, 
whilst ANFASEP’s activities are certainly similar to those see in LUM or organised by 
APRODEH, activities which use post-conflict memory as a means of supporting claims 
for human rights and articulating social and political positions, ANFASEP’s memory 
work is also indivisible from their social organisation, both during and after the conflict, 
with all such profits reinvested back into their community programmes. Therefore, 
whilst they do act in cohesion with Peru’s memory activist community and contribute to 
Peru’s post-conflict memoryscape, the inherent spatiality of ANFASEP’s own memory 
narrative means that their projects exist in a highly-localised memory circuit, in 
opposition to both the touristic memoryscape established in Lima, and Peru’s traditional 
touristic circuit of pre-Pizarrian museums and colonial architecture. 
Importantly too, however, the Santuario de la Memoria highlights the highly 
contested nature of public space as a battleground for narratives of the conflict. Whilst 
the Peruvian armed forces have certainly wielded a degree of cultural power by 
instigating their own memory projects, and have also influenced other projects 
including LUM to some extent, memory activists such as ANFASEP have used their 
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own projects to resist the military’s heroic narrative.322 In doing so, they not only 
challenge the military’s version of the internal conflict, but also their long-standing 
traditional image as heroes and protectors of the Peruvian nation. As discussed above, 
the spatiality of these sites of memory reflects the different prejudices and beliefs as to 
the purposes of memory practice in general. Whilst ANFASEP’s project reflects a 
grassroots and more egalitarian approach to commemoration, the sites created by the 
armed forces reflect the hierarchical, conservative and exclusionary outlook. This 
outlook, as highlighted at the beginning of the chapter, has been central to the 
development of a culture of military authoritarianism in the Peruvian armed forces since 
the nineteenth century, and also shaped the exclusionary practices of violence which 
were central to how the counterinsurgency operation was conducted.  
 
iii) Invisible military violence in Huamanga’s city-text 
However, these sites still do not tell the whole story in terms of the sites where 
counterinsurgency violence was deployed. Whilst the progress of the Santuario de la 
Memoria offers cause for optimism in the development of commemorative practice, 
there are clearly limits to the extent to which sites of violence in Ayacucho can be 
recuperated for the purposes of memory practice. Some of these limits are logistical, 
whilst others are put in place by those in Ayacucho who reject the need for 
remembrance. Nelson Pereyra Chávez told me an anecdote which highlights the 
problems of officially recognising an array of sites of violence in a city which is 
increasingly oriented towards the tourism industry: 
                                                          
322 The influence of the armed forces in shaping the production of LUM was discussed in several of the informal discussions and 
interviews which I conducted whilst on research trips to Lima, particularly by Juan Carlos Burga (as discussed in the section on 
LUM in Chapter 5). For a more detailed analysis of military intervention in LUM see Milton, Conflicted Memory, p. 
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“In 2005 there was a group of enthusiastic youths who made works 
about memory, and one of these was to produce a map with 
commemorative marks of many different sites, acts committed by 
Shining Path and by the armed forces…They produced this map and 
distributed it to tourists during Holy Week. Scandal! The…tourist 
guides and owners of the tourist agencies, the hotel chains and 
everyone involved in the tourism industry, saying that these things 
should not be done because they frighten tourists”.323 
From this, we can discern that there is a hidden, obscured geography of sites of 
violence and memory in the streets of Huamanga. As Lambright argues, in this sense 
the Holy Week festivities “underscore a national culture of silence, a collective amnesia, 
an unvoiced mandate to forget the atrocities that had marked the region”.324 Many of 
these sites will never be opened up to the public, never pointed out to tourists and will 
never have a plaque put outside of them to say what happened here. Los Cabitos is, 
rightfully, a space that has come to be representative of brutal, systemic, repressive state 
violence, yet it is only one location amongst a vast array of sites where agents of the 
counterinsurgency operation perpetrated human rights abuses with impunity. The 
Estadio de Huanta remains a public space used for different events, although it does 
have a plaque for the memory of Jaime Ayala, the journalist who was disappeared there 
in 1984. La Casa Rosada is, apparently, privately-owned, but very little is known about 
it. Only its colour and a vague location are found in testimonies given to the CVR. 
Likewise, the decommissioned bases at Putis and Totos and Huamanga General 
Hospital are now either abandoned or function as before the conflict. 
                                                          
323 Nelson Pereyra Chávez, ‘Interview in-person’ (Huamanga, 2016). The group which Pereyra refers to was called Ama 
Qunqanapaq (Quechua: “so as not to forget”), and the incident with the Mapa de la memoria is described in detail in Lambright, 
Andean Truths, pp.1-2. 
324 Lambright, Andean Truths, p.1. 
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This raises important questions about the relationship between Peru’s tragic past and 
the built environment in the country’s cities. Violence permeated the streets of 
Huamanga for almost two decades, yet that reality is quickly disappearing in a city that 
is looking to modernise and is changing rapidly. How then to represent the impact of 
past violence in the present, and to determine the degree to which such episodes should 
be allowed to interrupt public space, challenging current perceptions about society and 
state violence?  Without projects to highlight sites of violence in Huamanga, tourists 
will be delivered to the same museums on Inca and pre-Inca cultures, shown around the 
same colonial churches, and taken to the same artisanal markets to buy retablos and 
other local handicrafts. To a large extent, many locals (particularly business owners) 
may see this as the version of their city that ought to be remembered. Why focus on the 
tragic past when there is plenty of money to be made from the hordes of Semana Santa 
tourists, money that can be invested locally? Yet there are also many institutions and 
individuals who benefit from the silencing of the past, who don’t want their secrets 
uncovered.  
Huamanga’s main plaza is a beautiful site, particularly in the early morning as the 
sun rises behind the mountains. The seventeenth-century Catedral Basílica Santa María 
dominates one corner of the square, and a statue of General Antonio José de Sucre atop 
his horse sits in the plaza’s centre. Sucre is a war hero from Peru’s War for 
Independence, having been Lieutenant to Simón Bolívar and leader of the Patriot forces 
at the 1824 Battle of Ayacucho. Taken together, these two figures, of Sucre and the 
Cathedral, represent the image of Ayacucho and Peru that is promoted by tourist 
agencies to the outside world, that of a modern Republic with a benign history of 
European colonialism. To read the plaza as if it were a text, then, tells us that these 
moments in history have a privileged place in ayacuchano identity, a point corroborated 
by many of the surrounding street names which take inspiration from other significant 
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dates and names from the war for Peruvian independence.325 There is, however, a small 
plaque on one side of the square which reads:  
“To the Peruvian victims of the longest and most painful period of 
violence ever suffered in our country, so that the process which we 
have initiated may bring us towards justice and lasting peace. 
Ayacucho, 29 August 2003. Truth and Reconciliation Commission”. 
It is not a huge plaque, but it is at least something, a sign that something has 
happened here at a time when memories of what happened in Huamanga, and all over 
Peru, are disappearing into the fabric of the city. Perhaps this is what reconciliation 
looks like. Perhaps, when the dead are buried and those who remember them are gone, 
this is how a community moves on. Hopefully, the work of ANFASEP at the Santuario 
de la Memoria will encourage young ayacuchanos and tourists alike to learn about the 
region’s tragic past and pay tribute to those who lost their lives. Unfortunately, it seems 
that there are still too many untold stories, too many people still missing, and many sites 
of violence yet to be recuperated for the past to be forgotten just yet. This is the 
challenge that faces memory activists today: how to enshrine the tragic past in public 
space and to say simply, to paraphrase Montalbetti, that “something happened here”.326  
 
                                                          
325 Streets named after Sucre, José de San Martín, Francisco Pizarro and Miguel Grau (an admiral during the War of the Pacific) are 
all within three blocks of the plaza, as are the Jr. 28 de Julio (the date of San Martín’s declaration of Peruvian independence in 1821) 
and Jr. 2 de Mayo (Battle of Callao). These are common street names in most Peruvian cities, however many Andean cities also 
contain references to Incan history with streets named Manco Capac, Cusco, and Avenida los Incas, as is the case in Huamanga. 
This approach to the city as a text is further developed in later chapters drawing on Palonen, ‘The city-text in post-communist 
Budapest’. 
326 See Montalbetti on Calle Tarata in Miraflores (which is also discussed in Chapter 3). Mario Montalbetti, ‘El lugar del arte y el 
lugar de la memoria’ in (Juan Andrés Bresciano ed.), La memoria histórica y sus configuraciones temáticas: una aproximación 
interdisciplinaria (Montevideo, 2013), pp.243-56 (p.252). 
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Conclusion 
Huamanga’s city-text tells us several important things about the commemoration of 
violence perpetrated by state agents, and about the nature of the violence of the 
counterinsurgency operation on the whole. For a start, it is clear that even for one of the 
cities most affected by both Shining Path and military violence during the internal 
conflict, the issue of historical memory is not one which the majority of the community 
wish to engage with. For some the issues and memories at hand are too painful to 
remember, but others  have no desire to remember a violent past when there is the 
potential of a bright economic future to focus on instead. There also remains the very 
real threat, as Lurgio Gavilán highlighted, that projects which seek to re-open the old 
Fig. 9: Plaque in Huamanga dedicated to the CVR (Author's photograph). 
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wounds of Los Cabitos and La Casa Rosada will be denounced, perhaps even 
criminalised, as “terrorist apologism”, a stigma which continues to be attached to 
ANFASEP to this day.327 
This situation is, to some extent, representative of Peru as a whole. In the period 
since the publication of the CVR’s Informe Final and its controversial criticisms of the 
armed forces, Peru largely has sustained high levels of economic growth which have, 
perhaps, limited greater criticism of the role of the Peruvian state and armed forces in 
the years of violence. Although a human rights memory narrative has emerged in these 
years, as well as numerous forms of cultural production that heavily criticise the 
counterinsurgency operation in the interior, this trend has been built upon the work of a 
community of memory activists whose wider public influence, despite the production of 
numerous works and projects which challenge state narratives of violence, remains 
limited in some sectors of society. 
The analysis in this chapter has drawn heavily on the work of this human rights-
based memory camp, but has also departed from it in important ways. Instead of 
inserting counterinsurgent violence into a wider critique of societal and insurgent 
violence which aims to define perpetrators and which is equally critical of all violent 
actors, I have drawn attention to the specific characteristics of the violence perpetrated 
by Peruvian state agents in this period. In particular, I have argued that state violence in 
the Peruvian interior can be understood as a form of vengeful, sovereign state power, 
directed in an exclusionary manner against target populations deemed to be internal 
enemies. Although there is, of course, an element of Cold War logic (and 
contemporaneous comparative examples from Latin America and beyond) to the way in 
which this violence was directed against Leftist groups, I have also highlighted how this 
                                                          
327 Lurgio Gavilán, ‘Interview in-person’ (Huamanga, 2016). 
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violence fits into the older ideological traditions within the Peruvian military 
(particularly from the 1880-1950 period) and how it took on a distinctly racial form 
because of the military’s understanding of indigenous communities as obstacles to 
Peruvian order and progress. As highlighted by Hurtado, however, this conflation of 
indigeneity with dangerous radicalism was not a continuous feature of the military’s 
outlook. During the 1960s, the Peruvian army “presented a more racially and ethnically 
diverse composition than the other military branches”, whilst during the Velasco years 
the armed forces positioned themselves as agents of social justice on behalf of  the 
indigenous population.328 The return of democracy in 1980, however, marked not only 
the end of the GRFA’s project in statecraft, but also the end of a period in which the 
Peruvian military had aimed to act as agents of progressive radicalism. 
As with Shining Path violence, I have also demonstrated how the counterinsurgency 
operation’s underlying cultural framework, which I understand as an underlying 
explanatory factor for state violence, has remained consistent in some forms of cultural 
production and sites of memory produced in response to state violence, whilst in others 
it has been challenged. In this sense, I have aimed to draw attention to the ways in 
which such cultural frameworks are reproduced through time and space, and how a 
failure to challenge them more fully could precipitate further violence in the future. 
These twin analyses of Shining Path and military violence have, however, so far 
been limited to violence perpetrated in Andean and Amazonian departments during the 
conflict. In the coming chapters, I will now move on to similar analyses of Shining Path 
and state violence in Lima, and how these developed in different ways throughout the 
1980s and 1990s. I have separated these analyses in this geographical manner in part 
because different forms of violence were deployed by both the state and by Shining 
                                                          
328 Hurtado, ‘Velasco, Nationalist Rhetoric, and Military Culture in Cold War Peru’, p.179. 
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Path in different regions during the conflict, highlighting further the importance of 
understanding the conflict from different geographical perspectives. In Chapter 4 and 5, 
however, it will also allow me to demonstrate how the exclusionary logics of state 
violence and sovereign power deployed in the Peruvian interior were increasingly 
demonstrated, as the conflict progressed, in areas of the capital as well.  
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Chapter 3: Violence in the capital  
The 1992 bombing of a wealthy, suburban district in Lima remains to this day a highly 
emblematic moment in the capital’s experiences of political violence. Shining Path 
perpetrated the attack when they were ostensibly at their most threatening to the 
Peruvian state, yet within three months the majority of their leadership had been 
captured. The images of destroyed buildings in Miraflores evoked not only the impact 
of violence, but a new type of proximate fear for Lima’s middle-class during a phase 
when Shining Path increasingly targeted the city. Although Peru had increasingly 
witnessed the transfer of governmental authority to its armed forces during the 1980s, it 
was this intensification of violence which provoked the final breakdown of democracy 
when President Fujimori dissolved Congress in 1992, and gave even greater powers to 
the military to deal with the insurgency. Therefore, the bombing symbolises the end of 
the Shining Path insurgency for many Peruvians, while for others it represents the 
beginning of a new phase of authoritarian rule across the nation. 
Arguably one of the CVR’s most significant contributions to understandings of the 
conflict was to argue that the “moderately educated urban sector” of the Peruvian 
population, particularly residents of Lima’s wealthier districts, had been so concerned 
about the encroachment of Shining Path violence upon the capital that they were 
indifferent to the militarisation of the conflict, and resulting deaths of thousands of their 
compatriots, in the interior of the country.329 The Informe Final argues that this 
indifference was a result of the “the veiled racism and scornful attitudes that persist in 
Peruvian society almost two centuries after its birth as a Republic”.330  
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As I argued in the previous chapter, this tells us that there exists in Peru a 
“differential distribution of grievability across populations” which constructs Lima’s 
population as eminently grievable when compared with indigenous communities in the 
interior. Because of this, responses to episodes such as Tarata are shaped by affective 
responses including horror and loss, whereas responses to violence in the interior have 
been characterised by ignorance or indifference.331 The publication of the Informe Final 
was therefore a significant step in the re-characterisation of the internal conflict, not 
simply as a series of terrorist-style attacks on Lima and subsequent pacification by the 
armed forces, but as a highly complex period of violence which took place 
predominantly in the rural departments, with predominantly rural victims. In this 
context, it is necessary to re-evaluate the significance of Tarata in the wider narrative of 
the conflict, to highlight the highly political nature of its commemoration, and to assess 
how and why memories of violence crystallise around particular events (whilst silencing 
or forgetting others).  
This cultural geography of grievability also has implications for how safe, dangerous 
and well protected different regions appear to be. The state’s inability, and to some 
extent unwillingness, to respond quickly to the threat of Shining Path in this sense 
exposed the rural, indigenous population exposed to a greater risk of violence and 
death.332 Experiences of Shining Path violence in Lima during the 1980s and early 
1990s, however, appear to subvert this assumed cultural geography. For instance, 
Greene describes the 1986 prison massacres as a moment when “that great geographic 
and immeasurable symbolic distance that separates coastal Lima from highland Peru 
was deﬁnitively breached”.333 However, whilst Lima did experience many forms of 
disruption and violence throughout the 1980s, much of it was confined to working-class 
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districts and the barriadas at the edge of the city with little major impact on middle-
class areas. Tarata, then, represented another important moment in which this cultural 
geography of safety was transgressed even more dramatically. As will be shown, this 
has shaped memory narratives about the bombing and about Shining Path violence in 
Lima in important ways, reflecting the differential distribution of grievability across 
Lima’s landscape, and across Peru as a whole. 
During the conflict, this geography acted as a framework which guided the 
responses of government figures, opposition politicians, military officers, journalists 
and the wider public to instances of Shining Path violence. In the post-conflict period, 
this geography has led to a historiographical focus on particular emblematic moments of 
Shining Path violence which fit into broader narratives in which the insurgents were the 
primary aggressors in the conflict with the armed forces as defenders of the nation. The 
CVR’s challenge to this geography of grievability has opened up discursive space for an 
array of accounts which challenge this narrative and instead highlight the victimisation 
of Andean and Amazonian communities. There is still a need, however, for Peru’s 
urban populations to engage with testimonies and cultural artefacts of the conflict 
produced by indigenous communities about their own experiences. Not only do such 
accounts simultaneously assert the grievability of all Peruvians and the active role of 
indigenous communities in shaping the conflict, they will also facilitate a challenge to 
the ignorance (highlighted by the CVR) which has characterised relations between 
Peru’s capital and interior for so long. 
The violence which did take place in Lima is, nonetheless, vital for understanding 
the different ways in which Shining Path operated in different regions and how 
narratives of the violence have come to be constructed from differing (and often 
competing) geographical perspectives. In this chapter, I will therefore analyse the logic 
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and aesthetics of the violence perpetrated by Shining Path and the counterinsurgency 
operation in Lima between 1980 and 1992. Firstly, I will assess the ways in which 
Shining Path made their presence felt for the urban population by creating recurrent 
blackouts, committing acts of robbery and vandalism and performing targeted 
assassinations throughout the 1980s. One of the most infamous of those assassinations 
was the murder of Maria Elena Moyano, a community leader from southern Lima, 
during Shining Path’s attempts to consolidate their influence in the Villa El Salvador 
district.  
Following this I will discuss the bombing of Calle Tarata, arguing that this episode 
has come to dominate some accounts of the conflict which highlight the bombing as an 
emblematic case of Shining Path terrorism. However, I will argue that the bombing is 
not only exceptional in terms of the wider conflict, but also in terms of the way in which 
the conflict was enacted in Lima. For instance, it was one of few instances of violence 
in Lima’s “residential” (i.e. middle-class and whiter) districts compared to a sustained 
campaign of sabotage, bombings and assassinations by Shining Path in working-class 
districts and the barriadas (alongside widespread harassment and violence conducted 
by the police). Greene has highlighted that, because of this, experiences of violence in 
Lima in came to be refracted through racial and class divides, themselves reflected in 
the capital’s geography.334 As a result, the Tarata bombing did subvert an imagined 
form of Lima’s geography in which it was assumed that residential districts such as 
Miraflores and San Isidro were protected from the pathologies (poverty, indigeneity, 
Shining Path) which had produced violence.  
It is also important to highlight that this subversion of the spatial dimension to safety 
was temporary and rare. As necessary counterpoints to the Tarata bombing, therefore, I 
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will briefly discuss the counterinsurgency massacres at Barrios Altos and La Cantuta. 
These instances of violence reflect working-class narratives of when and how violence 
entered into Lima, and are themselves deeply tied to memories of political violence in 
Peru and the way in which different issues, including amnesties for state agents and the 
imprisonment of Alberto Fujimori, are considered in the present. 
As with previous chapters, these analyses of instances of violence will be followed 
by an examination of the ways in which limeño experiences of the conflict have been 
culturally represented. In particular, I believe it is important to highlight which 
instances of violence have been deemed to be emblematic or representative cases, and to 
discern how the city’s geography features (or is absent) in these narratives. To this end, 
the film Tarata, by Fabrizio Aguilar, is worthy of consideration. I have chosen to 
explore how Aguilar’s film works as a cultural artefact which deals directly with the 
bombing and with the issue of how to represent the many narratives surrounding the 
incident. Using this film, I argue that it is possible to conceive of a cultural geography 
of the conflict in which middle-class and working-class communities suffered violence 
in different periods, and understood its causes in different ways. 
Of course, contributions to this geography of the conflict are not only made 
culturally but can also be made in space itself. For the purposes of this chapter, I will 
focus on two sites; the monument to the victims of the Tarata bombing and the 
Monumento en Honor a la Verdad para la Reconciliación y la Esperanza (MHVRE from 
hereon in). I have chosen to deal with these sites in particular because, in contrast to 
earlier chapters where I have dealt with the intentional uses of museographical space to 
develop memory narratives, the history of the sites discussed in this chapter also 
demonstrates the conflicts, challenges and unintentional issues of spatiality faced by 
commemorative projects. There are also interesting contrasts to be seen between 
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projects which have emerged from, and to some extent can be seen as representative of, 
local government initiatives and privately-funded artistic projects. In particular, the 
Calle Tarata (rebuilt since the bombing and seamlessly re-integrated into the 
fashionable, tourist-friendly Miraflores locale) and the MHVRE (a monument in the 
Villa María del Triunfo district of southern Lima to honour the members of Andean 
communities who migrated to the district as a result of the conflict) present interesting 
contrasts in their approaches to memory practice and use of space. Whereas the Tarata 
monument is in one of Lima’s wealthiest districts, the MHVRE is in one of the poorest; 
while Tarata focuses on a singular episode of brutal violence, the MHVRE is designed 
to commemorate the longer-term effects of violence; and whilst there appears very little 
connection between the Tarata monument and the effect of, or memories of violence, 
the MHVRE is located in a space where many people vividly remember the conflict, 
and where the effects of poverty, displacement and violence are on full display.  
Through the comparison of these two sites, I will argue that particular narratives of 
violence have been preserved not only in culture in Peruvian society, but have also been 
enshrined in space at important junctures in the development of memory narratives. The 
Tarata monument, for example, was erected in 1994 during the pre-CVR Fujimori era, 
and the MHVRE was erected in 2007 (and then destroyed in 2010) amid ongoing battles 
for memory and accountability in post-CVR Peru. Because of this, analysing the two 
sites together as part of the limeño city-text does not reveal a static and fixed image of 
memory, but reveals the overlapping memory narratives which have been produced in 
space at different times. 
However, focusing only on conventional sites of memory, such as museums or 
monuments, presents the possibility of understanding only a fraction of the spaces 
which have been used to practice forms of memory and commemoration. That is 
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because many memory activists, due to the political suppression of the Fujimori period 
and controversial nature of such projects in the present, have instead attempted to 
interrupt public space with projects and demonstrations. For instance, Lava la bandera 
was a public demonstration against the Fujimori regime in Lima’s Plaza des Armas, 
whilst Karen Bernedo’s project Tránsito a la memoria involved printing the faces of the 
disappeared on the back of city bus tickets.335  
Not only do such initiatives overcome the problems of finding and funding an 
exhibition space in which to hold an event, they thrust the politics of memory into the 
spaces of everyday life. In order to fully outline and understand the meaning of a 
geography of memory in Lima (and more widely in Peru), it will be vital to incorporate 
these non-conventional sites of memory; everyday sites imbued with new meaning by 
memory practice. Furthermore, the existence of such sites ties Peru into a wider global 
geography of commemorative practice. Peru’s memory activist community appears to 
be influenced by anti- or counter- memorial trends from Germany and Argentina whilst, 
as Feldman argues, the commemoration and memorialisation of trauma links Peru not 
just to many of its South American neighbours, but also to Hiroshima, Robben Island, 
Auschwitz.336 In some ways these previous initiatives have provided a template for the 
way in which Peru has commemorated its conflict, but in others Peruvians have diverted 
from the plan and created new forms of commemorative practice. 
In short, the aim of this chapter is to reassess the narratives surrounding the violence 
in the Peruvian capital through an analysis of particular episodes of violence, cultural 
production surrounding those episodes, and the memory practices and forms of 
commemoration which have attempted to enshrine or contest those cultural narratives in 
public space. This approach will highlight the differences between violence in the 
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capital and the violence which was perpetrated in the Andes, and will again argue 
against the crystallisation of violent narratives around particular emblematic events 
which betray the priorities and prejudices of Peruvian society. Yet, rather than 
dismissing the violence which was inflicted upon Lima as insignificant in comparison 
with the huge death toll in the Andes, it is important to firstly understand the ways in 
which the populations of Lima’s disparate districts encountered violence, and how 
Shining Path made their presence in the capital felt.  
 
Shining Path’s urban strategy 
Although 1992 was one of the bloodiest years of the conflict in Lima, the capital’s 
population had experienced Shining Path actions in a number of ways during the first 
decade of violence. Infamously, in 1980, Senderistas announced themselves to the 
Peruvian population by hanging dead dogs, with a message cursing the organiser of 
China’s market-driven reforms Deng Xiaoping, from lampposts in cities across the 
country. With limited knowledge of the group or their obscure references to Chinese 
history, the Lima population initially paid little attention to Shining Path and saw their 
actions, as Gorriti describes, as “not only…like political anachronisms, but fringe 
nuttiness”.337 It was not long, however, until Shining Path embarked on a concerted 
campaign of blackouts, assassinations and robberies. Such actions were never intended 
to begin wresting territorial control of the capital in the way that Senderistas did in the 
sierra by creating zonas liberadas. Far more vastly outnumbered against a better-
organised police force in the capital, the party instead focused on limited attacks which, 
although not as lethal in terms of death toll, would strike fear into the hearts of the 
urban classes through their frequency and proximity. As highlighted by the CVR, Lima 
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also became an important space in which Shining Path could gain maximum attention 
for their actions, creating wider publicity for the group which served effectively as a call 
to arms for sympathisers and which contributed further to the “climate of terror and 
insecurity”.338 
From early 1982 onwards, the party focused on disrupting the capital and attacking 
its infrastructure. These actions included (but were by no means limited to): the 
destruction of the Bayer industrial plant, the sabotage of transmission towers causing a 
citywide blackout across Lima, car bombings near the Presidential palace, and the 
bombing of the offices of Acción Popular (party of the ruling President Belaúnde). 
International newspapers such as the Chicago Tribune reported the lurid details of how 
Marxist guerrillas had blown up 1,196 of the country’s 5,000 high-voltage transmission 
towers during the 1980s, contributing to the $15bn of damage attributed to political 
violence between 1980 and 1988.339 During the visit of Pope John Paul II to Lima in 
1985, Shining Path bombed a power station which caused power outages across most of 
the city whilst “bonfires in the shape of a hammer and sickle” could be seen burning on 
nearby hillsides.340  
The blackouts were a highly effective method for creating a kind of collective sense 
of fear and paranoia across the city. Perpetrated frequently enough to demonstrate the 
powerlessness of the government to stop them, their regularity also convinced many that 
Shining Path had infiltrated the national grid.341 Hiatt argues that these blackouts are 
essential for understanding how residents of the capital experienced the presence of 
Shining Path, suggesting that the loss of light and disruption of household appliances 
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made the conflict feel intensely proximate, creating a societal level of unease that the 
country was at the edge of chaos.342 Furthermore, Hiatt has also suggested that the 
blackouts had important social effects, reshaping the lives of limeños as they negotiated 
the outages and taking an impact on the interactions between families, neighbours and 
communities.343  
For example, Rossana Díaz Costa’s 2014 film Viaje a Tombuctú depicts the family 
of Anita, one of the film’s protagonists, huddled around their dinner table listening 
nervously to news of bombings around Lima, before her father leaves to go to work 
despite the protests of his wife.344 In this way the blackouts can be seen as not only 
having an effect in terms of disruption; they also forced Lima’s population to internalise 
the reality of the internal conflict and learn how to negotiate the conflict in their day-to-
day lives. This was essential to the insurgents’ strategy, by creating fear and making it 
appear that the group was far more powerful than they actually were (which arguably 
also concentrated the attention of the capital’s population on the events taking place 
close to them, rather than on what was happening in the country’s interior).  
Between 1985 and 1988, Shining Path began to develop their position in the Lima 
Metropolitan area more thoroughly, a period which the CVR describes as “the transition 
towards the siege of the city”.345 During this period, Shining Path attempted to further 
split the Peruvian Left and garner more support by targeting Leftist and social 
democratic politicians, whilst also targeting military officials. These attacks included 
the assassinations of César López Silva and Rodrigo Franco of the Alianza Popular 
Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), Eriberto Arroyo Mío and Abelardo Ludeña Luque 
of Izquierda Unida (IU), trade union officials including Saúl Cantoral, general secretary 
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of the miners’ union, and Rear Admiral Carlos Ponce and Vice-Admiral Jeronimo 
Cafferata.346 These assassinations were strategically important for Shining Path in order 
to maintain their presence in the national media, eliminate Leftist rivals who rejected the 
party’s violence, and create a sense of chaos in the capital. That the assassination of 
well known-politicians and high-ranking Navy officers could be perpetrated in the 
centre of Peru’s political power suggested that the state had truly lost control of the 
insurgency. 
By the beginning of 1991, Abimael Guzmán and the Shining Path Central 
Committee believed that their armed struggle had reached a stage of “strategic 
equilibrium”.347 This referred to Shining Path’s improved ability to wage war more or 
less equally against the armed forces on a number of fronts. As a result, the insurgents 
intensified their strategy in Lima and between January and July of 1992, thirty-seven 
car bombs were detonated by Shining Path in the capital, resulting in fifty mortalities. 
However, as Burt argues, the term also referred to a turning point in the party’s 
geographical strategy whereby, from this point onwards, they attempted to exert greater 
political (if not territorial) control over the city’s barriadas.348  
 
Whilst Shining Path violence took many of the headlines, the backdrop to these events 
was a far deeper struggle for control of Lima’s slums. Between the 1940s and 1981 the 
population of Lima grew from 660,000 to 4,835,000 (an increase from 9.4% to 27.2% 
as a proportion of the national population).349 This longstanding trend was exacerbated 
by the Agrarian Reform of 1969 and the violence of the 1980s, and saw new districts 
spring up around the outskirts of the capital. The population of these Pueblos Jóvenes 
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(barriadas, or slums) rose from 316,000 in 1961 to over 1.5m in 1981, representing 
over a third of Lima’s entire population.350 Communities in San Juan de Lurigancho, 
San Martín de Porres and Callao (to the north of Lima), Ate Vitarte (east), and Villa 
María del Triunfo and Villa El Salvador (to the south) are characterised by high levels 
of poverty, self-made housing, high levels of informal economic activity and a dire lack 
of public investment, but often demonstrate a strong level of self-organisation and civil 
society to secure basic infrastructure such as electricity, water and phone lines.  
To Shining Path, these communities represented the best method by which to 
infiltrate the capital due to their ready-made political structures and a population which 
was both ignored by the existing state and considered to be “less modern” and more 
indigenous than the populations at Lima’s centre.351 Traditionally those political 
structures had been dominated by the legal Left but, as Feinstein argues, the 
disintegration of IU had a devastating impact on the Peruvian Left’s electoral results 
and organisation in the barriadas, leaving civil society groups increasingly vulnerable 
to attack or infiltration by Shining Path.352 Furthermore, as Smith has argued, some of 
Lima’s outer districts also had great strategic importance for Shining Path; Ate Vitarte, 
for example, was the “chokepoint for Lima’s water and electrical supplies”, has a 
concentration of thermal and hydroelectric plants, and maintained crucial transport links 
with the countryside.353 It was the party’s attempt to gain control of Villa El Salvador, 
however, which prompted one of the most important urban struggles of the conflict. 
In the 1980s, Villa El Salvador was a model district of Leftist politics, grassroots 
self-organisation and community planning which represented “a viable alternative to a 
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neglectful state” on the local level.354 The largest district in Lima’s southern cone, Villa 
El Salvador, Feinstein describes, was “forged in popular mobilization” in 1971 after the 
Velasco regime offered land to migrant families and squatters who had participated in 
land invasions in other areas of Lima, and the district maintained a tradition of radical 
Leftist mobilisation into the 1990s.355 In this, Villa El Salvador was not alone. As 
Stokes highlights, in 1983 ten of the eleven poorest districts in Lima elected mayors 
from IU and “the Left won the mayorship of all lower-class districts for at least part of 
the 1980s”, including three consecutive terms in Independencia.356 These Leftist 
traditions represented both an opportunity and a challenge to Shining Path, as strong 
civil society represented an alternative, peaceful form of mobilisation for each district. 
However, throughout the 1980s the Peruvian Left’s ideological outlook and 
organisational structures became increasingly refracted through the conditions and 
stresses of the internal conflict. Whilst the traditional (Leninist or moscovita) Peruvian 
Communist Party maintained strong links to trade unions and the Confederación 
General de Trabajadores del Perú (CGTP), the legal Left’s more radical organisations, 
the Partido Unificado Mariateguista (PUM) and Unión de Izquierda Revolucionaria 
(UNIR), lost members to the MRTA and Shining Path respectively, particularly after 
IU’s poor results in the 1986 municipal elections and the coalition’s collapse into two 
factions in 1989.357 This collapse of Leftist coalition, Zapata argues, not only left 
militants in the barriadas divided and dispirited, but also limited their ability to resist 
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Shining Path’s ambitions and left them as “easy prey” to agents of violence on both 
sides of the conflict.358 
One major obstacle to Shining Path’s infiltration of Villa El Salvador, however, 
remained.  María Elena Moyano was a community activist of Afro-Peruvian descent 
who was elected President of the Federación Popular de Mujeres de Villa El Salvador 
in 1984, at the age of 25. During her tenure, the federation obtained resources for 
several community programmes including the organisation of Comedores populares 
(soup kitchens), the Vaso de leche programme which provided milk to schoolchildren, 
as well as other committees for health and education.359 In 1990, Moyano was elected 
deputy mayor of Villa El Salvador, and she was part of a generation of young activists 
working hard to provide basic infrastructure and necessities to their communities during 
a time of economic crisis, whilst also forming an obstacle to Shining Path’s progress in 
the capital.360 
Realising the popular appeal of activists like Moyano, and their potential to draw 
support away from Shining Path, the party began to target civil society more forcefully 
and assassinated a number of activists throughout 1991. These included Juana López 
Léon (co-ordinator of the Vaso de leche programme in Callao), Doraliza Espejo 
Márquez (San Juan de Lurigancho) and Fortunato Collazos Crispín and Alfredo Aguirre 
Beraún (San Juan de Miraflores).361 Such figures infuriated the insurgents because they 
suffered greatly from the socioeconomic and ethnic structuring of Peruvian society, yet 
still they resisted their call to arms. Moyano was an exemplary figure of this attitude 
and so, in February 1992 after attending a peace march in Villa El Salvador, she too was 
murdered by Shining Path. Afterwards, Senderistas blew up her body with dynamite in 
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a warning to other civil society leaders not to organise against their popular war. As 
Rodríguez describes: 
“for Sendero Luminoso, any kind of civic organization represented a 
threat against its ideas and practices, which is why the terrorists took 
revenge against her body, blowing it to pieces in order to impede her 
burial by family members and hinder her peace in the afterlife”.362 
Moyano’s murder sparked an outpouring of emotion in Villa El Salvador and, 
although Shining Path moved to replace murdered activists with their own 
sympathisers, there appeared the possibility that civil society would be able to resist the 
party with such a strong backlash against their actions.363 At the same time President 
Alberto Fujimori enacted his autogolpe (or self-coup) in April 1992. The autogolpe, in 
which Fujimori dissolved Congress and suspended the constitution, allowed the 
President to strike a deal with the military allowing them greater freedom in the 
counterinsurgency operation whilst also ensuring that harsh economic reforms could 
continue without opposition.364 Ultimately, as Burt highlights, the coup caused a 
setback to attempts to form a joint offensive against Shining Path, which would have 
combined the state’s political opposition with a strong popular resistance from trade 
unions and civil society.365 Whilst on the one hand Fujimori had consolidated the 
counterinsurgency operation and given the military unprecedented power to deal with 
Shining Path, on the other he had weakened one of the last remaining obstacles to the 
group taking greater control of the barriadas. For this reason, the autogolpe can also be 
seen as a politically-motivated attempt to consolidate the power of the populist Right at 
                                                          
362 Rodríguez, ‘Artist Archives’.  
363 Moyano’s death is still remembered today, particular in Villa El Salvador. Peruvian artist Natalia Iguiñiz commemorated 
Moyano’s death in a number of limeño districts by printing images from La República and placing them on walls and lampposts for 
the communities to remember her. See Rodríguez, ‘Artist Archives’. For a collection of Moyano’s own writing see Diana 
Miloslavich Túpac, The Autobiography of María Elena Moyano: The Life and Death of a Peruvian Activist (Miami, 2000). 
364 Burt, Political Violence and the Authoritarian State in Peru, p.163. 
365 Burt, ‘Shining Path and the “Decisive Battle” in Lima’s Barriadas’, p.294. 
187 
 
the expense of the Leftist political parties, organisations and members of civil society 
who had successfully organised to resist Shining Path in the barriadas for a number of 
years.  
 
These cases exemplify the ways in which the types of violence perpetrated by Shining 
Path, and the level of response from both state agents and the national media, were 
highly contingent upon the geography in which they took place. Although Shining 
Path’s generalised strategy was to encircle the capital by taking control of key regions, 
in reality the party practiced different strategies in Lima and in the rest of the country at 
different times.  
Firstly, it is important to recognise that many of the group’s actions across the 
country shared a symbolic characteristic which was to demonstrate the fragility of 
existing state structures by disrupting them as dramatically and frequently as possible. 
In the words of Heath-Kelly, this type of violence “refuses the given inscription of the 
world through practices of re-inscription”.366 In Lima, Shining Path’s attacks on the 
electrical grid, control of prisons and assassinations of high-ranking state agents made a 
mockery of the state’s ability to function. At a time when strategic equilibrium had not 
been achieved, the party command focused on these symbolic acts which created huge 
fear in the urban population, but which also made it appear that they had a far greater 
capacity for conducting intelligence and military operations than was ever the case. The 
assassinations of civil society leaders are particularly interesting in this context because, 
whilst they were still highly symbolic of Shining Path’s attitude towards any opposition, 
they also fulfilled a strategic function by creating space which could be filled by party 
sympathisers. In this sense, they represent a turning point at which Shining Path ceased 
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to simply disrupt state function, and attempted to infiltrate the structures of civil society 
as a means of replicating and replacing the state.  
This turning point had already occurred in the Peruvian highlands at a much earlier 
stage of the conflict. As La Serna highlights, the initiation of Shining Path’s lucha 
armada in Chuschi was followed by over 200 “guerrilla acts”, in 1980 alone, designed 
to “raise awareness of the insurgency”.367 Heilman’s research on Ayacucho department 
prior to 1980 also demonstrates the efforts of Shining Path militants to agitate in teacher 
and student strikes, particularly in 1977-8 in the province of Cangallo.368 As would later 
happen in Lima, these actions allowed Shining Path to develop their local networks and 
articulate forms of symbolic resistance to the Peruvian state. As Gorriti’s discussion of 
Shining Path military thought shows, however, the insurgents’ activity increased with 
more substantial actions (such as the attack on Ayacucho prison) throughout 1982 and 
between 1983 and 1986 the party moved into a new phase of territorial expansion in 
which it strategically aimed to “conquer support bases” across Ayacucho department.369 
During this phase, Shining Path regularly assassinated local mayors and officials in 
ayacuchano towns, as they would later do in Lima’s shantytowns. This highlights a 
form of geography implicit in Shining Path’s military strategy in which Ayacucho 
department acted as an important laboratory for the development of Senderista military 
thought which would later be applied to other highland departments, the selva central, 
and the outskirts of Lima itself. It is from this perspective that we must try to understand 
the bombing of Calle Tarata. By picking apart the logics of the different forms of 
violence deployed by the group in different spaces, it will be possible to assess the 
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symbolic and strategic significance of the attack for its perpetrators, as well as its 
victims. 
 
The bombing of Calle Tarata 
In the afternoon of 16 July 1992, Shining Path carried out a series of attacks in Lima 
against police stations in San Gabriel, José Carlos Mariátegui and Nueva Esperanza, 
and in the district of Villa María del Triunfo, in order to disperse the city’s police 
forces. At the same time, Senderistas moved two cars into Miraflores and parked them 
near the Banco de Crédito offices, before later moving them onto the Calle Tarata.370 At 
9:20pm, the car bomb was detonated, killing 25 people and wounding 155.371  In 
addition, the blast destroyed or damaged 63 parked cars, 183 homes and 400 businesses 
including the newly-built, five star Hotel las Américas, and a number of financial 
institutions such as Supermercado Mass, Continental, Interbanc, and Crédito. The 
calculated cost of the damages amounted to $3.12m.372 The international community 
condemned the bombing as “dramatic pictures of a smoking building in ruins and tens 
of bloodied people who were evacuated” were relayed around the world.373  
The local response to the bombing represented a level of state-community co-
operation which was near impossible to achieve in the barriadas. As CVR documents 
attest to, there was extensive co-ordination between residents, the police, local hospitals, 
and planners in the wake of the bombing to assist in the reconstruction. Medicine and 
clothing were sourced for survivors whilst the district’s Serenazgo provided security.374 
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Building ruins were cleaned up, structural analysis performed on those still standing, 
and residents organised to collect donations, liaise with the authorities and set up a 
women’s committee.375 On 19 July, the Marcha por la Paz was organised locally by the 
Municipality of Miraflores in memory of the victims. Such concern over the area’s 
reconstruction in the midst of a raging conflict reflects not only the threat to financial 
institutions posed by Shining Path. It also demonstrated that the bombing had shaken 
cultural understandings of which spaces could be effected by violence, subverting the 
imagined geography which located violence in the city’s periphery.  
These actions reveal an imbalance in the responses by the limeño population to 
violence which was proximate, and to violence which appeared distant. As Žižek 
argues, there is a great hypocrisy in “tolerating the abstract-anonymous killing of 
thousands, while condemning individual cases of the violations of human rights”.376 The 
almost instant international condemnation of the bombing reflected this hypocrisy, but it 
could also be seen, as the CVR argues: 
“in certain sectors of society who until then had been distant to the 
subversive violence in the Andes and jungle...The feeling that Shining 
Path had entered Lima, and that there was no limit to their 
destructive action, was perceived with greater clarity”.377  
This reveals how Lima, and particularly districts such as Miraflores, had come to be 
imaginatively reconstructed as the heart of the nation (i.e. that violence elsewhere was 
undesirable, but violence in Miraflores appeared to be politically and culturally 
unacceptable). Moreover, this perspective renders invisible other instances of Shining 
Path violence which had taken place in Lima’s barriadas. Whilst those bombings and 
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assassinations were relatively proximate, the social, ethnic cultural distance between the 
slums and Miraflores means that they are often forgotten by politicians, scholars and 
cultural producers in their representations of Shining Path violence in the capital.  
The very idea of Miraflores or Lima being, geographically, at the heart of the 
Peruvian nation is of course complete nonsense, yet the bombing appeared to provoke a 
wave of paranoia which further blinded limeños to what was occurring in the interior. 
This was the imagined geography of security which permeated the outlook of many 
Peruvians. As outlined earlier, the Andes and Amazon were culturally constructed as 
places of danger, existing on the fringes of civilisation, a highly racialised perception of 
geography in which indigenous communities and the spaces which they inhabited were 
represented as exotic and violent, the antithesis to the supposedly whiter, more civilised 
capital. The migration and displacement of communities from Peru’s interior to Lima 
added a new dimension to this imagined geography, in which the capital was 
dangerously encircled; not just by terrorists, but by predominantly indigenous 
populations which, as Thorp and Paredes highlight, were considered to be “less urban”, 
“less occidental” and “less modern”.378 This geography of security dictated that violence 
took place in the Andes or in the slums because these spaces were violent anyway; but 
the incursion of violence into districts like Miraflores and San Isidro was an 
unacceptable transgression of this cardinal spatial rule.  
Despite breaking this rule, Tarata (in a similar way to Lucanamarca) has been 
constructed as an emblematic episode of violence. Although the location, and middle-
class status of the victims, makes Tarata appear as an exceptional case, certain 
narratives of the conflict privileged the Tarata bombing as a pivotal moment because it 
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has both the highest death toll of any Shining Path bombing and because it appeared to 
spark other events and processes.  
Within two months of the bombing Abimael Guzmán and a number of important 
Shining Path leaders were arrested (and party archives detailing members, operations 
and organisational structure across the country were confiscated), effectively bringing 
Shining Path’s campaign in Lima to an end. Yet the idea that Tarata brought about the 
end of the conflict must be challenged, not least because it contains numerous 
inaccuracies (as detailed below). The centrality of Tarata to narratives of the conflict 
must be challenged because it reinforces the myth that Fujimori’s autogolpe and 
repressive policies were directly responsible for the pacification of Shining Path. This is 
crucial because Fujimori’s attempts to grant amnesty to state agents guilty of human 
rights abuses, as well as more recent calls for Fujimori’s own sentence to be quashed, 
have been framed in the terms that state agents in the military-government command 
structure faced difficult choices and, in a time of crisis, prioritised the human rights of 
civilians over those of the Senderistas. Challenging the mythology of Tarata, however, 
will demonstrate that Fujimori’s post-coup repression was not solely targeted at Shining 
Path, but also victimised specific civilian communities deemed to be political enemies 
of his regime.  
 
The mythology of Tarata 
The narrative articulated by Fujimori and his administration during the 1990s was that 
the President’s autogolpe, for better or for worse, brought Peru’s twin crises of violence 
and hyperinflation to an end. The pacification myth, as it is often called, emphasises 
Fujimori’s personal role in pacifying Shining Path, and draws legitimacy from the idea 
that the bombing of Miraflores crossed a line which ultimately prompted the end of the 
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insurgency. This perception of the conflict has persisted in Peruvian mass media and 
society today, acting as an important source of support for Fujimorista politicians 
(particularly Keiko Fujimori, her brother Kenji, and their party Fuerza Popular). 
Burt has highlighted that the intensification of violence in Lima in the early 1990s 
and the deepening economic crisis were major factors behind the emergence of “a new 
coalition of technocratic state elites, the armed forces, and the domestic business elite 
[which] sought to reconstitute the state”.379 The Tarata bombing was a worrying episode 
of symbolic violence for this coalition as it directly targeted banks and financial 
institutions. However, Burt also argues that this coalition of vested interests gave 
Fujimori the extra-congressional allies which he needed in order to enact the autogolpe, 
well in advance of the bombing, as elites moved to protect their assets and reorder the 
Peruvian state. This reorganisation gave the military greater control over the 
counterinsurgency operation and greater impunity with regards to human rights abuses, 
but also reflected the desires of the finance community to remodel the Peruvian 
economy to suit their own interests. It is therefore important to see the reorganisation of 
the state as a process that was synchronous with, and given further political justification 
by, the Tarata bombing, rather than being a direct result of it. 
The idea that the autogolpe directly led to the capture of Guzmán has also been 
challenged. The role of the Grupo Especial de Inteligencia del Perú (GEIN), including 
Benedicto Jiménez, Marco Miyashiro, Ana-Cecilia Garzón Pérez and Julio Becerra, in 
capturing Guzmán has become increasingly clear since Fujimori’s downfall. GEIN ran 
an operation to find Guzmán for a number of years, eventually tracking him down 
through discarded boxes of psoriasis medication found in Lima’s San Borja district.380 
                                                          
379 Burt, Political Violence and the Authoritarian State in Peru, p.16. 
380 An account of the operation, with comments from Garzón Pérez and Becerra, is available from BBC Radio 4, ‘Witness: The 
capture of Abimael Guzmán’, 16 September 2016 [http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p047881w, accessed 17 January 2017]. This 
story is also loosely recreated in Nicholas Shakespeare’s The Dancer Upstairs (London, 1995). 
194 
 
Fujimori, on the other hand, maintained his support for the Grupo Colina death squad 
which participated in, so-called, low-intensity conflict which was perpetrated by 
intelligence officers in the Andes. Montesinos, director of the Servicio de Inteligencia 
Nacional del Perú (SIN), persistently interfered in GEIN’s operation, ordering them to 
instead provide their intelligence to him and Grupo Colina. Because of this, journalist 
Claudia Cisneros refers to the idea that Fujimori was directly responsible for Guzmán’s 
capture as “the most trafficked lie of Fujimorismo”, arguing that many deaths, and 
perhaps even the Tarata bombing, could have been prevented had GEIN been 
appropriately supported from the beginning.381 
 
1992 also saw increased state violence in the capital, including the case of La Cantuta; 
the murder of a university professor and nine students by the Grupo Colina in response 
to the Tarata bombing. Vich describes this intensification of violence by Fujimori after 
the autogolpe as “an agreement to radicalise the dirty war through a strategy which was 
inherited from the worst years of the 1980s; responding to Senderista violence with an 
even greater terror perpetrated by the state itself”.382 The Grupo Colina also perpetrated 
other massacres including the murder of fifteen partygoers in the Barrios Altos district 
of Lima and the killing of nine campesinos in the Santa province of Ancash to the north 
of Lima. Because such abuses occurred during the same period in which Shining Path 
intensified violence in the capital, they can to some extent be seen as a reshaping of the 
geographies of security and exercise of sovereign power. As Shining Path attacked 
Lima more concertedly, the state responded by increasingly directing violence against 
populations, which had hitherto avoided such abuses, with impunity (although some 
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members of the Grupo Colina were imprisoned for the La Cantuta case, they would later 
be freed by the President’s Amnesty Law).383 However, it is important to recognise that 
the victims in each case were the same groups who had been targeted elsewhere; 
students, campesinos, and the residents of poorer districts at the margins of the city.384 
Furthermore, the students in question at La Cantuta were training to be teachers, a 
profession which had strong associations with Shining Path since the group’s early 
mobilisation in Ayacucho in the 1970s and demands for education reform in the 1960s. 
The massacre therefore presented state agents with a unique opportunity to enact 
revenge on a group whom they perceived to be partly responsible for the emergence of 
Shining Path and the initiation of the internal conflict.  
The La Cantuta massacre should not, therefore, be treated simply as an over-
exuberant strike back against Shining Path in the wake of the Tarata bombing. Instead, 
the massacre must be understood as part of a wider state strategy to enforce violent 
repression on political opponents. In effect, the government response was to meet 
Shining Path’s symbolic violence with episodes of equally symbolic violence against 
target communities. The exercise of sovereign power which emanated from Cuartel Los 
Cabitos in Huamanga was now being replicated in Lima; most tragically, this strategy 
was completely inept at keeping Shining Path at bay. Not only did the state fail to co-
operate with civil society leaders and offer them greater support to bolster their 
resistance against Shining Path, political repression after the autogolpe destroyed any 
chance of communities organising themselves against the group and violence persisted 
in the capital for a number of years as a result.  
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The deaths of twenty-five people in the Tarata bombing should by no means be 
forgotten; nor should those stories be submerged by the huge death toll and sheer 
weight of human tragedy experienced throughout the conflict. However, it is one thing 
to commemorate those deaths, and another thing entirely to use them as part of a 
mythology which justifies brutal authoritarianism, human rights abuses, and vindictive 
reprisals against vulnerable communities. The Marcha por la Paz, during which 
Peruvian flags were flown from the broken buildings on Tarata, and veneration of 
Vanesa (a young girl who lost her leg in the attack, referred to as “the angel’s smile”), 
reflect some of the ways in which this memory practice was developed in the immediate 
aftermath of the bombing.385 Likewise, on the 24th anniversary of Guzmán’s capture in 
2016, state officials and families of the victims of Shining Path violence marched from 
the Ministerio de Justicia to Calle Tarata with candles and white flowers, an action 
reminiscent of the 1992 Marcha por la Paz. When speaking to the press, Marisol Pérez 
Tello (Minister for Justice) stated that “the only enemy that Peru has is terrorism”.386 
This highlights the way in which Tarata is not simply remembered as a tragic event in 
Lima. As Connerton highlights, social memory and commemorative actions are 
essentially performative, and so the marches in commemoration of Tarata act as 
important reminders of the spectre of Shining Path violence, whilst also reinforcing the 
centrality of Tarata to particular narratives of the conflict.387 It seems clear, however, 
that the bombing did not directly lead to the pacification of Shining Path, and that 
subsequent massacres were not reprisals targeted at insurgents but part of a concerted 
strategy to annihilate political opponents of the Fujimori regime.  
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Having attempted to remove Tarata from this mythology and delocate it from the 
political uses of its memory in the current section, I will now set out to relocate the 
event within a context which reflects more accurately the logic behind this episode of 
violence. As with previous chapters, I will examine the ways in which the Tarata 
bombing has been represented in Peruvian culture.  
 
Representations of violence in the city 
The purpose of this section will be to analyse how Shining Path violence in Lima has 
been culturally represented through Fabrizio Aguilar’s film Tarata.388 I argue that the 
bombing broke with spatialized cultural understandings of where political violence in 
Peru was expected to occur. Through his film, however, Aguilar challenges the idea that 
such a cultural geography of violence should exist in the first place, and highlights how 
these spatialized cultural understandings contribute to an Othering of violence. In doing 
so, I will work with a Lefebvrian framework which understands analyses the direct 
relationship between representations of space (in Peruvian cinema) and the social 
production of space (which has created Peru’s uneven historical socio-spatial 
structure).389 I will also argue that the cultural geography of violence depicted in Tarata 
gives value to populations, denoting their assumed grievability and their vulnerability to 
death, again highlighting the relevant ideas of Butler and Mbembe.  
Tarata is a 2009 which deals with the bombing from the perspective of a local 
family including Daniel (a professor at a local university) and his wife Claudia (who 
sells make-up in order to afford her lavish miraflorino lifestyle). The family encounter 
the conflict in a remote sense by seeing violence on the television news but, as the 
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conflict becomes more proximate, Claudia increasingly treats Rosa (her housemaid) and 
Roger (Rosa’s son) with a sense of paranoia and disdain. When Roger disappears, 
Claudia tries to keep Rosa’s problems at an arm’s length even while she is visibly 
distressed. This representation of the relationship between a middle-class woman and 
her empleada (“domestic servant”) is not accidental. Radcliffe has argued that the 
“ethnic and class distinctions between the two are usually significant and remain so in 
the course of employment”, and that the maintenance of these distinctions in middle-
class homes serves as a useful metaphor for the limited integration of indigenous 
communities into the Peruvian nation.390 Furthermore, Drinot has argued that the 
conflation between indigeneity and insurgency during the years of the conflict meant 
that “many white middle-class Peruvians began to suspect, and certainly to fear, that 
their empleadas were Senderistas”.391 
In this way, Aguilar represents Claudia, and miraflorinos more generally, as being 
emblematic of the indifference criticised by the CVR, particularly because they appear 
to view domestic servants and Lima’s lower classes as potentially violent, ethnically 
Other, and living in a distant reality. As a result of Claudia’s relationship with her 
family, which becomes increasingly strained, her daughter Gabriela tries to run away 
from home. It is not, therefore, violence which tears the family apart in Aguilar’s 
narrative, but a combination of Claudia’s behaviour and the harsh treatment of Daniel 
by the police. From this perspective, we can interpret the film as a statement that greater 
co-operation between the communities of Lima was necessary to face up to their shared 
threat of violence. Whilst the film alludes to the human cost of the bombing, it also 
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outlines the other forms of damage done by the ignorance of Claudia (and by extension 
residents of Miraflores more generally) to the plight of their fellow Peruvians.  
Furthermore, Claudia appears to believe strongly in a cultural geography of 
violence. It initially appears ridiculous that the conflict should affect her life in 
Miraflores, and Claudia characterises outsiders to her world as potential vehicles for 
violence (i.e. she does not necessarily see Rosa as personally violent but as a vehicle for 
Senderista violence). Thus, it is her belief that she can avoid violence which separates 
her from Rosa, and it is only once that boundary is transgressed by the bombing that 
Claudia is able to feel empathy. Therefore, Aguilar uses the case of Tarata to 
demonstrate that Peru’s middle-classes were blinded to the full scale of violence for so 
long not simply because they could not see it, but because of the fear that violence 
would transgress its assumed boundaries and come to affect their lives as well. The film 
is successful in demonstrating that the response of Peru’s urban middle-classes 
understandings of the conflict were conditioned by how and where they came into 
contact with violence, which in 1992 was increasingly proximate and impacting their 
daily lives. Rather than producing a sympathetic response to the plight of Andean 
communities suffering similar atrocities, Shining Path violence in Lima also had the 
potential to sharpen attitudes against indigenous, Othered migrants who were seen to be 
acting as vehicles for Senderista violence. 
 
Tarata, therefore, attempts to challenge the mythology of the bombing and resists the 
urge to overemphasise its importance. Whilst previous other representations of the 
conflict have constructed a cultural geography of violence which denotes certain spaces 
as violent and dangerous and others as non-violent, safe and secure, Aguilar’s Tarata 
ultimately supports Springer’s argument that such ideas are inherently unstable and 
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fragile.392 He achieves this by referring to the wider societal context which produces 
violence across all geographies, and the porosity of such cultural geographies which 
violence is able to transcend. Alberto Durant’s film Coraje, which details the life of 
Maria Elena Moyano and the battle for control of Villa El Salvador and Lima’s 
barriadas, achieves a similar feat.393 As Barrow argues, Durant depicts Moyano as a 
“flawed but admirable fighter for community benefits at a time of heightened social 
crisis…so as to emphasise the film’s broader message of rejection of violence as the 
principal solution to the problems of Peru”.394 Such work is important because it 
decentralises the struggle against Shining Path from Lima’s wealthier districts and 
instead places emphasis on the importance of collective action and political 
participation in the capital’s poorest neighbourhoods to reject the party’s advances.  
Furthermore, Springer argues that: 
“it is only through a geographical imagination constructed on a 
parochial agenda, rooted in colonial modes of thought, and 
dislocated from the dynamic material underpinnings of place that a 
culture itself can be caricatured as violent”.395 
Tarata, in this context, attempts to construct a new geographical imagination in 
which violence (or its absence) is not affixed to particular spaces. Aguilar challenges a 
colonial mode of thought which depicts working-class and indigenous populations, and 
the spaces which they inhabit, as naturally violent. The film, then, not only represents 
an alternative perspective on the internal conflict. Cultural artefacts such as Tarata 
which resist the temptation to depict violence as inherent to a particular space act, 
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intentionally or not, as a subversion of this internal colonialism upon which many 
narratives of political violence have been built. 
We are therefore able to say that the Tarata bombing has been used as an 
emblematic case of violence which precludes other experiences of the conflict, an action 
which fundamentally employs a form of spatial politics by emphasising the effects of 
violence in one space over those in another. Cultural representations of the bombing 
which challenge this cultural geography of violence, including Tarata, exist, but are by 
no means dominant in Peruvian culture. However, as narratives of the conflict, cultural 
representations of the Tarata bombing also act as repositories of cultural memory. With 
this in mind, it is important to also examine the ways in which spaces, and particularly 
sites of memory, have been used to establish, reinforce, or contradict narratives of 
violence. This analysis is vital because memory activists have used space and memory 
as powerful tools for challenging state narratives about the past, and for encouraging 
collective action in the present. 
 
Commemoration, as viewed from the capital 
The study of museums and monuments is commonplace in many post-conflict societies, 
particularly those which have undergone transitional justice processes. With reference 
to periods of violence in Latin America, scholars such as Jelin, Schindel and Milton 
have demonstrated the validity and utility of studying such sites, and have analysed 
their form, substance and use of narrative to reveal the ideological underpinning which 
goes into constructing such spaces. However, Hite has also highlighted the emergence 
of counter-memorial projects and grassroots collective arts projects as important forms 
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of memory practice.396 Such projects are often produced by community groups at the 
intersection of political activism, the arts community and civil society and, Hite argues, 
attempt to “resist staid representations [of violence], unengaging narratives, and insular 
decision-making” in their projects.397 For these reasons, the below analysis of sites of 
memory in Lima incorporates a diverse array of projects which use space to construct 
narratives and make statements about political violence. Furthermore, I will point to the 
sometimes accidental spatiality of sites which shape their narratives in ways unintended 
to their creators, and highlight the ways in which memory activists have attempted to 
reinscribe public spaces with new meanings and cultural values.  
 
The Tarata bombing is commemorated by a small monument and an annual 
ceremony of remembrance organised by the local council. The monument consists of a 
large stone, carved to represent the shape of a damaged building, which stands in the 
middle of a fountain on Calle Tarata. Wooden footpaths lead across the fountain, 
allowing visitors to read the inscriptions on either side: 
 
“In memory of the victims of the terrorist attack of 16 July 1992” 
 
“Solidarity promenade: a solidary and united Peru was born here.  
Miraflores, 16 July, 1994”. 
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elsewhere in this thesis. 
397 Katherine Hite, ‘Empathic Unsettlement and the Outsider within Argentine Spaces of Memory’, Memory Studies, 8:1 (2015), 
pp.38-48 (p.39). 
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That the monument is open and free to access suggests that the memory practice 
which it engages in is being encouraged by the municipality, insofar as the site is not 
closed to the public, nor is a guide necessary to interpret the monument. Having said 
that, the site is more or less unpublicised in Miraflores and near invisible to tourists. It is 
not signposted, appears on none of the many walking tours of the district, nor on a 
number of maps produced to highlight local hotspots. This contradiction reveals 
tensions in the desires of different groups (the municipality government, local 
community, tourist agencies) to remember a site of violence and tragedy in a district 
which is marketed as a well-maintained, fashionable safe-haven for tourists in an 
otherwise chaotic and dangerous city. 
This tension is further reflected in the surroundings of the monument on Tarata. The 
street itself is now, like many in Miraflores, full of restaurants, cafes and hotels, 
including the popular Mama Olla and Café La Paz which serve a selection of Peruvian 
Fig. 10: The Tarata monument (Author's photograph). 
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cuisine, European-style food and artisanal beers from local breweries. These 
establishments are, arguably, a greater attraction to Calle Tarata for locals and tourists 
alike; Mama Olla, for example, ranks highly on Trip Advisor’s list of restaurants in 
Lima, whilst there are also a number of local amenities on the street such as internet 
cafes and pharmacies.398 In short, the reconstruction of Tarata has been so complete that 
it puts the monument completely at odds with the idea of the street as a site of violence. 
This has led Montalbetti to argue that a reading of Tarata as a site suggests that “nothing 
happened here”.399  
Although the monument itself denotes the street as a site of violence, its function as 
a site of memory is therefore limited. Following Dwyer and Alderman’s argument that 
the “spatial context” (including neighbourhood and surrounding commercial activities) 
are vital for reading memorial landscapes as text, we can also deduce that the 
surrounding environment of the monument is not designed to support the memory 
practice of the monument, but to make use of expensive Miraflores real-estate and 
develop business opportunities.400 These businesses represent the municipality of 
Miraflores as it wants to be seen; as a district open to entrepreneurs, foreign capital and 
tourists alike, and not as a site of political violence. Ultimately, however, such a 
representation of the site also limits the potential for uncomfortable political debate and 
self-criticism about the nature of the conflict, why Shining Path launched the armed 
struggle, and why Miraflores became a target for such symbolic acts of violence in the 
first place. 
To only read the space of Tarata through the perspective of the monument, however, 
would be to give an incomplete picture of the memory practice which the site 
                                                          
398 Ranked #33 of 1894 of Restaurants in Lima, Trip Advisor [https://www.tripadvisor.co.uk/Restaurant_Review-g294316-
d2024500-Reviews-Mama_Olla_Restaurant-Lima_Lima_Region.html, accessed 29 August 2016]. 
399 Montalbetti, ‘El lugar del arte y el lugar de la memoria’, p.252. 
400 Dwyer and Alderman, ‘Memorial landscapes’, p.170. 
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represents. As Saona argues, it is the annual ceremony (or “performative event”) which 
gives the monument meaning.  She asserts that, whilst the street has recovered from the 
physical damage which was inflicted upon it, the commemoration ceremonies aim to 
“present the centrality of the district, not only in memorialising the victims, but in 
asserting its role in the nation”. Because the attack “finally brought war to the capital”, 
Saona argues that the bombing unified the Peruvian nation in a shared experience of 
violence.401  
The role of performative ceremonies in commemorative practice should certainly 
not be ignored, and it is clear that there are groups which continue to hold a desire to 
commemorate the bombing (particularly local residents and victims’ families who see 
Tarata as a landmark event when violence affected them personally for the first time).402 
Yet this particular form of memory practice, along with Saona’s description of it, raises 
uncomfortable questions. “A solidary and united Peru was born here”; “the centrality of 
the district…asserting its role in the nation”; “finally brought war to the capital”. These 
are phrases which do not refer to the individuality and suffering of victims, but which 
recast the conflict as an assault on the core of the nation by the periphery. This reading 
suggests that Peru became a united nation once Miraflores (and more importantly, the 
elite social sectors which the district represents) felt the impact of violence for the first 
time, and renders invisible the wave of political violence unleashed by Shining Path on 
the capital prior to Tarata (as well as over a decade of trauma, murders and 
disappearances experienced by communities outside of Lima). To assert that Tarata 
holds a central role in the “centralised imaginary of the nation” would appear to assign 
extra significance to instances of violence which took place in urban, middle- and 
upper-class, predominantly white and mestizo spaces over those episodes of violence 
                                                          
401 Saona, Memory Matters in Transitional Peru, p.115. 
402 Legg argues, for example, that “social memory is maintained through objects and performances... [which] are not static but 
manipulated and updated with changing regimes”. Legg, ‘Contesting and surviving memory’, p.498. 
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which took place in Lima’s barriadas and in provincial departments.403 In short, it 
represents the use of memory practice to reinforce the political and economic 
domination of Peru’s elite, reinforcing a cultural framework which conflates 
provinciality, violence, barbarity and Otherness on the one hand, and centrality, 
security, civilisation and whiteness on the other. This is so significant, and so 
dangerous, because the words of the monument in effect assert that the cultural 
imagining of the Peruvian nation is born from cultural imaginings of the district of 
Miraflores, reasserting the right of the elite, Europeanised, non-indigenous classes to 
govern and dictate narratives of political violence in Peru. 
 
The MHVRE was a monument designed by the sculptor Jaime Miranda as part of a 
public bid award (although Miranda later had to source private funding to complete the 
project) for a memorial to the displaced victims of violence during the internal conflict, 
                                                          
403 Saona, Memory Matters in Transitional Peru, p.115. 
Fig. 11: The MHVRE during a public event in 2007 
 [http://jaimemiranda.com/works/monumento-en-honor-a-la-verdad-para-la-reconciliacion-y-la-esperanza]. 
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situated in the middle of the Óvalo Nueva Esperanza where three of Lima’s poorest 
districts meet: Villa María del Triunfo, Villa El Salvador and San Juan de Miraflores.  
Inaugurated in 2007, its design featured an uprooted tree (representing the communities 
uprooted from the Andes to the district of Villa María del Triunfo) held several metres 
above the ground by a steel frame. At the base of the structure was an octagon carved 
with the departments, towns and villages where locals had migrated from (now the sole 
surviving piece of the monument).  
As on the Calle Tarata, numerous public ceremonies were held at the monument 
between 2007 and the monument’s destruction in 2010. Prior to the inauguration, 
Miranda also held fundraising events for the sculpture which saw participation from the 
local population, community organisers and representatives of the Church. These events 
suggest that the local population felt at least some connection to the monument and 
were willing to engage in the memory practice which it represented. Furthermore, the 
monument didn’t represent a single instance of historical violence but the shared 
experiences on which the community was founded. For this reason, although the 
MHVRE is deeply tied to the violent upheaval associated with Peru’s internal conflict, 
it was also designed to act as a focal point for the district, both representing the 
foundational narrative of the community and acting as an arena in which the social 
memory of the community can be performed and reconstituted through annual 
ceremonies.  
The circumstances regarding the monument’s destruction are still rather unclear but, 
according to eyewitnesses who spoke with Miranda and Gustavo Buntinx afterwards, 
contractors destroyed the monument in the night under the orders of the municipal 
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government.404 As mentioned, the plaques engraved with the names of Andean towns 
have survived the demolition, but these are more or less invisible from the road. 
Although it is difficult to say for certain what the motives were, the destruction of 
MHVRE can be seen within the context of the battle for memory in the public space of 
Lima and Peru. Miranda argues that “by performing this action they were 
reinforcing…actually making evident that the monument was necessary. They made the 
symbol of the tree a stronger symbol, and included themselves in the history of the 
work.”405  
Numerous critics have reacted to the incident in a similar way, particularly Buntinx 
who has criticised the local authorities and argues that “in reality, what we are seeing is 
                                                          
404 Gustavo Buntinx, ‘Batallas por la memoria III: Municipalidad de VMT niega responsabilidad en destrucción del monumento a 
los desplazados por la violencia’, Micromuseo, 2010 [http://micromuseo-bitacora.blogspot.co.uk/2010_05_01_archive.html, 
accessed 9 August 2016]. 
405 Jaime Miranda, ‘Interview in-person’ (Lima, 2016). 
Fig. 12: The remains of the MHVRE, 2016 (Author's photograph). 
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how we are continuously losing fights for remembrance”.406 Rodrigo Quijano has also 
criticised the destruction, stating that: 
“The official attack and dismantling, conducted against [Miranda’s] 
will, is part of the long number of disagreements and conflicts about 
the place of the political sphere in local public space…in this fight for 
space and the inhabitants’ right to the city.”407 
For those familiar with post-conflict memory in Peru, this incident will be 
reminiscent of the 2007 attack on the El ojo que llora monument in the Jesús María 
district of Lima. 408 Several intruders beat and tied up a municipal policeman guarding 
the site in the Campo de Marte, then threw paint over the monument and attacked it 
with sledgehammers. The bright orange colour of the paint used to deface the 
monument suggested a link to Alberto Fujimori who, only two days earlier, had been 
extradited from Chile to Peru to face trial for human rights abuses. Moreover, as Drinot 
highlights, the “attack on the monument was expressive of a desire to silence, indeed 
destroy, debate”.409 
Martín León has also argued that the destruction of the MHVRE can similarly be 
seen as an attempt to silence the population of Villa María del Triunfo, pointing to the 
silence of “those who can no longer speak, of those who would no longer speak, but 
also those who never wanted or knew how to speak”.410 In contrast with the Tarata 
monument then, which appears open to the public, the narrative represented by this site 
                                                          
406 Gustavo Buntinx, ‘[Video] Municipalidad de Villa María del Triunfo destruye monumento’, La Mula, 2010 
[https://vimeo.com/110734685, accessed 9 August 2016]. 
407 Rodrigo Quijano, ‘Spaces of Remembrance / Spaces of Conflict’ (Lima, 2013) [http://jaimemiranda.com/works/monumento-en-
honor-a-la-verdad-para-la-reconciliacion-y-la-esperanza, accessed 9 August 2016]. 
408 The MHVRE’s similar history to that of El ojo que llora, insofar as both have been attacked and damaged after their 
construction, means that a detailed discussion of both in this chapter is unwarranted, and so I have opted instead to focus primarily 
on the MHVRE as the history of this monument is comparatively unknown in the historiography of the conflict. For more on El ojo 
que llora see Drinot, ‘For whom the eye cries’; Milton, ‘Defacing memory’; Katherine Hite, ‘“The Eye that Cries”: The Politics of 
Representing Victims in Contemporary Peru’, A Contracorriente, 5:1 (2007), pp.108-34. 
409 Drinot, ‘For whom the eye cries’, p.16. 
410 Martín León G., ‘Noticias de un secuestro o la crónica de una muerte anunciada  - el eucalipto del óvalo de la Esperanza’ (Lima, 
2013) [http://jaimemiranda.com/works/monumento-en-honor-a-la-verdad-para-la-reconciliacion-y-la-esperanza, accessed 30 August 
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of memory has been silenced. Furthermore, its ability to act as an arena for the 
performative social memories of the local population has also been precluded, an action 
which diminishes the right of migrant communities to control public space and to create 
their own narratives of the internal conflict. 
However, the relationship between the monument and the local population may not 
be so simple. When I visited Villa María del Triunfo with Jaime Miranda in 2016, we 
met a local author named Daniel Cienfuegos. Cienfuegos’ opinions of the monument 
were less positive, and he criticised the symbolism of the uprooted tree as a macabre 
and unsettling image in a district which had seen recurrent Shining Path sabotage and 
assassinations during the conflict. Although he appeared to be unaware of the 
ceremonies which had occurred at the monument, he suggested that his reading of the 
structure was by shared by many friends in the local community. It is difficult to 
evaluate exactly how accurate Cienfuegos’ assessment is, but his criticisms do allude to 
a possible tension between the numerous forms of memory practice in a country which 
is deeply culturally divided. For example, the Óvalo Nueva Esperanza is not far from 
the Cementerio De Nueva Esperanza, a sprawling site which is the largest cemetery in 
Lima. On All Saint’s Day, many families visit the cemetery to take care of the graves, 
share food, sing, dance, and commemorate the lives of those interred, in a similar 
manner to the way in which the members of ANFASEP tend to the Santuario de la 
Memoria in Ayacucho. Because of this, Nueva Esperanza clearly functions as a site of 
memory for the local population in a way that is at odds with idea of a site of memory 
as a memorial, statue, or museum represented in transnational discourse on post-conflict 
memory.  
The existence of such sites do not preclude the potential for sculptures or 
monuments to also contribute to memory practice in important ways. However, given 
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that, in many ways, the Peruvian conflict (and indeed many of Peru’s social problems 
today) was predicated on forms cultural domination and resistance, and the tensions 
between a Europeanised elite and the indigenous poor, it is important to be sensitive to 
the possibility that projects which appear to be highly effective vessels for memory 
practice may be rejected completely by those who they are intended to represent, 
because they are constructed from an entirely different set of cultural values. For 
instance, El ojo que llora is a monument which has attracted a significant amount of 
scholarly attention from academics in Anglo-European institutions and which remains 
incredibly important for the human rights activism community in Lima, yet its 
significance in the wider public imaginary in Peru is questionable. Furthermore, the 
politics and aesthetics of monuments and memorials should not distract us from the 
more personal, family-based commemoration of individuals which takes place in 
cemeteries (which are, first and foremost, sites of memory).  
Space, therefore, does not act simply as a container for memory projects. The 
production of space, and battles over the rights to it, can reinforce or challenge pre-
existing structures of cultural power. Commemorative sprojects can also resist pre-
ordained prescriptions of power by interrupting the everyday function of such spaces 
and subverting their meanings in interesting ways. Hite has argued that, in particular, 
“Argentine memory sites are deeply enmeshed in creative ‘anti-museum’ and counter-
memorial debates”, pointing to the work of  German counter-memorial artist Horst 
Hoheisel in collaboration with Argentine artists and collective memory projects.411 In 
many ways these debates have taken inspiration from counter- or (anti-)memorial trends 
in Germany which include the vanishing “Monument against Fascism” at Hamburg 
created by Jochen Gerz and Esther Shalev-Gerz, and Jochen’s creation, with the help of 
                                                          
411 Hite, ‘Empathic unsettlement’, p.39. 
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his own art students, of an invisible “Monument against Racism” in Saarbrücken. 
Young argues that Gerz’s work embodies the notion of the memorial as an interior 
space, a belief shared by Hoheisel who in 1995, submitted a proposal to a public 
competition for a “German national memorial to the murdered Jews of Europe” which 
involved blowing up the Brandenburg Tor, sprinkling the dust over where it once stood, 
and covering the remainder with granite slabs, so that destruction would be 
commemorated with destruction.412 Arguably, the Käthe Kollwitz memorial statues at 
the Vladslo German War Cemetery in Belgium and Neue Wache in Berlin also reflect 
non-conventional or anti-memorial commemorative tendencies.  
Perhaps Peru has not yet seen the creation of an anti-monument in the vein of one of 
Gerz’s works, yet many Peruvian memory activists have clearly taken inspiration from 
these international trends in commemoration. Some have challenged traditional notions 
of what a museum is or can be, whilst others have turned to symbolic collective action 
as a means of commemorating the past. Again, there are international precedents for 
such actions. In Argentina, Jelin has highlighted the work of the Madres and Abuelas de 
Plaza de Mayo who formed part of a broad social movement which articulated protest 
against the state, denounced human rights violations and have argued for the 
“vindication of the historical and collective memory struggling against oblivion”.413 
Likewise, from Turkey there is the example of the Saturday Mothers who, as Ahiska 
highlights, “since 1995 have been silently demonstrating by holding aloft photographs 
of their disappeared kin every Saturday in Galatasaray, Istanbul”.414 Whilst such 
projects and movements have sometimes overlapped with national memory projects, or 
                                                          
412 James E. Young, ‘Germany's vanishing Holocaust monuments’, Yad Vashem (Jerusalem, 1994) 
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subsequently become institutionalised as part of a semi-official national rhetoric of 
memory, they have emerged from similar desires to provide a united front against state 
violence, to foster a collective and participatory environment of resistance, and to 
occupy public spaces as a means of opposing and commemorating violence.   
In Peru, there have been a range of commemorative actions stemming from a similar 
perspective on memory and grassroots organisation.  On the one hand, there have been 
the political protests in Lima’s public spaces, including Lava la bandera (“Clean the 
flag”, when Peruvians took to Lima’s Plaza des Armas to symbolically wash Peruvian 
flags as a protest against the corruption of the Fujimori regime) and Pon la basura en la 
basura (“Put the rubbish in the rubbish”, a project which involved throwing bags of 
rubbish with the face of Fujimori on the side at emblematic places of power such as the 
houses of key Fujimoristas and offices of television channels which colluded with the 
regime).415 On the other, Vich refers to the work of memory activists working on 
projects related to the internal conflict. He draws a common link between political 
protest and the Chalina de la esperanza, a “powerful symbol against the disinterest of 
the Peruvian political class towards the families of the disappeared” which was 
eventually hung in the Plaza des Armas (and now in LUM).416 Similarly, the collective 
Museo Itinerante Arte Por La Memoria is an “alternative and independent museum…a 
travelling museum installed in public space which collects art pieces related to the 
period of political violence” whose objective it is to “maintain a living memory of our 
recent past of violence though art”.417 These projects are important, Vich told me, 
because: 
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“public space is a battle…so projects like Lava la bandera try to 
reappropriate public space and demonstrate the importance they 
have, like an agora, as a sign of the community, beyond political 
control, beyond the exclusion of capital.”418 
Such projects are relevant to Tarata because they appear almost as the antithesis of 
everything that the Miraflores monument is. Whereas symbolic disobedience and 
protest attempt to use collective, grassroots organisation to encourage political 
participation, memory making, and the re-inscription of public space with new cultural 
values, the Tarata memorial is designed as a static statement of historical fact. Whilst it 
clearly holds a resonance with members of the local community, such commemoration 
does so within the framework provided by the municipality and state narratives of 
violence, which focus heavily on the suffering of individuals and the destruction caused 
by Shining Path violence.  
Memory activists therefore not only make important statements about political 
violence and corruption, but about the rights of the population to the city space around 
them. The right to the city was an idea outlined first by Lefebvre, but has also been 
developed by David Harvey who describes it as: 
“far more than the individual liberty to access urban resources: it is a 
right to change ourselves by changing the city…the exercise of a 
collective power to reshape the processes of urbanization.”419 
In this sense, memory activists organise against a much more fundamental aspect of 
the society which they critique by identifying spaces of power as sites of ideological 
struggle. By developing activism in these spaces, as well as by interrupting the space of 
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everyday life, memory activists attempt to challenge the pre-existing orthodoxies and 
ideologies attached to such spaces, and imbue them with new narratives about political 
violence, the function of public spaces, and the power of collective action. 
However, the extent to which such projects can undermine the systems they purport 
to challenge is limited. Whilst often successful in achieving a degree of popular 
participation, many of these commemorative projects have emerged from an artistic 
community based in Lima whose members are an established part of the middle-class. 
Whilst political activism may make statements about the right to the city, it is unclear 
whether these demonstrations represent mobilisation in favour of Peru’s indigenous 
communities, or if they simply aim to protect the political rights of  Lima’s established 
urban middle-class (and to some extent the emerging “cholo” middle-class).420 Because 
of this, such artistic commemorative projects are, whilst valuable, also limited by the 
privileged subject positions from which they are constructed (of which not all, but 
some, artists are unaware). They seek to speak both to and for the Peruvian nation, and 
their works therefore seem destined to remain representations of Peruvian reality 
constructed from the perspective of the capital. This does not invalidate such projects, 
but it does mean that the optimism for the future born out of them should be tempered 
by a recognition that the artist-public relationship in Peru remains emblematic of class 
and racial hierarchies, even while artists themselves may seek to challenge these norms.  
Because of this, these interpretations of Peruvian politics and society, and the 
narratives they construct about the internal conflict, necessarily share characteristics 
with indigenista discourses which, Mariátegui argued, “cannot give us a rigorously 
accurate version of the Indian. It must idealise and stylize him”.421 Of course, not all of 
these projects aim to make statements about the nature of race or condition of 
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indigenous communities in Peru, yet in seeking to make political statements about the 
internal conflict and processes which, arguably, their lives are removed from, memory 
activists are similarly limited by the extent to which they can accurately depict 
experiences of political violence. This is most apparent in the local opposition to 
Miranda’s MHVRE, which saw the monument as an abstract and inappropriate art form 
for remembering the conflict. This is not to say that these projects are in any way 
useless, nor should they be disregarded. Instead, I argue that they reflect a distinctly 
urban perspective, meaning that they represent a political position which is inherently 
tied to, and constrained by, limeño society. Whilst the MHVRE and other projects 
therefore articulate important spatialised understandings of the internal conflict, it is 
also necessary to highlight their political contexts and limits too. 
 
Conclusion 
The analyses of these sites of memory point towards a significant conclusion in the idea 
of a geography of memory. In this geography, there are sites which can be described as 
open (in terms of access) which are easy for the public to visit; the Tarata monument 
and LUM fall into this category. On the other hand, there are also sites which are 
closed, unable to be accessed easily by the public (or which are destroyed); these 
include the MHVRE, El ojo que llora, and the island of El Frontón (discussed in the 
next chapter). The extent to which sites are open or closed can give us an indicator to 
the degree to which the narratives of political violence which they represent are 
acceptable or intolerable to the vested interests of Peruvian society; particularly by 
Fujimoristas and representatives of the Peruvian state who have intervened to limit the 
impact of projects which they do not support. However, as demonstrated with the Tarata 
monument, even those sites which are open to the public and which do not require a 
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guide to interpret the material on show can have the impact of their narrative limited in 
numerous ways, particularly by the way in which they interact with their surrounding 
environment or in which they are marketed to potential visitors.  
On the other hand, grassroots organisation, artists and memory activists have found 
ways to subvert public space and interrupt everyday life with their own projects and 
narratives, giving new significance and meaning to spaces which would otherwise be 
thought of as mundane (the city bus) or representative of elite power (the Plaza des 
Armas). Yet these projects, whilst at times capable of producing intense, short-term 
resistance to political figures or programmes, also have a limited capacity to generate 
true social change (if, in fact, this is their aim at all). To some extent, these projects can 
be compared with the discourse of indigenismo, in so far as they represent the creation 
of narratives about the internal conflict both by and for an urban audience largely 
protected from wider experiences of violence.422 With this in mind, it seems clear that 
forms of testimony and commemorative projects promoted by indigenous communities 
remain crucial in the further development of commemorative practice in Peru. 
As Feldman has argued, narratives of violence and memorialisation discourses also 
become “localized and transformed in specific places and historical moments”, meaning 
that memory narratives are deeply tied to local populations and contribute to a cultural 
geography of memory.423 Through participation with memorialising discourses, 
communities are able to contribute their local perspective to what Feldman describes as 
the “national cacophony of memories”.424 In this way localised perspectives, supported 
by grassroots memory activists, raise optimism about resisting more centralised, state-
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driven narratives, but also face huge pressures to survive financially and conform 
politically. 
Throughout this chapter, then, I have highlighted the symbolic power of the Tarata 
bombing for Shining Path. I have challenged some of the myths which exist about the 
bombing which support state narratives of violence. Furthermore, I have highlighted 
how cultural representations and commemorative sites have been produced in order to 
support or challenge narratives of the conflict in which the Tarta bombing remains 
central. In all of these cases, the production and politics of space are central to my 
arguments insofar as they gave Tarata symbolic significance, have been used to 
construct cultural narratives about violence, and shaped the narratives constructed at 
sites of memory.  
Yet even with the array of memory projects that exist in Peru today, there remain 
certain topics which appear, to some degree, to be off-limits. These particular moments 
are red lines in memory discourse which cannot be crossed, because to challenge 
memories about these moments would be to challenge the values on which the Peruvian 
state has been reconstituted over the past 30 years. Furthermore, state agents have 
moved to close off the spaces in which they took place and have acted to produce their 
own memory discourses in order to head off potential revisionism of these events. One 
of these events is the 1997 hostage crisis in Lima, discussed in the final chapter in the 
context of the neoliberal reconstruction of the state by Fujimori. My analysis in the next 
chapter turns to another of these moments; namely, to the murder of over 250 prison 
inmates by state forces at the San Pedro prison in San Juan de Lurigancho, and on the 
prison island El Frontón.     
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Chapter 4: The prison massacres at El Frontón and Lurigancho 
The prison massacres of 1986 are a highly underestimated case for understanding the 
logics of state violence during the internal conflict, whilst the potential for the prison 
island of El Frontón to be studied as a site of memory has been almost completely 
ignored. In part, this lack of attention is due to the large majority of the victims being 
prisoners accused of terrorist acts; their lives and memories have been deemed to be 
non-grievable because of their associations to Shining Path. Yet such a perspective is 
not only fragile because of the state’s disastrous penal and counterterrorism policies 
(which detained hundreds of innocent Peruvians without evidence in prisons dominated 
by Shining Path, exposing them to the party’s indoctrination). It also denies the 
possibility that Shining Path memories having something to offer the historiography of 
the conflict, and perhaps even contribute to the prevention of violence in the future.  
This chapter will therefore be devoted to a spatial re-reading of El Frontón and the 
afterlife of the prison massacres in Peruvian society. In part, I will focus on the ways in 
which Shining Path developed their presence in prisons and took control of huge 
swathes of the state’s penitentiary space. The party’s ability to parade around their 
prison yards had a profound effect on the population of Lima, who saw television 
images of what a Shining Path state would look like being transmitted from only a few 
hundred metres off the capital’s coastline. I will also explore the ways in which the state 
approached its own prison space, and argue that the abandonment of El Frontón to 
military (and later Shining Path) control amounted to the creation of a “space of 
exception”. A space of exception, as Stavrides highlights, is a space in which 
individuals are removed from the protection for the state, their citizenship and human 
rights denied.425 
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As with previous chapters, I will approach the prison massacres through a 
theoretical framework which utilises Foucault’s theories of sovereign and governmental 
power and Agamben’s work on spaces of exception.426 I will supplement this 
framework by engaging with Ong’s concept of spatialised exercise of sovereignty and 
its links to a mode of neoliberal governance which aims to exclude populations resistant 
to market-driven reforms.427 Furthermore, I will also contextualise these ideas with 
research by Carlos Aguirre on the history of prisons in Peru in order to highlight a 
genealogy of El Frontón as a space of exception, and to draw comparisons between 
other spaces of exception established under the logics of counterinsurgency from around 
Latin America.428 These sites include Los Cabitos in Ayacucho, the Escuela Superior de 
Mecánica de la Armada (ESMA) in Buenos Aires and the Estadio Nacional Julio 
Martínez Prádanos in Santiago.429  
The use of comparative literatures in this way offers the possibility of illuminating 
the extent to which repressive state practices have been replicated across Latin America, 
particularly those which have been followed by market-driven reforms. As a whole, this 
thesis aims to avoid sweeping continental conclusions about such episodes of history, 
and aims to contextualise the Peruvian case rather than seeing it as a simulacrum of 
Southern Cone experiences of violence. However, whilst Peru’s unique historical 
context is doubtlessly crucial for understanding the conflict, the confluence of neoliberal 
reforms with official or de facto military rule in numerous Latin American states 
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towards the end of the twentieth century raises questions about why state practices in 
different scenarios shared such similarities.  
Although the prison massacres have not been explored to a great extent through 
Peruvian cinema or literature, there are several key artistic works which deal with the 
logics and aesthetics of the violence enacted at El Frontón. Some of these artistic works 
are dealt with in El Frontón: Demasiado pronto / Demasiado tarde, part of Gustavo 
Buntinx’s Partes de guerra series, including the photographs of Gladys Alvarado 
Jourde which I analyse below. These photographs explore the solemn ruins of El 
Frontón, detailing the shattered remains of the prison’s structures with inscriptions by 
inmates still visible. Buntinx and Jourde explore the wider cultural significance of the 
massacres and how they have been represented in the post-conflict era. I will also 
analyse Los rendidos by José Carlos Agüero. As the son of two Senderistas who both 
died in detention in Peruvian state prisons, Agüero’s perspective is invaluable in this 
context. Los rendidos is a thought-provoking meditation on violence, guilt, culpability 
and forgiveness which has challenged many beliefs about the truth and reconciliation 
process in Peru. I will include a discussion of it in this chapter in part because of the 
way in which it deals with the issue of incarceration, but also because it presents some 
stark conclusions about violence and memory which are of great importance to my 
thesis.  
Finally, I will ask what it means for this site of violence to be considered a site of 
memory. El Frontón is by no means a site where commemorative practice takes place, 
but it is a space which draws out unresolved, competing narratives of Peru’s conflict. 
The contradictions and tensions which exist in the island’s history make it a highly 
evocative site, and so it is important to understand how it fits the city-text of Lima. As 
discussed previously, the city-text is the geography of memory which Lima (and other 
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urban landscapes in Peru) evokes through the way in which public spaces are 
constructed with reference to the past, how these spaces are accessible through public 
transport and other means, and how they interact with the built environment and other 
local buildings (public squares and parks, businesses, universities etc.). Palonen has 
expanded this idea to include statues, public artworks and street names, arguing that that 
the city-text is a “site of politicking…deeply embedded in the everyday 
experience...[where] through the act of naming and replacing political symbols, people 
are engaged in political acts that invest objects and sites with positive and negative 
connotations”.430 
This analysis will continue to elaborate on the argument developed in the last 
chapter which highlighted how public space in Lima, and across Peru, acts as a 
battleground in which memory narratives are continually contested. Numerous actors 
have attempted to inscribe their version of events into the capital’s city-text, while 
others have actively intervened to suppress remembrance and erase evidence of the 
conflict. At present, El Frontón is almost silent in this geography, but that has not 
prevented memory activists from trying to use its history to recuperate, and to some 
extent rehabilitate, hidden memories of Peruvian state violence. For example, Vich asks 
with reference to the island, “Why does the State impede its citizens from accessing a 
place that says something about their own history?”.431 Through a spatial reading of El 
Frontón and its history, I hope to demonstrate that the island’s continuing state of ruin is 
symbolic of the ongoing exclusion of Senderista memory narratives from acceptable 
memory discourse in Peru.  
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Background 
Neither the executions of prisoners in 1986 nor the riots which preceded them can be 
understood outside of the context of the counter-terrorism strategy of successive 
Peruvian governments. The early years of the conflict saw the Belaúnde administration 
struggle to cope with the sudden pressure applied by Shining Path to the state’s 
woefully inadequate defensive resources and disciplinary structures in the interior. As 
the CVR details, the group organised numerous prison breaks, including the escape of 
78 Senderistas and 169 other inmates from Huamanga prison in March 1982.432 The 
Commission’s report also highlights how: 
“In the prison in Callao women paraded dressed in red and black… 
and at [Castro Castro prison] men and women once marched for an 
hour carrying a giant banner with the face of Abimael Guzmán.”433 
Coupled with dramatic overcrowding and poor record keeping in prisons, these 
actions highlighted the state’s unpreparedness for the conflict, and demonstrated an 
almost total loss of control over internal prison space. As a result, large numbers of 
accused insurgents began to be sent to prisons in Lima. 
Having been elected as President in 1985, Alan García attempted to devise a new 
counterinsurgency strategy which moved away from the human rights abuses 
committed under Belaúnde, and established the Comisión de Paz to intervene in cases 
of maltreatment (including internment without charge, drastic overcrowding, lack of 
basic resources and living conditions, and theft by prison guards) of detainees accused 
of terrorism.434 The effects of reform efforts were, however, limited. Despite numerous 
instances of rioting between 1983 and 1986 against the conditions prisoners were held 
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in, Human Rights Watch reported in 1992 that it was still the case that human rights 
were “systematically and constantly denied”.435  
Neither the Instituto Nacional Penitenciario (INPE) nor the government could claim 
that such a situation was sustainable without the prospect of violence. There were seven 
cases of rioting in Lurigancho and El Frontón in 1985-6, as well as incidents at the 
Canto Grande and Chorrillos prisons in Lima, and at institutions in Arequipa, Cusco, 
Huánuco and Piura. In the majority of these cases, the protests were against poor food 
provision and a lack of sanitation in prisons, as well as against the slowness of the 
judicial system.436 Hostages were taken in many of these incidents, and when police 
tried to conduct a search at Lurigancho in October 1985, Shining Path “barricaded the 
entrance to their wing with cement blocks and burning mattresses and launched a 
variety of homemade weapons, wounding one officer and 20 inmates”. The result was 
the death of 30 inmates, with both the police and Senderistas accusing the other side of 
having conducted executions.437 
 
It is worth noting briefly here how prison space was organised across Peruvian 
geography. After the breakouts in Ayacucho, the government decided to concentrate all 
accused insurgents in three prisons in Lima; Santa Bárbara, Lurigancho, and El Frontón. 
Shortly after, Miguel Castro Castro Prison (specifically designed for insurgents) was 
built in the district of San Juan de Lurigancho, although many women were sent to the 
women’s prison in Chorrillos. Whilst each of these prisons was in the area of the 
capital, they were located in its poorer districts (or in the case of El Frontón on an island 
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off the coast) as if to prevent contagion and reduce the proximity of the city’s elite to 
the country’s most feared prisoners.   
To an extent, this policy reflects the type of spatial partitioning identified by 
Foucault as a feature of panopticism. Each prison was an “enclosed, segmented space, 
observed at every point”, so that the “plague” of Senderismo could be isolated, 
identified and treated in distinct areas of the city.438 In this sense, the state appeared to 
adhere to Foucault’s principles for the governmental management of a population. The 
management of internal prison space, however, suggests otherwise. The dire conditions 
in which prisoners were kept reflected no desire to rehabilitate, but instead “a power 
that not only did not hesitate to exert itself directly on bodies, but was exalted and 
strengthened by its visible manifestations of power…a power that demonstrated not 
why it had to enforce its laws, but who were its enemies”.439 The power outlined by 
Foucault here is sovereign power, and its exercise over accused insurgents in state 
prisons demonstrated a desire for vengeance and a reassertion of the state authority. 
This suggests that the state did not just use the detention of insurgents to limit the scope 
of the ongoing conflict, but also to reassert its own right to rule and to visibly 
demonstrate its own power. As will be seen, this desire to assert authority was 
dramatically demonstrated in response to the prison riots of 1986. 
This spatial partitioning of insurgents from society was also reflected in President 
García’s increased deployment of Emergency Zones.440 As the Informe Final notes, the 
establishment of Emergency Zones (and their Political-Military Commands which 
placed all civilian authorities under military control) amounted to the “abdication of 
democratic responsibility”, and ultimately created an environment in which human 
                                                          
438 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.197. 
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rights abuses became common. Even prior to the massacres, therefore, it is possible to 
see García’s increased use of Emergency Zones as a sign that the spatialised logics of 
the counterinsurgency operation would continue, with states of exception enabling the 
differential treatment of populations in different regions across the country. 
This is particularly relevant to the case of El Frontón for two reasons. Firstly, 
because Lima came under a state of Emergency in 1985, thus enabling the military to 
conduct their operations with impunity in the capital. Secondly, because the prison 
island itself became, similar to Los Cabitos, a localised space of exception. El Frontón 
was a space which had no value, the population of which was not worth preserving, and 
so state agents effectively withdrew to a policy of containment instead focused on 
policing it from the outside. As will be seen, this policy proved to be a disastrous 
mistake, as it gifted Shining Path a significant platform from which they could continue 
their propaganda war against the state.  
 
Shining Path incarcerated  
Rather than being deterred by their incarceration, Shining Path used imprisonment as an 
opportunity and began to see the space around them as “centres of political action” from 
which they could recruit new members.441 Prison space was also important for Shining 
Path as an arena in which they could perform their own version of self-organisation and 
statecraft, converting each institution into a space of propaganda and organisation for 
the ideological war they were conducting against the state.442 In the words of Abimael 
Guzmán, the prisoners: 
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“never bent the knee and continued to fight…and with fiery cheers 
they transformed the sordid dungeons of the decaying and rotten 
Peruvian State into shining trenches of combat”.443  
As can be seen in footage from the Dispatches documentary People of the Shining 
Path, the party established control over their wings in El Frontón and Lurigancho in a 
more stable way than they were able to do in ayacuchano communities, allowing them 
to produce organisational structures and create a kind of model state according to their 
own ideology.444 The party marched through the prison with hammer and sickle flags, 
painted murals and displayed posters of Guzmán, and sang songs in praise of the 
Cultural Revolution. Agüero has also pointed to the party’s use of ceremonial clothing 
as a form of propaganda which formed a part of the “extreme cultural aggression” they 
directed against the state in this symbolic war.445 
Whilst these factors allowed Shining Path to aesthetically redefine the internal space 
of the prison, the party also recreated its organisational structures in the management of 
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Fig. 13: Shining Path inmates during a prison march. Still from People of the Shining Path. 
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the prison wing, controlling access to their domain, cooking their own food and carrying 
out ideological lessons for other inmates. Prisons therefore became a microcosm of the 
kind of state Shining Path would have created had they succeeded in their revolutionary 
project. Although the guerrillas never truly came close to recreating their prison utopias 
on a larger scale, these images remain shocking to this day because they represent a the 
doctrinaire and dogmatic reorganisation of society reminiscent of Mao’s Cultural 
Revolution. This has led Boutron to state that Shining Path had “conquered prison space 
to serve their own interests”.446 However, a large degree of responsibility for Shining 
Path’s ability to organise must fall upon the state’s organisation of prison space.  
Prison management was chaotic and reflected the presence of “poorly paid guards 
and employees, corrupted authorities, and a general state of abandonment” which 
Aguirre argues generally characterised Peruvian prisons in the 1980s.447 Of course, 
Shining Path resisted attempts by prison staff to enforce greater authority upon them, 
including plans to control prison visits by issuing ID cards to inmates’ families.448 
However, Aguirre’s work also demonstrates a much longer history of disorder and 
chaos in Peruvian prisons which reflects the low status they appear to have within the 
state’s prioritisation of functions.  
He describes how, between 1850 and 1930, attempts were made to modernise and 
reform the prison system but that a “despotic approach to punishment, one that 
emphasised revenge and deterrence over rehabilitation and reform” generally prevailed 
with the result that prisoners continued to be “treated like savage beasts” facing the 
persistent problems of overcrowding, poor sanitation and poor provision of resources.449 
In this sense, the problems of prison management in Peru were not new to the 1980s, 
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and it is perhaps more useful to understand the problems of prison management as being 
shaped by over a century of chronic underfunding and a lack of attention to persistent 
problems. The state’s lack of control can be seen as a form of deliberately organised 
chaos, a product of the exclusionary ideas which informed approaches to the state’s 
disciplinary function and which rejected the need for rehabilitation and reform to 
become central tenets in prison policy.  
That these activities occurred “with knowledge and tolerance of the authorities” 
made the party’s actions appear even more brazen to those on the outside.450 Shining 
Path were not simply enjoying their free time but, as Feinstein highlights, carrying on 
many of their activities with greater freedom than they had experienced on the outside. 
The party created graphic re-enactments of their favourite assassinations, organised 
“Cultural Thursdays” (which acted as recruitment meetings), and even planned some of 
their operations from inside the walls of Lurigancho and El Frontón.451 Shining Path 
had resignified prison space, changing it from a site symbolic of their defeat to a space 
in which they could perform small-scale versions of the state which they wanted to 
create in Peru.  
Ultimately, however, Shining Path’s development of this symbolic war made them 
more vulnerable in the long run. The group, which was almost impossible to locate in 
the Andean puna, now had a visible and conspicuous presence in urban space. 
Furthermore, whilst the riots which took place prior to 1986 challenged the state’s 
ability to manage their prisons, Shining Path’s use of clothing, evocative images and 
demonstrations (alluding to a dogmatic, foreign ideology) challenged the Peruvian 
state’s right to rule. These actions therefore represented both a conspicuous affront to 
the state, and a territorialisation of Shining Path which located the party in a specific 
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space. Understanding the massacres in this wider military context of the conflict is 
crucial. As the Ames Commission would later argue, there was a “profound motivation” 
for the state to “confront the prison riots in the same terms that they had come to 
confront Shining Path actions in the Emergency Zones of the South-Central sierra”.452 
 
18 June 1986 
On 18 June 1986, Shining Path prisoners initiated three days of riots in the El Frontón, 
Lurigancho and Santa Bárbara prisons. The CVR states that the rioters, motivated by 
awful living conditions and the government’s attempts to move them to the new Canto 
Grande prison, took members of the Republican Guard and INPE staff hostage. The 
inmates also released a list of demands which included recognition of their status as 
political prisoners, the cessation of interventions by the Navy into El Frontón and the 
closure of Canto Grande. However, the demands also reflected numerous day-to-day 
concerns of the prisoners, including the provision of sufficient clothing and food, repair 
of the lighting and water systems, guarantees for the protection of the accused’s 
families, and the speeding up of judicial processes.453 
After the failure of the Comisión de Paz to resolve the situation, García ordered the 
armed forces to suppress the uprisings. At Santa Bárbara, three prison staff were taken 
hostage, but the prison was quickly retaken with only two fatalities. At Lurigancho, 
there was a sustained stand-off between inmates and the army. A plan was devised by 
Coronel Cabezas which, the CVR argues, “put in grave risk the lives of the hostage, the 
inmates, and of the Republican Guard”.454 Nonetheless, the army retook the Pabellón 
Industrial and, after an assault by the military, many of the inmates surrendered. Shortly 
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after, a large number of the surrendered prisoners were extrajudicially executed under 
the orders of Cabezas. In total, 124 prisoners died at Lurigancho. 
The Navy took a day longer to subdue the uprising at El Frontón. The island fortress 
briefly sheltered the prisoners and gave them a vantage point, but the Navy responded 
with mortar shelling. The walls of the infamous Pabellón Azul were destroyed but many 
Senderistas survived the night until reinforcements arrived from the army and 
Republican Guard. The rioters eventually surrendered to the armed forces, but over 
seventy were extrajudicially executed by the Navy after their surrender, some having 
been tortured.455 In total, there were 118 deaths in El Frontón. 
 
The existing literature depicts the massacres as an episode which demonstrated the 
increasing impunity with which the armed forces acted during the conflict. Senator 
Rolando Ames was commissioned by the government to investigate the deaths in the 
wake of negative public reaction to the large death toll. The commission found that the 
three key factors which produced the massacres were García’s own decisions to meet 
the riots with violent reprisal, the militarised climate created by the state’s 
counterinsurgency operation, and the assumption that the states of Emergency 
superseded the human rights guaranteed by the Peruvian constitution.456 The 
Commission also found numerous Army and Navy officers guilty of crimes against 
human life, including Coronel Cabezas of the Republican Guard, General Máximo 
Martínez Lira and General Rabanal from the army (all at Lurigancho), and the 
Commander of the Navy Infantry and his subordinates (El Frontón).457 However, when 
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Rabanal was indicted for murder the military demanded that the trial be awarded to the 
military courts. As a result of the subsequent trial, Cabezas was sentenced to fifteen 
years in prison yet, as Human Rights Watch highlights, Rabanal and Martínez Lira (the 
two highest authorities at Lurigancho on the day of the massacre) were only charged 
with negligence (Cabezas and numerous others were also released after the 1995 Law of 
Amnesty).458  
García was quick to distance himself from responsibility, blaming the massacres on 
an overzealous police force and denying any personal responsibility for the deaths.459 
Whether or not García had a personal role in commanding the suppression of the riots, 
Burt argues that the failure of the President to impose civilian authority upon the armed 
forces, and the armed forces’ reciprocal mistrust of civilian elites, created a situation in 
which the military was able to act with violent impunity. The executions offered a very 
public demonstration of how far the armed forces would go to stop the chaos from 
spreading. Similar abuses of power increased sharply after 1986 when the government’s 
counterinsurgency policy reverted to the previous hard-line approach.460 
For this reason, the massacres also need to be understood in the context of the state’s 
reassertion of sovereign power which simultaneously reflects the breakdown of the 
state’s disciplinary and governmental functions. Vich believes that the destruction of El 
Frontón was a “powerful sign of the tragedy of the Peruvian state…an extremely weak 
state that, in response to its own weakness, could only responds with a kind of suicidal, 
extreme violence”.461 Vich’s argument here refers to the prison as an important symbol 
of state function. It therefore follows that if the state cannot even manage its own 
disciplinary structures, and feels compelled to destroy its own prisons, then its exercise 
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of legal power has failed at a very fundamental level. Ultimately, the state was propped 
up by a moment of brutal violence; a vengeful demonstration of a sovereign power 
which “asserted itself as an armed power whose functions of maintaining order were not 
entirely unconnected with the functions of war…[which] sought a renewal of its effect 
in the spectacle of its individual manifestations”.462 
This violent practice can partly be seen as an attempt to tackle the increasing 
visibility of Shining Path around Lima, developed through their political activities 
inside the prison walls. It also betrays a preoccupation to defend the capital from a 
conflict which was “previously relegated to the remote Andean highlands in the pages 
of the national press” but “violently exploded onto the Lima stage” during the riots.463 
Whilst fear in Lima was growing about the continued threat of Shining Path (a fear 
encouraged through the regular blackouts and assassinations perpetrated by the group), 
the prisons became a priority for the state as a space in which they could forcefully 
assert their authority, and vengeance, on the insurgents.  
 
There have been a number of scholarly studies which represent the massacres as a 
moment which refracts competing memory narratives of the conflict. Drinot argues that 
“two understandings of the responsibilities and culpabilities of the violent and non-
violent actors” have produced two broad memory narratives in relation to the internal 
conflict. One of these interpretations prioritises the heroism of the armed forces in 
suppressing the Shining Path insurgency, whilst the other reinterprets the armed forces 
as major perpetrators of human rights abuses which must be criticised and dissected 
simultaneously with the actions of Shining Path.464 Likewise, Feinstein argues that 
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analysis of the events of 1986 has led to “not only very different interpretations of the 
massacres themselves, but also very different interpretations of the civil conflict that 
had torn the country apart”.465 Whilst the massacres have been represented in the 
Peruvian media as a necessary end to the chaos unleashed by Shining Path on Lima’s 
prisons, those in the human rights-based memory camp have instead highlighted the 
mistakes made by the government in creating such dire living conditions for prisoners 
and allowing Shining Path to take control.466 Gorriti for instance, has highlighted the 
dire living conditions inside the prisons whilst also criticising the state for ceding 
control of prison space to Shining Path.467 In this sense, for the human rights memory 
camp the massacres represent two major failures of the Peruvian state during the 
conflict; the failure to protect human rights, and the failure to limit further violence. 
Because of this, the massacres are remembered as a means of criticising the state and 
attempting to guarantee human rights in the present.  
From the perspective of the armed forces, the prison massacres are not an episode 
which fit very well into their overarching narrative of the conflict. The deaths of over 
250 surrendered prisoners is difficult to explain away as a necessary step for the 
salvation of the nation. As Milton describes, the museum curated by DINCOTE based 
on the perspectives of the police and armed forces during the conflict exhibits over 1000 
objects which belonged to prisoners in El Frontón, Lurigancho and Santa Bárbara with 
almost no mention of the massacres which took place there.468 This particular way of 
telling events emphasises the heroism and ingenuity of the armed forces over the 
brutality and disregard for human rights demonstrated in other scenarios. Salomón 
Lerner, the head of the CVR, argues that: 
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“this is the false argument that the military wield… Do not look in the 
rearview mirror, do not open old wounds. The question is whether the 
wounds have healed. I think they are still open”.469 
One perspective which is missing from the both memory camps, however, is that of 
Shining Path members. Whilst human rights activists and the non-revolutionary Left 
identify some Senderistas as victims of military massacres, they ultimately interpret the 
violence of the internal conflict as damaging to the whole of Peru and therefore are 
simultaneously critical of Shining Path and military violence. As Feinstein argues, 
however, Shining Path commemorate the fallen prisoners of 1986 as heroes whose 
deaths demonstrate the need for the revolution to continue.470 In the foreword of a 
document entitled ¡Día de la Herocidad!, published for the third anniversary of the 
massacres, Abimael Guzmán commemorated those who died at El Frontón and 
Lurigancho, arguing that they had laid bare the genocidal nature of the Peruvian state 
and that the prisoners “continue winning battles beyond their death”.471 The rest of the 
document is an illustrated account of the riots and their subsequent pacification in the 
context of the conflict, in which the Shining Path prisoners are depicted heroically, 
shouting “this is a triumph of President Gonzalo...Honour and glory to comrades and 
fallen combatants! Long live President Gonzalo! Long live the Peruvian Communist 
Party!”.472 For Shining Path, the massacres represented a “grand moral triumph” as the 
military’s repressive violence had been exposed, and because the state had been goaded 
into engaging the insurgents on their own terms, as an opposing army rather than as 
terrorists.473 For these reasons, El Frontón holds an important place in Shining Path 
memories and was used as a rallying cry for future operations. Although, as Aguirre 
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highlights, the massacres did not prompt any sympathy for the insurgents in public 
opinion, they did give Shining Path cohesion and “reinforced their mystique”.474 
Remembering the massacres in this way also represented an important way for the 
Maoist group to further demonstrate the distance between themselves and the 
democratic Left, a position they emphasised on the first anniversary of the massacres by 
opposing a march organised by Izquierda Unida, describing it as an “opportunist march 
that seeks to traffic with our dead”.475 The importance of prison space to Shining Path’s 
construction of their own identity would continue after 1986. Almost all Shining Path 
prisoners were moved to Canto Grande but, despite their earlier protests, Senderistas 
continued to enjoy better conditions than other prisoners by recreating the forms of 
organisation they had maintained in other prisons, enforcing discipline, conducting 
ideological lessons and being allowed to receive a portion of their food raw so they 
could cook it themselves.476 The MRTA also took advantage of the state’s struggle to 
organise its prisons when 47 of its members (including their leader Víctor Polay) 
escaped from Castro Castro in 1990. The memories of these groups focus on their time 
in prison, as Apristas do to this day, because they represent rare moments in which party 
members were actually able to act out their political fantasies and self-organise, making 
incarceration crucial in the development of their political identities.  
However, whilst these narratives of human rights abuses, heroic soldiers and heroic 
revolutionaries are certainly diverse and central to understandings of the massacres, 
little work has been done to spatialise the massacres or to assert the role which prison 
space had to play in producing the massacres. In the next section, I will argue that the 
way in which Peruvian state prisons were managed during the conflict can give us key 
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insights into the wider forms of geographically contingent power exercised by the 
Peruvian state and armed forces. From this perspective, El Frontón and Lurigancho can 
be seen as microcosms of the internal conflict which was simultaneously being played 
out on the national scale.  
 
Spaces and geographies of exception 
The events which transpired at El Frontón and Lurigancho, and the conditions which 
existed in them prior to the massacres, support the claim that Peruvian prisons during 
the conflict acted as spaces of exception. Calveiro has traced a lineage in the existence 
of spaces of exception from the concentration camps of the Second World War, to the 
detention centres and public buildings used during the periods of dictatorship in Chile 
and Argentina, to the “black holes” of the 21st century.477 Spaces of exception are 
designed as tools of biopolitical control because they spatially separate undesirable 
elements from the body politic, under the logic that this will exorcise violence or 
dangerous ideologies from a given society. Agamben argues that they are vacant spaces 
characterised by the “emptiness of law”, and Gregory has highlighted how Guantánamo 
Bay has often been described as being “beyond the reach” or “outside” the rule of 
national and international law.478  
However, this interpretation has been critiqued by Calveiro who argues that spaces 
of exception and global black holes are created in an international context which “does 
not recognise any sort of outside”.479 Whilst individuals reduced to bare life inside 
spaces of exception are to an extent physically emplaced outside of the protection of the 
state, spaces of exception themselves are created and supported by legal frameworks 
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including the state of Emergency. Although the space of exception facilitates the 
exclusion of individuals, it should not be seen as an exception in itself but an example 
of precisely how disciplinary law is designed to function.   
It is also necessary to ask why the state would manage, and ultimately destroy, its 
own prison space in this way, for which I believe the work of Colombo is highly 
valuable. The confinement of large numbers of accused insurgents in prisons, combined 
with the political activities which Shining Path embarked upon inside, produced the idea 
of prisons as subversive spaces, or as the spaces of Shining Path. In turn, this created the 
impression that this previously elusive enemy could at least be located in one place. 
Colombo, with reference to the Tucumán monte during Argentina’s military 
dictatorship, argues that this means “that the enemy could be territorialised, and thus 
rendered visible and tangible, so making it possible for it to be annihilated”.480 Given 
that Shining Path and the MRTA were territorialised in this way (not only in prison 
space but in regions of the sierra and selva as well) it makes sense to analyse prison 
space not simply as a feature of the state’s overall disciplinary structure but as a key 
arena in which the state conducted the counterinsurgency operation and exercised a 
specific type of power over those accused of insurgency.  
It is important to ask, at this juncture, why El Frontón functioned like a space of 
exception in the manner of ESMA or Nazi concentration camps, rather than simply as a 
prison. The Ames Commission argued that whilst a state of emergency and Emergency 
Zones could be created through legal frameworks, their creation increasingly gave an 
active role to the military and formalised the suspension of guaranteed citizenship 
rights.481 The report also asserted that the Peruvian state failed to comply with 
international and constitutional law which continued to guarantee human rights during a 
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state of emergency.482 In this context, it is possible to see that whilst there were legal 
frameworks which allowed the creation of Emergency Zones, the armed forces went 
beyond what was permitted in such cases. This, I believe, constitutes a state of 
exception in which the counterinsurgency operation responded to the prison riots within 
the logics and context of the ongoing war, rather than within the context of peacetime 
discipline. This situation was given a veneer of legality because of its creation through 
legal frameworks, but these frameworks did not give any structure to the way in which 
the armed forces were supposed to act. Successive governments simply abdicated power 
to the military, allowing them to conduct violent reprisals and exercise forms of 
sovereign power on behalf of the state.  
In this sense, whilst prison space was in itself not exceptional, the way in which it 
was managed by the military was. Furthermore, the goal of this repressive mechanism 
is, Calveiro argues, the “extermination of the Other who is unremittingly excluded and 
eliminated, whether s/he represents a real threat or is subject to a pre-emptive course of 
action”.483 This Other which the state was trying to segregate, contain, and eliminate 
was nominally Shining Path militants, yet the way in which state agents conducted their 
operations meant that the profile of those suspected of being insurgents was highly 
racialised. What this suggests, then, is that prison spaces which could usually expect to 
form part of the normal disciplinary function of the state were now being used as a 
means of repression, not only against Senderistas but against the indigenous ethnic 
community which was perceived to support them. As described in Chapter 2, prisons 
were not the only spaces of exception established during the conflict as the detention 
centres Los Cabitos and La Casa Rosada were used as sites for arbitrary detentions, 
torture and disappearances in Huamanga. The forms of counterinsurgent violence 
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conducted from these sites were also shaped by exclusionary logics which 
disproportionately victimised the indigenous population.  
These prisons and spaces of exception also reflect the exercise of different forms of 
state power. Prisons are highlighted by Foucault as being central to the exercise of 
governmental power and the practice of biopolitics, arguing that modern states 
segregate these undesirables from the rest of the population and try to rehabilitate them 
through practices and institutions (dispositif, or apparatus). To some extent, this is 
corroborated by Aguirre who states that incarceration had become the most common 
form of judicial punishment in Peru by the mid-nineteenth century whilst the death 
penalty was enforced less and branding was legally abolished.484 Furthermore, as 
Foucault highlights, this practice is premised upon the same medical logic of 
containment which hospitals and quarantine are based on: 
“The plagues as a form, at once real and imaginary, of disorder had 
as its medical and political correlative discipline. Behind the 
disciplinary mechanisms can be read the haunting memory of 
‘contagions’, of the plague, of rebellions”.485 
By isolating a disease (in this case Senderismo) spatially, and by separating its 
carriers from the healthy population, the hope is that the diseased can be cured and 
reintegrated into society. The same logic underpins the prisons as a disciplinary 
institution, and both hospital and prison space are organised spatially (with numerous 
wards / wings and rooms / cells to isolate the patient / prisoner further) to reflect this.   
However, this logic did not appear to function during the conflict as internal 
divisions of prison space were not maintained and Shining Path were allowed to wield 
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their influence, amassing more supporters through proselytising and coercion. This 
meant that many inmates who took part in the prison yard marches, joined in with the 
riots and, ultimately, were killed during the armed forces’ recapture of the prisons had 
not necessarily been Senderistas before. Instead they had been turned into party cadres 
through their prison experiences, an essential failure of the function of prisons as a 
means of containment and isolation. This should be considered a major failure of 
governmental policy and state function during the conflict. As Vich argues, that “the 
state cannot manage a jail, they cannot even manage a jail well, [this is] incredible”.486 
Yet, it may be more productive not to view this situation as a failure, but as being 
representative of a longer history of attitudes towards, and status of, prisons in Peru. As 
referenced earlier, Aguirre has argued that between 1850 and 1930 approaches to 
incarceration were shaped by a desire to punishment rather than to reform, “if not 
always in the official discourse, certainly in the perception and behaviour of prison 
experts”.487 The evidence from the CVR suggests that these attitudes largely prevailed 
in the 1980s, as long before the 1986 riots there were severe failures in the infrastructure 
of prison space and provision of food to inmates, to the extent that the state was in 
severe breach of prisoners’ human rights. According to the CVR, these conditions 
amounted to “the absence of the minimum conditions of life” in Peruvian state 
prisons.488 Prisoners were not treated as a manageable population, but as an expendable 
mass of non-valued, non-grievable life. They lived in a state which Agamben refers to 
as homo sacer, the reduction of individuals to “bare life”.489 This state of exception and 
exclusion was not simply a product a failure to provide provisions or certain standards 
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of hygiene, but was entirely reflective of attitudes towards the disciplinary function of 
prisons in Peru at the time. 
Aguirre argues that reformers in nineteenth-century Peru believed that the 
modernisation of Peruvian penal justice was central to projects of liberal state 
formation.490 In reality, however, punitive discourses of prison management persisted 
well into the twentieth century and a balance was always struck to some extent between 
reform and punishment. This describes a more nuanced perspective on the state and the 
penitentiary which is perhaps more realistic for describing the nature of prisons in Peru, 
despite Foucauldian narratives of progress towards governmentality which have 
suggested otherwise. However, whilst impulses towards the deployment of sovereign 
and governmental power through the carceral system may well have fluctuated since its 
inception, particular political situations and acute crises appear to have pushed the 
debate towards one side or the other. In 1980s Peru, in the context of ongoing 
insurgency, the discourse of prison management appears to have been heavily weighted 
towards the punishment and exclusion of insurgents through the exercise of sovereign 
state power.  
Furthermore, Agamben argues that sovereign power uses exclusionary techniques to 
produce a population which is manageable through biopolitical mechanisms; like 
severing a diseased limb in order to treat an otherwise healthy patient.491  This suggests 
that, in its responses to Shining Path and the MRTA, the state produced spaces in which 
insurgents were isolated and eliminated in order to preserve a docile population which it 
saw as suitable for a modern nation-state. In a Lefebvrian sense, the state used space as 
a technology for producing a particular type of population from which undesirable 
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elements were excluded. As has been argued earlier in this thesis and by Drinot, 
however, the production of this biopolitical population was also highly racialised 
project which focuses on: 
“the micro-management of sectors of the population in ways that 
express racialized understandings of the ontological capacity of 
different population groups to contribute to, and indeed be subjects 
of, projects of ‘improvement’ and national ‘progress’ more 
generally”.492  
This supports Agamben’s argument that sovereignty and governmentality can 
coexist in modern societies, and that sovereign power is exercised as a way of 
producing a biopolitical population through exclusion. From this perspective, it is 
possible to further challenge the idea of the counterinsurgency operation as simply a 
reaction to the threat of political violence. The methods of the operation reflected a 
reconstitution of the population as a biopolitical body, which was conducted alongside 
other reconstitutions of Peruvian society (including Fujimori’s later economic shock 
programmes and self-coup discussed in Chapter 5, and the attacks on civil society by 
both state agents and insurgent groups). These microrevolutions were only possible 
through foundational moments of violence such as the prison massacres.  
Furthermore, this form of governance has been enacted through a distinctly 
neoliberal rationale. As Ong argues, neoliberalism is: 
“Often discussed as an economic doctrine with a negative relation to 
state power, a market ideology that aims to limit the scope and 
activity of governing. But neoliberalism can also be conceptualised… 
[to be] reconfiguring relationships between governing and the 
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governed, power and knowledge, and sovereignty and 
territoriality”.493 
This depiction of a neoliberal mode of governance contests the idea that 
neoliberalism is an ideology grounded solely in individual and market-based freedoms. 
Instead, it implies that neoliberal projects are necessarily founded on forms of exclusion 
in order to produce a docile society in which market-driven reforms can be applied. In 
particular, Ong describes this exclusion as “spatialising practices of sovereignty” (i.e. 
exactly the kind of process outlined above).494 In this context, the spatialised application 
of sovereignty acts as a foundational moment of violence upon which the neoliberal 
order is premised.  
It is important to note that the distinct economic and political rationalities of 
neoliberalism outlined above were not initially deployed simultaneously in Peru. This is 
particularly pertinent in the middle phase of the conflict when Alan García’s APRA 
government were pursuing a heterodox economic policy.495 Perhaps without the 
simultaneous deployment of market-drive reforms, the categorisation of the García 
Presidency of neoliberal is somewhat meaningless, given that the criteria for 
establishing its neoliberal character is in fact the authoritarian application of sovereign 
power.  
However, the purpose of this argument is to draw links between the García 
administration’s approach to counterinsurgency with the forms of power deployed by 
other Latin American states in the final three decades of the twentieth century, and 
particularly to highlight how the roots of Fujimori’s later neoliberal authoritarianism 
were visible during García’s Presidency. Wendy Brown has argued that neoliberalism 
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has often been “compatible with, and sometimes even productive of, authoritarian, 
despotic, paramilitaristic and corrupt state forms”.496 The evidence from the García era 
suggests that these state forms are not always produced by Friedmanite doctrine or 
reforms. Instead it demonstrates that both the political and economic components of 
neoliberal governance can be seen as reflections of deeper exclusionary beliefs present 
in the worldview of those who chose to pursue a market-led reorganisation of society.  
In this context, Peru’s turn toward authoritarianism and neoliberalism in the late 
1980s and throughout the 1990s appears contradictory. However, it is also reminiscent 
of, and perhaps suggests a re-emergence of, the tendencies highlighted by Mallon in 
reference to nineteenth-century state projects in Peru, which focused on liberal trade 
policies and a centralised, repressive state.497 This description, however, is particularly 
pertinent to the Fujimori period, and will be explored in greater depth in the next 
chapter.  
Although each period of violence took place within starkly differing contexts with 
different social groups as victims, there are comparisons to be drawn between Peru’s 
internal conflict, the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile, the military dictatorship in 
Argentina, and Bolivia’s period of dictatorship and economic reform in the 1980s. 
Although the timings of economic reforms and repressive violence vary, in each case 
sovereignty was enacted upon resistant populations prior to the rolling back of the state 
and introduction of market rationality to numerous areas of society. That is not to say 
that Peruvian conflict should be viewed as part of some kind of international neoliberal 
conspiracy promoted by the US government under a Cold War mentality. Instead, the 
purpose is to highlight the forms of governance deployed across different nations and to 
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highlight the common forms of power, deployed in most cases by elite-military political 
alliances, used to reconstitute the state.  
The way in which the Peruvian state and armed forces conducted their 
counterinsurgency operation, through a spatialised gradation of sovereignty, reflects this 
neoliberal mode of governance which has also been witnessed in the emergence of the 
counterrevolutionary New Right across Latin America. As Grandin argues, in the 
second half of the twentieth century “conservatism as a world-view moved from an 
instinctual defence of the status hierarchy to a more contrived, self-conscious ideology” 
which was not only distinctly anticommunist, but patriarchal, Catholic and opposed to 
social change.498 Therefore, in response to the radical Leftist revolutions proposed by 
Shining Path and the MRTA, and in many ways to earlier forms of social revolution 
articulated by radicals in the 1960s (and to some extent co-opted by the Velasco 
military government), the Peruvian state used the internal conflict as a means of 
revolutionising itself and reconstituting society to suit its needs. As will be discussed in 
the final chapter, this project was continued by Alberto Fujimori, but has also been 
sustained and developed since his downfall.  
The above argument highlights the ways in which space has been used as a 
mechanism or technology of power by the Peruvian state. To continue with my 
Lefebvrian tripartite approach to the production of these spaces, however, it is also 
necessary to analyse how these spaces have been produced on the representational level. 
To do this, I will now engage with several forms of cultural production and testimonial 
art which deal with the history of Peruvian state prisons and the events at El Frontón 
and Lurigancho; in this sense, they are representations of space. In doing so, I will 
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attempt to unpick elements of the cultural framework which allows such moments of 
repressive violence to take place. I will also highlight the ways in which cultural 
producers have challenged the exclusionary logics applied both to those detained in the 
prisons, and to their memories which continue to be systematically repressed and 
excluded in the years since the conflict. 
 
The prison massacres in Peruvian art 
The following cultural artefacts have been chosen not only because they have something 
to say about prisons, or the prison massacres, but because they have something to say 
about the ways in which space produces ideas about the people who exist in them. In the 
case of prisons, this often means some kind of castigation, or the assumption of guilt of 
anyone who is in, or has been in, prison space. The case of El Frontón adds another 
dimension to this, however, insofar the state’s obliteration of its own island fortress 
didn’t just function as a way of killing more Senderistas, but as a way of symbolically 
reasserting the state’s power over a space which had been re-produced (to some extent) 
by Shining Path as a shining combat trench. The subsequent destruction of the prison 
therefore acts on a symbolic level too, as an attempt to obliterate Shining Path and any 
evidence of their existence from history. 
In this sense, I have chosen to deal with the works of Jourde and Agüero because 
they distinctly give evidence that something happened on the island. Through the 
production of these cultural artefacts, they act as interlocutors in wider debates about 
memory by attempting to represent experiences which have been collectively forgotten. 
In doing so, I believe these artefacts reflect import debates about grievability by 
representing silenced and forgotten narratives. They challenge the idea of El Frontón as 
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an abandoned, lifeless island of little significance by recreating the lives which were 
lived and lost there.499  
The 1986 prison massacres demonstrated that the military saw no value in the lives 
of the prisoners or of Senderistas. This is supported by Aguirre’s argument that the 
demonization of Shining Path members and sympathisers in government and media 
reports of the conflict was successful because of: 
“the (real or attributed) ethnic background of most Shining Path 
members and suspects, who were seen as indigenous or serranos 
(people from the highlands) and, thus, dangerous, deceitful, and 
undeserving”.500 
Furthermore, I believe that the absence of Shining Path memories and lack of 
attention to the massacres in the conflict’s historiography reflects the continuing success 
of this demonization and that these lives are still considered non-grievable. Little has 
been done (culturally, politically or historiographically) to posthumously ascribe value 
to the prisoners, and so the logics of governance which precipitated the massacres have 
not been challenged. Whilst these cultural artefacts do not directly represent Shining 
Path memories, they treat the massacres in such a way that gives value to Senderista 
perspectives and, in doing so, they challenge the “perception of most Peruvians –and 
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certainly that of state administrators – [that the massacres] did not really resonate as a 
real, regrettable tragedy”.501  
 
i) Gladys Alvarado Jourde’s photographs of EL Frontón 
Gustavo Buntinx describes El Frontón as “today, a liminal space where geography and 
history intermingle”, and this theme is central to the photographs of Gladys Alvarado 
Jourde.502 These photographs take us not only to a moment which is temporally distant, 
but into a space to which access is heavily limited by the Peruvian state. Jourde herself 
employed a local fisherman to take her across the narrow stretch of water between Lima 
and El Frontón. 
One of her photographs shows an image which is evocative of the past, not only for 
Peruvians but for many across the world. A large hammer and sickle can be seen 
inscribed upon a stone wall, framed by the sky and rubble. The symbol, however, has 
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Fig. 14: Hammer and sickle. Photograph by Gladys Alvarado Jourde, El Frontón (Buntinx and Vich eds).  
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been deliberately erased, seemingly scratched out in order to remove evidence of 
Shining Path’s presence on El Frontón in a symbolic recreation of the massacre. 
Ironically, whoever was tasked with erasing the hammer and sickle has only 
endeavoured to scratch out the paint with the effect that the shape of the symbol can still 
be seen in a blurred grey form. This photograph stands in for the experience of the 
massacres as a whole, in which by trying to erase Shining Path, the state has only 
managed to inscribe them further into history. This represents the continuation of the 
symbolic battle waged by Shining Path against the state during their time in 
incarceration.  
Vich argues that the photos “point to the failure of the national state and make 
visible the ruins of our memory”.503 His argument is tied to the ridiculousness of a state 
which not only loses control of its own prisons, but then feels compelled to bomb and 
destroy them. But the photos also present the island as the past resurgent, forcing itself 
into the present, and lingering off the coast of Lima like an open wound. In this sense, 
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Jourde represents the island as an active memory, or, to borrow a phrase from Steve 
Stern, as “memory knot”; in this case referring to “the specific physical remains or 
places that [demand] attention to memory”.504 She achieves this by juxtaposing images 
of the past with those of the present, the dead with the living, the peaceful with the 
violent. The circling birds overhead are seen in contrast with the guano droppings which 
cake the shattered prison walls. Shining Path slogans and graffiti on these walls appear 
to speak through time, but the bullet holes which surround them allude them to the 
tragic demise of their authors. Perhaps most evocatively, the clear blue sky sits above a 
dark, turbulent sea.  
Ultimately, however, the collection shows the total desertion of the island, its 
emptiness of life, and the island’s isolation, close to being swallowed by the Pacific 
with the Lima coast nowhere in sight. This demonstrates that the past cannot be 
recovered, but that it has the potential to interrupt the present. As Vich argues, the 
photographs reflect “the absolute tension between the present and the past, appearing as 
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a register of a dramatic act that we have repressed”.505 An important element of this 
tension, however, is that Jourde’s work tells us definitively that something happened at 
El Frontón. The trips she made to the island and the photographs she took to document 
them show the real evidence of the violence which took place there in unique way. That 
is not to say that the evidence of the Ames Commission or CVR is not just as important 
for understanding the massacres, but that these sources represent events which happened 
in the past without being able to show how those events continue to take shape in the 
present. Her contribution goes beyond documentation in this sense; it places us as 
spectators within the geography of the island, transporting us temporally and spatially 
so that we are more able to understand the complexity of what happened there.  
 
ii) The memoirs of José Carlos Agüero 
Los rendidos is part testimony, part essay, part meditation on the prison massacres, the 
internal conflict, and those involved. As with Lurgio Gavilán’s Memorias de un soldado 
desconocido, it offers valuable insight into the perspectives of those who, although not 
involved in the central command of Shining Path, at least had a personal connection to 
the group. In the case of Los rendidos, the parents of the author José Carlos Agüero 
were both Shining Path militants who were extrajudicially executed by state agents; his 
father at El Frontón, his mother after the riots at Canto Grande in 1992. Agüero’s 
memoir focuses on complicity, guilt and forgiveness after episodes of political violence, 
and highlights the stigma attached to him through the memory of his parents.  
The first two chapters of Los rendidos deal with the nature of stigma and guilt, 
themes which continue throughout the book. Agüero refers to the worry of neighbours 
                                                          
505 Vich, ‘Un hueco en el presente’ in (Gustavo Buntinx and Víctor Vich eds.), El Frontón: Demasiado pronto / demasiado tarde 
(Lima, 2014), pp.54-63 (p.57). 
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or friends finding out about where his parents were, and that he too will be socially 
castigated because of his parents’ legacy. He also has to deal with a kind of internal 
shame which partially manifests itself in response to students and Leftists who 
continued to defend Shining Path actions: “You are required to accept that members of 
your family, your dearest friends, your inner circle, committed acts that brought death”. 
Yet even these troubles are almost irrelevant, he argues, because the type of shame he 
feels is “not shame sustained in emotions…it is an institution that implies the 
renunciation of pride, the creation of myths, and the security of a familiar heritage”.506 
In short, Agüero is talking about a kind of socially-enforced shame which he suffers as 
a result of being the son of Senderistas. This is significant, insofar as it points to another 
way in which Shining Path militants and those who died in the prison massacres are 
excluded from society, their memories and perspectives deemed unworthy of being 
heard.  
There is little of the book which deals specifically with the prison massacres or with 
the details of the conflict, but it does attempt to investigate the nature of culpability and 
innocence which is central to any understanding of what happened at El Frontón. 
Agüero’s parents, he says, were not innocents, they were Shining Path militant who 
contributed to the conflict and the damage done to Peruvian society.507 This does not, 
however, preclude their rights for their story to be told, nor for their children to grieve 
for them. Agüero’s shame stems from a desire to grieve for his parents which he feels 
the need to suppress due to the assertion of others that his parents’ lives are non-
grievable, and not worth remembering.  
This right to bear witness may seem abstract, but it is central to how we understand 
the prison massacres. The state’s actions at El Frontón and Lurigancho were not just a 
                                                          
506 José Carlos Agüero, Los rendidos: Sobre el don de perdonar (Lima, 2015), p.24. 
507 Ibid., p.67. 
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suppression of the riots but an attack on the rights of Senderistas to exist, an impulse 
which is replicated in the stigma which castigates prisoners as terrorists deserving of 
death and a form of non-grievable life. In a television interview, Agüero argued that his 
work was not designed to pardon his parents, but to contextualise their actions: 
“What do we gain saying that they were characters outside of history, 
as if they were pathological beings, diseased, simply "terrorists”? I 
think they were not. They were complex beings who had complex 
motivations, wrong without doubt, but they cannot be reduced to evil 
beings that we must destroy”.508 
The above quote states what much of Los rendidos alludes to; the complexity of 
morality in situations of violence and the necessity of testimony and debate to allow 
forgiveness to occur. The testimonies laid out in Los rendidos and the photographs of 
Gladys Jourde, therefore, are absolutely pivotal for reconciliation in Peru and for 
challenging the impunity with which state violence was perpetrated. Each of them, in a 
different way, posthumously ascribes value to the lives that were lost during the 
conflict, making the statement that these lives are grievable, and to some extent 
beginning the grieving process by giving testimony and telling their story. These 
artefacts reach out from the past and state: we were here, we exist, and have the right to 
be remembered. 
The recuperation, and to some extent the rehabilitation, of these memories is 
increasingly becoming a focus for scholarly attention. The above examples are a 
handful of the ways in which artists with varying methods have tried to represent 
narratives and give testimony of the prison massacres. There is another important 
                                                          
508 José Carlos Agüero quoted in ‘José Carlos Agüero: "'Los Rendidos' es una historia de amor"’, La Mula, 7 July 2015 
[https://redaccion.lamula.pe/2015/07/07/jose-carlos-aguero-sobre-los-rendidos/jorgepaucar/, accessed 2 October 2016]. 
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feature of this testimony, however, which is the testimony of space. What does El 
Frontón tell us itself, as a site of violence, and now necessarily as a site of memory? 
Efforts to understand this question have been limited by the state’s desire to prevent 
access to the island, to some extent preventing an engagement with its history. There 
have, however, been numerous attempts to assess what this island means in the 
trajectory of the internal conflict, how it reflects the long-standing practices of the 
Peruvian state, and how it reveals which forms of memory are privileged in Peruvian 
society and which continue to be repressed. 
 
Between the nation and the landscape 
It is important here to recognise the difference between the significance of El Frontón as 
a site of memory and the cultural production which has focused on retelling narratives 
and testimonies of what occurred on the island. Whilst in the previous section I dealt 
with representations of space (i.e. how El Frontón has formed part of cultural geography 
which castigates those who died there), this section will focus on the island as a space of 
representation. By that, I mean that the continued silence and emptiness of El Frontón 
has something to say in itself. The spatiality of the island has an aesthetic and a political 
meaning from which it is possible to draw wider implications about the conflict and 
memory as a whole. In this sense I will draw on Lefebvre’s outline of representational 
spaces as “embodying complex symbolisms, sometimes coded, sometimes not, linked to 
the clandestine or underground side of social life”.509 Through this analysis, I will argue 
that whilst it is important to recognise what happened there, that the “there” or “where” 
of the prison massacres is equally important for grasping their full significance.  
 
                                                          
509 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, p.33. 
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The idea of El Frontón as an important site of memory has been developed by 
Gustavo Buntinx. Of paramount importance is Buntinx’s concept of the “poéticas del 
resto”; the poetics of the remains. On his website Micromuseo, which acts as an online 
repository for a diverse range of memory projects and artworks relating to the Peruvian 
conflict, Buntinx outlines his manifesto for the poéticas del resto: 
“The contemplation of the ruin is already a mark of time 
In some sense sensitive to our Peruvian present. 
Ruins that are too present: 
fragments of a not remote or immediate past, 
whose greatest tragedy dates back twenty-five years 
but which we still inhabit as a personal memory… 
The result is the poéticas del resto”.510 
The poéticas del resto is an attempt to understand the relationship between 
materiality and memory. Mandolessi argues, with reference to literature from post-
dictatorship Argentina, that it is possible to conceive of a “materiality of absence…in 
which the affective experience of absence is inscribed into a space”.511 The bullet holes, 
etched symbols and slogans and destroyed buildings of El Frontón form a part of this 
materiality. However, as discussed earlier, access to the island is prohibited by the 
government, and although we have Jourde’s photographs as a key documentation of 
what the island looks like now, her own experiences in struggling to find anyone willing 
to take her to the island confirm that access is severely limited. As a site of memory, El 
                                                          
510 Gustavo Buntinx, ‘POÉTICAS DEL RESTO II: MELANCOLÍAS DE LA VIOLENCIA EN LA OBRA DE GIANCARLO 
SCAGLIA Y MAYA WATANABE’, Micromuseo [http://micromuseo.org.pe/rutas/poeticasdelresto-ii/sinopsis.html, accessed 3 
October 2016]. 
511 Silvana Mandolessi, ‘Haunted Houses, Horror-Literature and the Space of Memory in Post-Dictatorship Argentine Literature’ in 
(Estela Schindel and Pamela Colombo eds.), Space and the Memories of Violence: Landscapes of Erasure, Disappearance and 
Exception (Basingstoke, 2014), pp.150-61 (p.156). 
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Frontón is therefore a closed space, one that invites no contemplation of its significance 
and which precludes the possibility of commemorative practice taking place there.512 
This makes analysis of the island beyond Jourde’s work difficult, and although effort 
has been made in this thesis to make distinctions between representations of space and 
spaces of representation, her photographs necessarily straddles this divide as a key form 
of documentation. 
Nonetheless, the island also inhabits another spatiality, another geography, which 
has particular significance. Looming off the coast of Lima like a spectre of the past, 
impossible to see through the murky garúa (a low-lying cloud which descends on Lima 
like a fog) in winter months, yet re-emerging unexpectedly at other times, the island is a 
part of Peruvian history which will not go away. As Buntinx says, the past is all too 
present. This invites the question as to whether El Frontón ever really enters into the 
consciousness of the tourists and locals who jog along, take lunch in, or go paragliding 
from the Malecón which runs atop the cliffs of Miraflores’ Costa Verde. This area 
stretches from close to the popular Larcomar shopping centre along the cliff top to 
LUM at the northern boundary of Miraflores, and has been dotted with well-kept green 
spaces. One of the parks is named after Miguel Grau (a Peruvian Admiral during the 
War of the Pacific) and another after Antonio Raimondi (a Peruvian-Italian scientist and 
geographer from the nineteenth century), whilst the Parque del Amor is a popular site 
for young locals and tourists alike to watch the sun set over the Pacific. Each of these 
parks have statues, sculptures and plaques which commemorate figures from nineteenth 
century Peruvian society and culture, including those mentioned above.  
                                                          
512 Ironically, another massacre of Shining Path prisoners was at the centre of a controversy about commemoration. In 2006, the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (CIDH) ruled that the Peruvian state should apologise for the death of 41 inmates who died 
at the hands of state agents at Castro Castro prison in 1992. The CIDH also ruled that the victims must be commemorated 
individually in the El ojo que llora monument in Lima, a decision which caused a huge controversy in Peru in which the idea that 
Senderista lives were non-grievable was articulated by numerous scholars, politicians and public figures. Interestingly, the presence 
of a stone commemorating the death of “more than 200” [sic] at El Frontón at El ojo que llora has not garnered much attention. For 
details on the polemic surrounding the CIDH ruling, see Drinot, ‘For whom the eye cries’. 
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In this sense, there is a clear disconnect between the image of Peru presented to 
visitors to the Malecón and the recent history of state violence represented by El 
Frontón, obscured but still often visible from the cliff top. This recalls Schindel’s 
argument about porteños’ relationship to the Río de la Plata in Buenos Aires, the river 
into which numerous detainees were dumped after being disappeared by state agents 
during the period of military dictatorship. Schindel argues that the river “as an abjected 
space, carries remembrance of those whom the criminal state had excluded from the 
national community”, but also points to the ways in which urban development has made 
the river difficult to access, separating porteños from the water and the possibility of 
engaging with the memories which exist there.513  
Although Palonen makes efforts to distinguish between the “commemorative city-
text” (which incorporates statues, street names and museum among other things) and the 
“broader symbolic urban landscape”, I believe that viewing El Frontón within the 
context of the urban landscape of Lima’s coast is a productive line to pursue.514 Whilst 
El Frontón remains an abjected, restricted space whose closure to the public precludes 
many forms of active engagement with the site’s history, the forms of urban planning 
and limited commemorative practice which have been enacted on the Costa Verde have 
reshaped the coastal area as an attractive site for tourists and middle-class communities 
alike. 
Although not a dominant or particularly vocal element of this planning, the 
commemoration of figures from the 19th century promotes limited engagement with a 
nostalgic view of the Peruvian Republic as opposed to more complex and troubling 
                                                          
513 Estela Schindel, ‘A Limitless Grave, Memory and Abjection of the Río de la Plata’ in (Estela Schindel and Pamela Colombo 
eds.), Space and the Memories of Violence: Landscapes of Erasure, Disappearance and Exception (Basingstoke, 2014), pp.188-201 
(p.199). 
514 Palonen, ‘The city-text in post-communist Budapest’, p.219. 
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periods from Peru’s more recent history.515 Whilst the ruin and closure of El Frontón 
restricts debate and precludes the possibility of Shining Path memories being 
represented and commemorated in the site, this process is to some extent supported by 
narratives of Peruvian history represented symbolically in Lima’s urban landscape.  
Furthermore, it is useful to think of the island within the context of Gordillo’s 
distinction between “ruins” and “rubble”. Whilst there are numerous huacas dotted 
across Lima (not to mention the vast array of Incan and pre-Incan sites in the Andean 
interior and along Peru’s coast) which are walled off, protected and preserved for 
tourists as sites of “transcendental importance”, the destroyed prison fortress of a not 
distant past is disregarded as rubble. In the words of Gordillo, this points to a 
fetishization of one type of ruin, likely on the grounds that it represents a past which is 
both uncontroversial and lucrative for the tourism industry, and the dismissal and 
closure of another site which has had far greater political consequences for the lives of 
modern Peruvians.516 A more contemporary comparison of sites with similar functions 
would be between El Frontón and Robben Island; both are testament to forms of state 
violence and exclusion, but the former represents the hidden and restricted nature of this 
history while in the latter it has become a commodified part of the tourism industry and 
powerful image of collective history and national identity. Viewing El Frontón through 
this perspective, then, demonstrates the intersection of space and memory beyond the 
immediate context of the commemorative city-text, and instead provides an appreciation 
of how the overlapping geographies of urban planning, the tourism industry and 
commemoration feed into a far broader geography of memory. 
                                                          
515 Majluf has also identified a wave of public sculptures in mid-nineteenth century Lima which she argues attempted to “create and 
mould a collective memory and national spatiality”. Elements of this expansion are still highly visible in central Lima and continue 
to greatly outnumber public artworks related to the internal conflict. Natalia Majluf, Escultura y espacio público. Lima, 1850-1879 
(Lima, 1994), p.38. 
516 Gastón R. Gordillo, Rubble: the Afterlife of Destruction (Durham, 2014), p.256. 
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These processes are rarely one-way however, and often these projects can 
themselves be contested by other actors who reject the memory narratives they appear 
to embody (such as the attacks on El ojo que llora and the MHVRE). These battles are 
not simply about how to commemorate history and competing versions of events. They 
are about assigning value to the lives of different agents of history, asserting that it is 
their perspectives which should be remembered, that their lives are grievable, and that 
their memories ought to be reflected in the nation’s outlook on the past.  
How these memories translate into space is deeply important. Earlier in this chapter 
I argued that it was not simply the sovereign power of elites or state agents to assign 
value to populations, but that this value was deeply inscribed in the nation’s historical 
socio-spatial structure, and that spaces which had been governed by sovereign rule were 
more likely to reflect the characteristics which encouraged the further exercise of 
sovereign power (including poverty, radicalism and resistance to the state). In this 
context, ongoing memory battles which re-inscribe spaces with new meaning do not 
simply contest interpretations of the past, but are also deliberately articulated as political 
projects for the future. By contesting the impunity with which state agents acted, not 
just in times of violence but also through policies which have harmed particular 
populations in a more structural manner, memory activists aim to break the cycle in 
which space produces violence and violence, in turn, produces space. 
Unfortunately, however, the scope of these projects is still highly limited. To some 
extent as well there is a degree of apathy about challenging the past among sectors of 
the Peruvian population who have seen genuine economic improvements in their lives 
since the turn of the century. Because of this, even if El Frontón were more accessible, 
it is unlikely that many Peruvians would want to engage with the site, particularly given 
the continued castigation of Senderistas. For now, the island remains a silent presence 
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of Lima’s shores where, in the same way that Montalbetti has described the town of 
Uchuraccay, there is an “emptiness impossible to mark, and there this emptiness has 
been maintained as emptiness”.517 
 
Buntinx has also explored the idea of El Frontón as an island of diverse memories 
which reflected important points in Peru’s past. The ruins of the prison, overgrown and 
covered in bird droppings, as can be seen in Jourde’s photographs, represent for Buntinx 
“an accumulation of cultural and natural remains that transfigure geography. The often 
traumatic relationship between nation and landscape”.518 Not only is the history of the 
prison massacres distilled in images of the island, but so is a longer history of the 
exclusion by the state of Leftist political organisations. As Aguirre highlights, when 
around 2000 Apristas were imprisoned during the 1930s, many referred to El Frontón as 
                                                          
517 Although many uchuraccaínos returned to their village in 1993 after having previously abandoned it, they settled at the margins 
of their old community away from the site of the death of eight journalists. Montalbetti, ‘El lugar del arte y el lugar de la memoria’, 
p.66. 
518 Buntinx, ‘Su cuerpo es un isla en escombros’, p.37. 
Fig. 17: Drawings of Julio Adilberto Godínez, imprisoned in El Frontón for associations to the 1932 Trujillo uprising. 
Buntinx, 'Su cuerpo es un isla en escombros' p.19. 
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the place of greatest torture and suffering, an experience which contributed significantly 
to APRA’s vision of prisoners as revolutionary heroes.519 Fernando Belaúnde Terry and 
Hugo Blanco were also imprisoned on the island during the decades preceding the 
conflict.  
Buntinx explores this history of power and exclusion through the aesthetic and symbolic 
qualities of the island, where the violence of the Peruvian state is made visible and, 
through photographic comparisons, it is possible to see an overlapping of experiences 
from APRA to Shining Path. However, that these histories now lie on top of each other 
in the same space demonstrates a more important point about memory. That is, for all of 
the photographs and artistic representations of the prison massacres, it is quite possible, 
highly likely even, that the history which the ruins allude to will be forgotten, and that 
the island will stand in wait for the next generation of political opponents of the state to 
be sent there. In this sense, the ghostly figure of El Frontón is not just reaching out from 
the recent past of Peru’s internal conflict, but from a longer trajectory in which the state 
has cyclically and consistently reconstituted itself and Peru’s political landscape 
through acts of exclusionary violence. Because of this, Buntinx refer to El Frontón as: 
“like the ruin of the great modern, modernist dream of the Peruvian 
republic...El Frontón was to be the model jail, the modern jail. Soon, 
however, it became Devil's Island, so it was called, a place of terrible 
suffering. And to me it is so eloquent that El Frontón was bombed by 
the same state that built it”.520 
In this context, the modernist dream can be seen as a project of nation-building 
designed to overcome some of Peru’s longstanding problems and contradictions, and 
                                                          
519 Carlos Aguirre, ‘Hombres y rejas. El APRA en prisión, 1932-1945’, Bulletin de l'Institut français d'études andines, 43:1 (2014), 
pp.7-30 (p.12). 
520 Gustavo Buntinx, ‘Interview in-person’ (Lima, 2016). 
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one that is built to last through modern, governmental approaches to society rather than 
being sustained through punitive violence. Shining Path and the internal conflict, 
however, demonstrate the resistance to this dream, and ultimately its failure to create a 
state which responds to such resistance with anything else than militarised sovereign 
power. For this reason, the island is a space which is testimony to the forms of power 
exercised by the Peruvian state; neither as excess nor as error, but as part of a practice to 
periodically exclude undesirable elements of society and ideological enemies. 
Yet, if this is true of El Frontón, then is it not also true of Los Cabitos, Putis and 
Ayacucho department, which were all governed under the logics of the Emergency 
Zone and acted as spaces of exception? Furthermore, these spaces exist within 
overlapping geographies of previous attempts by the Peruvian state and its elites to 
remake the Andes in accordance with their own priorities, and to develop the Peruvian 
interior into a productive engine for their own version of modernity.521 These are, to 
borrow words from Gordillo again, the “real ruins” of the Peruvian state which “elites 
cannot bear to confront”.522 The relationship between nation and landscape, marked in 
geography. 
Then there are Lucanamarca, Chungui and Tarata, spaces which have already been 
considered in this thesis but which form part of an alternative geography of power. As 
Shining Path looked to assert the power of their New state, they too marked the 
landscape. And Peru’s selva central, today a region synonymous with narcotrafficking, 
is a space which stands testimony to the forms of power which both Shining Path and 
the state practised upon it. Each of these examples stands as testimony to political 
                                                          
521 See Mark Carey, In the Shadow of Melting Glaciers: Climate Change and Andean Society (Oxford, 2010); Willie Hiatt, The 
Rarified Air of the Modern: Airplanes and Technological Modernity in the Andes (Oxford, 2016). 
522 Gordillo, Rubble, p.256. 
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violence, spaces which have been physically, socially and imaginatively produced by 
these experiences.     
The testimony of space cannot, therefore, be limited to forms of commemorative 
practice such as museums and monuments, although certainly these spaces have value 
for the ways in which they enshrine narratives about the past in public space. The 
materiality of sites of violence, however, inscribes those experiences into the landscape. 
Of course, these marks can be erased, silenced, and built over. In other cases, they are 
simply forgotten, left overgrown and unvisited. Nevertheless, they exist as part of a 
geography of memory in which the past is continually interrupting the present. This 
history is not one of individual moments or isolated incidents, but complex, wide-
ranging processes of power and statecraft. 
In this way, violence emphatically contributes to the production of space; not simply 
in a physical way, but by marking victims and perpetrators with experiences which 
shape their relationship with the landscape. As Feinstein argues, El Frontón and 
Lurigancho continue to shape the memories and identities of distinct actors; not just 
their victims or Shining Path supporters, but members of the armed forces, Apristas, and 
members of the non-revolutionary Left who continue to see the importance of the prison 
massacres in the trajectory of the conflict.  
 
Conclusion  
First and foremost, the evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates the importance 
of understanding Peruvian state prisons as exclusionary spaces of exception. Using the 
work of Foucault, Agamben and Ong, I have argued that this spatialized exercise of 
power over a sector of the population represents both a form of sovereign power 
practised in order to produce a biopolitical population, and a feature of the neoliberal 
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form of governance which has been practiced in Peru since the beginning of the 
conflict. A full analysis of how this form of governance developed in the 1990s, and 
how it formed a major part of Alberto Fujimori’s reconstitution of the Peruvian state, is 
continued in the next chapter. This will also focus on the way in which this neoliberal 
project has been seen in highly racial terms in Peru, encompassing diverse issues 
including drug trafficking, extractive industries and forced sterilisations. As will be 
shown, this project is deeply tied to the relationship between the Peruvian nation-state 
and its geography.  
As has been argued, the creation of Emergency Zones during the conflict also 
reflects the dual forms of governance and power exercised over different populations, in 
different spaces, for different purposes. Whereas exclusionary violence and sovereign 
power have often been used to enact political vengeance on opponents of the state and 
indigenous communities, governmentality as a practice remains a preserve to be enjoyed 
by the nation’s elite. These differentiated approaches to the governance of different 
populations are tied to Peru’s historical socio-spatial structure, and for this reason it is 
difficult to argue that this practice is representative of a wholly new form of neoliberal 
governance. The idea of a mitigated liberal order, in which liberty (that is, a limited 
amount of social and economic freedom, or the freedom to live as part of a 
governmentally managed population) is a preserve for elites whilst the rest suffer the 
exercise of sovereign power, has arguably been central to the Peruvian Republic since 
its inception. However, there have also been distinct periods in which the Peruvian state 
has attempted to incorporate different populations into its governmental project (most 
notably under the Velasco military government which created SUTEP and SINAMOS 
in order to bring grassroots social movements and teachers’ unions under state 
structures). The beginnings of Peru’s neoliberal turn in the 1980s can therefore be seen 
as a return to the highly differentiated, spatially contingent, division of sovereign and 
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governmental power. From this perspective, the conflict was an incredibly important 
period during which the state was distinctly reconstituted. 
This chapter has also referred to other ways in which the idea of Peruvian state 
prisons, and particularly El Frontón, have been produced over time through 
representations of space (such as Los rendidos and the photos of Gladys Alvarado 
Jourde) and the exploration of El Frontón as a space of representation (particularly in 
the work of Gustavo Buntinx). In particular, it has been important to use the island as a 
focal point around which it is possible to expand notions of exactly what constitutes a 
space of memory. The ruins of El Frontón, as with the abandoned village of Uchuraccay 
and the graveyard behind Los Cabitos (now the Santuario de la Memoria) tell us stories 
about history which are inscribed into space. These spaces refer to a past which today 
seems distant, but which remains all too visible in the landscape. The production of 
these spaces is by no means limited to the traumatic and violent events which occurred 
over the past 37 years, but to a much wider history in which communities, institutions, 
and the landscape are continually renewed and reconstituted. 
Today, therefore, the island of El Frontón is a space which gives testimony to the 
forms of power deployed by the Peruvian state during the internal conflict, as well as 
over a longer period of the twentieth century. However, whilst this deployment of 
power may have had old historical roots, it was highly suited to the economic shock 
programmes that were being encouraged across Latin America in this period. In the 
words of Orlando Letelier, the Chilean economist and allendista politician who was 
assassinated in the United States under the orders of General Pinochet, “repression for 
the majorities and economic freedom for small privileged groups are two sides of the 
same coin”.523 In particular, it is possible to see an overlap between the previously 
                                                          
523 Orlando Letelier, ‘ The ‘Chicago Boys’ in Chile: Economic Freedom’s Awful Toll’, Reprinted at The Nation, 21 September 2016 
[https://www.thenation.com/article/the-chicago-boys-in-chile-economic-freedoms-awful-toll/, accessed 22 September 2016]. 
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mentioned geography of power and the new economic geographies created by 
neoliberal economic policies. As the Andes was increasingly seen as the space which 
could potentially drive huge growth in Peru’s economy, particularly through the 
extraction of natural resources, sovereign power has been increasingly exercised in the 
region in order to suppress dissent and remove obstacles to further mining projects. The 
internal conflict played a crucial role in turning the Peruvian state back towards this 
differentiated exercise of power and, as a result, the post-conflict period has seen a 
continuation of repressive policies in the sierra with the goal of completing the 
conquest of the Andes for economic gain, whilst securing the power of an elitist liberal 
order. 
  
268 
 
Chapter 5: Memory in Peru’s neoliberal order 
In previous chapters, I have analysed an emblematic episode of violence through the 
lens of my spatial framework, and have argued that representations of these episodes in 
forms of cultural production and memory practice have reflected, and also challenged, 
the exclusionary logics and spatialized understandings of Peruvian society which 
precipitated these episodes. In doing so, I have highlighted how memory activists such 
as ANFASEP, as well as representatives of the Peruvian armed forces and state, have 
embarked upon forms of memory-making and have contributed to the commemorative 
city-text of Lima and Huamanga through the creation of sites such as the Museo de la 
Memoria, MHVRE, and the Museo Chavín de Huántar.  
For the purposes of this chapter, I will deploy a slightly different approach by 
analysing the forms of systemic, structural violence which have been produced in Peru 
as a result of the neoliberal restructuring begun by Alberto Fujimori, and which has 
been continued by his successors (drawn from, ostensibly, across the political 
spectrum). Whilst the roots of this period of political authoritarianism and economic 
liberalism can be seen, as discussed in the previous chapter, during the 1980s, the 
neoliberal order established by Fujimori in the 1990s can be seen as a project which 
resulted in the further marginalisation of indigenous communities in Andean and 
Amazonian regions, and of the communities in Lima’s barriadas. However, I will 
develop this argument further by highlighting how the construction of this neoliberal 
order has emerged from, and been supported by, particular narratives of Peru’s internal 
armed conflict. In opposition to these narratives, I will argue that other post-conflict 
memories have been developed not only to articulate versions of the past, but also in 
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order to challenge this neoliberal order and the cultural frameworks which support it, 
and to promote a more transformative process of truth and reconciliation.524 
In order to do so, I believe is important to revisit the issue of counter memory in this 
chapter, and in particular the Operación Chavín de Huántar which provided inspiration 
for the military museum (discussed in Chapter 2) of the same name. Milton has studied 
the Museo Chavín de Huántar as part of a broader military production of a cultural 
counter memory which is “both counter-intuitive and to counter ‘victim-oriented’ 
memories”.525 The Chavín de Huántar museum represents a salvation narrative of Peru’s 
conflict in which heroic state agents delivered the country to safety from the hands of 
rampant terrorist groups. However, whereas Milton has sought to highlight the 
heterogeneity of counter memory and locate a range of cultural artefacts produced by 
state agents in a broader spectrum of memory practice, I will argue that counter memory 
narratives (such as the armed forces’ salvation narrative) have been deployed in order to 
legitimate the neoliberal revolution prompted by Alberto Fujimori in the 1990s.  
I will also view the project of counter memory within the context of other competing 
memory narratives of the conflict which have challenged Peru’s social and racial 
hierarchies as well as the military’s version of events. Through analyses of cultural 
artefacts, such as Alonso Cueto’s La hora azul (2005) and the production of la novela 
de la violencia in post-CVR Peru, I will argue that spatialized understandings of the 
internal armed conflict have been constructed in particular memory narratives which 
understand transformative economic justice and cultural exchange between Peru’s 
disparate communities as important factors for the prevention of future violence.  
                                                          
524 For a discussion of the origins and key themes of transformative justice see Paul Gready, Jelke Boesten, Gordon Crawford, and 
Polly Wilding. ‘Transformative Justice – A Concept Note’ [https://wun.ac.uk/files/transformative_justice_-
_concept_note_web_version.pdf, accessed 16 August 2017]. 
525 Milton, Conflicted Memory, pp.36-7. 
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Outside of these cultural artefacts, I will also identify where such narratives have 
been enshrined in public spaces such as LUM and the Casa Yuyachkani theatre, arguing 
that the spatiality of these sites is central to understanding the narratives they aim to 
produce.526 However, as in previous chapters, I will also argue that a spatial 
understanding of post-conflict memory in Peru cannot simply be limited to 
commemorative or performative sites such as these, but must also take into account the 
forms of commemoration and memory practice which exist in the urban landscape and 
Lima’s commemorative city-text. This approach, I believe, will reveal a greater array of 
public and cultural spaces which act as battlegrounds for memory narratives, and as 
arenas for broader ideas about nationhood, modernity and society in Peru. 
 
In dealing with this final period of structural violence from the conflict, I will again 
employ the same theoretical framework to develop my spatial analysis. This framework 
is based upon Lefebvre’s aforementioned conceptual triad of physical space, 
representations of space and representational spaces. I believe this approach is 
particularly expedient because of the “interplay between culture and transitional justice” 
identified by Milton, who argues that both human rights advocates and pro-military 
apologists have produced cultural and museological responses to the conflict.527 An 
understanding, therefore, of how violence, culture and memory have been produced in 
space is, I believe, a particularly productive way to approach Peru’s internal conflict. 
In the first part of my analysis, which focuses on violence and the production of 
physical space, I will again engage with the work of Agamben and Ong in order to draw 
                                                          
526 Another important site of cultural memory which has already been extensively analysed and which I will not discuss in detail 
here is the Yuyanapaq photography exhibition in Lima. See Kaitlin M. Murphy ‘What the Past Will Be: Curating Memory in Peru’s 
Yuyanapaq: Para Recordar’, Human Rights Review, 16:1 (2015), pp.23-38; Deborah Poole and Isaías Rojas Pérez, ‘Memories of 
Reconciliation: Photography and Memory in Postwar Peru’, e-misférica, 7:2 (2010) [http://hemisphericinstitute.org/hemi/en/e-
misferica-72, accessed 19 January 2017]. 
527 Milton, Conflicted Memory, Conclusion, p.7. 
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links between spatial practices of power and Fujimori’s reconstituted neoliberal order 
after 1990. When dealing with cultural representations of space articulated by memory 
and counter memory producers, I will again deploy a Lefebvrian approach alongside 
Butler’s concept of grievable lives. I will also return to Nora’s work on lieux de 
memoire and the frameworks proposed by Dwyer and Alderman for dissecting several 
sites of memory in Lima as forms of text, arena and performance.528 Furthermore, I will 
expand my analysis outside of individual sites, looking at how sites of memory interact 
with each other and the city around them, arguing for the existence of a geography of 
memory and city-text in Lima which must be approached holistically to be properly 
understood. I believe that the specific context of the Peruvian conflict means that each 
of these sites necessarily says something and contributes towards the production of 
space and geography, whilst also representing a form of spatial production in 
themselves. Many responses to the conflict, whether cultural artefacts or sites of 
memory, are articulated as a response to the CVR’s conclusion that a disproportionate 
number of the conflict’s victims came from rural departments of the nation’s interior. 
This is what renders the specific context of the Peruvian conflict, and what makes sites 
of memory in Peru necessarily narratives of space, as well as narratives in space.  
 
From this perspective it is possible to understand a chain of events, from early military 
operations in the Andes to the 1986 prison massacres to the Operación Chavín de 
Huántar, as a cycle in which space is produced and re-produced by violent acts and 
discourses of grievability. Because of this, I believe Cueto’s La hora azul is an 
important counterpoint to the salvation narratives promoted by state agents. This is 
because Cueto’s narrative stands in direct contrast to the military narrative which 
                                                          
528 Nora, ‘Between Memory and History’; Dwyer and Alderman, ‘Memorial landscapes’. 
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attempts to justify the impunity with which state violence was perpetrated. He does this 
by attempting to actively reproduce and resignify Lima’s urban geography and give it 
new meaning, rather than acting as a simplistic template of poverty and wealth, danger 
and safety. In this sense, Cueto’s narrative of state violence and the levels of 
responsibility attached to different violent actors during the conflict is constructed in 
opposition to the heroic military narratives established in places such as the Museo 
Chavín de Huántar.  
The sites of memory I will discuss in detail are the LUM and the Casa Yuyachkani 
theatre. I have chosen to deal with these sites because I believe that the narratives they 
establish also stand in direct contrast with the commemorations of Operación Chavín de 
Huántar (as discussed in Chapter 2). Both sites act as physical spaces in which human 
rights abuses perpetrated by the state are laid bare, and in which the cultural frameworks 
and discourses which supported such abuses are thoroughly challenged. In this way, 
they are linked to La hora azul by articulating a form of truth and reconciliation which 
is critical of state violence and systemic inequality in Peru. Furthermore, each site 
deploys spatialized understandings of the conflict and of reconciliation, engaging with 
ideas about Peru’s historical spatial structure and encouraging cultural exchange across 
social boundaries, as a means of generating transformative justice. In each case, 
therefore, I will perform my analysis through attention to the spatiality, content, and 
performative significance of each site. I will take into consideration their emplacement 
and construction, alongside their function as arenas for memory, in order to make 
conclusions about their significance and ability to elucidate ideas about the conflict.  
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Post-conflict? Peru, 1992-97 
Firstly, it is necessary to very briefly establish the context of the ongoing internal 
conflict in which Fujimori’s neoliberal revolution took place. That is because the 
Fujimorista state was, at this time, already engaged in the development of particular 
narratives about the internal armed conflict and the pacification of insurgent groups, 
despite the ongoing activities of Shining Path and the MRTA, at a time when political 
opposition was heavily suppressed. This means that the narratives and memory practice 
developed by state agents and Fujimoristas took a significant level of precedence in the 
public domain over narratives which were more critical of the role of the Peruvian state 
and armed forces (which certainly existed in the 1990s but which would not gain 
prominence until after the 2003 publication of the Informe Final).  
The capture of Abimael Guzmán in 1992, along with a host of Shining Path leaders 
and important documents detailing party information and strategy, precipitated a sharp 
decline in the group’s activity, but by no means brought it to an end. Between August 
1992 and May 1994, there were 63 acts of sabotage perpetrated by the group in Lima, 
including the use of explosives and incendiary material against private property and 
financial institutions. Many of these episodes occurred in the districts of El Agustino 
and La Victoria, but they also occurred in San Juan de Lurigancho, San Martín de 
Porres, San Juan de Miraflores and San Borja. In addition to this there were 17 acts of 
“guerrilla combat” which included robberies and attacks on foreign businesses and 
banks, and ten assassinations.529 These assassinations included members of civil society 
in El Agustino, local businessmen, and the Lieutenant Governor of Villa María del 
                                                          
529 Lima, Defensoría del Pueblo, Unidad de Investigaciones Especiales y Antropológicas Forenses.1003. Equipo de 
Investigaciones.100369.Tarata.I del Tm.I.SCO-529-01.000303. 
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Triunfo.530 In many respects, therefore, Shining Path continued in the same pattern of 
targeted symbolic violence in Lima which had existed prior to Guzmán’s capture. 
During this period, the MRTA insurgent group was attempting to develop their own 
activities further. After numerous failures in the late 1980s, Meza Bazán argues, the 
MRTA attempted to adapt to the changing political situation in Peru and reinvigorated 
their mobilisation in cities and universities.531 The group also favoured the use of 
strategic kidnappings, largely for the purposes of extortion, and between 1984 and 1996 
they developed this technique “from isolated actions into a systematic practice”.532 
However, the MRTA’s operations were also severely diminished as a result of 
Fujimori’s re-intensified counterinsurgency programme and their leader, Víctor Polay 
Campos, was captured in 1992, a few months before Guzmán. Despite continuing 
Shining Path and MRTA activities, therefore, between 1992 and 1997 Peru appeared to 
enjoy a period of relative respite from political violence.  
This peace was broken by what would loosely come to be known as the Japanese 
embassy hostage crisis. The hostage situation began during an event at the residence of 
the Japanese ambassador to Peru, Morihisa Aoki, on 17 December 1996 when the 
MRTA took around 600 people, including government officials, magistrates of the 
Supreme Court and officers from the police and armed forces, hostage. They then 
communicated their demands to the police outside by freeing one hostage, stating that 
they would leave the residence on the condition that: 
A. Imprisoned members of the MRTA (numbering 458 at the time) 
were released. 
                                                          
530 Lima, Defensoría del Pueblo, Unidad de Investigaciones Especiales y Antropológicas Forenses.1003. Equipo de 
Investigaciones.100369.Tarata.I del Tm.I.SCO-529-01.000334.. 
531 Mario Miguel Meza Bazán, ‘El Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA) y las fuentes de la revolución en América 
Latina’ (Tesis Doctoral – El Colegio de México, 2012), p.305. 
532 CVR, Hatun Willakuy, p.190. 
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B. Significant changes were made to government economic policy, 
reversing President Fujimori’s neoliberal shock programme. 
C. The guerrillas in the ambassador’s residence were given safe 
passage to the central jungle. 
D. That the government pay a “war tax” to the MRTA.533 
As Meza Bazán highlights, the most important of these demands was clearly the 
release of MRTA prisoners as among those incarcerated were many important MRTA 
leaders.534 However, the group’s demand for the reversal of government economic 
policy was an important secondary demand, particularly as Víctor Polay later stated that 
the MRTA’s failure to represent an alternative to both neoliberalism and Shining Path 
violence was his greatest regret.535 Ultimately, the crisis persisted for so long because of 
both sides’ refusal to back down on the issue of the release of MRTA prisoners, but the 
group’s reference to neoliberal policy in their demands and targeting of elites, who were 
seen as the agents of neoliberalism, should not be ignored.  
A long process of unsuccessful negotiations took place between the guerrillas and 
Fujimori’s emergency cabinet, represented by Domingo Palermo (the Minister for 
Education). Meanwhile, however, the armed forces had been digging tunnels as part of a 
rescue plan for the hostages which was practised at a replica of the ambassador’s 
residence in the Chorrillos military base.536 The Operación Chavín de Huántar, named 
after one of Peru’s most ancient archaeological sites, began around 3pm on 22 April. 
Soon after, the hostages crept along a tiled patio to the team of waiting soldiers who 
subsequently signalled the operation’s success after only half an hour.537 All 14 
                                                          
533 CVR, Hatun Willakuy, p.190. 
534 Meza Bazán, ‘El Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru’, p.390. 
535 Ibid., p.344. 
536 CVR. Unidad de Investigaciones Especiales. Lima. SCO-495-001. ‘Manifestación de Augusto Jaime Patiño’. 
537 Milton, ‘Curating memories of armed state actors in Peru’s era of transitional justice’, p.370. 
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members of the MRTA in the Embassy died during the assault, but only two soldiers 
and one hostage lost their lives, with eight hostages wounded.  
The official account given by the military stated that the rebels were killed by 
gunfire during the operation. However, as Milton argues: 
“It was this unequal ratio of survivors and dead that makes the 
operation Chavín de Huántar difficult to present as clearly heroic for 
it raises the question of whether the kidnappers had been 
extrajudicially executed”.538 
This crisis, combined with the continued (although limited) activities of Shining 
Path, as well as the repression meted out by the Fujimori regime to political opponents 
and members of civil society, highlight the limitations of terming Peru in this period as 
a post-conflict society. However, alongside the continuation of these forms of physical, 
subjective violence, was a simultaneous process of neoliberal restructuring which would 
form the basis of Peruvian society after Fujimori’s own downfall, and which exists to 
this day. This restructuring would be reliant on the development and dissemination of a 
narrative of the conflict in which Fujimori pacified insurgent groups in 1992, but which 
continued to evoke their threat in order to provide legitimacy for authoritarian rule and 
the suppression of political opposition. As will be seen, many of these narratives would 
later revolve around representations of the 1997 Japanese embassy crisis. 
 
Fujimorismo and post-1990 Peruvian neoliberalism 
Although it would, perhaps, be going a step too far to make the case for the Embassy 
residence representing a space of exception, in the way that this thesis has already done 
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for Los Cabitos and El Frontón (among others), the manner in which the Operación was 
conducted reflects similar themes with previous episodes of state violence: the 
escalation to a military solution to the crisis; extrajudicial executions; and the apparent 
impunity with which violence was conducted. Although it did not take place in a 
localised space of exception, the operation (which put the lives of soldiers and hostages 
at risk for the sake of Fujimori’s approval ratings) did exist within a generalised 
atmosphere of impunity which had, since the President’s autogolpe, become the norm in 
Peru. Agamben describes how, in this type of environment:  
“The normative aspect of law can thus be obliterated and 
contradicted with impunity by a governmental violence that—while 
ignoring international law externally and producing a permanent 
state of exception internally— nevertheless still claims to be applying 
the law”.539 
In the context of the internal conflict, this moment perhaps represents the true 
Andeanisation of limeño space. The generalised practice of violent impunity established 
in the Andean and Amazonian Emergency Zones of the 1980s was, under Fujimori’s 
neoliberal regime, brought to Lima. The Operación Chavín de Huántar is indicative of 
this, as are the La Cantuta and Barrios Altos massacres (discussed in Chapter 3), in the 
sense that the violent exercise of sovereign power (by the will of the President and 
armed forces alone) had now become the general rule. 
The immediate roots of this generalised state of exception stemmed from the García 
and Belaúnde governments which created numerous Emergency Zones, abdicated 
democratic power to the armed forces and contributed significantly to the militarisation 
of the conflict. In this sense, Fujimori’s rule was little different, except that military 
                                                          
539 Agamben, State of Exception, p.87. 
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control of the Peruvian state was now formalised. This adds a further dimension to the 
discussion of how well the Peruvian conflict can be compared with Southern Cone 
experiences of dictatorship and state violence. Whereas in Argentina and Chile the 
coups d’état signalled the beginning of an intense period of state violence, the Peruvian 
conflict was a drawn out process in which the state was reconstituted as a sovereign 
military power whilst simultaneously reconstituting a biopolitical population through 
processes of exclusionary violence. 
Springer has highlighted, with reference to Cambodia, how this type of sovereign 
military rule is a particular feature of neoliberal regimes which need state violence to 
suppress opposition to their unpopular economic reforms.540 With reference to the 
García government, this conception is potentially problematic as the economic policy of 
the first García administration was more balanced and heterodox. It is therefore 
important to remember Brown’s distinction between neoliberalism as “liberalism’s 
economic variant” (a doctrine of market-driven economic policies associated with 
Hayek, Friedman and the Chicago School) and as “a social analysis that, when deployed 
as a form of governmentality…involves extending and disseminating market values to 
all institutions and social action”.541 With Fujimori’s 1990 reforms, the “Fujishock”, 
however, orthodox neoliberal policy was also enacted in order to liberalise trade and 
tackle hyperinflation. In this sense, Fujimori could be seen as a true neoliberal; both in 
the sense that he adopted a set of liberalising economic policies driven by market-
rationale, and by deploying neoliberalism’s political rationale as a form of 
governmentality. Given the continuity in state practice of violence between the 1980s 
and 1990s, it is therefore important to assert that this neoliberalism contained an 
element of authoritarianism which is not derived from resistance to economic projects, 
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279 
 
but which shares elements with the aforementioned political rationale of neoliberalism. 
In the case of Peru, this authoritarianism has deep roots in the country’s racial 
hierarchies, and has regularly been deployed to support the power of Creole elites 
against movements for radical reform. To an extent, this suggests that an analysis of 
Peru through the lens of neoliberalism says more about how Peruvian society and state 
actors shaped neoliberal ideas to suit their own ends, than it does about how Peru was 
reshaped by transnational neoliberal trends.   
 
i) Peru’s neoliberal revolution 
Having said that, there is no doubt that Fujimori deployed market-driven reforms 
simultaneously to his authoritarian project.542 In July 1991, Fujimori enforced 126 
Presidential decrees to reorganise the military, establish emergency powers and 
introduce an economic package of deregulation and austerity, decried by Burt as a 
foundational moment of violence which rebuilt Peru’s political landscape.543 Economic 
reforms included public expenditure cuts, deregulation, a price stabilisation programme, 
and attempts to reform the tax system so that revenues could be collected from the large 
informal sector of the economy. Politically, the reforms led to a crackdown on the 
activities of trade unions, student societies and indigenous organisations.544 
Despite the success of these policies in stemming hyperinflation, they also caused 
difficulties for Peru’s poorest communities. Prices of numerous important goods rose 
dramatically immediately after the Fujishock: oil increased from $0.13 to $4.00 a barrel, 
the price of bread and milk tripled, and the price of newspapers and noodles 
                                                          
542 As Stokes has highlighted, before he became President, Fujimori surrounded himself with neo-Keynseian advisors and actively 
campaigned against the neoliberal policies espoused by Mario Vargas Llosa in the run-up to the elections. The role of Hernando de 
Soto, a former advisor to Vargas Llosa, was “critical in precipitating the switch” and in pressuring Fujimori to adopt pro-market 
reforms. See Susan Stokes, ‘Are Parties What's Wrong with Democracy in Latin America?’, (International Congress of the Latin 
American Studies Association, Guadalajara, Mexico, April 17-19, 1997). 
543 Burt, Political Violence and the Authoritarian State in Peru, p.169.   
544 Michel Chossudovsky, The Globalization of Poverty: Impacts of IMF and World Bank Reforms (London, 1997), p.206.   
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quadrupled.545 These effects were dismissed as the collateral damage of dealing with 
hyperinflation and economic crisis which were blamed on Alan García’s APRA 
government. As I have previously argued, Fujimori deliberately deployed a rhetoric 
about the “twin fires” of hyperinflation and terrorism to conflate the crises the nation 
faced, in effect justifying his economic strategy through combined fears of Shining Path 
and hyperinflation.546 The myth, that Fujimori alone had pacified Shining Path, was 
convincingly put together and reiterated in mass media to the point, Carrión argues, that 
it both legitimised the Fujimori administration and shielded it from criticism for other 
areas of policy.547 
 Alternatively, however, these policies could be seen as an extension of the 
sovereign power deployed to produce a population suitable for neoliberal 
modernisation, appearing punitive rather than technocratic. In this sense, the “twin 
fires” model is reversed so that the rhetoric of economic modernisation is deployed to 
justify further forms of state violence. Whilst the sharp increase in food prices 
represented the more objective, structural form of this violence, its counterpart was the 
very subjective programme of forced sterilisation designed to drive down levels of 
poverty. In practice, the programme overwhelmingly sterilised women of indigenous 
backgrounds, putting their lives at risk. This was the case with Mamerita Mestanza who 
died in 1996, the same year in which the Reproductive Health and Family Planning 
Programme began, after a tubal ligation operation which she did not consent to.548   
In this context, Denegri’s concept of gine sacra is useful. Gine sacra is the feminine 
counterpart to Agamben’s homo sacer who, Denegri argues, is twice excluded; firstly 
                                                          
545 ‘Peru’s Poorest Feel Hardship of Fujishock Austerity’, New York Times, 11 August 1990 
[http://www.nytimes.com/1990/08/12/world/peru-s-poor-feel-hardship-of-fuji-shock-austerity.html, accessed 19 November 2016].  
546 Daniel Willis, ‘The Violent Andes: Crisis and Cultural Difference in Narratives of Peru’s Internal Armed Conflict’ (Master’s 
Thesis – University of Manchester, 2013), p.17. 
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548 ‘Forced sterilisation haunts Peruvian women decades on’, BBC, 2 December 2015 [http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-
america-34855804, accessed 1 November 2016]. 
281 
 
by the modern legal framework which places them outside of the state’s protection, and 
secondly by their gendered position of subalternity.549 In this context, indigenous 
women are victimised as representatives of the wider indigenous population. The 
assumption inherent within the policy of forced sterilisations is that poverty is 
inextricably linked to the growth of the indigenous population. As Boesten has argued, 
existing intersectional inequalities of gender, race and class “made abuse in health 
services possible” and, alongside Malthusian notions about population control, led to 
“population policies that were…highly damaging and discriminative”, in effect 
reproducing those same inequalities in society.550 Sterilisations therefore emerged as a 
way of tackling poverty through the exercise of exclusionary sovereign power, on the 
basis of an underlying cultural framework which excludes indigenous communities and 
posits them as the antithesis to neoliberal modernity.  
The way in which these reforms disproportionately affected the lives of poor and 
indigenous communities demonstrates, I would argue, another form of graduated 
sovereignty in which state power is punitively directed against particular populations. 
Whilst the Embassy crisis, and La Cantuta and Barrios Altos massacres, demonstrate 
the violent authoritarian elements of this project, the other side of the coin is an 
economic modernisation project which is equally violent and exclusionary.  
 
ii) Free trade and sovereign power 
Similar arguments have been made about this relationship between neoliberalism and 
authoritarianism in other cases. For example, the violence and economic restructuring 
                                                          
549 Marisol de la Cadena has argued that the intersectional construction of indigeneity in the Peruvian Andes is refracted through the 
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conducted by General Pinochet in Chile, the Argentinian junta, and Víctor Paz 
Estenssoro in Bolivia are central to Naomi Klein’s thesis in The Shock Doctrine, but 
Springer has also explored this argument in relation to Cambodia. It is worth noting 
that, particularly in the case of the Klein, the focus in these studies has been on the 
imposition of neoliberal policy on nations through institutions such as the IMF and 
World Bank (directed by politicians and economists from the United States). While 
such studies are useful, the idea that neoliberal ideas are delivered to such nations from 
abroad is given greater attention than the historical traditions of state practice which, in 
the Peruvian case, provides the basis for authoritarian rule. However, in Peru in 
particular, it is crucial to also consider that adopting Friedmanite policies was a 
strategical choice made by state actors in order to supplement and develop their pre-
existing projects of statecraft – often already violent and authoritarian before the arrival 
of neoliberalism.  
The possibility of this argument has perhaps been obscured by the timing of what 
Arce calls Peru’s “vigorous economic revolution” at the beginning of the 1990s, which 
lends itself well to arguments that Fujimori was joining the post-Cold War order of free 
trade consensus.551 In some aspects, this revolution, implemented by Fujimori but 
maintained by his successors Toledo, García and Humala, has appeared highly 
successful, with Peru maintaining high rates of growth into the new millennium (even 
returning to 10% after the 2008 global economic crisis). Drinot has argued that the 
expansion of access to credit has created “a new social stratification based primarily on 
patterns of consumption”, facilitating a construction boom and the emergence of a new 
middle-class with indigenous ethnic roots.552 However, the potential of this social 
mobility and reduction in poverty is limited in an economy geared towards providing 
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opportunities and profits to foreign finance, particularly due to the Peruvian economy’s 
renewed reliance on resource extraction. Other critics have also argued that neoliberal 
economic reforms have created a political environment in which corruption is rife and 
where few Peruvians have genuine trust in politicians and policy-makers.553 Because of 
this, as with the junta in Argentina and Pinochet in Chile, the very real and tangible 
(although possibly short-term) benefits of these policies must be balanced against the 
political and economic systems which support them. While Peru’s neoliberal revolution 
has ameliorated levels of poverty and provided many with new opportunities, it has also 
done so in a limited way which has simultaneously consolidated political and economic 
power in particular hands and left systemic, structural inequalities unchallenged.  
The MRTA’s Embassy attack was a symbolic challenge to the authoritarian 
neoliberalism of Fujimori outlined above. Whilst the release of MRTA prisoners was 
certainly their highest priority during the crisis, the insurgents had a proven history of 
using kidnapping as a strategic method of putting pressure on the state and, as Meza 
Bazán highlights, had planned a similar attack on Congress in the light of Fujimori’s 
autogolpe.554 Furthermore, as opposed to other attacks by MRTA and Shining Path 
which sought to gain territorial control over (or inflict reprisals upon) poorer provincial 
communities, the Embassy attack put the elite of limeño society in the firing line, the 
same people who the insurgents associated with power and wealth.  
 
Ironically, however, the lower levels of insurgent activity between 1992 and 1997 
meant that Fujimori’s grip on power was becoming increasingly strained, and so the 
Embassy crisis actually served to restore a temporary level of credibility to Fujimori’s 
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neoliberal order. This was acknowledged by Fujimori himself with the promotions 
given to members of the commando unit involved in the Operación, a statement not 
only of his gratitude but of his recognition that the image of a brave and skilled military 
protecting the Peruvian nation was central to his own grip on power.555 Arce has argued, 
using survey data on Presidential approval ratings, that Peruvians continued to rank the 
“control of terrorism” as the most positive aspect of President Fujimori’s second term 
(from 1995 to 2000).556  
The Fujimori administration, in collusion with a number of media outlets, also 
ensured that the spectre of violence was constantly evoked. As Conaghan has 
illustrated, Fujimori’s right-hand man Vladimiro Montesinos cultivated relationships 
with a number of television networks, radio stations and prensa chicha newspapers to 
ensure positive coverage for the government.557 Burt argues that the Fujimori regime 
“continued to fan the flames of fear” by warning of a resurgence in Shining Path or 
MRTA activity, which in turn inhibited the growth of civil society organisations who 
might be fearful of being associated with either group.558 Furthermore, Oliart proposes 
that “Peruvians aspirations had been reduced…to a guarantee of survival” with the Left 
appearing as “a potential threat to the peace that had been achieved”.559  From this 
perspective, the hostage crisis appeared to many Peruvians as a painful aftershock of the 
conflict, and a reminder that the potential for further violence had not fully evaporated.  
Operación Chavín de Huántar took place within this context of evoking the threat of 
terrorism to justify and reinvigorate Fujimori’s stuttering rule. Only a few days before the 
mission, La República found the President to have an approval rating of only 35% with 
                                                          
555 Umberto Jara, Secretos del túnel: Lima, Perú. 126 días de cautiverio en la residencia del embajador del Japón (Lima, 2007), 
p.242. 
556 Moisés Arce, ‘Political Violence and Presidential Approval in Peru’, The Journal of Politics, 65:2 (2003), pp.572-583, (p.582). 
557 Prensa chihca refers to the sensationalist tabloid press in Peru. Catherine M. Conaghan, ‘Cashing in on Authoritarianism: Media 
Collusion in Fujimori’s Peru’, Press/Politics, 7:1 (2002), pp.115-25 (p.118). See also Juan Gargurevich Regal, La Prensa 
Sensacionalista en el Perú (Lima, 2000). 
558 Burt, Political Violence and the Authoritarian State in Peru, p.208. 
559 Oliart, ‘Alberto Fujimori’, p.422. 
285 
 
52% disapproving of his regime.560 Four days later, the newspaper was able to report 
Fujimori’s approval had jumped to 67%, with 92% of respondents agreeing that the 
operation was at least a partial success.561 As the article would go on to suggest however, 
the increase in popularity provided only short-term benefits to the President and did not 
give him carta blanca to continue along the same path. Ultimately, the mobilisation of 
fear and suppression of insurgency was increasingly insufficient to paper over the cracks, 
contradictions and corruption of Fujimori’s authoritarian rule. However, there remain 
great consistencies in the forms of governance deployed in the 1990s and in the post-
Fujimori era. This is particularly apparent in what Brown calls the “political implications 
of neoliberal rationality” insofar as the “extending and disseminating [of] market values 
to all institutions and social action” have not been undone in the post-Fujimori era.562 
Whilst some of the most obvious corruption and generalised state of exception of the 
Fujimori-Montesinos regime have gone, the neoliberal rationality which underpinned 
them remains, and now takes the form of a graduated deployment of sovereignty designed 
to open up new spaces to capital investment and exploitation.  
 
iii) Geographies of neoliberalism and modernity  
This neoliberal rationality for governance has persisted despite ideological opposition 
from ostensibly Leftist Presidents, including Toledo, García and Humala. Vergara and 
Encinas have pointed to the growing power of technocratic elites to govern at the 
expense of politicians to explain this stability.563  In particular, there appears to be a 
desire among the political and technocratic class to avoid radically challenging a system 
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which has provided Peru with high levels of growth since the turn of the millennium, 
and to make the most of the country’s abundant natural resources. This impulse has led 
to a drastic change in perceptions of the Andean and Amazonian regions; from spaces of 
political radicalism and instability to the engines of modern Peru’s economic growth. 
The liberalisation of extractive industries and trade has opened up the sierra and selva 
to a new wave of investment from foreign capital which has reshaped the relationship 
between Lima and the provinces, as well as between peasant communities and the land 
around them. For example, Paeregaard, Stensrud and Andersen have highlighted the 
deregulation of water industries and introduction of water tariffs and licenses as an 
example of this new wave of neoliberalism, a process resisted by community leaders.564 
Likewise, Bebbington has pointed to the large increase in capital investment in 
hydrocarbon extraction across Eastern and North-eastern Peru and the resistance that 
resource extraction has been met with by indigenous communities.565  
In recent years, resistance to extractivism has become increasingly violent, with 
incidents including the baguazo in which 23 policemen and 10 civilians died during 
protests (a further 155 civilians were injured) and the death of three protesters at the Las 
Bambas mining project in Apurímac in 2015. These protests represent resistance to the 
neoliberal order established during the internal conflict which has attempted to rid 
Peru’s provinces of political dissidents and promote investment in Amazonian and 
Andean departments. The violent suppression of these protests can be seen as a 
continuation of the practice of graduated sovereignty established during the conflict in 
which provincial populations were subject to punitive measures on a regular basis. The 
state uses these methods to refine its production of a biopolitical population, and 
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reconstitutes itself through foundational moments of exclusionary violence. Often these 
actions are justified through narratives, particularly Alan García’s evocation of el perro 
del hortelano, which attempt to mobilise fears of the unmodern, indigenous Other. This 
not only demonstrates the strength and persistence of the neoliberal order to have 
survived Fujimori’s downfall, but also the continuity in modes of governance between 
the years of internal war and the present.  
This can be further understood in the context of Ong’s work on graduated 
sovereignty. Ong argues that in such a system, national economic territory is 
fragmented and workers and populations (often migrant or indigenous communities) in 
production zones are subjected to disciplinary modes of power, whilst foreigners and 
wealthier citizens are regulated through pastoral, governmental mode of care.566 In this 
context, both the counterinsurgency operation (a harrying of the south-central Andes 
and selva central to empty the region of political radicals) and suppression of 
indigenous resistance to extractivism (the exercise of state violence to remove the dog 
from the manger) can be understood as attempts to convert the Peruvian interior from 
zonas rojas into spaces attractive to investment from global capital.  
Earlier in this thesis, representations of the Andes and Amazon as spaces of 
indigeneity and violence were discussed in reference to Edward Said’s concept of 
imaginative geography, and the relationship of internal colonialism between the 
Peruvian capital and the nation’s provinces which this representation implies. 
Throughout the twentieth century, Peruvian elites based in Lima, including military 
figures such as President Odría, embarked upon plans to make the Andes productive 
through investment in roads, hydroelectricity and infrastructure for the development of 
tourism.567 Similarly, Hiatt has highlighted earlier state interventions into the Andes 
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during the Leguía Presidency (1919-30) alongside attempts to use technology to 
engender modernity across the region, whilst further integrating Andean communities 
into the modern nation.568 In this sense, Peruvian elites have not always simply 
colonised the nation’s interior, but have consistently tried to remake the region in their 
own image, and in accordance with their own priorities. 
The perro del hortelano narrative and attempts to liberalise extractivism in the 
Andes and Amazon can in thise sense be seen as a return to previous attempts to 
modernise the Andes and make the region productive through state intervention and the 
introduction of technology.  These interventions are built upon an imaginative 
geography in which the Andean and Amazonian regions are seen as backwardness and 
poverty-stricken. However, such interventions, both earlier in the twentieth century and 
in post-conflict Peru, also sought to reconstruct this geography in order to develop the 
nation’s interior into a new engine of Peruvian economic growth and modernisation.  
In this context, the MRTA’s taking of the ambassador’s residence can be seen as a 
last desperate attempt to demonstrate the validity of their revolutionary method and 
resist the consolidation of this neoliberal order. As Meza Bazán highlights, the MRTA 
represented the end of an era in which revolutionary violence had been used across 
Latin America to effect social change.569 This brought them into direct conflict with the 
Fujimorista state, a phenomenon representative of a very different trend in which Latin 
American states deployed exclusionary state violence to entrench social hierarchies and 
elite power. Ultimately, the MRTA’s attempts to oppose the policy, values and power of 
this system failed and the effects of their operation have been limited. The response by 
the Peruvian state, however, was a highly symbolic moment for the military constitution 
of the state, constructing the residence as an important symbolic space in the Fujimori 
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and post-Fujimori era. It also had important implications for how life is considered as 
grievable or non-grievable in Peru. The logical conclusion of this is distinction is visible 
today, consistently performed through the violent suppression of indigenous 
communities who resist the economic liberalisation of the Andes and Amazon. This 
application of state violence is legitimated by narratives of what has happened in the 
past, particularly by the Fujimorista salvation narrative and the forms of counter 
memory which exist to justify the Peruvian military’s role as protectors of the state and 
as important, heroic figures in Peruvian national identity. 
 
Competing cultural memories of the internal armed conflict 
I will now turn to an analysis of how state narratives of insurgent violence, and 
opposing narratives of the internal conflict which are more critical of the state, are 
premised upon opposing cultural frameworks for understanding Peruvian society. As 
will be demonstrated, these frameworks are inherently spatial, denote the ability of 
different populations across geography to contribute to modern society, and either 
support or contest the continuation of Peru’s neoliberal revolution.  
In my discussion of state narratives of violence, I will consider the official account 
of the CPHEP of the Operación Chavín de Huántar. Milton has argued that the official 
historical report can be seen as an attempt to reflect the methods of traditional 
practitioners of memory and produce a riposte to the CVR’s Informe Final.570 Similarly, 
the accounts of the crisis produced by Luis Giampietri and Samuel Matsuda Nishimura 
(both hostages during the crisis) are designed to represent victims’ testimonies. As 
Milton asserts, these accounts are not false or fabricated, but are contorted in such a way 
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that is designed to cast doubt on the truth and objectivity of previous memory work.571 
In wielding this kind of soft, cultural, power, state agents have not only attempted to 
challenge criticisms of the role of the armed forces; they have attempted to challenge 
the nature of truth-telling itself, by demonstrating that every argument against the 
military can be matched by one in defence of them. 
There is however, I believe, a fundamental weakness in this strategy and discourse. 
Whilst the organising principle of many memory projects across Latin America has 
been Nunca Más or Para que no se repita (i.e. they have aimed to remember the dead 
and prevent further violence), the organising principle of counter memory is to close 
down debate about the nature of victimhood and the possibility of grieving those who 
they see as ungrievable terrorists.572 Counter memory supports the exercise of sovereign 
power by denoting spaces of civilisation and security in contrast to Othered spaces of 
violence and barbarism, associating the insurgency with Peru’s indigenous population. 
In doing so, they allude to a “differential distribution of grievability across 
populations”, contributing to the demarcation of “grievable” and non-grievable lives. 
This point is crucial to the study of the Embassy crisis as the MRTA members who 
were killed are (as with the victims of the 1986 prison massacres) still often represented 
as being deserving of their fate.573 
Partially in response to military impunity, but also produced as a result of the 
discursive space for memory-making opened up by the CVR, Peru has seen a boom 
cultural and literary responses to the conflict since the publication of the Informe Final. 
Broadly speaking, these películas and novelas de la violencia are cultural artefacts 
which deal with the theme of memory in relation to Peru’s internal conflict, but many 
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have also gone further to explore the country’s underlying social and ethnic divisions 
which are often interpreted as having precipitated the violence.574 Because of this, these 
works are often assumed to be using the CVR’s Informe Final as the basis for their 
interpretation of the conflict and, as Caballero argues, “aim to subvert the idea that only 
one version of the past exists”.575  
Asides from the numerous examples discussed in previous chapters here, some 
literary responses to the conflict include Santiago Roncagliolo’s Abril rojo (2006), 
Julián Pérez Huarancca’s Retablo (2004), and Gustavo Faverón Patriau’s anthology 
Toda la sangre (2006); from cinema there is Claudia Llosa’s La teta asustada (2009), 
Alejandro Legaspi’s La última noticia (2016) and Palito Ortega’s La Casa Rosada 
(2015). An analysis of any of these artefacts would reveal a slightly different conception 
of how the conflict should be remembered, who its victims were and what caused the 
violence, yet each stands apart from counter memory narratives by representing state 
agents as active participants in the conflict, capable of widespread crimes and human 
rights abuses. From this wealth of options, however, I have decided to deal with Alonso 
Cueto’s La hora azul (2005).  
I have decided to deal with this novel because I believe Cueto’s narrative stands in 
direct contrast to the heroic military narratives of the internal conflict represented in 
memories of the Operación Chavín de Huántar. Furthermore, Cueto mobilises Lima’s 
urban geography as a central element in his narrative, which has consequences for how 
violence and grievability are experienced throughout the novel. Because of this, I 
believe the novel is an important artefact for understanding how geography shapes post-
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conflict Peruvian society, as well as for analysing the idea of la novela de la violencia in 
opposition to counter memory projects. 
 
i) “Official” accounts of Operación Chavín de Huántar 
The official account of the Operación, published by the Peruvian Army in 2010, aims to 
highlight the ingenuity of the operation through diagrams of the building and 
photographs of the replica created in Chorrillos.576 Numerous photos are included in the 
back of the report celebrating commandos and hostages. As the report highlights, there 
was a generally positive international response to the rescue, and these photos (from 
which the dead insurgents are completely absent) demonstrate that the Operación was 
not only a successful military operation, but also a carefully-planned media exercise to 
re-establish Fujimori’s commitments to tackling so-called terrorism in Peru.577 The 
report also contains a brief analysis of the conflict from the army’s perspective and 
deals with potential criticisms of the rescue operation, but limits these to operational 
and procedural matters rather than a discussion of the extrajudicial executions which 
took place.578 
The narrative produced in the army’s official account of the Operación reflects a 
similar perspective to that outlined previously (in Chapter 2) in traditions of Peruvian 
military thought and in the Peruvian army’s official account of the internal conflict, En 
honor a la verdad. In this formulation of the crisis, the MRTA are depicted as Peruvian 
representatives of international terrorism. A brief history of terrorism in the early part of 
the report draws somewhat tenuous associations between disparate groups (including 
the Judean Zealots, Klu Klux Klan, Croatian Ustaše and Irish Republican Army) as 
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examples of idegologically-motivated movements which have used violence for 
political ends.579 The report therefore attempts to delegitimise the MRTA by placing 
them within a global tradition of criminal and terrorist organisations, comparing the 
1997 crisis to the taking of the Palacio de Justicia in Bogotá by the M19 insurgent group 
in 1985 (which resulted in 94 deaths) and the 1972 Munich massacre (17 deaths).580 
Representing the hostage and the MRTA in this way reflects a clear attempt to 
depoliticise the insurgent group, and the political demands they made during the crisis, 
by depicting the MRTA as an external force, within a narrative of international 
terrorism and national security. In doing so, the CPHEP not only sought to reinforce 
what they saw as the ultimate morality of the Operación by asserting the non-
grievability of the emerretistas, but also attempted to use memories of the crisis to 
delegitimate political opposition to Fujimori’s neoliberal order.    
Similar themes reoccur in two accounts of the crisis from individuals who were 
taken hostage by the MRTA. Luis Giampietri, a naval officer implicated in the 1986 
prison massacres who was later Alan García’s Vice President after the 2006 election, 
suggests in his account that the insurgents were more or less deserving of their fate, 
stating that the MRTA “had not achieved such a large military triumph to surrender 
meekly. They felt like winners and wanted to get a response of equal size”.581 Likewise, 
Samuel Matsuda Nishimura’s day-by-day account of his time as a hostage ends with a 
description of how “the saviour commanders” gallantly enter the building and guarded 
the hostages whilst they escaped, killing the remaining insurgents in combat during the 
process.582 In these accounts, there is little or no discussion of the morality of the 
soldiers’ actions or of the legality of the extrajudicial executions which they perpetrated.  
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These representations of the operation support the myth that Fujimori and the 
Peruvian military were the nation’s saviours from terrorism by celebrating the actions of 
the commandos, and contribute to the denotation of the insurgents’ lives as non-
grievable by depicting them as violent enemies of the state. As was discussed with 
reference to Carrión earlier, this myth laid the cultural foundation for Fujimori’s 
neoliberal order to such an extent that once the threat of insurgency appeared to be 
diminished, his approval ratings fell dramatically. However, the myth has also outlasted 
Fujimori’s Presidency and continues to be evoked to defend the role of the armed forces 
during the conflict, contributing to the creation of counter memory narratives. As 
Milton has highlighted, Giampietri’s account was written during Alan García’s second 
Presidency, at a time when the President appeared keen to undo the work of the CVR by 
instituting new amnesty laws and frustrating the development of what would eventually 
become LUM.583  
In this context, the international attention which Giampietri’s account received 
(including two print runs in Spanish and an English translation with the dramatic title 41 
Seconds to Freedom: An Insider's Account of the Lima Hostage Crisis) appeared to 
provide support to the Peruvian state’s narrative of the internal conflict as the defence of 
national security from the threat of terrorism. To this day the images of the rescue 
operation are highly symbolic and central to the claims of Fujimorismo to be the only 
doctrine under which Peru is safe from insurgency. For example, numerous similar 
short documentaries and collections of video footage are available on YouTube 
including one, entitled ‘Operacion Comando Chavin de Huantar’ [sic], uploaded by the 
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user ‘Fujimori2016’, an account for the recent Presidential campaign of Keiko 
Fujimori.584  
 
ii) La novela de la violencia: La hora azul 
Since Fujimori’s downfall and Peru’s transition back to democracy, this myth has been 
distinctly challenged. The publication of the CVR’s Informe Final acted as a pivotal 
cultural moment after which criticism of the military was to some degree 
institutionalised. Post-CVR Peru has also seen the production of a diverse range of 
cultural responses which articulate severe criticisms of the armed forces and attempted 
to represent subaltern perspectives on state and insurgent violence. As an example of 
this memory narrative trend, which stands in direct contrast to Fujimorista and military 
narratives of the conflict, I will now discuss Alonso Cueto’s La hora azul (“The Blue 
Hour”). As referred to earlier, I believe that the memory narrative established by Cueto 
in the novel, and the particular symbols and images he deploys during its course, 
directly oppose the cultural frameworks of Fujimorista neoliberalism.   
In some respects, La hora azul has come to be seen as an emblematic cultural 
response to the internal armed conflict, standing alongside other post-CVR artefacts 
such as La teta asustada, Abril rojo by Santiago Roncagliolo and Julio Ortega’s novella 
Adiós Ayacucho.585 The novel was released just two years after the publication of the 
Informe Final, and Cueto himself told me that: 
“when the book came out it was called the novel of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, which I had no problem with because I 
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admire the work of the commission, but…it was a criticism for many 
people I think”.586 
The novel’s narrative is, arguably, structured in such a way that it does not only 
reflect the uncovering of a history of military violence, but achieves this from the 
perspective of a middle-class protagonist who has previously been ignorant to the 
atrocities of Peru’s recent history, as well as to the social conditions which precipitated 
the conflict. Because of this, La hora azul represents another distinct feature of la 
novela de la violencia by encouraging a degree of self-criticism on the part of Peru’s 
middle- and upper-classes.  
Through letters left to him by his recently deceased mother, Adrián Ormache learns 
that, during the conflict, his father (also deceased) systematically violated the women 
who had been detained in the military base at Huanta, Ayacucho, where he was an 
officer.587 During this time, Adrián’s father fell in love with Miriam, a woman detained 
at the base, developing a brief relationship with her before Miriam escaped. As the 
novel progresses, Adrián develops a keen interest in tracking Miriam down, apparently 
out of a sense of guilt, and eventually falls in love with her. Later on it transpires that 
Miriam has a son who Adrián tries to help, believing that he is his step-brother. 
 Read one way, the novel appears to be moving towards the redemption of Ormache 
(and, by extension, of Lima’s wealthier classes) as he attempts to learn more about 
Miriam’s family in San Juan de Lurigancho and thus challenge his own previous 
ignorance. In particular, this narrative is supported by the way in which Cueto 
references Lima within the novel; Ormache is a lawyer who goes out for business 
lunches in Miraflores and San Isidro, enjoying the high life, whilst Miriam’s family 
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work hard to survive in the city’s slums.588 By transgressing this social geography, 
Ormache appears to break an important socio-spatial boundary and demonstrates an 
apparent willingness to sacrifice personal prestige (by visiting San Juan de Lurigancho) 
in order to support Miriam and his son. In Cueto’s words: 
“I said that [the novel] was a fairytale told backwards, because in a 
fairytale what happens is that people live in a normal reality and they 
are brought into a magic world, where in this case he lives in a magic 
world and he is brought into reality … The fact that he goes to San 
Juan de Lurigancho is just like breaking all the rules, because people 
in Miraflores never go there”.589 
Transgressing Lima’s internal geography, which Cueto deliberately interprets as a 
barrier to the process of reconciliation, is certainly an important element of the novel. In 
this sense, it is not enough for Ormache to simply discover his father’s abuses; he must 
also redeem himself and banish his ignorance through these journeys to San Juan de 
Lurigancho. Cueto is here deploying a particular form of imaginative geography, a 
common depiction of Lima’s landscape which his audience will either know well or can 
grasp from his depiction of well-off and poor neighbourhoods. As Lefebvre argues, 
however, these abstract conceptualisations of space play an active role in how space is 
produced, planned and lived in.590 And so, to transgress Peru’s social structures in his 
narrative, Cueto first transgresses this conceptualisation of limeño space. 
Through this method, not only does Cueto importantly dismiss the notion of the 
heroic military office in Ormache’s father, but elucidates a spatial dimension to memory 
narratives.  To believe in the Fujimori myth, and to live in Lima’s wealthier districts, is 
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depicted as living in a fantasy which is able to persist because of the lack of direct 
experiences of violence of the population. In this way, Cueto produces another form of 
city-text in which his characters can be read through their associations to different 
neighbourhoods and their abilities to transgress their borders. It would, however, be a 
highly simplistic reading to say that Ormache’s transgression of this boundary is 
completely altruistic or successful, and this point is challenged later by the novel 
itself.591  
This is demonstrated during a passage when Ormache states that he cannot undo the 
deeper socioeconomic and cultural factors which separate his life from Miriam’s, nor 
would he want to.592 In this sense, Ormache represents only a partial acceptance of the 
conclusions of the CVR; allowing for a degree of accountability for violence without 
accepting the need for developmental reparations or transformative justice programmes. 
As Ubilluz argues, Ormache reinforces the socio-spatial distance between his and 
Miriam’s family by refusing to invite her son to his house, and appears incapable of 
“subverting the implicit laws of a ‘Republic without citizens’”.593 This suggests that, 
after Miriam’s death, Ormache is already reconstructing the boundaries around him and 
easing himself back into his old life. In doing so, he is reconstructing his own amnesia 
by suppressing what he knows. This has deep implications for the novel’s narrative, as 
it suggests that without deeper transformative processes, both Ormache’s retribution and 
Peru’s reconciliation are only superficial.  
That is not to say, however, that he has not changed. Ormache’s visits to San Juan 
de Lurigancho are, as Cueto says, not journeys into fantasy, but out of fantasy into the 
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real world. By the end of the novel he seems deeply unsettled by his experiences and 
Cueto appears to suggest that he is beginning to question the reality of his middle-class 
life in San Isidro. Unlike the narrative of Vargas Llosa’s Lituma en los Andes which 
articulates the exposition of an ancient, barbaric violence in the sierra, La hora azul 
raises more questions about the reality of middle-class limeño experience and gives 
Ormache an insight into the tensions and violence which lie beneath the surface of his 
everyday life.  
Ubilluz, Hibbett and Vich have argued that an incapacity to effect substantive 
change is not limited to Ormache, however, but is also inherent in Cueto’s decision to 
make Ormache the protagonist of the novel, an act which they argue acts as a form of 
symbolic violence against Peru’s subaltern communities.594 Lambright has supported 
this argument, suggesting that it is representative of many post-conflict novels which 
have reproduced tropes about indigenous cultures and have been shaped by the demands 
of a global, Western audience.595 These criticisms are certainly valid, and are supported 
by the novel’s own conclusion in which the status quo persists. However, whilst Cueto 
may not use his narrative to construct an image of radical change, he does hold a mirror 
up to the fantasy in which Lima’s elites exist, and offers a glimpse of how the social and 
economic violence of neoliberal Peru could be challenged and undermined. 
Furthermore, he represents Ormache (and by extension himself, and Lima’s middle-
class communities) as incapable of effecting such change by themselves, as the breaking 
of these boundaries is represented as only being achievable through greater co-operation 
and cultural exchange between Westernised national elites and indigenous communities. 
                                                          
594 Juan Carlos Ubilluz, Alexandra Hibbett and Víctor Vich, ‘Introducción: Violentando el silencio’ in (Juan Carlos Ubilluz, 
Alexandra Hibbett and Víctor Vich eds.), Contra el sueño de los justos: la literatura peruana ante la violencia política (Lima, 
2009), pp.9-18. 
595 Lambright, Andean Truths, pp.30-32. 
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This, arguably, is the greater conclusion of La hora azul, and where it best reflects 
the realities of post-conflict Peru. Whilst violence has been recognised through the work 
of the CVR, there has been a wider social amnesia reconstructed around the conclusions 
made by the commission on the social and racial dimensions to the violence. The 
Fujimori pacification myth has been rigorously challenged, although it is still persistent 
and popular among many Peruvians. However, an even more pervasive fantasy remains; 
the fantasy that Peru’s socio-spatial hierarchies are natural, and that they can continue to 
exist without the prospect of further violence.  
La hora azul does not represent a utopic vision of truth and reconciliation, but 
instead aims to detail deeply violent acts committed by state agents, and the forms of 
social cultural domination which support them. Such a narrative is crucial in Peru, 
however, because it stands in direct opposition to the continuation of neoliberal 
practices which may deepen structural inequality, and to the obfuscation of the more 
transformative aspects of the Informe Final. Cueto is also careful not to make concrete 
conclusions about the future, but develops a sense of ambiguity throughout the novel 
which encourages readers to question the fantasy of Peru’s elite neoliberal order. In 
doing so, he promotes forms of non-hierarchical cultural exchange as a means, Vich 
argues, of “building a different national consciousness” in which middle- and upper-
class limeños take a greater degree of responsibility for their roles in creating a society 
in which the internal armed conflict was possible.596 The memories and inherited guilt 
from the past which Cueto represents in his novel therefore act as imperatives in the 
present to embark upon a path towards a more transformative process of truth and 
reconciliation and reconstruct Peruvian society along more equitable lines. 
                                                          
596 Víctor Vich, ‘Violencia, culpa y repetición: La hora azul de Alonso Cueto’ in (Juan Carlos Ubilluz, Alexandra Hibbett and Víctor 
Vich eds.), Contra el sueño de los justos: la literatura peruana ante la violencia política (Lima, 2009), pp.233-46 (p.234). 
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Against impunity? The Lugar de la Memoria and Casa Yuyachkani 
As previously discussed (in Chapter 2), commemorative sites have been produced in 
Lima and Huamanga which reflect the narratives established by both the Peruvian 
armed forces and by human rights organisations. In this section, I will delve further into 
the array of commemorative sites which have been produced in Lima and which 
contribute to the capital’s commemorative city-text. However, in this case I will 
demonstrate how each site has been, to some extent, produced in opposition to the 
systemic inequalities and military impunity which Peruvian neoliberalism has come to 
represent, and assess how successful each site is in achieving its goals. In particular, I 
will establish how the narratives constructed in each site have been shaped, at times 
unintentionally, by the spatiality of each site and the politics of space which provides 
the foundations for Lima’s geography of memory.  
LUM is a highly emblematic space for memories of the conflict and its creation is 
deeply tied to the work of the CVR. That alone would make it an important object for 
study, as the museum is in some ways seen as a national site of memory designed to 
reflect all experiences of violence, but the criticisms the museum has received also 
reveal ongoing tensions in how the conflict is remembered. As will be seen, the 
museum’s curators have been accused of not going far enough in their criticisms of the 
military, and of curating an exhibition which is (but should not be) acceptable to state 
and military figures who broadly agree with counter memory narratives.  
I will also go beyond my analysis of LUM, which functions as a traditional, text-
based site of memory, to explore how memory narratives have increasingly been 
interwoven into more participatory and performative forms of memory practice. These 
include the creation of the Santuario de la Memoria in Huamanga (analysed in Chapter 
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2), the staging of numerous political demonstrations against state violence and 
impunity, and the work of the Grupo Cultural Yuyachkani. Yuyachkani are a theatre 
group who have been making highly political works of theatre for over 45 years, and 
who performed during the CVR’s public hearings in Huanta and Huamanga (2002-3).597 
By exploring the spatiality of their works as well as the spatiality of their theatre space, 
the Casa Yuyachkani, I will draw comparisons between the ways in which memory 
narratives are produced in museums and theatres in Lima, and make conclusions about 
the extent to which these have reshaped public discourse and challenged Peru’s 
neoliberal order. I have chosen to use Yuyachkani as a case study not only because they 
are a pre-eminent theatre group in Peru, but because through their works they actively 
seek to make statements about the importance of memory, ethnic plurality and gender 
relations for understanding Peru’s past and future. By comparison with LUM, Grupo 
Cultural Yuyachkani have regularly been denounced as terrorist sympathisers for being 
too critical of the military and Fujimori in the conflict. In this sense, it is useful to view 
the memory narrative of the Casa Yuyachkani in direct contrast to that represented by 
the Museo Chavín de Huántar, at the other end of the memory spectrum, with LUM 
somewhere in between.598 
In doing so, I will be using an approach outlined by Nora’s work on lieux de 
memoire which expands the analysis of sites of memory beyond traditional spaces such 
as museum and monuments, highlighting how modern nation-states are themselves 
                                                          
597 Lambright, Andean Truths, pp.88-106. 
598 The cultural significance of Grupo Cultural Yuyachkani has previously been analysed by a range of scholars from theatre and 
literary studies, most notably by Diana Taylor who has identified Yuyachkani as important performers of a form of cultural memory 
designed to contest versions of the past. Others, including Peruvian anthropologist Rodrigo Montoya, have focused on the 
significance of Yuyachkani to broader historical processes such as ethnic integration and post-conflict transitional justice. Whilst 
this work has doubtlessly contributed to an extensive and diverse literature on the group, for the purposes of this chapter I will 
primarily draw on the work of Taylor and Cynthia Garza in order to develop my spatial analysis. Diana Taylor, The Archive and the 
Repertoire: Performing cultural memory in the Americas (Durham, 2003), pp.190-211; Rodrigo Montoya, ‘El teatro quechua como 
lugar de reflexion sobre la historia y la politica’, Revista de Crítica Literaria Latinoamericana, 19:37 (1993), pp.223-241; Francine 
A'ness, ‘Resisting Amnesia: Yuyachkani, Performance, and the Postwar Reconstruction of Peru’, Theatre Journal, 56:3 (2004), 
pp.395-414; Cynthia M. Garza, ‘Colliding with Memory: Grupo Cultural Yuyachkani’s Sin título, técnica mixta’ in (Cynthia Milton 
ed.), Art from a Fractured Past: Memory and Truth Telling in Post-Shining Path Peru (London, 2014), pp.197-215. 
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constructed through projects of memory.599 The complex intersection of memory, art 
and performance at LUM and Yuyachkani, and during political protests and street 
demonstrations, make each of these sites important representational spaces which 
produce not only shared forms of cultural memory, but also related ideas about the 
national community and nation-state. 
 
The story of LUM from inception to inauguration has been a long, and often 
torturous, journey. Despite the need for such a museum being established in the 
conclusions of the CVR’s Informe Final, it took over 12 years for the museum to be 
fully completed and opened. During this time, Alan García rejected a $2m donation 
from the German government for the construction of LUM, then performed a swift U-
turn after public pressure spearheaded by Mario Vargas Llosa. Furthermore, since 2015 
Denise Ledgard and Guillermo Nugent have both been removed as Directors of LUM 
after inventions by Peru’s culture ministry. Such controversies have not (yet) halted the 
project, but have highlighted the ways in which LUM represents a highly political 
battleground for the different memory narratives which exist in Peru today.  
These battles have been continued in debates over the design and content of LUM. 
Salomón Lerner, President of the CVR, believes that the museum “does not fulfil the 
desires of its donors nor reflect what honestly happened”.600 For Lerner, the fact that 
Aldo Mariátegui, a passionate critic of the Peruvian Left and the political antithesis to 
his great-uncle José Carlos, stated that the museum had “decaffeinated the subject a 
little, even for people as hypercritical as me" demonstrates that the museum does not go 
far enough to replicate the conclusions of the CVR.601 Víctor Vich, a key participant in 
                                                          
599 Nora, ‘Between Memory and History’, p.12. 
600 Salomón Lerner, ‘Interview in-person’, (Lima, 2016). 
601 ‘Mariátegui en su Laberinto’, Caretas, 7 January 2016 [http://www.actualidadambiental.pe/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/2418-
CARETAS.pdf, accessed 2 November 2016]. 
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the content of the museum, counters this by accepting that the museum is, ultimately, a 
state institution, but argues that the discourse which it articulates is one of self-criticism, 
intended to criticise Shining Path and the MRTA, as well as perpetrators of violence in 
Peruvian society and from the state. Vich also sees public engagement as the key to the 
project, arguing that it should be mandatory for schools to visit LUM.602 
Many other criticisms of LUM, however, stem from elements of the museum’s 
spatiality. For one, Montalbetti has criticised the emplacement of the museum, stating 
that: 
“If there was one place in which we could consecrate memories of the 
years of terrorism in Peru, what would it be? Probably the first that 
passes into our minds is Ayacucho, or more specifically Uchuraccay, 
Lucanamarca…Tarata as well. But the Commission chose Lima, the 
limits between the affluent districts San Isidro and Miraflores…a 
beautiful landscape, the gastronomic cordon, a zone for tourists and 
cafés…the Commission seems to want to say that LUM ought to be 
part of Lima’s tourist circuit”.603 
The idea of fostering a national sense of collective responsibility for, and memory 
of, the conflict may seem like an unachievable goal, but human rights activists and 
memory practitioners have nonetheless articulated concerns that narratives of the 
conflict should not be provincialized, lest this lead to their own work being completely 
ignored by a limeño audience. These concerns can also be seen in the presentation of the 
CVR’s Informe Final, which also worried about the possible “ayacuchanización” of the 
report.604 However, Montalbetti argues that making the museum a tourist attraction 
                                                          
602 Víctor Vich, ‘Interview in-person’ (Lima, 2016). 
603 Montalbetti, ‘El lugar del arte y el lugar de la memoria’, p.65. 
604 CVR. Núcleo de Informe Final. SC0-141-01. ‘Esbozo de estructura y comentarios como contribución al Informe Final’. 2002.  
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leads only to the “banalisation of experience through tourist commercialisation”, further 
excluding Peruvians from their own history and memory practice.605 Sastre Díaz has 
argued that the forms of narration and visual forms of memory deployed by LUM 
represent, instead, the limeñización of Peruvian memory narratives, constructed by and 
for the capital’s population.606 Furthermore, LUM’s location is not only representative 
of affluence, but of a particularly fashionable part of Lima which is associated with 
elites enjoying expensive lunches together. The problem for the curators and 
museographers of LUM is that, whilst they may not be at the centre of this world, they 
are now associated with it, and appear to share a convivial relationship with the state 
forces who they are supposed to criticise.  
There is also a certain architectural and spatial logic inherent in the design of the 
museum, which requires visitors to descend down a long flight of stairs to the entrance, 
then progress gradually up throughout the museum space, floor by floor, until they can 
exit at the top of the building to be confronted with a view of the ocean. Two things are 
particularly worth nothing about this; firstly, that the architecture represents an 
oversimplified narrative in which Peru has emerged from its own violent past and, 
presumably, dealt with the conditions which precipitated crisis in the first place. Such 
an interpretation is not only clearly inaccurate, but occludes the possibility of further 
debate and support for developmental funds designed to assist the process of 
transformative justice. Secondly, as one leaves the museum and walks onto the 
concourse between the cliffs of Miraflores, in plain sight (on a clear day, at least) is the 
island of El Frontón. The prison massacres are referenced in very little detail inside the 
museum, and the building’s architecture appears to suggest that there is nothing to 
worry about in reference to the island, no ongoing memory debates, no cause for 
                                                          
605 Montalbetti, ‘El lugar del arte y el lugar de la memoria’, p.66. 
606 Camila Fernanda Sastre Díaz, ‘Tensiones, polémicas, y debates: el museo “Lugar de la Memoria, la Tolerancia y la Inclusión 
Social” en el Perú post-violencia política’ (Tesis de Magister  - Universidad de Chile, 2010), p.162. 
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concern over the massacres perpetrated by the state. Combined, these elements make for 
an uncomfortable reading of the spatiality of LUM, making it appear as a symbol of 
ignorance to the deeper underlying socioeconomic issues and pervasive forms of state 
violence which precipitated violence and which persist in Peru today. 
That being said, clear efforts have been made by the curatorial team to work under 
the restrictions placed on them (by the architecture of the site and the involvement of 
state institutions) and use the museum’s content to create a space in which subaltern 
stories can be told and heard, most likely to audiences who have never heard them 
before. The ground floor houses a room of video testimonies from a diverse range of 
people (including José Carlos Agüero, author of Los rendidos) and four emblematic 
episodes of violence including the incident and subsequent reprisals at Uchuraccay, the 
massacre of peasants at Putis, and two studies of Asháninka communities highlighting 
violence perpetrated by insurgents and the armed forces. The aim and effect of this is to 
contextualise the conflict’s different forms, perpetrators and victims of violence, 
creating a narrative in which the Shining Path began its insurgency and the armed forces 
responded brutally. The second floor tackles a number of convergent themes linked to 
the conflict, including the response of the state, the disappeared, and the cultural and 
academic responses to the conflict which have become a central part of Peruvian culture 
over the past thirty years. Visitors are invited to peruse the displays as they see fit, the 
antithesis to the Museo Chavín de Huántar in which memory is presented fully formed 
to non-participating guests.607 
Deliberate attempts have also been made to subvert the linear progression created by 
the architects throughout the museum. As Ponciano del Pino told me, the curators 
attempted to interrupt this pathway by drawing visitors into slightly disjointed displays, 
                                                          
607 Milton has also argued that her experience visiting the DINCOTE museum was directed by her guide, a Colonel in the National 
Police. Milton, ‘Curating memories of armed state actors in Peru’s era of transitional justice’, p.365. 
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forcing them to walk back and forth at times, and with windows in the floor allowing 
visitors to look back down to the rooms below. Although this slightly disrupts the 
visitors’ experience, the intention, as del Pino highlights, is to challenge the simplified, 
linear narrative of violence created through the building’s architectural design.608  
The efforts taken to demonstrate how violence affected everyone in Peruvian society 
arguably detract from the representation of the ways in which violence specifically 
affected indigenous communities. Very few of the displays (asides from one retablo on 
the second floor and one video playing on loop as visitors exit the museum) are of an 
Andean character, or reflects Andean culture. As Sastre Díaz alludes to, this creates the 
unfortunate effect of making the retablo appear as a quirky, exotic item, thus 
reinforcing its position as an example of subaltern culture.609 This suggests that, at the 
very least, there is little prospect of the ayacuchanización of LUM, while at worst there 
is possibility that the museum’s form may actually reinforce pre-existing cultural 
hierarchies.  
The redeeming quality of the site, however, is its focus on being a centre of 
participation in memory which offers the possibility of all sectors of Peruvian society 
coming to LUM to continuously give testimony, share experiences, and remake 
narratives of memory together. LUM regularly holds public events, including film 
screenings, political discussions, and presentations about other memory projects (such 
as the Quipu project which collects the testimonies of women who underwent forced 
sterilisation), designed to encourage participation with its subject matter.610 Visits to the 
museum for schools and Andean or Amazonian communities have been arranged 
regularly, and perhaps most importantly, LUM now houses its own Centro de 
                                                          
608 Ponciano del Pino, ‘Interview in-person’ (Lima, 2016). 
609 Sastre Díaz, ‘Tensiones, polémicas, y debates’, p.162. 
610 For more on the Quipu Project see https://interactive.quipu-project.com/#/en/quipu/intro. 
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Documentación e Investigación, both in the museum building and online. This 
repository of physical and digitised documents relating to the CVR, victim’s 
testimonies, videos and journals related to Peru’s internal conflict is an invaluable 
source for academics and researchers in Peru, with the intention that the availability of 
these documents online will democratise memory practice, encouraging others to 
engage in investigation into their own histories or wider experiences of the conflict.  
However, the dismissal of Guillermo Nugent as Director of LUM in 2017 
demonstrated the extent to which such sites are not simply produced as part of an ever-
growing trend of memory practice, but are constantly involved in memory struggles and 
battles over the interpretation of history. Nugent left LUM after Francesco Petrozzi, a 
Fujimorista Congressman and former musician, Tweeted that he agreed with the idea 
that “LUM is full of hatred against Fujimorismo” and, as such, was failing in its brief as 
a site of reconciliation.611 The comment was, in part, a response to the inauguration 
three days earlier of a new temporary exhibition in LUM entitled Resistencia visual 
1992, curated by Karen Bernedo, which exhibited artistic responses to episodes of 
violence from the year 1992 (including acts perpetrated by insurgents and state agents). 
Subsequently, Petrozzi complained to the Minister for Culture, Salvador Del Solar, who 
met with Nugent, a result of which was the latter’s departure from LUM. These events 
sparked a polemic with a range of figures from the memory activist community, 
including Jorge Villacorta, Gustavo Buntinx and Víctor Vich, arguing against state 
intervention into memory practice and in favour of LUM’s autonomy.612  
                                                          
611 La República, ' Denuncian presiones contra muestra artística en el LUM tras renuncia de su director’, 19 August 2017 
[http://larepublica.pe/politica/1075999-denuncian-presunta-censura-a-muestra-artistica-en-el-lum-tras-renuncia-de-su-director, 
accessed 23 August 2017] 
612 El Comercio, ‘Lugar de la Memoria: "Resistencia visual 1992" - Reflexiones en torno a la polémica’, 22 August 2017 
[http://elcomercio.pe/luces/arte/lugar-memoria-resistencia-visual-1992-polemica-partir-ano-trance-noticia-452152, accessed 23 
August 2017]; Víctor Vich, ‘Crisis en el LUM, crisis en el Ministerio de Cultura’, La Mula, 21 August 2017 
[https://victorvich.lamula.pe/2017/08/21/crisis-en-el-lum-crisis-en-el-ministerio-de-cultura/victorvich/, accessed 23 August 2017]. 
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At the time of writing, this polemic is ongoing and Resistencia visual 1992 remains 
open to the public. However, these events demonstrate that representatives of 
Fujimorismo, the Peruvian state, and Peruvian armed forces are more than willing to 
intervene to limit the impact of memory projects and institutions which they perceive to 
be critical of the state’s role in the internal armed conflict. At times, interventions have 
taken a more soft-touch approach with more subtle adjustments to the curation of 
LUM’s permanent exhibit, with pressure exerted through LUM’s Comisión Alto 
Nivel.613 At others, as with the destruction of the MHVRE and the attacks on El ojo que 
llora (discussed in Chapter 3), interventions have been more direct. This meants that it 
is both reductive and short-sighted to understand the impact of memory through the 
content of individual sites alone. Instead, sites which commemorate the internal armed 
conflict must be understood as part of a geography of memory which is continually 
contested and reconstructed, and in which memory narratives of Peru’s recent past must 
fight for prominence against other historical narratives (of Independence, the Peruvian 
Republic, and its War with Chile) which are often assumed to constitute the nation’s 
common heritage.  
 
The Casa Yuyachkani is located in the limeño district Magdalena del Mar, a 
bohemian and reasonably affluent area up the coast from San Isidro and Miraflores. 
Visitors can pass through an enclosed garden to the box office at the front of the 
building, then into several anterooms around the theatre space including a café and a 
shop which sells recordings of Yuyachkani plays, posters, and books on Peruvian art 
                                                          
613 For example, the museographer Juan Carlos Burga referred to the minute details involved in planning the ‘Sala de los 
desaparecidos’, for which he was asked to move a photo of a victim of state violence so that it would not be the first photo which 
visitors would see as they approach at a particular angle. Juan Carlos Burga, ‘Interview in-person’ (Lima, 2016). See also the 
chapter on LUM in Milton, Conflicted Memory.  
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and history. Immediately before the theatre entrance is a mural of the Peruvian flag with 
the message: 
“Memory needs anchors: places and dates, monuments, 
commemorations, rituals, sensory stimuli - a smell, a sound, a picture 
- can trigger memories and emotions.” 
Visitors are then invited into a final antechamber. For their production of Sin Título - 
Técnica Mixta in 2015/16, visitors were allowed to explore two selections of 
photographs, newspapers and books relating to the Shining Path and MRTA 
insurgencies on the one side, and Peru’s nineteenth century war with Chile, the War of 
the Pacific, on the other. Finally, the guests were led into the open theatre space for the 
production, a highly innovative and non-traditional form of theatre which aims to make 
statements about memory and draw comparisons between Peru’s experiences of 
violence in the War of the Pacific and the internal conflict. 
Casa Yuyachkani is fundamentally a business, and its internal space and location in 
a fairly well-off neighbourhood reflects the success and the prominence which the group 
Fig. 18: Actress Teresa Ralli in front of the mural at Casa Yuyachkani 
[https://redaccion.lamula.pe/media/uploads/55e4f669-3a3a-49c1-b642-2a303ba10da8.jpg]. 
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has been able to achieve. However, there is also, of course, an element of performance 
integrated into the space. For Sin título, the seating had been removed from the main 
theatre space and visitors could move freely around the room, witnessing the 
performance from different angles or focusing on different aspects being performed 
simultaneously, whilst there was also extensive material on walls and screens for 
visitors to engage with. This kind of space actively encourages visitors to participate in 
the performance and to assemble their own experiences of the production from the way 
in which they interact with the space around them. As director Miguel Rubio describes, 
the aim is to “prepare the space to create an experience that engages all participants in 
the event”, so that performers and attendees become part of the same performance of a 
common memory.614 Not only is this done in the main theatre hall, but is continued 
outside with the anteroom collections of wartime paraphernalia, photographs of 
previous productions, and the shop selling materials related to Yuyachkani and the 
internal conflict.  
As Taylor highlights, the term Yuyachkani is also central to this idea, a Quechua 
word which loosely translates as “I am remembering”, but which also “signals 
embodied knowledge and memory and blurs the line between thinking subjects and the 
subjects of thought”.615 The internal space of the Casa Yuyachkani, as well as the open 
plan theatre space, is deliberately constructed to blur the lines between performers and 
spectators, making guests active participants in and performers of cultural memory. 
There are also, in the words of Dwyer and Alderman, signs of ongoing activism and 
commemorative rituals which tie the performances in the theatre space into a wider 
project of collective remembrance and political activism.616 This is crucial, as it 
suggests that visitors to Casa Yuyachkani are not invited as spectators to a constructed 
                                                          
614 Miguel Rubio Zapata, El cuerpo ausente: Performance política (2006), p.51. 
615 Taylor, The Archive and the Repertoire, p.191. 
616 Dwyer and Alderman, ‘Landscape memory’, p.174. 
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representation of the past, but as participants in an ongoing performative process of 
memory. Because of this, Taylor argues that the group’s work represents neither the 
commodification nor the desecration of memory, but a representation of the violence 
designed to encourage guests to recognise their own role in “an ongoing history of 
repression which, directly or indirectly, implicates them”.617 
Although it shares the themes of absence, violence and memory with other works by 
Yuyachkani, Sin título stands out as a meditation on the nature of memory and 
nationhood, in which, Rubio states, the group return to the body, memory, dramaturgy 
and space as the media for their message.618 As Garza describes, numerous figures, 
photographs and objects representing Peru’s past (including War with Chile, the internal 
conflict, and the Fujimori era) are assembled in the performance space allowing visitors 
and actors alike to engage with them, a jumble of artefacts which “make up the 
country’s past, its incomplete nationhood”.619 Whilst it is difficult to argue that there 
any distinct conclusions made in the play, this established link between moments of 
history and the weakness of the Peruvian nation is a theme which runs throughout. In 
this way, is reminiscent of previous Yuyachkani works (including Adiós Ayacucho, 
Rosa Cuchillo and Antígona) which, Lambright argues, represent the Peruvian nation as 
a “mutilated, dismembered, [or] displaced” body.620 
Towards the play’s end, two large puppet-like figures with the faces of Alberto 
Fujimori and Vladimiro Montesinos come to life and parade around the room whilst 
Monopoly money is thrown around the room by another character. This is in direct 
reference to the well-known corruption of the Fujimori regime. A lesser known element 
of Fujimori’s reign is the issue of forced sterilisations; this is represented in Sin título 
                                                          
617 Taylor, The Archive and the Repertoire, p.211. 
618 Rubio, El cuerpo ausente, p.59. 
619 Garza, ‘Colliding with Memory’, p.205. 
620 Lambright, Andean Truths, p.88. 
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when two women appear on rolling stages, one dressed in traditional Andean clothing, 
the other in the garments of the Asháninka. Both characters open up their clothing to 
reveal narratives written underneath; the Asháninka woman who lost her baby after 
being abused by Shining Path cadres in her village, the Andean woman a victim of 
forced sterilisation.  
There are many more elements to Sin título worthy of mention, too many to discuss 
in detail here.621 What I hope to demonstrate from this brief outline is that whilst 
Yuyachkani deliberately break down boundaries of space to create a participatory form 
of remembrance in their works, these plays also involve distinct representations of space 
which have consequences for the memory narratives the plays represent. As Garza 
argues: 
“the plays Yuyachkani produced during the Shining Path era argued 
that such violence was not new; rather they highlighted the long-
standing systemic inequities that the Andean and Amazonian 
populations had suffered by calling on Andean myths, customs, and 
the firsthand testimonies of survivors and witnesses”.622 
In this sense, the Yuyachkani project is based on a similar argument to that of La 
hora azul, insofar as it highlights uneven geographies of power and wealth as a distinct 
weakness of the Peruvian nation, suggesting that greater parity and cultural exchange 
between peoples and places is needed for to break its historical cycles of violence.  
It should also be noted, however, that Yuyachkani do not limit themselves to 
performing only in their own theatre in an affluent neighbourhood, but actively 
participate in public engagement and take their performances around Peru. They 
                                                          
621 For greater detail on Sin título see Garza, ‘Colliding with memory’. 
622 Ibid., p.200. 
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conduct performances and theatre classes across the country’s provinces, including in 
Junín, Huancavelica and Ayacucho. These performances are, as Taylor highlights, part 
of the way in which the group attempt to engage directly with mestizo and indigenous 
populations and “introduces itself as a product of a history of ethnic coexistence”.623 
Likewise, Garza has highlighted the way in which members of the group have learned 
Quechua, researched Andean and Amazonian dances and mask-making traditions, and 
performed in open-air markets, the steps of government buildings and street corners to 
reinforce their commitment to “socially-engaged theatre”.624 Ahead of the 2016 
Presidential Elections, Yuyachkani also participated in the Keiko ¡no va! March in 
central Lima against the candidacy of Keiko Fujimori, taking with them the puppets of 
Alberto Fujimori and Montesinos used in Sin título; another way in which the line 
between Yuyachkani’s performances and their collaborative political activities are 
continuously blurred.  
 
Whilst incredibly significant individually, it is worth highlighting what these sites of 
memory tell us collectively, with the purpose of further exploring an analysis of Lima as 
a city-text of memory. Whilst the Museo Chavín de Huántar, Casa Yuyachkani and 
LUM all appear as significant sites to those working on the subject of memory and 
culture in Peru, each space has only a limited engagement with the wider limeño and 
Peruvian population. There are clear contrasts between the ways in which LUM appears 
as part of Lima’s tourist circuit, Casa Yuyachkani is open to the public but preferred by 
middle-class families with Leftist sympathies, and how, when I attempted to visit the 
Museo Chavín de Huántar in 2016, I was told it was closed to foreign visitors without 
express permission from their embassy. On some level, this is representative of memory 
                                                          
623 Taylor, The Archive and the Repertoire, p.192. 
624 Garza, ‘Colliding with memory’, p.198. 
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politics on the whole in Peru, in which numerous competing narratives are 
simultaneously expressed, but within a community with which wider public engagement 
is limited.  
As mentioned, both the Grupo Cultural Yuyachkani and LUM have made efforts to 
promote public engagement by encouraging visitors from the Andean interior or going 
there themselves to perform. Yet the Casa Yuyachkani is on a back street in an affluent 
neighbourhood, likewise LUM is hidden from the busy Avenida del Ejército and for 
those who live in Lima’s outer districts would likely only be glimpsed in passing from 
the passing bus. Neither will draw in curious passers-by, and require participants to 
know what they are taking part in beforehand. Whilst clear efforts have been made to 
transcend this, both are ultimately spaces produced by the memory activist community 
who, within the wider context of Peruvian society, hold relatively elite positions. As 
such, both spaces are produced by and for a cultural elite, and face inherent limitations 
in their projects to transform narratives about society because of this. As referred to 
earlier, Peru’s impressive economic growth and the emergence of a cholo middle-class 
in the last decade may arguably have contributed to a degree of apathy towards projects 
which challenge interpretations of the past and the existing political order. 
Outside of these spaces, and other sites referred to in this thesis, there are many 
other battlegrounds across Lima, and Peru, in which memory conflicts are being 
continually waged. If we borrow Palonen’s approach to the city-text through the 
medium of street names, Lima reveals a distinct cultural preference for military heroes 
and former Presidents.625 Major streets include the Avenida del Ejército, Bolívar, Sucre 
and Miguel Grau. References to the Republican period and War of the Pacific are also 
fairly frequent, with a limited scope for names from Peru’s Inca past (a tradition 
                                                          
625 Palonen, ‘The city-text in post-communist Budapest’, p.222. 
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represented far more strongly in the street names of Cusco, Huamanga and other 
Andean towns).626 Milton also highlights the large boulevards named after Bolognesi, 
Miró Quesada and Pardo, and the statue erected to Andrés Cáceres in San Isidro in 
1986, as a form of “soft” cultural power wielded by the military. By reshaping urban 
space, she argues, the Peruvian military (and its supporters in national and local 
government) has attempted to use the limeño cityscape as the basis for constructing its 
own version of a common national heritage and identity.627 
LUM and Casa Yuyachkani are, in a very important way, the antithesis to the 
construction of this image. Furthermore, the memory activists who have taken part in 
these projects have deliberately attempted to create spaces in which criticism of, and 
opposition to, Peruvian neoliberalism can be fostered, articulated, and undermined 
through forms of memory practice and cultural exchange. However, the memory 
narratives these sites evoke are also overwhelmed by a relentlessly articulated form of 
militarised nationalism which is reinforced so regularly throughout Lima’s city-text hat 
even military losses (such as the War with Chile) and those who presided over them are 
remembered. Peru’s more recent history, incorporating not only the conflict but most of 
the twentieth-century, is dramatically underrepresented in this city-text, but even some 
sites which do engage with the conflict (like the Chavín de Huántar and DINCOTE 
museums) contribute to the purposeful veneration of military and police heroes.628 
The politics and production of these spaces have implications beyond histories of the 
internal armed conflict. These are sites in which cultural values and frameworks are 
reconstructed contiuously, producing new visions for what a future Peru should look 
                                                          
626 The predominance of military and political figures in street names is also reflected in the stops along major bus and metro routes 
across Lima. Although there a myriad different routes which the micro and combi buses can take, a typical southeast-northwest 
route would travel along roads dedicated to former Presidents Benavides, Pardo and Salaverry, as well as the Avenida del Ejército 
and Avenida La Marina. The War of the Pacific is specifically commemorated through streets and parks dedicated to Admiral 
Miguel Grau and the battle of Angamos (where Grau died), as well as through the production of a popular board game called 
Guerra en el Pacífico: El Juego de Mesa. 
627 Milton, Conflicted Memory, Conclusion, p.5. 
628 Ibid., Chapter 5; Milton, ‘Curating memories of armed state actors in Peru’s era of transitional justice’. 
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like. For example, Vich has argued that class and racial hierarchies are reinforced 
through daily spatial practice in Peruvian society; particularly through the existence of 
VIP boxes at theatres and segregated spaces at public beaches, with fewer “contact 
zones” which allow for social and cultural exchange.629 I do not think it is too much of 
an assumption, on the part of the curatorial team at least, to say that many of those 
working at LUM would dearly love to maintain the museum space as an important 
contact zone, not just between competing experiences and narratives of the conflict but 
for Peruvians of varying social groups to meet as well. At present, it is difficult to argue 
that this has been achieved. However, it is not inconceivable that, with great attention 
paid to the museum’s educational activities, and function as an arena for both public 
engagement and research, LUM will become an important contact zone in the future. If 
it does, then it will be a highly symbolic space capable of affecting important cultural 
changes in Peruvian society.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed important forms of continuity in the history of Peru’s 
internal conflict; the consistent exercise of an authoritarian and spatially contingent 
graduated sovereignty by both democratic (Belaúnde and García) and dictatorial 
(Fujimori) regimes, and the persistence of a Fujimorista neoliberal order in Peru in the 
post conflict period. The Operación Chavín de Huántar is an important moment in this 
trajectory, as it is often seen as the apogee of Fujimorismo, temporarily reinvigorating 
the President’s approval ratings before the regime collapsed in disgrace in 2000. 
However, as can be seen in the Peruvian Army’s official account of the Operación, the 
                                                          
629 Víctor Vich, ‘The violence of the VIP box: Culture and Class in Peru’, ReVista: Harvard Review of Latin America (2014), 
[http://revista.drclas.harvard.edu/book/violence-vip-boxes, accessed 8 November 2016]. 
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forms of governance and cultural values which made the extrajudicial executions of the 
Operación possible continue to be practised and celebrated in Peruvian society today. 
Instances of state violence deployed to protect this neoliberal order, notably against 
indigenous groups contesting the liberalisation of extractive industries in the Andes and 
Amazon, are supported through a narrative of the conflict which continues to depict the 
armed forces as heroes and political dissidents as potential terrorists.  
Resistance to this narrative, and to the impunity which it enables, has grown 
considerably since the publication of the CVR’s Informe Final, and has not only 
challenged the human rights abuses perpetrated by the military but also the cultural 
frameworks which support them. In La hora azul, LUM and the Casa Yuyachkani, the 
themes of transgressing the boundaries of historical spatial structure, fostering dialogue 
and generating cultural exchange are central to the projects of reconciliation which each 
articulates. That is because each project articulates spatialised understandings of the 
conflict, recognising spatial structures not only as a component of Peru’s neoliberal 
order, but as a persistent historical feature which has undermined the consolidation of 
the Peruvian nation.  
However, the way in which these cultural projects have challenged this framework 
have been inconsistent and have many inherent limitations. One of those limitations is 
the elite nature of many commemorative and artistic projects, constructed in and from 
the perspective of the capital. Both LUM and Grupo Cultural Yuyachkani have, like 
Adrián Ormache, attempted to transgress these traditional cultural boundaries in their 
own way: by incorporating elements of Andean culture, by encouraging visits from 
diverse communities, and by taking their projects to departments outside of Lima 
themselves. Even so, the extent to which the Peruvian public en masse see memory and 
commemorative projects as a means to reconciliation and future progress is still highly 
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contestable. The very real economic gains made by sectors of the population have 
reduced incentives to challenge accounts of the past. Particularly when these gains are 
seeing as being a direct result of Peru’s neoliberal revolution, and that revolution has 
been deliberately associated with the pacification of Shining Path and the MRTA, 
appetites for revising the history of the latter are to some extent limited by the benefits 
provided by the former.  
In each chapter of this thesis I have aimed to demonstrate the ways in which 
violence, power and projects of statecraft take form over space, and at times rely heavily 
on spatial technologies to take effect. I have examined how cultural representations of 
space have supported or challenged narratives about those types of violence and power, 
and have discussed in detail how these narratives have themselves become enshrined in 
forms of space anew. Across the breadth of this thesis, there is the outline of a 
somewhat cyclical narrative in which it is argued that Peru’s internal conflict was 
produced by space, but has also reproduced hierarchies and narratives across space in 
such a way that future conflict is completely possible. 
However, there are also distinct changes which have taken place over the period of 
the conflict, and over the last five chapters, which are demonstrated by the evidence 
presented above. Whilst by no means linear or complete processes, I believe firstly that 
the evidence demonstrates that Peru’s internal conflict was a period in which state 
power was dramatically reconstituted across Peruvian geography. The use of 
Emergency Zones and spaces of exception to tackle Shining Path in the Andes in the 
early years of the conflict gradually spread across the whole country, even to Lima. The 
violence deployed by the state was aimed at taming radicalism, a harrying of the 
Peruvian interior which progressed towards the coast in order to deal with political 
dissidents from the non-violent Left and assumed enemies in Lima’s barriadas. In 
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effect, this process achieved what the Spanish conquistadores never quite managed to 
do; to conquer the Andes and consolidate the colonial connection between Lima and 
Peru’s interior.  
Furthermore, cultural responses to the conflict have reshaped the way in which 
Peruvian geography is represented in important ways. The social structures of Peruvian 
society are increasingly represented as a national weakness in response to the conflict, 
but the spatialised nature of these structures is specifically identified as a feature which 
is neither natural nor permanent, but a construction which ought to be challenged and 
transgressed. Finally, the conflict has produced a new geography of memory which will 
challenge the prominence of the Wars for Independence and War of the Pacific in 
Peru’s historical memory. 
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Conclusion 
Between late 2016 and early 2017, Peru was reinserted into the global imaginary among 
a series of political and economic developments, and crises, which seemed destined to 
shape the country’s immediate future. The election of Donald Trump to the US 
Presidency appeared to leave the TransPacific Partnership (TPP), a free trade deal 
which President Kuczynski had been a vocal supporter of, dead in the water. The 
Brazilian Petrobras corruption scandal found its way across the Amazon to implicate 
former President Alejandro Toledo. In March 2017, amid an ongoing crisis in 
sustainable water provision, additional rainfall created by El Niño propagated 
devastating landslides across the country, killing scores of people and prompting the 
national government to declare a state of emergency in hundreds of districts in Lima, 
Trujillo and along coastal and Andean regions.630 And in August of the same year, in 
the same month that Guillermo Nugent was dismissed as Director of LUM and Peruvian 
courts finally convicted military personnel for the abuses perpetrated at Los Cabitos, 
huge teachers’ strikes erupted again in Ayacucho, and in Cusco. 
These examples are a handful among many contemporary issues in Peru which are 
deeply tied to the politics and production of space. The VRAEM, for another example, 
has been under a state of emergency for over three decades (with a short respite in 2016 
after the capture of several Shining Path leaders) and is an area heavily shaped by 
narco-trafficking. Although ties between Shining Path and narcotraffickers appear to 
have deepened in recent years, accusations have also been levelled against the military 
                                                          
630 Reuters, ‘Floods and landslides kill scores in Peru’, 18 March 2017 [http://www.reuters.com/news/picture/floods-landslides-
spread-havoc-in-peru?articleId=USRTX31FTN, accessed 27 March 2017]. 
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and police of collaborating with drug cartels, fuelling depictions of the VRAEM as a 
lawless, chaotic space.631  
Although a very different type of collaboration, the Peruvian state has also openly 
supported the Camisea project, operated by Royal Dutch Shell, despite concerns that 
gas extraction in Amazonian regions has prompted forced contact with remote tribes 
and caused “recurring epidemics of acute respiratory infections and severe diarrhoea 
and regular deaths”.632 The recent extraction boom in Peru also has uncomfortable 
parallels with the rubber boom in the early twentieth century in terms of its impact on 
the local population, and both industries have demonstrated that the limits of what is 
possible in Peru, politically, economically and ethically, are heavily contingent on 
geography.633 Peru’s jungle regions continue to represent spaces where sovereign power 
is exercised by the state, either directed against Shining Path remnants or against groups 
resistant to resource extraction as seen in the baguazo in 2009.634 
Furthermore the devastating effects of landslides is deeply related to the swathes of 
self-built housing which sit at the periphery of more or less every urban center in Peru. 
Mass migration to urban areas has taken place with negligible state planning to organise 
new communities or provide infrastructure. This phenomenon is by no means restricted 
to Lima, but the capital’s fragmented political geography (with forty three districts 
governed by forty three mayors, each collecting tax individually) is highly indicative of 
how urban planning has not been fully utilised as a tool by the Peruvian state to 
intervene in broader problems. Of course, migration from the Andes to the coast also 
                                                          
631 La Mula, ‘Ejército remueve a jefes militares por denuncia de Panorama sobre corrupción en el VRAEM’, 17 July 2016 
[https://redaccion.lamula.pe/2016/07/17/ejercito-remueve-a-jefes-militares-por-denuncia-de-panorama-sobre-irregularidades-en-el-
vraem/redaccionmulera/, accessed 27 March 2017]. 
632 The Guardian, ‘Pioneer gas project in Latin America fails indigenous peoples’, 3 June 2016 
[https://www.theguardian.com/environment/andes-to-the-amazon/2016/jun/02/pioneer-gas-latin-america-indigenous-peoples, 27 
March 2017]. 
633 Issues of memory, violence and indigenous identity in the selva central were recently explored in a temporary exhibition on the 
rubber boom at LUM entitled Memorias del Caucho: Revelaciones del Bosque Humano, 30 March – 30 July 2017. Several 
workshops on indigenous art were also held throughout the period in which the exhibition was open. For an emotive representation 
of the effects of the rubber boom, see also Mario Vargas Llosa, The Dream of the Celt (London, 2010).  
634 See Bebbington, ‘The New Extraction’, p.12. 
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has a highly racialised character, and the decisions of indigenous communities to move 
to Lima are deeply rooted in the country’s historical socio-spatial structure. Over ninety 
years after it was raised by Mariátegui, the problem of the land is still alive and well in 
Peru. 
These are just a handful of examples of the contradictions of Peruvian space and 
society, many of which were exacerbated during the internal conflict and which remain 
unresolved to this day. However, while the internal armed conflict is rarely discussed 
within the context of these broader societal issues, the processes, forms of violence and 
attitudes towards state governance which I have discussed in this thesis have clear 
implications for how Peru could approach such problems in the future. Furthermore, the 
issue of space and its production are deeply linked to each of these crises which, to 
some extent, are the product of the continuation of spatialised forms of governance 
demonstrated during the conflict, and which have persisted since. In this sense, a spatial 
approach to the internal conflict in Peru is not only a useful means by which to 
understood this violent period in the country’s history, but also as a lens for 
understanding contemporary Peruvian society.  
I believe that this dissertation has contributed to the current literature, which has 
previously emphasised the importance of Shining Path ideology and ingrained cultural 
racism for explaining insurgent and state violence, by asserting the importance of 
spatialised understandings of the conflict. Not only did Shining Path articulate such 
spatialised understandings in their military strategy and cultural production, but the 
Peruvian state’s counterinsurgency operation also reflected imagined geographies which 
acted as the foundation for spatialised exercise of state power. I have also drawn on pre-
existing scholarship on sovereignty and grievability in post-conflict Peru to argue that 
these concepts can improve our understandings of the conflict itelf, explaining both the 
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spatialised manner in which violence was perpetrated and the differentiated level of 
responses which individual instances of violence have provoked. This idea is not only 
important for introducing a spatialised understanding of sovereignty and grievability 
into the literature of the internal conflict, but also for demonstrating a link between 
forms of violence, affective responses, and cultural representations. Furthermore, I have 
contributed to the existing literature on memory in Peru, by highlighting the spatialised 
nature of memory practice in Peru’s national geography and urban landscapes. Space, in 
this dissertation, is not simply the location in which memory projects are created or 
performed, but an active participant in giving meaning to (and limiting the effects of) 
such projects, a technology which has been deployed to reproduce cultural narratives 
about Peruvian society throughout the twentieth century and beyond. In this reading, 
memory cannot be limited to a handful of post-CVR projects (such as LUM or El ojo 
que llora) but exists within a landscape of competing narratives about what constitutes 
the Peruvian national; politically, spatially and racially.  
These contributions to literature are further supported by a range of significant 
findings from my research. Given that I have presented arguments about violence, 
culture and memory in relation to each case study in this thesis, I will now present the 
findings of my research as to how each of these individual elements can be viewed 
across the duration of the conflict, and in Peru today.  
 
i) Space and violence 
It would be gratuitous, perhaps grotesque, to suggest that the internal conflict represents 
only continuities from early decades in terms of the relationship between space and 
violence, and this is certainly not my aim. However, I think it is useful to think of the 
conflict as a period in which deep tensions and pervasive forms of structural violence, 
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rooted in space and landscape, came to be converted into almost two decades of 
physical violence perpetrated by state agents, insurgents, peasant communities, and the 
indigenous communities of the selva central. That so many different groups engaged in 
violence suggests, in my interpretation, that the politics of space prompted groups to 
participate in violence in a number of different ways. 
Firstly, as discussed at length, the existence of a tradition of Andean radicalism 
meant that political violence had been imagined as a valid, and successful, means 
through which to achieve social change. Despite the focus of Shining Path’s leadership 
on Maoist doctrine, the party was doubtlessly shaped by the local politics of space 
which had produced earlier insurgent movements, an influence which is present in the 
cultural production of party cadres. In it is therefore important to place Shining Path 
within a context of ongoing struggle between Andean communities and the Peruvian 
state, a struggle shaped at different times by numerous forms of subjective physical 
violence, as well as by forms of objective structural violence and cultural exclusion. In 
this way, I have found Shining Path to be a product of the spatial structure of Peruvian 
politics and society.  
The conflict also provided many peasant communities with fresh opportunities to rid 
themselves of local rivals and officials. Although studies conducted across Ayacucho, 
Cerro de Pasco and the selva central reveal similar patterns, it is difficult to generalise 
as to exactly why diverse communities reacted in the way that they did, other than to 
suggest that Shining Path were also used as a vehicle by peasant communities to act on 
long-held grievances. Similarly, indigenous groups in the selva central took the 
opportunity to conduct violence against Andean colonos who had encroached upon their 
lands for almost a century. The violence of the conflict was therefore conducted for an 
array of disparate, sometimes contradictory reasons. Because of this, broader narratives 
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about terrorism and state violence must be framed by the acknowledgment that many 
violent actors did not seek to participate in grand struggles but instead acted upon the 
politics of their own locale. This interpretation challenges previous interpretations, 
which have emphasised the Shining Path’s ideology and organisational capacity, by 
arguing that the local production of space had a far greater impact on the internal 
conflict than narratives of global revolution.  
 
It is also apparent that Emergency Zones, clandestine detention centres and systematic 
human rights abuses conducted against the civilian population all represented, and 
contributed to, the spatialisation and extreme militarisation of Peruvian society during 
the 1980s and 1990s. State violence in particular was deployed in accordance with a 
geography of the differential exercise of sovereign and governmental powers. Whilst 
this geography of sovereignty and governmentality exists in peacetime too, the 
militarisation of the conflict made the differences between how the state governed in 
Emergency Zones in the interior and elsewhere particularly stark. In this sense, where 
current literature tends to rely on the CVR’s description of ingrained cultural racism as 
an explanation for state violence, I have argued that this violence is better understood in 
the context of the production of biopolitical bodies and the differentiated exercise of 
sovereign and governmental power. Through this argument, state violence can be 
understood as a process which is intensely spatialised, and by extension also racialised.   
There are also, of course, examples of structural violence which can be understood 
in a similar way. Chapter 5 highlighted how Fujimorista policies in the 1990s, including 
economic reform and forced sterilisation, represented a continuation of state violence 
against target communities, albeit through very different means. The mining and 
resource extraction industries have brought further problems, and arguably forms of 
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structural violence, to Andean and Amazonian communities, including with the 
aforementioned Camisea project. Numerous protests erupted at the Tía María mining 
project in Arequipa between 2015-6, during which Verónika Mendoza argued that 
“where there is the greatest exploitation of natural resources there has not necessarily 
been the greatest development, and on the other hand with [mining] has come 
corruption”.635 In this sentence we can see that the forms of structural violence which 
characterised these regions, and which to a degree precipitated the internal conflict, 
have persisted to this day and are creating new social conflicts. 
There has also been further violent suppression by state forces, with two major 
examples of conflict between state forces and protesters in Bagua (2009) and the Las 
Bambas mining project in Arequipa (2016). There are direct comparisons here to be 
drawn, if not with the state’s response to Shining Path, then certainly with the 
suppression of earlier Andean resistance such as the 1969 Huanta student protests. 
Either through inability or unwillingness, the state has not resolved the tensions and 
contradictions of Peruvian space which precipitated the internal conflict. The 
suppression of anti-mining protests, far more than the murky, seemingly never-ending 
struggle to eliminate Shining Path in the VRAEM, appears as a repetition of the logic of 
state violence seen in the internal conflict, and as the continuation of a system of 
spatialised graduated sovereignty for the differential governance of populations in Peru 
to this day.  
 
ii) Space and culture 
This thesis has examined the relationship between space and culture largely by 
highlighting the existence of a cultural framework in which space and race are 
                                                          
635 Verónika Mendoza, quoted in ‘“Cateriano ha entrado con el pie en alto”’, Somos, 18 April 2015. 
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perceived to be mutually constitutive in Peru, a framework which has arguably 
informed cultural producers in the country since Independence. I have contributed to the 
existing literature by arguing that many cultural responses to the internal conflict have 
built on pre-existing racial categories and spatialised understandings of Peruvian society 
to shape their narratives and ascribe differentiated levels of grievability to different 
populations. Throughout my five case study chapters, I have highlighted how this 
framework has shaped the violence of the internal conflict alongside the concept of the 
differential distribution of grievability across populations. However, in order to assess 
the significance of the internal conflict for the relationship between culture and space in 
Peru, it is necessary to ask the following questions. To what extent has the cultural 
framework of space and race changed, or remained consistent, during and after the 
internal conflict? Also, in what ways have cultural responses to the conflict continued to 
reflect this framework, and in what ways have they aimed to challenge it? 
As is clear from many of the artefacts studied in this thesis, many cultural responses 
to the conflict have repeated similar tropes, narratives and caricatures which depict 
indigenous communities in an essentialised manner, representative of a residual ancient 
violence in Peru. Insurgent groups have often been depicted as a barbaric, unknowable 
force, whilst those responses which focus on violence perpetrated in Lima highlight the 
continued grievability of the capital’s populations, despite the knowledge that the 
majority of victims were from rural areas.  
Although there have been many representations of indigenous communities as 
victims of violence during the conflict, in many ways peasants remain one-dimensional 
figures. As highlighted in La boca del lobo, peasants act only as victims or perpetrators 
of violence, not as complex characters who are central to the narrative. The work of the 
CVR has been vital for highlighting the victimisation of peasant communities during the 
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conflict, and peasant communities have to some degree represented themselves as 
victims in order to avoid accusations of being associated with Shining Path (and perhaps 
also to attract reparations). However, I would argue that this relatively new 
understanding of indigenous populations as victims has not produced a corresponding 
change in the perceived grievability of these populations. That is because the category 
of indigenous victim has been understood in a highly simplified manner, in a way which 
occludes the complex political choices and forms of mobilisation which peasants 
participated in before, during and after the conflict. 
Furthermore, indigenous victimhood has been understood alongside other assumed 
characteristics which have traditionally constructed indigenous communities as relics of 
Peru’s ancient past: poverty, helplessness, illiteracy etc. Whilst it is true that poverty, 
illiteracy and vulnerability to disease and death do persist in many regions in Peru’s 
interior, and are highlighted as having a strong correlation with the likelihood of being a 
victim of violence by the CVR, the cultural conflation between the two fails to 
recognise, or wilfully ignores, the numerous forms of peasant mobilisation past and 
present, or the many attempts of peasant communities to take control of their own 
destinies. In short, rather than being simply represented as brutal Indian savages, Peru’s 
indigenous communities are represented as poor, helpless Indians in need of saving 
from other Indian savages. Whilst this dichotomous construction of indigeneity is not 
entirely new, the internal conflict has allowed for a whole array of cultural responses in 
which these portrayals are prevalent. So, while the imagined cultural geography of Peru 
is slightly different, this change is not entirely helpful as it continues to rely on 
essentialising assumptions about race, nature and poverty. As such, indigenous 
populations remain non-grievable, as their position of victim corresponds to persistent 
racial hierarchies which are represented still in the country’s physical and cultural 
geography.  
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In this context, it is also useful to consider how violence in the selva during the 
conflict has been represented. As Greene has highlighted, indigeneity in Peru has 
historically been associated with Andean peasant communities, with the effect that 
indigenous communities of Amazonian regions have either been treated as native tribes, 
or assumed not to exist at all.636 To some extent, the violence conducted against the 
Asháninka has drawn greater attention to communities in the jungle, and there have 
been a range of post-conflict developmental initiatives created by Presidents Paniagua 
and Toledo which have attempted to address the Amazonian region.637 Nonetheless, 
cultural representations of the conflict continue to focus on Andean peasants as 
principal victims of the conflict, and whilst there have been certainly attempts to 
challenge this through memory practice (particularly by LUM, the Museo de la 
Memoria and Yuyachkani) the selva central continues to be represented in only a 
peripheral manner in geographical constructions of the conflict. Whilst there is plenty of 
evidence from this period in Peru’s history (for example, from the mobilisation of the 
rondas nativas and Ejército Asháninka) to challenge existing ideas about indigeneity 
and geography, cultural representations of the conflict are yet to reflect the complexity 
and reality of the period in a way which would substantially alter understandings of the 
nation’s cultural geography. 
That being said, there have been significant contributions from cultural producers 
such as Alonso Cueto, Yuyachkani and Fabrizio Aguilar. Throughout my research I 
have found that these cultural responses do not simply replicate the conclusions of the 
CVR, but use spatialised understandings of the internal conflict and contemporary 
Peruvian society to represent Peru’s cultural geography as a barrier to the process of 
reconciliation and to the consolidation of the Peruvian nation. Each of these artists has 
                                                          
636 Greene, ‘Getting Over the Andes’, p.337. 
637 Ibid., p.349. 
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deliberately represented geographical barriers and boundaries in their works, which are 
also then transgressed in order to facilitate greater cultural exchange and understanding 
between communities. These works highlight that cultural producers are not blind to the 
issues of geography and race in Peru. It also suggests that, combined with the work of 
the CVR, cultural responses to violence have the ability to encourage further 
transgression of these boundaries. As discussed below, forms of memory practice also 
have a crucial role to play in challenging these structures of culture, race and space 
which continue to exist in Peru. 
 
iii) Space and memory 
As has been outlined earlier, the internal conflict in Peru has prompted a range of new 
memory practices in response, from memory museums and memorials to forms of 
performance and commemorative ceremonies. Beyond these sites, the conflict has also 
been inscribed into the landscape in a number of ways, leaving ruins and displacing 
communities so that the geography of Peru is quite literally not what it was before. 
However, memory is associated not just with specific events, but also with ideas about a 
nation’s history and its future. In this sense, while many of these practices are new, they 
take place within the context of a wider geography of memory which, I have found, still 
heavily favours a patriarchal and militaristic image of the Peruvian nation. This 
geography of memory has not remained static, nor has it progressed in a linear fashion. 
Instead, it has been continually reconstructed through a number of direct interventions 
(eg. against the MHVRE, El ojo que llora, and LUM) and cultural factors (lack of 
funding for projects, lack of engagement, the ongoing exclusion of Senderista 
memories) which demonstrate both the state’s desire to limit interpretations of the past 
and a wider societal reluctance to engage with memories of the internal conflict. 
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Because of this, I believe that my contributions of the concept of the city-text to the 
existing literature on post-conflict memory in Peru is highly valuable for demonstrating 
the limits placed on contemporary memory projects. 
Perhaps the most suiting example to discuss in this context is LUM (analysed in 
detail in the last chapter) which embodies a number of contradictions and tensions in 
terms of its relationship to space. The creation of LUM is undoubtedly part of an 
attempt to institutionalise a particular narrative of violence in Peru and to create a site 
which will not only function as a museum, but as a national monument to the conflict. 
In this sense there is certainly a centralising tendency involved in the museum project, 
but this has emerged as a distinct response to the CVR’s assertion that the violence of 
Andean and Amazonian Peru was not felt by residents of the capital. Much of this thesis 
has highlighted how experiences of violence in the interior and in Lima were distinctly 
different during the conflict; the work of LUM in this light is to bring limeños into 
contact with histories of violence to which they were previously ignorant. Furthermore, 
not only is this element of the project understood by the museographers and academics 
involved with LUM, but appears to be accepted by communities who experienced 
violence themselves. Before LUM’s inauguration, one survivor of violence stated that: 
“It would be illogical if we didn’t have a major national initiative, 
because to say that these things happened only in Apurímac or in 
Ayacucho, or only in the departments which suffered the most, would 
be wrong”.638   
In this sense, memories of the conflict exhibited in LUM create the possibility of the 
symbolic incorporation of indigenous communities into the nation. That experiences of 
                                                          
638 Instituto de Democracía y Derechos Humanos. Criterios Básicos para un Espacio de Conmemoración de la Violencia en el Perú: 
La centralidad de los derechos de las víctimas (Lima, 2012), p.27. 
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violence from Andean and Amazonian regions, much of it perpetrated by state agents, is 
now on display in something like a national monument is, on symbolic level, a huge 
step in terms of how indigenous communities are considered as participants in the 
modern Peruvian nation. 
Undoubtedly, however, there are important symbolic limitations to the project (in 
addition to the political limitations imposed upon LUM by interventions from the 
Culture Ministry). Whilst it is certainly possible that the forms of positive cultural 
exchange promoted by Alonso Cueto and Yuyachkani as possible remedies to Peru’s 
racial hierarchies could take place within LUM, they would not do so within a vacuum 
but within a space which is designed by and for the communities of the capital. There is 
a risk that the sharing of testimonies and cultural practices will continue to take place 
within a hierarchical relationship between coastal residents on the one hand and Andean 
and Amazonian communities on the other. Whilst certainly there are some grounds for 
optimism about the museum, it is also important to recognise that the spatial context in 
which it is located, as discussed earlier, is to some degree inescapable, and places limits 
on the extent to which it can lay the foundations for radical change. 
To take the museum solely on face value, to read it as a text, is to see its many 
limitations. However, it ought to be remembered that even today the museum’s work 
takes place within a political context which is still highly restrictive and in which one 
could potentially press criminal charges for acts considered to be terrorist apologism. 
Furthermore, for it to be possible for LUM to achieve a kind of symbolic integration of 
indigenous communities, there would need to be a continuously high level of public 
engagement with the site, its content and the events which are held there. As highlighted 
previously, there is certainly a feeling among sectors of society that it is unhelpful to 
dwell on the past, a feeling which appears to some extent to be enhanced by the 
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country’s recent economic fortunes. For these reasons, rather than seeing LUM as a 
panacea to racial hierarchies, or as a project which will radically subvert the existing 
geography of memory which exists in Lima today, I believe that it is enough at this 
point to hope that the museum acts as a starting point from which, as happened with the 
CVR, further physical and cultural spaces are opened up for the reassessment of Peru’s 
past which encourage communal and performative forms of memory, and which eschew 
prescriptions of what can and ought to be remembered. 
 
Final remarks 
The aim of this thesis has been to demonstrate that a spatial reading of Peru’s internal 
armed conflict can contribute numerous new perspectives on this period of the country’s 
history, as well as fresh ideas through which to interpret Peruvian society past and 
present. Whilst building on previous research which I consider to be implicitly spatial, 
or to have applied a spatial analysis to Peru in different contexts, I have aimed to 
provide a more rigorously spatial framework to the issues present in the historiography 
of the internal conflict, whilst also dealing closely with the key themes of violence, 
culture and memory. This has been a highly productive line of analysis which, I believe, 
has challenged some narratives of the conflict, supported others, and contributed new 
knowledge to an already diverse historiographical field.  
As is also hopefully clear, however, this project is by no means designed as a 
conclusive approach to space and Peru’s internal conflict, and the research undertaken 
here has produced many new lines of enquiry for applying a spatial analysis to Peruvian 
history and society in the future. Beyond the memory museums, public streets and 
plazas des armas, there is a world of spaces, places and contact zones not studied here 
in which ethnic categories, class hierarchies and cultural values are performed and 
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reconstituted on a daily basis. Busy marketplaces, crowded buses, public beaches, 
football pitches, cafes and churches are all important spaces which can reveal a myriad 
things about Peruvian society. 
Yet the focus of this thesis has been to apply a spatial analysis to the history of the 
internal conflict, precisely because of the CVR’s assertion that so many Peruvians did 
not notice the widespread victimisation of their compatriots, or simply did not care. This 
is a phenomenon which many have grappled with and which, in the current literature, is 
framed within discussions of ingrained cultural racism, yet how exactly this shaped the 
processes of the conflict has remained quite vague. By highlighting how the internal 
conflict was shaped by space, how violence was produced by and productive of cultural 
ideas, and how constructions of space are central to many memory projects, I hope to 
have demonstrated how these social and cultural distances work in practice in Peru, and 
to have highlighted possibilities as to how a more transformative process of truth and 
reconciliation might take place. 
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Appendix 1: Full list of interviewees 
Ayala, Roberto. Lima, April 2016.  
Alarcón, Yuber. Huamnga, April 2016. 
Bernedo, Karen. Lima, February 2016. 
Buntinx, Gustavo. Lima, Aprill 2016. 
Burga, Juan Carlos. Lima, March 2016. 
Cueto, Alonso. Lima, Nov 2015. 
del Pino, Ponciano. Lima, April 2016. 
García, Adelina. Huamanga, March 2016. 
Gálvez, Héctor. Lima, February 2016. 
Gavilán, Lurgio. Huamanga, April 2016. 
Hibbett, Alexandra. Lima, March 2016. 
Iguíñiz, Natalia. Lima, January 2016.  
Lerner, Salomón, Lima, March 2016.  
López, Felipe. Huamanga, April 2016. 
Meza, Américo. Huancayo, March 2016. 
Miranda, Jaime. Lima, March 2016. 
Montalbetti, Mario. Lima, February 2016.  
Otta, Eliana. Lima, February 2016. 
Panfichi, Aldo. Lima, March 2016. 
Pereyra, Nelson. Huamanga, March 2016.  
Rubio, Miguel. Lima, April 2016. 
Vich, Víctor. Lima, February 2016. 
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